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Intelligent failure occurs when an entrepreneurial initiative falls short of its 
anticipated performance. It provides valuable new knowledge to the 
organisation and is recognised as an important factor in long-term corporate 
entrepreneurial success.  
This thesis is located within the domain of corporate entrepreneurship and 
entrepreneurial failure, and explores the various processes of intelligent 
failure. The specific aim of this thesis is to learn how organisations manage 
intelligent failure.  
Research takes an inductive approach with the predominant use of a 
qualitative methodology and, as part of a multiple case study strategy, 
research is carried out in six organisations operating in differing sectors within 
the UK.  
Findings indicate that the organisations often fail to manage intelligent failure. 
There is little evidence of a strategic approach to learning from failure and, 
where learning occurs, it is predominantly unstructured. This is significant 
because literature consistently argues that a structured process is required to 
manage learning from failure successfully. This research recognises that 
structured processes may be more effective than unstructured processes 
when looked at in isolation. However, this thesis argues that unstructured 
mechanisms do have inherent value.  
Therefore, when organisations develop failure management processes, a dual 
path may be considered, which might extract value from both systems as is 
contextually appropriate. This may enable organisations to maximise their 
ability to learn from failure. 
This thesis adds to existing management theory in the corporate 
entrepreneurship domain. In specifically focusing on the structured and 
unstructured forms within the process of intelligent failure, this thesis 
addresses a gap in current literature. It also adds to existing literature that 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
 
Research suggests that failure rates of entrepreneurial initiatives are 
significant ranging from 35% to 45% (Boulding et al., 1997, Griffin, 1997, 
Corbett et al., 2007). In a four year study of Nokia from 1998 to 2002, McGrath 
et al (2006) discovered that 70% of corporate investments were discontinued 
or divested. In considering the volume of failures, it is argued that the lessons 
from such failure episodes, as an organisational resource, are far too 
expensive to waste (Corbett et al., 2007). “Managers are often curious about 
what other companies have done and how their ventures have performed, but 
overlook the most relevant learning of all – the learning that can be extracted 
from their own venture experience. Such experience has been achieved at 
great expense to the organisation, and to ignore or discard it is to squander an 
irreplaceable asset” (Block and MacMillan, 1993 p.312). Mistakes are the 
inevitable consequence of innovation and should be viewed as valuable 
(Birkinshaw and Haas, 2016). When operating in uncertainty, it is expected 
that much of the time individuals will be wrong and this is fundamental to the 
process and completely acceptable (Furr and Dyer, 2014). Indeed, lessons 
from failure are viewed as an essential component of success. IBM’s Tom 
Hunter argues, “if you want to succeed, double your failure rate” and he is 
supported by the mantra of IDEO, “fail often to succeed sooner” (Lafley and 
Charan, 2008). Learning from failure is the hallmark of a truly innovative 
organisation which recognises failure as a necessary by-product of 
experimentation and therefore promotes experimentation to increase learning 
(Cannon and Edmondson, 2005). 
Yet despite this recognition of the importance of learning from failure, it would 
appear to be more common in management exhortation than in practice 
(Cannon and Edmondson, 2001). “The idea that people and organisations in 
which they work should learn from failure has considerable popular support – 
even seems obvious – yet organisations that systematically learn from failure 
are rare” (Cannon and Edmondson, 2005 p.299). Research suggests that 
organisations are generally unable to manage failure, finding it difficult to 
create a systematic process to analyse failures and document the lessons 
learned (Manimala et al., 2006). Whether large or small, most organisations 
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are poor at managing entrepreneurial failures in a way that maximises the 
value of lessons learned. Even organisations which invest significant money, 
time and effort into becoming ‘learning organisations’ struggle to engage on a 
daily basis with the appropriate mindset and processes of learning from failure 
(Cannon and Edmondson, 2005). In consideration of the phenomenon of 
learning from entrepreneurial failure, this thesis centres on the final stage of 
the entrepreneurial process, the after action review and, specifically, when the 
outcome is one of failure: ‘intelligent failure’. 
 
1.1 Failure and intelligent failure 
 
Research offers differing perspectives on the nature of entrepreneurial failure. 
Shepherd et al (2009) suggest that entrepreneurial failure occurs when a 
project is terminated on the basis that it becomes apparent its performance is 
unacceptably low (as operationally defined by the main resource providers of 
the project). However, to understand the concept of entrepreneurial failure 
further, Cannon and Edmondson (2005) put forward a definition suggesting 
that it is “the deviation from expected and desired results”. They argue for this 
broader definition that includes avoidable and unavoidable negative outcomes, 
whether the failures are large or small and whether they are technical or 
interpersonal in nature. The proposition is that there are opportunities for 
learning in both minor and major mishaps. In a similar view, McGrath (1999) 
argues that intelligent failure occurs when an entrepreneurial initiative is 
terminated because it has, or is likely to, fall short of its anticipated 
performance. Often this is due to circumstances which are out of the control of 
those involved (McGrath and MacMillan, 2000). Edmondson (2011) suggests 
that failures fall into three broad categories; a) preventable in predictable 
operations, which is due to deviation from prescribed processes or practices 
(bad failure); b) unavoidable in complex systems due to the inherent 
uncertainty of operations and exogenous factors; and c) intelligent as they 
provide valuable new knowledge for the organisation (good failure). She 
argues that exceptional organisations purposively generate intelligent failure 
for the specific purpose of learning and innovating. 
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Lafley and Charan (2008) argue that “there is such a thing as a smart failure, 
or a failure that works” (p. 203). Perhaps this was built on the views of  Williams 
(1998) who described ‘smart mistakes’ as being “made within the confines of 
a high quality decision process or for the purpose of expanding the 
organisation’s decision set” (p. 72). In essence, smart mistakes increase 
organisational knowledge enabling the creation of new capabilities (Danneels, 
2008). In a similar vein, Kriegesmann et al (2005) consider ‘creative errors’ 
(that occur due to bad luck, coincidence or residual risk, ‘system errors’, and 
environmental dynamics or changing circumstance) as representing 
‘successful failure’. They argue that the creative errors represent “an 
innovative initiative that is conducted with calculated risk” (p.59). This is 
separate from deliberate errors, failure concealment, carelessness, 
overestimating own ability, omissions, repeat errors, or a mismatch between 
capabilities and responsibilities. However, Sitkin (1992) argues that “not all 
failures are equally adept at facilitating learning” (p.554). He suggests that 
those failures that are most effective at fostering learning are, what he terms, 
“intelligent failures” and they have five characteristics; 
 They are the result of well-designed, planned and executed actions. 
 They have uncertain outcomes (in order to provide new information to learn 
from). 
 They are of modest scale (a balance between being large enough to attract 
attention and small enough to avoid negative reaction). 
 They form part of speedy action cycles whereby action and feedback happens 
fast enough so that information can be generated quickly for evaluation. 
 They take place in domains that are familiar enough to permit effective 
learning. 
The strategical resonance of this determination of entrepreneurial failure in this 
seminal article is generally adopted and often referred to by researchers in this 
domain.  However, Masden and Desai (2010) put forward an alternative 
argument suggesting that learning may not derive from such small failures as, 
due to their size, they may be redefined a successes, or they may be ignored 
due to the self-enhancing nature of individuals and the organisation. 
15 
 
Additionally, it may be difficult to extract meaningful knowledge from smaller 
failures. They argue that organisations learn more from large failures due to 
their size and visibility. 
There is a clear difference between projects that fail because of bad luck and 
those that fail from incorrect decision making (McGrath and MacMillan, 2000). 
Indeed, Marrisa Mayer, CEO of Yahoo, when speaking at an ERC Research 
Conference is quoted as saying “Don’t worry so much about being right – worry 
about being wrong intelligently” (Ucbasaran, 2013). This thesis addresses this 
strategic interpretation of failure centring on the concept of ‘intelligent failure’. 
 
1.2 The benefits of intelligent failure 
 
McGrath (1999) suggests that there is “a tendency in literature to view failure 
negatively and this causes a pervasive bias in entrepreneurship theory and 
research” (p.13). Indeed, she argues for the theoretical focus in 
entrepreneurship to have a more integrated approach between achieving 
success and avoiding failure, as failure represents an important experiential 
outcome where learning can take place (Shepherd et al., 2011), and which can 
prove to be fundamental to both the entrepreneur and the organisation (Cope, 
2011). “A company, a team, a leader, or an individual who can accept and 
learn from failure is going to be more creative – and happier – than an 
equivocator who avoids risk lest something go wrong because something will 
always go wrong” (Lafley and Charan, 2008 p. 207). Indeed, this is supported 
by the Gu et al (2013), whose study of 151 R&D teams in Chinese high-tech 
companies demonstrates a statistical link between learning from failure, 
creativity and organisational development. Results shows a reliable and strong 
correlation between ‘team learning from mistakes’ and ‘team innovation’. “Our 
results confirmed that LFM (learning from mistakes), a particular form of 
learning, is especially important for R&D teams to maintain creativity and 
continuously improve products and services” (p.98). 
Sitkin (1992) suggests that intelligent failure has the potential to deliver a 
number of significant benefits to the organisation. He argues that intelligent 
failure can draw attention to potential problems that both stimulate potential 
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solutions and challenges the status quo. It can represent a clear sign that 
enables the recognition and analysis of otherwise ambiguous outcomes. It may 
also stimulate search processes, and provide the motivation to adapt, to 
consider new alternatives, produce a learning readiness to the organisation, 
and it increases the level of risk tolerance within an organisation. Additionally, 
it can heighten innovation, which has the positive effect of increasing the 
versatility in organisational response through a mixture of organisational 
strategies, processes and outcomes. Indeed, the more varied the internal 
capabilities of the organisation (in terms of systems, routines, and personnel) 
the more adaptable the organisation will be when confronting unforeseen 
difficulties. He also asserts that it may provide the opportunity for the individual 
and organisation to learn from experimentation. Significantly, he argues that 
the benefits are more long term compared to the more short-term benefits gain 
associated with success. 
Additionally, literature suggests that learning from failure can: 
 Be an early warning sign, which can be instrumental in avoiding potential 
large failures. In proactively highlighting problems quickly there is a 
reduced likelihood that these problems will multiply, grow or be 
incorporated in the wider organisational system (Cannon and Edmondson, 
2005). 
 
 Lead to increased resiliency, a sense of self-efficacy and be a motivator 
(Cardon et al., 2011). Failure motivates action to bridge the gap between 
aims and outcomes in order to achieve the desired aims (ibid). 
 
 Improve organisational reliability, service quality, adaptability, 
innovativeness, productivity and a reduced risk of failure (Carmeli and 
Gittell, 2009). 
 
 Highlight gaps in organisational knowledge and can often show where the 
gap resides. Failure therefore, may increase individual’s willingness to look 
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for new knowledge and may provide a map of where to look (Madsen and 
Desai, 2010). 
 
 Enhance the organisational ability to change and adapt, and be more 
responsive to its environment   (Carmeli and Sheaffer, 2008). 
 
 Derive more learning than learning from successful outcomes and, 
significantly, the lessons are forgotten much more slowly (Madsen and 
Desai, 2010). 
 
 Experience higher levels of performance within R & D teams. Organisations 
that carry out an increased level of experimentation with the intention of 
creating an opportunity to learn, experience a higher level of performance 
(Cannon and Edmondson, 2005). 
 
Within the innovation process, learning from failure is argued as being an 
important component of the new product learning cycle (Maidique and Zirger, 
1985). Whether ‘learning by using’ within the market context, or ‘learning by 
doing’ within the context of the internal production processes of manufacturing 
or marketing, learning from failure in these spaces result in new development 
of concepts, technologies and market approaches. Product failure informs the 
organisation as to what new effort might be successful in the future, providing 
the “ultimate market study” (ibid, p.306). Organisational failure offers an ability 
to identify weak links and install systems to prevent failure reoccurrence. 
Further, Maidique and Zirger (1985) put forward a model of new product 
success and failure that suggest that there is a flow from success to failure and 
back to success again. This recurrent cycle can come in the form of a number 
of successes followed by changes in product design, the market, technology, 
or organisation change, which can lead to a number of new product failures 
before new learning delivers successful products. Failure is an intrinsic part of 
the learning process that ultimately leads to success. “In the simplest terms, 




The benefits of learning from failure are significant and substantial. Yet despite 
the general recognition by organisations of the importance of learning from 
failure, the numerous benefits remain elusive to most organisations as the 
process of learning from failure is difficult (Carmeli and Gittell, 2009). It is in 
consideration of the difficulty that organisations experience in trying to manage 
the process of learning from failure that this thesis centres its attention. 
 
1.3 Aims of the research 
 
This thesis explores the domain of corporate entrepreneurship and 
entrepreneurial failure within the field of entrepreneurship, specifically 
addressing the key constructs relating to the process of intelligent failure. 
Recognising the significance of entrepreneurial failure in the field of 
entrepreneurship, and recognising how organisations find the process of 
learning from failure difficult, this thesis explores the learning from failure 
domain. It explores: 
 
 The processes that organisations use to learn from failure. 
 
 The importance of a process for managing intelligent failure to the 
organisation. 
 
 How failures are recognised and how they are analysed 
 
 How individuals and organisations learn from failure. 
 
 How lessons learned are disseminated across the organisation. 
 
 The nature of the outcomes of the process of learning from failure. 
 




 Why organisations do not learn from failure. 
 
In exploring these areas of interest, this research aims to answer the 
fundamental and overriding research question of this thesis: 
How do organisations manage the process of intelligent failure? 
 
1.4 Intended contribution to theory 
 
By exploring the domain of entrepreneurial failure, this thesis will add to 
existent literature on learning from failure, which is a domain that lacks 
significant exploration within the field of entrepreneurship (Baumard and 
Starbuck, 2005). In specifically centring on the process of intelligent failure and 
on the learning processes of failure episodes, this thesis addresses a gap in 
current literature (Cope, 2011). 
Principally, the thesis will add to literature addressing three areas of interest: 
1. The value of formal mechanisms in the process of learning from failure 
and their significance, Senge 1990, Wilkinson and Mellahi (2005), (Liker 
2005), Ellis et al (2006), and Platzek et al (2014). 
   
2. The value of informal mechanisms in the learning from failure process 
and their significance by centring on each stage individually: 
 
 Recognising failure, Cannon and Edmondson (2005), Reason 
(1990), Liker (2005), Barkai and Harrison (2012), Syed (2015) 
Limoncelli et al (2016). 
 
 Analysing and conceptualising failure, McGrath and MacMillan 
(2000), Lafley and Charan (2008), Kuratko et al (2011), Gino and 




 Communication lessons learned, McGrath and MacMillan (2000), 
Lafley and Charan (2008), Kuratko et al (2011), Gino and Pisano 
(2011), and Birkinshaw and Haas (2016). 
 
3. By exploring formal and informal mechanisms of learning from failure 
as individual constructs, and as a combined construct, this thesis 
intends to add to important literature relating to the process of intelligent 
failure, Sitkin (1992) Cannon and Edmondson (2001, 2005), Baumard 
and Starbuck (2005), Ellis et al (2006), Madsen and Desai (2010), and 
Muehlfeld et al (2012). 
 
Separately, this thesis will also add to literature on the practical management 
of the learning from failure process, and how organisations may improve their 
ability to convert failure into individual and organisational knowledge. 
 
1.5 Thesis structure 
 
The thesis consists of six chapters. Following the introduction (Chapter 1), a 
literature review (Chapter 2) explores literature in the entrepreneurship domain 
and the sub domain of corporate entrepreneurship, and specifically the area of 
organisational entrepreneurial failure. With the aim of creating a conceptual 
framework that might illuminate the process of managing intelligent failure, the 
review investigates the nature of corporate entrepreneurship and the 
entrepreneurial process. It considers entrepreneurial capability and learning 
from failure. Specifically, the chapter explores the cognitive and organisational 
processes that influence or are influenced by the learning from failure process. 
In Chapter 3, the research methodology is addressed and the discussion 
centres on the philosophical approach, focusing on the research philosophy, 
ontology, and epistemology. Justification for a multiple case study strategy 
using mixed methods is put forward, before illuminating the details of the 
project design. Chapter 4 details the findings from the empirical research and 
is structured to reflect the conceptual framework, centring on the 
organisational entrepreneur, the entrepreneurial environment, and the process 
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of learning from failure. In the discussion (Chapter 5), the empirical evidence 
and the important theoretical constructs from entrepreneurial failure literature 
are examined. The chapter explores the significance of structured and 
unstructured processes of learning from failure, managing negative emotions, 
and managing an environment that supports learning from failure. Chapter 6, 
the conclusion, summarises the thesis and the outcomes before highlighting 
the contributions the thesis makes to theory and practice, also putting forward 

























The purpose of this chapter is to review existing literature with the aim of 
gaining an understanding as to how organisations learn from failure. Exploring 
literature, this review investigates the nature of corporate entrepreneurship 
and the entrepreneurial process. The chapter is divided into three main 
sections, Corporate Entrepreneurship, Intelligent Failure, and a Conceptual 
Framework. Within the section on Corporate Entrepreneurship, and as a 
means to provide a theoretical base on which the thesis may rest, the review 
starts by focusing on Corporate Entrepreneurship and the overarching theory 
of entrepreneurship and important constructs thereof. The review then seeks 
to understand the setting for entrepreneurial failures, focusing on the 
characteristics of the corporate entrepreneur and the characteristics of an 
entrepreneurial environment that significantly influence the level of 
entrepreneurial capability within the organisation.  
By exploring the entrepreneurial capability, the nature of an entrepreneurial 
organisation is developed and offers an understanding of the setting of 
intelligent failure episodes, which allows a full exploration of the learning from 
failure domain. The review explores the cognitive and organisational 
processes that influence or are influenced by the learning from failure process, 
and how they may be managed. Finally, the review offers a conceptual model 
that draws together the central constructs to provide a holistic perspective of 
how organisations can manage intelligent failure, and affect the 
entrepreneurial capability of the organisation. In the first instance, this section 
establishes the strategy process for the review of literature. 
 
2.1.1 Literature review strategy 
 
At the outset, the review of literature explores the entrepreneurship domain in 
its wider context before centring on the corporate entrepreneurship construct 
and then, specifically, on the theory surrounding the failure of entrepreneurial 
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ventures (intelligent failure) within organisations and start-ups. From this initial 
exploration into literature, enquiry starts to centre on the way organisations 
manage entrepreneurial failure. In seeking to explore this area, the review then 
focuses on theory relating to the entrepreneurial organisation and learning 
from failure. As a consequence of this approach, a theoretical framework 
emerges around these constructs (as illustrated in Figure 2.1). This framework 
was used to explore potential answers to the research question of this thesis: 
“How do organisations manage intelligent failure?” 
 
 
Figure 2.1. A Theoretical Framework of the Literature Review 
 
In carrying out the initial review of theory in the entrepreneurship domain, and 
then the subsequent constructs within the theoretical framework, searches 
were carried out in the Business Source Complete database hosted by 
EBSCO. All searches focused on ‘scholarly’ (peer reviewed) journals. In the 
initial search within the entrepreneurship domain, the ‘wildcard’ character was 
used with the search word ‘Entrepreneur’ to include the various possible word 
endings and produce a wider set of results. Searches using key words 
‘Entrepreneurial Environment’, ‘Corporate Entrepreneur’, and ‘Learning from 
failure’ illuminated significant current literature that was used as a means to 
start a ‘snowballing’ process of literature review. This enabled an exploratory 
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approach whereby reading current articles and reviewing references 
highlighted important and/or relevant papers (and books) from within the 
respective domains. In following this approach, the search continued 
identifying additional articles until no more relevant articles could be found and 
it was considered that the necessary depth and breadth of literature had been 
sourced. In a similar fashion, snowballing searches were carried out from a 
small number of article and book references offered by professors with 
expertise in this research area. 
 
2.2 Corporate entrepreneurship 
 
Corporate entrepreneurship centres on the phenomenon of entrepreneurship 
within the context of established business (Nielsen et al., 2012). With the aim 
of gaining a definition of corporate entrepreneurship, and as a back drop to the 
exploration of the domain, this review of literature starts by centring on wider 
theory central to the entrepreneurship domain which seeks to define its 
meaning.  
The significance of the opportunity to the field of entrepreneurship is 
assertively argued - whether it is sought through innovation (Schumpeter, 
1934) or perception and exploitation (Kirzner, 1979). Literature repeatedly 
suggests a strong relationship between the opportunity and the entrepreneur 
(Knight, 2012 (1921), Timmons and Spinelli, 2004, Shane, 2012), and there is 
much debate regarding resources, (Casson, 2003 (1982), Say et al., 1843, 
Penrose, 2011 (1959), Ireland et al., 2003).  
Pulling together recognised central arguments within literature on the definition 
of entrepreneurship, it may be useful to consider the definition of 
entrepreneurship by Venkataraman and Shane (2000), offered in their seminal 
paper (“The promise of entrepreneurship as a field of research”): 
“We define the field of entrepreneurship as the scholarly examination of how, 
by whom, and with what effects opportunities to create future goods and 
services are discovered, evaluated, and exploited. Consequently, the field 
involves the study of sources of opportunities; the processes of discovery, 
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evaluation, and exploitation of opportunities; and the set of individuals who 
discover, evaluate and exploit them.” 
Whilst it may be argued that this definition may be the closest literature can 
provide us in terms of a unified understanding of entrepreneurship, it does not 
offer a definitive understanding that is fully accepted. Whilst academics may 
know what it is, can see it occurring and can see its affects, they are unable to 
define conclusively what entrepreneurship is. It may be argued that academics 
may have to settle for a collage of perspectives that shape our understanding 
of the nature of entrepreneurship and its core concepts. Whilst this situation 
may not be ideal, literature suggests somewhat reassuringly that even when 
very established fields of research have difficulties in defining central concepts, 
researchers have learnt to live and prosper within the respective field (Gartner 
et al., 1992). 
Stevenson and Jarillo (1990) argue for a need “to establish clear links between 
the fields of entrepreneurship and corporate management, if the large body of 
research in the former is to benefit the latter” (p.17). They argue that focusing 
on economic functions as being ‘entrepreneurial’, or that the construct of an 
entrepreneur is based upon particular personality traits, does not provide a 
useful basis for understanding entrepreneurship. They argue that the 
perception of opportunities differ among individuals and among individuals 
over time, because individuals have different desires, and they perceive 
themselves with different capabilities. In other words, the level of 
entrepreneurship varies during the life of an individual, or across the activities 
of an individual at any specific moment in time. It is this behavioural, situational 
definition, which fits with common definitions of entrepreneurship. In this way, 
by focusing on understanding the ‘entrepreneurial process’ (by focusing on 
entrepreneurial behaviour), it is possible to utilise previous research on 
entrepreneurship to consolidate the field of corporate entrepreneurship. They 
argue that, “entrepreneurship is a process by which individuals – either on their 
own or inside organizations – pursue opportunities without regard to the 
resources they currently control” (p.23). The pursuit of opportunities 
constitutes the core of entrepreneurship, inclusive of individuals within a start-
up context or a corporate context. They assert that the definition offers a link 
between the fields of entrepreneurship and corporate entrepreneurship.  
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Kuratko et al (2011) argue that the definition of corporate entrepreneurship, 
also termed “intrapreneurship”, “corporate venturing”, and “organisational 
entrepreneurship”, has been evolving for over 30 years. Early on in the 
development of this domain of literature Burgelman (1983) argues that 
corporate entrepreneurship is a process whereby firms diversify through the 
internal development of resource combinations (in a manner suggested by 
Schumpeter (1934)), extending the firms activities to new areas of opportunity. 
Put another way,  it is the creation of new businesses within existing 
organisations which occurs through innovation (Guth and Ginsberg, 1990) 
whether it be product or process (Zahra, 1991). Indeed, “innovation is a key 
ingredient of corporate entrepreneurship where one can take an idea or 
invention and create something new of value” (Finkle, 2012). 
Since innovation is a core entrepreneurial activity (Phan et al., 2009), 
innovation literature adds to the discussion on corporate entrepreneurship. Of 
particular relevance is the ‘Stage-Gate’ process for new products identified in 
innovation literature, where a stage-gate process offers a conceptual and 
operational map showing the journey of a new product from idea to launch 
(Cooper, 2000). The Product Development & Management Association 
(PDMA) suggest that 68% of U.S product developers use a stage-gate process 
(Griffin, 1997) and indeed a formal process of New Product Development 
(NPD) is now the norm (the number of U.S product developers using a stage-
gate process became 78%  in 2003), (Barczak et al., 2009). Perhaps 
significantly only 40 % of service firms use the stage gate process (40% of 
firms use informal process for NPD, 20% use no NPD process). 
Cooper (2000) puts forward a stage-gate system which he argues is made of 
six stages and five ‘gates’, or decision points, before the finality of a post 
launch review. He presents the construct in a simplified manner to illustrate 
the nature of the process: 
 Discovery stage followed by gate 1: idea screening 
 Stage 1: preliminary investigation, followed by gate 2: the second screening 
 Stage 2: detailed investigation, followed by gate 3: the decision to develop 
 Stage 3: development, before gate 4: decision to test 
 Stage 4: testing & validation, followed by gate 5: decision to launch 
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 Stage 5: launch which is then followed by a post launch review. 
Perhaps summarising the NPD process Trott (2008) offers a generic linear 8 
stage NPD model that he argues represents the majority of text books on this 
subject: 
Idea generation – Idea screening – Concept testing – Business analysis – 
Product development – Test marketing – Commercialisation – Monitoring and 
evaluation. 
Building on this generic model Lean Startup theory (Reis, 2011) argues that 
entrepreneurship is a process of constant and iterative experimentation at the 
lowest level of cost possible. This is achieved through the development of 
‘minimal viable products’ that enable testing but are achieved through a 
minimum of effort and development time (as opposed to fully developed 
products). Through testing assumptions (termed as ‘leaps of faith’) directly with 
consumers, early and affordable learning is gained as a means to move the 
initiative forward. The iterative process eventually leads to the development of 
a business model. This argument offers a faster iterative approach compared 
to previous NPD theory. Furr and Dyer (2014) build on this theory offering “The 
Innovators Method” that suggests an entrepreneurial process whereby 
entrepreneurs go through five stages: 
1. Gaining ‘Insights’ through searching widely for insights 
(questioning, observing, networking, and experimenting). 
2. Discovering ‘Problems’ by exploring customer needs or problems 
worthy of solving. 
3. ‘Solution’ finding through Lean Startup – iterative experimentation 
of minimal viable prototypes towards a potential ‘Business Model’. 
4. The creation of a developed ‘Business Model’ by testing each 
component of the model individually with customers seeking ‘validity’. 
5. The model is then ready for scaling.  
The essence of the theory lies within experimentation of assumptions at every 
stage to deliver the entrepreneurial outcome. 
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Ostrom et al  (2010) highlight research from the PDMA which suggests that 
service firms lag behind manufacturing with only 40% using formal innovation 
processes. This may be explained by Nijissen et al (2006) who suggest that 
whereas product firms have a necessity for R&D departments and formal 
processes this is not the same for service firms; indeed most service firms are 
not characterised by significant R&D departments. Further they argue that 
service innovation is about the development of new procedures and concepts 
rather than core technology (Preissl, 2000). Bessant  (2011) puts forward six 
differences between manufacturing and service operations; 
1. Services are mostly intangible 
2. Perceptions of performance and quality are more important in the 
service sector 
3. Simultaneity of production and consumption (of the service) 
4. Services cannot be stored 
5. Customer contact is high in service operations 
6. The importance of location to service operators 
Sundbo (1997) also argues that the nature of the service firm is different from 
the manufacturing or technical firm. He suggests that innovation in service 
firms can be quite fragmented as it is usual for top managers to set strategy 
and then corporate entrepreneurs (from within staff and management) initiate 
and execute the process. He sees it as a broad organisational process 
involving many individuals and departments where innovation is on the basis 
of quick ideas rather than scientific results. Subsequent development is in ad 
hoc organisations rather than in permanent R&D departments. Indeed, 
entrepreneurship (in the classic sense whereby the entrepreneur is 
responsible for the whole innovation process) is possible but rare. Generally, 
when employees come up with ideas the company manages them through to 
fruition (ibid).  Irrespective of the extent to which a firm is innovative, innovation 
itself is an important way in which the firm can extend its reach in areas where 
it is highly competent (Covin and Slevin, 1991) by exploiting market 
developments (Zahra, 1991). In this way, it is argued that corporate 
entrepreneurship is the creation of a new business by redefining products 
and/or services (by innovation activity, acquisition or by joint ventures) or by 
developing markets (placing existing product in new markets (ibid). Further, an 
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organisation can "renew themselves and their markets by pioneering, 
innovation, and risk taking" (Covin and Slevin, 1991 p.7). 
Perhaps pulling these strands of literature together Wolcott and Lippotz (2007) 
define corporate entrepreneurship, “as the process by which teams within an 
established company conceive, foster, launch and manage a new business 
that is distinct from the parent company but leverages the parent’s assets, 
market position, capabilities or other resources.” (p.75). Thereby “corporate 
entrepreneurship centers on re-energizing and enhancing the ability of the firm 
to acquire innovative skills and capabilities” (Hornsby et al., 2002 p.255), giving 
the firm the ability to gain competitive advantage (Burns, 2013). 
However, corporate entrepreneurship is also referred to in a general and 
subsequently more inclusive manner. Zahra (1991) defines corporate 
entrepreneurship as “the activities that enhance a corporation’s ability to 
innovate, take risk, and seize opportunities in its markets” (p.259), arguing that 
it “takes place at the corporate, division (business) or project levels in a 
company” (p.261). Birkinshaw (2003) asserts that corporate entrepreneurship 
is “the development of new business ideas and opportunities within large and 
established corporations” (p.46).  It is also described as “a term used to 
describe entrepreneurial behaviour inside established mid-sized and large 
organisations” (Kuratko et al., 2011 p.11).   
Damanpour (1991) views corporate entrepreneurship as concerning the 
creation, development and implementation of ideas which may lead to new: 
markets, businesses, products, services, processes, administrative systems, 
employee programs. Antoncic and Hisrich (2001) also puts forward an 
inclusive perspective arguing that intrapreneurship has four distinct 
dimensions which form the building blocks of entrepreneurship: 
1. New business venturing where the organisation pursues new businesses 
that are closely related to existing products or markets. 
2. Innovation that refers to the creation of new products, services, and 
technologies. 




4. Proactiveness that reflects the orientation of top management towards 
pursuing increased competitiveness through risk taking, and competitive 
aggressiveness. 
It is argued that these broad and inclusive definitions are supportive of the 
exploratory nature of this thesis as the broader definition is likely to be 
accepted by most scholars and therefore more resilient (Sharma and 
Chrisman, 1999). This research therefore utilises the inclusive definition of 
corporate entrepreneurship. 
Importantly, Zahra (1991) argues that corporate entrepreneurship and 
performance are positively concurrently related. Subsequently building on his 
original work with Covin (Zahra and Covin, 1995) he finds a positive 
association with company financial performance and corporate 
entrepreneurship, a relationship which strengthens with time, particularly for 
organisations in hostile environments (also Dyduch (2008) and Kuratko et al 
(2011)).  Indeed, in a world being driven by accelerating change, corporate 
entrepreneurship is argued as being important as organisations are 
recognising that to survive and achieve competitive success entrepreneurial 
activity is essential (Shepherd et al., 2009). 
Hornsby et al (1993), in a review of literature on corporate entrepreneurship, 
put forward “an interactive model of corporate entrepreneurship” which seeks 
to explain the process of corporate entrepreneurship. They argue that 
entrepreneurial behaviour is preceded by the combination of a number of 
organisational characteristics and characteristics of the corporate 
entrepreneur that interconnect with events that will ultimately trigger corporate 
entrepreneurship. In seeking to explore the nature of an entrepreneurial 
organisation this thesis utilises these two constructs, starting with a discussion 
that centres on the characteristics of a corporate entrepreneur. 
 
2.2.1 Entrepreneurial capability 
 
Intelligent failure relates to negative outcomes derived from initiatives 
developed and pursued by individuals within an organisation. This section 
seeks to illuminate the setting for intelligent failure by looking at the nature of 
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the (corporate) entrepreneur and the nature of the organisation that enables 
entrepreneurship, which combines to shape the entrepreneurial capability of 
the organisation. Entrepreneurial capability is defined as the “firm’s overall 
capacity to sense, select, shape, and synchronize internal and external 
resources for the exploration (recognition, discovery, and creation) and 
exploitation of opportunities” (Abdelgawad et al., 2013 p.396). An 
understanding of the entrepreneurial capability of an organisation affords an 
understanding as to the situation within which intelligent failure occurs. In the 
first instance this section looks to explain the nature of the domain of this 
thesis, a sub domain in the field of entrepreneurship, that being corporate 
entrepreneurship. 
 
2.2.1.1 The characteristics of the corporate entrepreneur 
 
Within the field of entrepreneurship, empirical research relating to the personal 
characteristics of entrepreneurs surpasses any other topic (Churchill and 
Lewis, 1986). The level of interest reflects the desire to explain why 
entrepreneurs often seem like special people who achieve things that most 
cannot. It may be easy to assume that these entrepreneurial achievements are 
the product of an inner personal quality (Gartner, 1988). Collins et al (2004) 
suggest that understanding the motivational traits of entrepreneurs gives us 
the opportunity to identify potential entrepreneurs of the future and understand 
why some are more successful than others. Indeed, they argue that it is 
important to identify the motivational characteristics that spur people on to 
become entrepreneurs. The implications and relevance to potential 
entrepreneurs, investors, government agencies and career counsellors are 
considerable. As Baum et al (2001) note, investors should seek to ensure 
identified entrepreneurial traits are present in the personality of entrepreneurs 
with whom they may potentially invest. 
This section aims to elucidate the arguments that have arisen across the years 
to help highlight these potential characteristics. Within the literature on the 
psychology of the entrepreneur, exploration centres on a number of constructs 
that form dominant areas of discourse, and these areas form the scope of this 
review. The constructs are risk-taking propensity, the need for achievement, 
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self-efficacy, and locus of control, tolerance of ambiguity, passion, and 
tenacity. The review starts with a focus on the Five Factor Model and the traits 
of the entrepreneur. 
 
2.2.2.1.1 The Five Factor Model 
 
With a view to ascertaining the broad personality characteristics of the 
entrepreneur, Zhao et al (2010) carry out a meta-analysis of some 60 previous 
studies with a sample size of over 15,000 individuals. They combine these 
responses with the Five Factor Model (FFM) with the aim of establishing a 
relationship between personality and the intention to become an entrepreneur. 
The analysis also integrates the previous studies and the FFM to establish 
potential relationships between entrepreneurial personality and new venture 
performance.  Zhao et al (2010) identify and describe the FFM factors as: 
 Conscientiousness: An individual’s level of achievement, work motivation, 
organization and planning, self-control and acceptance of traditional norms, 
and virtue and responsibility towards others. 
 
 Openness to experience: Someone who is intellectually curious, imaginative, 
and creative; someone who seeks out new ideas and alternative values and 
aesthetic standards. 
 
 Emotional stability: People who are emotionally stable are described as calm, 
stable, even-tempered, and hardy. 
 
 Extraversion: People high on extraversion are gregarious, outgoing, warm, and 
friendly; they are energetic, active, assertive, and dominant in social situations; 
they experience more positive emotions and are optimistic; and they seek 
excitement and stimulation. 
 
 Agreeableness: People high on agreeableness are characterised as trusting, 
altruistic, cooperative, and modest. They show sympathy and concern for the 
needs of others and tend to defer to others in the face of conflict. 
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Results from the study suggest that the strongest of these personality effects 
is ‘openness to experience’, having a particularly strong relationship with the 
intention to become an entrepreneur. ‘Conscientiousness’ follows and is 
another highly important factor .The factors of ‘emotional stability’ and 
‘extraversion’ follow and are significant but show weaker relationships with 
entrepreneurial intentions, however, the relationship with ‘agreeableness’ is 
not established.  Importantly, the study infers that people with personalities 
that are very positively linked with ‘openness to experience’, 
‘conscientiousness,’ ‘emotional stability’, and ‘extraversion’ are more likely to 
be drawn to entrepreneurship and more likely to succeed should they become 
an entrepreneur (Zhao et al., 2010). In an attempt to understand which specific 
traits may belong to the entrepreneur, discussion moves to examine those 
traits that form dominant areas of discourse within literature, starting with ‘risk 
taking propensity’. 
 
2.2.2.1.2 Risk taking Propensity 
 
“The propensity for risk taking is defined as the perceived probability of 
receiving the rewards associated with success of a proposed situation, which 
is required by an individual before he will subject himself to the consequences 
associated with failure, the alternative situation providing less reward as well 
as less severe consequences than the proposed situation” (Brockhaus, 1980 
p.513). Although a propensity for risk-taking is frequently identified in literature 
as a characteristic of an entrepreneur, Schumpeter (1934) suggests otherwise, 
arguing that risk taking rests with ownership rather than the entrepreneur 
(Carland et al., 1984). However, contemporary research puts forward an 
alternative perspective. Liles (1974) argues that in becoming an entrepreneur, 
an individual takes on significant risk including their own financial wellbeing, 
career opportunities, family relations and emotional wellbeing. The decision to 
progress the new venture is therefore an important one and depends on the 
potential entrepreneurs perception of the risk involved (ibid). According to 
McClelland (1961) risk-taking is the domain of the entrepreneur. He posits that 
risk-taking is an entrepreneurial trait and that entrepreneurs are known as 
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being high risk-takers, however, he also argues that entrepreneurs are in fact 
moderate risk-takers. The entrepreneur effectively manages risk (ibid).  
 
2.2.2..1.3 The Need for achievement 
 
McClelland (1961) in his seminal book, “The Achieving Society” focuses on 
achievement motivation (nAch) and the psychology of the entrepreneur. He 
argues that the entrepreneur has a higher need to achieve than the non-
entrepreneur. Additionally, he argues that a need for achievement is an 
important factor that leads individuals to become entrepreneurs. Indeed, the 
study finds that countries with higher mean levels of nAch have higher levels 
of entrepreneurial activity and faster economic development. As Begley and 
Boyd (1988) put it, “High achievers set challenging goals and value feedback 
as a means of assessing goal accomplishment. They compete with their own 
standards of excellence and continuously seek to improve their performance” 
(p.81). They also identify from their research that the need for achievement 
differentiates entrepreneurs from non-entrepreneurs which is also supported 
by Singh and Ray (1980) and Babb and Babb (1992) (founders and non-
founders) to name but two other supporting studies. 
Furthermore the meta-analysis of 41 studies of entrepreneurial characteristics 
within literature by Collins et al (2004) concluded that achievement motivation 
is closely related to both the choice of an entrepreneurial career and 
entrepreneurial performance. Thus, they suggest that through identification of 
successful groups of entrepreneurs the identification of levels of achievement 
motivation will be particularly helpful. “Achievement motivation may be 
particularly useful for selecting entrepreneurs that may be more likely to 
successfully take advantage of entrepreneurial financing and other supporting 
activities” (Collins et al., 2004 p.111). There is a strong link between the 








Self-efficacy is defined as an individual’s cognitive belief in their own capability 
to perform a task (Gist, 1987). Bandura (1977) posits that self-efficacy has 
three dimensions concerning: 
1. Magnitude, which relates to the level of difficulty of the task 
2. Strength, which relates to the strength of the individual’s conviction of 
the magnitude 
3. Generality, which relates to how the task may become generalised to 
another task 
Boyd and Vozikis (1994) argue that sources of self-efficacy are mainly derived 
from the four areas of,  
 mastery experiences (gained from experience and through previous 
accomplishments),  
 observational learning (observing role models),  
 social persuasion (in the form of positive feedback, encouragement and 
persuasive discussions), and  
 perceptions of physiological wellbeing (the perception of the individual 
as to their ability to cope with stress, anxiety and be in a good physical 
and mental condition). 
Indeed, self-efficacy is an important factor in determining the level of 
entrepreneurial intent and is a prerequisite for potential entrepreneurs (Boyd 
and Vozikis, 1994, Krueger, 1993). Chen et al (1998) argue that 
entrepreneurial self-efficacy will distinguish entrepreneurs from managers. 
Specifically, they identify that self-efficacy of innovation, and risk-taking 
distinguishes entrepreneurs from managers. As entrepreneurs have a strong  
belief in their ability to determine outcomes, they perceive a lower possibility 
of  failure (Brockhaus, 1980). Thus, self-efficacy is an important construct for 
entrepreneurial action. 
The empirical research of Chen et al (1998) suggests that people who carry 
out entrepreneurial roles and tasks, and who see themselves as efficacious, 
are more likely to become entrepreneurs. “Self-efficacy influences personal 
goal setting and goal commitment. People who perceive a high sense of self-
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efficacy set challenging goals for themselves and possess a stronger 
commitment to these goals” (Boyd and Vozikis, 1994 p.72).  
 
2.2.2.1.5 Locus of Control 
 
In defining the term ‘locus of control’ Mueller and Thomas (2001), reflect 
heavily on the seminal work of Julian Rotter (1966) that explores the construct. 
“According to Rotter, an individual perceives the outcome of an event as being 
either within or beyond his or her personal control and understanding. An 
“internal” believes that one has influence over outcomes through ability, effort, 
or skills. On the other hand, “externals” believe that forces outside the control 
of the individual determine outcomes” (Mueller and Thomas, 2001 p.56). 
Indeed, whilst both cognitive constructs focus on control (Rotter, 1966), Gist 
(1987) argues that the difference between locus of control and self-efficacy is 
that the former covers a variety of situations, and the latter is task specific. 
From their study of the personal characteristics of 42 entrepreneurs and 41 
middle/senior managers (part time MBA students), Cromie and Johns (1983) 
found that in terms of locus of control orientation, entrepreneurs have a 
significantly more internal disposition than managers. Thus, they argue, an 
internal locus of control is one of the principle characteristics of an 
entrepreneur. In a similar way, a study by Kroeck (2010) of 448 nascent 
entrepreneurs and 290 non-entrepreneurs quantifiably found a much stronger 
internal locus of control in entrepreneurs than non-entrepreneurs. However, 
too high an internal locus of control (an over estimation of their perceived 
control) may negatively impact on the quality of decision making, leading to 
reduced success (Duchesneau and Gartner, 1990). 
 
2.2.2.1.6 Tolerance of ambiguity 
 
Norton (1975), suggests that tolerance of ambiguity may be the result of not 
having  “a tendency to perceive or interpret information marked by vague, 
incomplete, fragmented, multiple, probable, unstructured, uncertain, 
inconsistent, contrary, contradictory, or unclear meanings as actual or potential 
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sources of psychological discomfort or threat” (p.608). It is argued that 
ambiguity may come from such areas as novelty, complexity or insolubility 
(Wagener et al., 2010). 
Begley and Boyd (1988) conclude from their empirical study of business 
founders and non-founders that founders demonstrate significantly higher 
tolerance of ambiguity than non-founders. In a similar way, Schere (1982) finds 
that entrepreneurs have a greater tolerance of ambiguity than both top and 
middle managers. Tajeddini and Muller (2009) also put forward a strong link  
between  the entrepreneur and tolerance of ambiguity. Indeed, it is this 
tolerance of ambiguity that can lead to unnoticed opportunities (Schere, 1982). 
Research suggests that people with a high tolerance enjoy and deliberately 
seek out ambiguity, excelling in the performance of ambiguous tasks (Mac 
Donald Jr, 1970). It also suggests that it is this ability that gives the potential 
entrepreneur the psychological impetus to believe they can make it on their 




Cardon et al (2009) argue that literature generally asserts that passion relates 
to “any intense emotion that stirs humans with energy and deep longing to 
make a difference and by nature it involves feelings which are hot, 
overpowering and suffused with desire” (p.512). When entrepreneurs 
experience passion, they benefit from a motivational energy (ibid). 
Indeed, “Passion is at the heart of entrepreneurship, because it can foster 
creativity and the recognition of new information patterns critical to the 
discovery and exploitation of promising opportunities” (Cardon et al., 2013 
p.373). Whilst Shane et al (2003) also view passion as an entrepreneurial trait, 
they perceive a differing dimension. They argue that the ego is the central 
motive creating a trait of egoistic passion, that is, “a passionate, selfish love of 
work”. It is suggested that entrepreneurial motivation is derived from passion 







There are significant challenges that the entrepreneur has to overcome when 
creating a new venture. These include, working intensively with uncertainty, 
isolation, personal and financial liabilities, overcoming the liabilities of 
newness, smallness and legitimacy, and establishing a market foothold and 
dealing with retaliatory action from competitors (Markman and Baron, 2003). 
In such circumstances it is argued that persons with high levels of 
perseverance perform more proficiently (Bandura, 1997). Therefore, 
perseverant entrepreneurs are more likely to outperform entrepreneurs who 
are less perseverant (Markman and Baron, 2003). 
Chandler and Jansen (1992) add that success in the entrepreneurial role 
requires the founder to have the drive to see firm creation through to fruition, 
particularly as the limited available resources to most new ventures means that 
considerable personal commitment is a prerequisite (Hofer and Sandberg, 
1987). Shane et al (2003) argue that drive is made up of ambition, goals, 
energy and stamina, viewing persistence or tenacity as a sustained and 
prolonged goal-directed energy. To sustain effort over longer periods, high 
self-efficacy is important (ibid).  
 
2.2.2.1.9 The variances of the corporate entrepreneur 
 
The identified themes are not exhaustive and additional characteristics are put 
forward. For example, ‘need for autonomy’ (Rauch and Frese, 2007, Zgheib 
and Kowatly, 2011, Thapa, 2015) is referred to regularly, ‘innovativeness’ 
(Carland et al., 1988, Shane et al., 1991, Rauch and Frese, 2000) and 
‘creativeness’ (Hagen and Irwin, 1968, Kao, 1993). Whilst there is some 
fragmentation to the discussion of entrepreneurial characteristics within 
existing theory, it is argued that the themes addressed in this section capture 
the main arguments and emphasis. However, literature does not suggest that 
every entrepreneur has all of these characteristics. As Mueller and Thomas 
(2001) put it: “no single trait or characteristic defines the entrepreneur, nor 
does it allow one to predict entrepreneurial behavior. It is a configuration of 
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traits that separates the potential entrepreneur from those who are not 
predisposed or motivated to engage in new venture formation” (p.61). Also 
relevant, is that whilst significant attention is given to the characteristics of the 
entrepreneur there may be value in considering other facets which could be 
important. Indeed Jain (2011) argues that “an entrepreneur is someone (a) 
who is characterised by certain dispositions and attributes; (b) who is 
motivated to discover, evaluate and exploit entrepreneurial opportunities; (c) 
demonstrate creativity; (d) who is able to organize and turn resources to 
practical use, and accepts risk and failure” (p.136). 
Within the corporate entrepreneur domain there is only limited theoretical 
discussion specifically on the characteristics of corporate entrepreneurs which 
go beyond the identify characteristics of the entrepreneur as, “studies focus on 
factors very similar to those analysed in the area of the independent 
entrepreneur” (Camelo-Ordaz et al., 2012) or as Burns (2013) argues, 
“intrapreneurs share many of the characteristics of entrepreneurs” (p.244). 
This may suggest an overriding acceptance that the two are very similar or, 
that there is as yet a lack of empirical evidence in this theoretical area. There 
is general support for the argument that corporate entrepreneurs and 
entrepreneurs have similar characteristics For example, Burns (2013) argues 
that corporate entrepreneurs have a need for achievement, autonomy, have 
an internal locus of control, are tolerant of ambiguity, and are risk-taking. 
However, he also asserts that they are opportunistic, innovative, self-confident, 
are driven and determined, and are visionary. Ross and Unwalla (1986) 
suggest that the corporate entrepreneur focuses on results not activity, 
questions the status quo, is motivated by problem solving and delivering 
change and innovation, and ambitious and competitive. However, Hisrich and 
Kearney (2011) put forward a number of characteristics that reflect the 
common themes in the literary discussion of the entrepreneur. They put 
forward that, as a creative individual, the corporate entrepreneur is objective 
and open-minded, recognises and overcomes obstacles, engages in 
calculated risk-taking, is intrinsically motivated, has an internal locus of control, 
seeks achievement and recognition, and is driven by growth and development.  
Whilst the nature of the corporate entrepreneur may sit comfortably within the 
theory of the entrepreneur, the corporate entrepreneur operates within a 
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different form of entrepreneurship. Importantly, within corporate 
entrepreneurship, it is the company, not the individual, that takes the risk and 
owns the concept. Additionally, there are levels of bureaucracy which can 
hinder initiative development, but more positively, there is access to significant 
organisational resources (Kuratko et al., 2011). Thus the corporate 
entrepreneur needs the ability to be political astute in taking an initiative 
forward (ibid). Camelo-Ordaz et al (2012) argue that the most significant 
difference lies within the context in which activities take place: opportunity 
recognition and innovation for the corporate entrepreneur occurs within the 
organisation. Neilson et al (2012) summarise the arguments of Morris et al 




















Start-Up Entrepreneurship Corporate Entrepreneurship 
  
Entrepreneur takes the risk Company assumes the risks, other than 
career related risk 
Entrepreneurs owns the concept or 
innovative idea 
Company owns the concept, and 
typically the intellectual rights 
surrounding the concept 
Entrepreneur owns all or much of the 
business 
Entrepreneur may not have equity in the 
company, or a very small percentage 
Potential rewards for the entrepreneur 
are theoretically unlimited 
Clear limits are placed on the financial 
rewards entrepreneurs can receive 
One miss-step can mean failure More room for errors, the company can 
absorb failure 
Vulnerable to outside influence More insulated from outside influence 
Entrepreneur is independent (although 
successful ones are typically backed by 
a strong team) 
Interdependence of the champion with 
many others. May have to share credit 
with an 
Speed of decision making Longer approval cycles 
Little security Job security 
No safety net Dependable benefit package 
Few people to talk to Extensive network for bouncing around 
ideas 
Limited scale and scope initially Potential for sizeable scale and scope 
fairly quickly 
Severe resource limitations Access to finances, R&D, production 
facilities for trial runs, and established 
sales force, brand, databases, and 
market research, resources, distribution 
channels and customer base 
 
Table 2.1 Differences between entrepreneurship and corporate 






Understanding the corporate entrepreneur gives us an indication of the nature 
of the actor in corporate entrepreneurship processes. But what organisational 
environment will effectively reflect and support the characteristics of the 
corporate entrepreneur to enable entrepreneurship to thrive? In seeking to 
answer this question, attention centres on the second area that influences the 
organisations entrepreneurial capability: the characteristics of the 
entrepreneurial organisational environment. 
 
2.2.1.2 The characteristics of an entrepreneurial organisational 
environment 
 
With the aim of illuminating the characteristics of an environment that are 
supportive of entrepreneurship, this section examines the organisational 
cultures and climates put forward by literature as supporting mechanisms to 
the entrepreneur and the entrepreneurial process. 
 
2.2.1.2.1 Organisational culture and climate 
 
Within literature the concepts of culture and climate are sometimes confused 
(Trice and Beyer, 1993), however, it is generally recognised that they 
represent two alternative constructs for conceptualising how members of an 
organisation experience and describe their work environment (Schneider et 
al., 2013). Culture is a concept with evolved meaning, with its roots collectively 
held in history, and due to its complexity, it is difficult to manipulate directly. 
Climate, however, relates to thoughts, feelings and behaviours of the members 
within an organisation. It is temporal, subjective and is often manipulated by 
leaders (Denison, 1990). Where climate is observable culture is invisible 
(Ahmed and Shepherd, 2010), culture is the ‘why’ of organisational behaviour 
and climate is the ‘what’ of organisational behaviour (Ostroff et al., 2003). The 
“Three levels of Culture”  put forward by Schein (2010) argues that the surface 
level of culture is made up of artefacts which include the structures and 
processes which can be seen or felt. It is these surface level manifestations 
that represent the much deeper core values and assumptions that are within 
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the organisational culture. That is, climate is a manifestation of culture (Baer 
and Frese, 2003). Specifically and typically, these manifestations appear in the 
form of, artefacts, ceremonials, training (and/or development) courses, heroes, 
jokes, language, legends, mottoes, norms (of behaviour), physical layout, rites, 
sagas, slogans, stories and symbols (Buchanan and Huczynski, 2010). 
 
2.2.1.2.2 The influence of culture and climate on entrepreneurship 
 
A review of literature highlights a number of climates that are put forward as 
being supportive to corporate entrepreneurship. This section centres on 10 
climates that are most visible within literature in this domain, and offers a brief 
summary of each. 
 
2.2.1.2.3 Ten elements of organisational culture and the manifested climates 
which are supportive of entrepreneurship 
 
2.2.1.2.4 Openness and trust 
 
In their research into the climates that encourage or discourage creativity 
within a team environment, Isaksen and Lauers (2002) establish that, of the 
identified factors, the most significant positive factor is trust and openness. 
Indeed, building a strong sense of openness and trust across the organisation 
is a significant climate setting factor for entrepreneurial success (Leavy, 2005). 
Hoecht and Trott (1999) assert that trust is a personal judgement that carries 
an emotional and cognitive dimension, and is practiced between individuals. 
They argue that there are three different levels of trust prevalent to different 
degrees, dependant on the nature of the organisation. ‘Competence trust’ 
relates to confidence in colleagues to perform well, ‘contractual trust’ relates 
to the honouring the agreed rules of the contract, and ‘goodwill trust’ relating 
to the mutual expectation of open commitment beyond the requirements of an 
agreed contract. Whereas for introspective technology development 
strategies, ‘competence’ trust is required, as the strategies become more 
outward looking then ‘contractual’ trust is required, and in full outward 
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strategies ‘goodwill’ trust is required. The level of trust put in individuals 
increases in outward facing strategies that support innovation and “call for a 
considerable degree of openness” (p.263). Therefore, trust, it is argued, is an 
important component of an outward facing innovative environment. 
Indeed, where cultural values include openness and trust, members create a 
climate where there is more free, fluent and unrestricted communication (top 
down, bottom up and across divisions (Burns, 2013)), where open debate is 
encouraged (Kuratko et al., 2011).  It is this free flow of information and ideas 
across the organisation which increase the likelihood of entrepreneurial ideas; 
where there is a high level of trust, new ideas surface more easily (Ahmed, 
1998). It is a climate which supports the sharing of internal information and 
knowledge, regardless of organisational position, which encourages 
entrepreneurship (Burns, 2013, Russell and Russell, 1992). In Isaksen and 
Lauers' (2002) research a respondent concisely describes the significance of 
a climate of trust: “the most important factor for the success of the team was 
the overwhelming trust we had for each other, both personal and work related” 
(p.84). Schneider et al (1994) argue that trust begins with management 
behaviour which is not exploitative but trustworthy by nature. As management 
behaviour is highly linked with the value of fairness, so that fairness generates 
a sense of trust. Fairness, therefore, is an important value in itself that 
enhances trust and openness within an organisation. For the corporate 
entrepreneur it encourages risk taking, proactivity, creativity, and 
innovativeness (Ahmed, 1998, Jain, 2011). Indeed, Takeuchi and Nonaka 
(1986) highlight how Fuji-Xerox create an open work environment to enable 
new product development. 
 
2.2.1.2.5 Autonomy and freedom to act 
 
Values surrounding individual freedom in the work place are conducive to 
entrepreneurial behaviour. As individuals and teams are given more scope to 
influence and carry out their work, so they are more likely to experiment and 
try things. A climate which encourages experimentation supports 
organisational entrepreneurship (Burns, 2013). As Kuratko et al  (2014) put it, 
“research suggests that entrepreneurial opportunities are often best 
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recognised by those with discretion over how to perform their work, as well as 
by those encouraged to engage in experimentation” (P.39). Indeed, when 
organisations focus on the individual and the style of management, 
emphasizing autonomy is an essential contributor to the development of 
radical innovation (Lassen et al., 2006). 
Shimizu (2012) suggests that autonomy supports entrepreneurs in middle and 
operational management roles who tend to be more risk averse than top 
management (as their future is narrowly dependant on current and ongoing 
activity). He argues that it is important that senior management encourage 
autonomous behaviours of middle management to allow idea creation, 
innovation, and use of real time information and their unique experience, as 
well as support entrepreneurial activity in their teams. However, they must call 
for a balance, as it is argued that too much autonomy may lead to opportunistic 
behaviour that may serve the self or the team at the expense of the interests 
of the organisation (ibid). 
Essentially, organisational strategies that encourage autonomy are conducive 
to innovation in the work place (Treuer and McMurray, 2012), particularly as in 
these climates people tend to work on their ideas with more intensity and with 
more tenacity (Frese et al., 1999). Peters and Waterman (1984) found the most 
successful companies in their study create radical decentralisation and 
autonomy “with its attendant overlap, messiness around the edges, lack of 
coordination, internal competition, and somewhat chaotic conditions, in order 
to breed the entrepreneurial spirit” (p.201). Therefore, a climate which 
empowers entrepreneurial individuals and teams by offering decision-taking 
latitude and freedom from close management oversight will gain from an 
enhanced entrepreneurial performance (Kuratko et al., 2014). In this way, 




It is argued that an effective entrepreneurial culture is one where risk taking is 
encouraged (Ireland et al., 2003) and is the norm (Burns, 2013).  Indeed, 
supporting risk taking promotes corporate entrepreneurship (Hornsby et al., 
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2002) and is an important organisational practice which supports the corporate 
entrepreneurship cultural framework (Aaltio et al., 2006). Specifically, risk-
taking encourages product and service innovation that can positively affect 
competitive advantage, and positively affect organisational and business 
growth (Karen Yuan et al., 2015, Wang and Yen, 2012). Acceptance of risk 
means the willingness to make risk assessment decisions and consider risky 
opportunities carefully (Trott, 2008). A climate that supports measured risk-
taking is likely to promote team creativity as individuals push boundaries, think 
laterally and experiment into new areas. It is these behaviours that sustain and 
drive innovation (Isaksen and Lauer, 2002). Indeed, a Boston Consulting 
Group survey in 2015 found that 31% of respondents recognised that a risk-
averse culture is a key obstacle to innovation (Birkinshaw and Haas, 2016). 
Ahmed (1998) argues that within a risk-taking climate a norm exists whereby 
it is accepted that innovation is part of the job roles of all members of an 
organisation.  
In order to encourage risk-taking  the organisation needs to promote a culture 
of psychological safety (Edmondson, 1999). Psychological safety, as  
suggested by Kahn (1990), relates to a member’s “sense of being able to show 
and employ one’s self without the fear of negative consequences to self-image, 
status or career” (p.708). Edmondson (1999) adds to the discussion from a 
team perspective, arguing that, “team psychological safety is defined as a 
shared belief that the team is safe for interpersonal risk-taking” (p.354). Within 
an organisation with such a climate, members are safe to speak without fear 
of rejection (Baer and Frese, 2003), are significantly more involved in their job, 
and put in considerably more effort (Brown and Leigh, 1996). In this way, risk 
taking is supported, encouraged, and endeared, inspiring the entrepreneur to 
express entrepreneurial behaviours. 
 
2.2.1.2..7 Tolerance of failure 
 
The culture and climate that tolerates failure when entrepreneurial projects go 
wrong supports the entrepreneurial process (Russell and Russell, 1992, 
Ireland et al., 2003, Burns, 2013). A culture of fear blocks the generation of 
ideas (Lafley and Charan, 2008), stems creativity and promotes continuity, well 
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proven, trusted methods and fault free work (Kuratko et al., 2011). Where 
people believe they will be blamed for failures (leaving them potentially tainted 
with suggestions that they either lack knowledge and/or skills or are have low 
intelligence), so they are less likely to act entrepreneurially (Van Dyck et al., 
2005). Or as Lafley and Charan (2008) suggest, “a corporate culture is living 
thing; it will not breathe if the employees are holding their breath in fear” 
(p.204). Rather than be concerned with admonishment from a superior, in an 
entrepreneurial environment organisational members are not burdened by the 
fear of failure. Indeed, failure is seen as part of future success (Kuratko et al., 
2011).  
An organisation which wants to establish a corporate entrepreneurial spirit 
allows failure in the development of innovative initiatives; failures should be 
seen as an indirect investment into the innovation success of the future (Hisrich 
and Kearney, 2011). Indeed, among managers at Johnson and Johnson the 
maxim is “failure is our most important goal” (ibid, p.284). Honda use the 
mantra “a 1% success rate is supported by mistakes made 99% of the time” 
(Takeuchi and Nonaka, 1986, P. 143). BMW have a ‘successful failures’ 
programmes with a ‘flop of the month’ award for employees whose innovative 
ideas fall short during implementation (Hisrich and Kearney, 2011). The Tata 
group has a ‘Dare to Try’ award as they want “people to be bold and to not be 
afraid to fail” Sunhil Sinhal, Head of Quality Management Services (Birkinshaw 
and Haas, 2016). In a particular instance a review of a failed venture within 
Nokia established that there may be some future potential for the venture and 
so key staff were integrated into other ventures which eventually lead to it 
forming a new mainstream division (McGrath et al., 2006).   
Entrepreneurial success is achieved by giving people the space and freedom 
to grow, to develop ideas and learn from mistakes, a culture that supports, “a 
place where you are allowed to have a bit of fun, to think unlike the norm, 
where you are allowed to make mistakes” (Leavy, 2005 p.39). Indeed, 
experimentation should be encouraged as failure is an assured prerequisite 
for success (Hisrich and Kearney, 2011). When it comes to experimenting, a 
UK newspaper CEO suggests that: “Success is about confirming or refuting a 
hypothesis” (Birkinshaw and Haas, 2016). It is this climate of tolerance of 
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failure which supports and promotes entrepreneurs to further their 




The manner with which success and failure is recognised elucidates cultural 
values that in turn highlights the focus of management (Ahmed, 1998). Hisrich 
and Kearney (2011) argue that a proper reward system which recognises and 
rewards individuals who demonstrate drive, energy, effort and perseverance 
is an important feature of an entrepreneurial culture. How organisation 
members are rewarded affects the direction of their attention and a climate that 
rewards entrepreneurial behaviour reinforces those behaviours (ibid). Systems 
that encourage risk-taking and innovation have been shown by numerous 
studies to have a strong influence on organisation members and their 
propensity to behave in an entrepreneurial manner (Kuratko et al., 2014, 
Treuer and McMurray, 2012). Van Den Bosch and Duysters (2014a) argue that 
“if your goal is to create an entrepreneurial unit, you should aim to reward 
success and not punish failures. The use of stock benefits/ownership attracts 
and motivates entrepreneurial people in a much better way than regular 
financial arrangements” (p131). Schneider et al (1994) concur asserting that 
fair reward systems which go beyond job specific rewards and include rewards 
for several other kinds of activity are more likely to encourage displays of these 
kinds of behaviour. Indeed, rewards for personal and team initiatives 
encourage risk taking and the propensity to innovate (Burns, 2013). Van der 
Panne et al (2003) argues that an innovation culture explicitly recognises the 
collective nature of innovative efforts. Similarly, the company 3M offer a 
number of different rewards which recognise innovative activity including, for 
example, the ‘Innovators  Award’ (Tidd and Bessant, 2013). Cannon have 
established a reward system based on group performance relating to patent 
products applied for (Takeuchi and Nonaka, 1986). Perhaps in a summative 
fashion, Hornsby et al (2002) assert that the appropriate use of rewards 
promote corporate entrepreneurship. Systems of rewarding organisational 
members therefore, are a very real manifestation of the values inherent in an 
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entrepreneurial organisation and significantly encourage the corporate 
entrepreneur. 
 
2.2.1.2.9 Collaboration and teamwork 
 
Collaboration and teamwork are often limited to the function or silo within the 
work place. However, innovation that involves collaboration and teamwork 
across functions and silos (and includes people external to the organisation) 
can deliver financial growth (Lafley and Charan, 2008). Indeed, Isakson and 
Lauer’s (2002) suggest that collaboration and teamwork are a prerequisite for 
creativity arguing that the most creative teams have the ability to work well 
together, avoiding personality clashes, respecting the contributions of 
teammates, and organising themselves so member roles are clear. They put 
forward that in the least creative teams there is an unwillingness to 
communicate to each other, which may lead to animosity, jealousy and political 
posturing. Thus, it can be argued that a climate that encourages teamwork 
would positively support the entrepreneurial process. Treuer and McMurray 
(2012) also establish a link between co–worker cohesion and innovation, as 
the results of their research also suggest that the presence of co-worker 
cohesion is a predictor for organisational innovation. At 3M individual creativity 
is enhanced by collaboration across the divisions (Ahmed and Shepherd, 
2010). Sales team members are in constant dialogue with customers, and the 
ideas generated are openly shared with technicians who then initiate creation 
of a new product. For 3M this is a fundamental part of their culture. Where 
there is a lack of cohesion and conflict occurs, creativity dissipates. From their 
research, Isakson and Lauer (2002) concluded that, of the factors studied, 
conflict was found to have the strongest negative correlation with creativity and 
change. While taking these negative aspects of conflict into account, Kuratko 
et al (2011) argue that ‘healthy discontent’ drives continuous improvement. 
They put forward that an entrepreneurial culture fosters a constantly 
challenging environment, where even after successes there is constant focus 
on learning and further improvement. Individuals critique, positively criticise 
and challenge as a means to progress. The authors caveat their discussion by 
suggesting that a healthy discontent will always need careful balancing to 
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ensure the climate remains positive. What we may surmise from literature is 
that a climate that is supportive of teamwork and collaboration provides fertile 




Turner and Pennington (2015) argue that innovation, itself a function of 
knowledge generation, must cross the organisational barriers and disseminate 
throughout the organisation. Therefore, innovation is dependent on the 
organisations ability to learn through being able to capture and exploit 
knowledge throughout the firm. Turner and Pennington therefore perceive a 
learning organisation as an organisation capable of continuous transformation, 
leveraging knowledge and experience in order to learn and innovate. However, 
Liu et al (2002) inclusively argue that a learning organisation is an institution 
which creates a learning process and this acts as a stimulus to the corporate 
entrepreneur to continuously pursue new ways to acquire and share 
knowledge. Indeed the learning organisation facilitates rapid change in the 
workplace as it fosters information exchange and knowledge retention 
enabling individuals and teams to enhance their ability to deliver better 
performance (Vijayabanu et al., 2015). A culture which effectively supports 
corporate entrepreneurship is a culture which promotes a climate for learning 
(Ireland et al., 2003). Schein (1994) argues that a climate for learning includes 
six important factors: 
 The presence of approachable leaders 
 Open communication across the organisation 
 Empowered team members who believe they can effect change 
 A focus on people rather than tasks 
 An holistic approach towards problem solving 
 Psychological safety 
Indeed psychological safety also allows for enhanced team learning behaviour 
(Edmondson, 1999). Additionally, where organisations create opportunities for 
learning through socialisation this may provide a broader culture of learning 
(Graham and Nafukho, 2007). 
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Keith and Fresse (2011) argue that a climate which supports learning from 
failure also supports the learning of the entrepreneur. They assert that 
organisational tolerance of failure reduces the stigma surrounding failure and 
therefore enables more after action reviews to deliver important individual and 
organisational learning. Indeed, Burns (2013) argues that the norm of 
continuous learning from failure from entrepreneurial activity is what defines a 
learning climate. 
The essence of existing theory argues that within a learning environment 
organisations will learn from entrepreneurial activities and experiments as it 
creates knowledge and future options (Platzek et al., 2014). In this way, 
entrepreneurs are supported in the development of their entrepreneurial 
capabilities. 
 
2.2.1.2.11 Time for entrepreneurial activity 
 
“The fostering of new and innovative ideas requires that individuals have time 
to incubate these ideas” (Hornsby et al., 1993 p.32). Flexible timelines allow 
individuals and teams to discover new avenues and alternatives, therefore, 
where time pressures exist, thought processes become restricted, making it 
difficult to think and behave innovatively (Isaksen and Lauer, 2002). The 
availability of some ‘slack’ for individuals allows for thinking, discussing ideas, 
experimenting, and being creative (Trott, 2008). Kuratko et al (2014) argue 
that, “research suggests that time availability amongst managers is an 
important resource for generating entrepreneurial initiatives” (p.39). Indeed 
team creativity is enhanced if time is made for generating individual or team 
ideas and this creates the opportunity to test suggestions, explore and develop 
new ideas (Isaksen and Lauer, 2002). A climate that makes time available for 
innovation will positively impact the entrepreneurial capacity of the 
organisation (Kuratko et al., 2014 ). 
An environment supportive of entrepreneurship moderates employee 
workload, reducing time constraints on work, allowing individuals to work 
together on long term initiatives (Hornsby et al., 1993). That same supportive 
environment may also offer extra time for all organisational members and 
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teams engaged in the pursuit of innovation to pursue ideas, with jobs 
structured to support such activity in order to achieve short and long term 
organisational goals (Kuratko et al., 2014). Bessant and Tidd (2011) adds that 
a supportive environment not only gives time for idea generation but that 
suggestions are received in a positive way by bosses and colleagues; people 
are able to share ideas, listen to ideas and encourage each other in a 
constructive atmosphere. 
3M exhibit such a supportive climate according to Katz (2004). 3M encourage 
mainly technical employees to develop interesting ideas allowing them to 
utilise up to 15% of their total time for this activity. The 15% rule also applies 
to machine run time and (potentially) to the department’s budget (ibid). If the 
idea has promise it receives internal venture funding to enable further 
exploration and eventually management support to allow the individual to build 
a business form that idea (Tidd and Bessant, 2009). It is perhaps well known 
that it is through this climate that 3M developed the ‘Post-it Note’ which now 
populates most offices (Katz, 2004). In a similar way to 3M, technical 
employees at Google are expected to spend 20% of their time away from the 
main part of their roles initiating and developing projects, as are managers 
(Tidd and Bessant, 2013). Indeed, managers are expected to spend an 
additional 10% of their time on completely new products (ibid). 
 
2.2.1.2.12 Positive emotions 
 
Vacharkulksemsuk et al (2011) argue that a climate which supports positive 
emotions can increase organisational identification and the strength of 
relationship between people within the organisation. Indeed, these positive 
emotions can lead to employees being more flexible, creative, empathetic, 
compassionate and respectful towards others. They put forward that positive 
emotions can produce, unusual patterns of thought – creativity, flexibility and 
inclusion, receptiveness to new information, enhanced interest in others (which 
reduces the distinction between others and themselves), and increases trust 
between known people. It is also suggested that positive emotions; have 
adaptive benefits, signal present and long term optimal functioning, increase 
persistence, lead to more favourable reactions to others, as well as helping 
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behaviours. Essentially, Vacharkulksemsuk et al argue that positive emotions 
can broaden the mind-sets of people by extending their ability to see 
themselves, others and the social world. A positive climate is motivational and 
supports people to anticipate success and be willing to tackle challenges. 
Positive emotions, and the subsequent effects, have an important influence on 
the entrepreneurial process. In particular, it is argued that a positive climate 
fosters entrepreneurial behaviour and is supportive towards entrepreneurs: 
“When employees are passionate about their work, their organizations thrive. 
Once passion is present and reinforced throughout an organization, it 
becomes contagious” (Chang, 2001 p.135). 
 
2.2.1.2.13 Commitment from top management 
 
When the entrepreneurial values of the organisation are manifested in the 
commitment from top management, there is a direct relationship with positive 
entrepreneurial outcomes (Kuratko et al., 2014). Thus, a climate of 
management support reflects the willingness of managers to facilitate and 
promote corporate entrepreneurship within the organisation (Hornsby et al., 
2002). This commitment may come in the form of prioritising, controlling, 
protecting, allocating resource, and active involvement (Lassen et al., 2006). 
Commitment can also come in the form of shaping the boundaries in which 
individuals may explore (Hornsby et al., 1993). Without management support, 
entrepreneurship can be challenging. As van den Bosch and Dusters (2014b) 
argue “once you lose the management’s commitment, it will be extremely 
difficult to secure funds, benefit synergies and survive in the long run” (p,130). 
Championing innovative ideas and providing resources is a significant 
management activity and promotes entrepreneurial behaviour (Hisrich and 
Kearney, 2011), as does encouraging creativity, constant innovation, team 
working, the mind-set that change is normal, and that new ideas are expected 
(Burns, 2013, Ireland et al., 2003). Indeed, top management is supportive is 
one of the critical factors for innovation success (Trott, 2008). Also significant 
is the promotion of norms of helpfulness and cooperation, perhaps by pitching 
in at periods of peak activity or crisis (Schneider et al., 1994). In an 
organisation where there is an atmosphere of reciprocation and cooperation, 
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a culture is established whereby employees willingly engage in work over and 
beyond what is required (Schneider et al., 1994). When staff feel they belong 
to the organisation, the level of commitment rises (Burns, 2013). Kuratko et al 
(2011) argue that an entrepreneurial culture includes elements of commitment 
and personal responsibility. This can be encouraged by increasing the level of 
challenge and the involvement of team members (Ahmed, 1998). By giving 
individuals opportunities to get involved with day-to-day operations as well as 
longer term planning, management can increase levels of motivation, energy 
and commitment which, in turn, leads to a highly dynamic and inspiring climate 
(Isaksen and Lauer, 2002). In consideration of the review of theory, it is argued 
that a climate where top management show commitment to corporate 




Through an exploration of literature on organisational culture, climates and 
corporate entrepreneurship, this section demonstrates that culture and climate 
influence entrepreneurship in many ways. The manifestation of culture yields 
visible, tangible clues as to the nature of organisational climate in the form of 
policies, practices, procedures and behaviours. This section highlights those 
dimensions that may support the entrepreneur and the entrepreneurial 
process. Specifically, openness and trust, autonomy and freedom to act, 
facilitation of some risk-taking, a tolerance of failure, the effective use of 
rewards, collaboration and teamwork, learning, creating time for 
entrepreneurial activity, positivity, and the commitment from top management 
are ten such cultures and climates. 
In summative fashion, Rami and Gould (2016) argue that a ‘learning from 
failure culture’ can be affected by established social support and reduced 
hiding of failure. Indeed, when employees feel the social backing and 
normalising of failure communication, failure can be viewed as a means to 
learn. A precondition to open communication of failure is the level of trust within 
the hierarchy and amongst colleagues. They argue that, “respectful, 
constructive and fearless conduct toward each other promotes learning from 
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errors. Therefore strategies need to focus primarily on the organizational 
culture” (p.167). 
Literature supports the positive relationship between not only entrepreneurship 
and organisational performance (Zahra, 1991, Zahra and Covin, 1995), but 
also of an entrepreneurial culture and organisational performance (Denison, 
1990, Gordon and DiTomaso, 1992, De Brentani and Kleinschmidt, 2004). 
Recognising the significance of this relationship is important as it highlights the 
positive impact of an entrepreneurial culture on the entrepreneur. 
 
2.2.1.3 Summary – entrepreneurial capability. 
 
In exploring the facets that may influence the entrepreneurial capability of 
organisations, this thesis has considered theory relating to the characteristics 
of the corporate entrepreneur and characteristics of an environment that may 
support and enable the corporate entrepreneur to act entrepreneurially, and 
the entrepreneurship process.  
The review finds corporate entrepreneurial characteristics are similar to those 
of the parent construct, the entrepreneur. Existing theory highlights that of the 
factors within the Five Factor model, entrepreneurs show higher levels of 
‘openness to experience’ and ‘conscientiousness’. Theory also highlights other 
important characteristics that include: 
 A propensity for risk taking, 
 A need for achievement, 
 High self-efficacy, 
 Internal locus of control, 
 Tolerance of ambiguity, 
 Passion 
 Tenacity 
The review of literature also illuminates 10 climates that characterise the 
entrepreneurial environment, those being: 
 Openness and trust 




 A tolerance of failure 
 Rewards 
 Collaboration and teamwork 
 Learning 
 Creating time for entrepreneurial activity 
 Positivity 
 Commitment from top management 
This review has not only highlighted the nature of the corporate entrepreneur 
but also the organisational means to enable him or her to behave 
entrepreneurially, maximising the value of his or her natural entrepreneurial 
characteristics. The review of literature has provided clear insights, illuminating 
the actor and the setting in which corporate entrepreneurship takes place. 
Within this conceptual space, whether entrepreneurial initiatives relate to new 
business venturing (new products or new markets), innovation, or 
organisational self-renewal, entrepreneurial initiatives are created and 
pursued. These entrepreneurial endeavours may end in success but often they 
end in failure. Understanding how the entrepreneurial capability of an 
organisation is effected creates the backdrop to the process of learning from 
failure and the significant factors that require managing. Each initiative is led 
by an entrepreneur operating in differing organisational environments, and this 
review now explores literature with the aim of explaining how learning from 
failure occurs and what factors may influence the process.  
 
2.3 Intelligent failure 
 
“Effective entrepreneurs are exceptional learners. They learn from everything. 
They learn from customers, suppliers, and especially competitors. They learn 
from employees and associates. They learn from other entrepreneurs. They 
learn from experience. They learn by doing. They learn from what works and, 
more importantly, from what doesn’t work” (Smilor, 1997 p.344).  
Experiential learning comes in many forms (Argote and Miron-Spektor, 2011). 
Organisational experience can: 
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 Involve success and failure in outcome 
 Be acquired from new tasks or those that have been regularly used in 
the past 
 Range from ambiguous  to easily interpretable 
 Be geographically concentrated or dispersed 
 Vary in frequency and pace 
 Be acquired during or after task performance 
 Naturally occur or be stimulated (experiments) 
 Be rare and, therefore, more challenge to conceptualise from. 
This thesis centres on learning from experiences that are acquired after task 
performance and predominantly inclusive of their rarity and their naturalness, 
or otherwise. 
Argote and Miron-Spektor (2011) argue for the focus on specific experiences 
as a foil for learning, as it allows for a more specific approach to maximising 
organisational learning, as it “facilitates designing experience to promote 
organizational learning” (p. 1127). 
Recognising learning from failure as being highly significant in the 
entrepreneurial process, this section seeks to explore the process of learning 
from failure. How do organisations learn from failure? What are the barriers to 
learning from failure? How do organisations manage the emotions brought 
about by entrepreneurial failure? In addition, how do organisations create an 
environment that normalises intelligent failure? Before this review explores 
these questions, attention centres on an exploration of organisational learning 
theory within the organisational behaviour domain. This forms a backdrop that 
will enable examination of entrepreneurial learning theory within the 
entrepreneurship domain, thereby enabling a more comprehensive approach 
towards understanding of how individuals may learn from failure within the 






2.3.1 How organisations learn 
 
Organisational learning, according to Argyris and Schon (1978) occurs through 
individuals who become “the agents for organizational learning” (p.19). They 
assert that organisational learning occurs when individuals recognise and 
adjust organisational thinking in response to internal and external changes, 
embedding these changes within the organisation. However, Fiol and Lyles 
(1985), suggest that whilst individual learning is important to organisational 
learning, it is not merely the sum of individual member learning. They argue 
that organisations develop and maintain learning systems that influence 
members transferring new knowledge to others. Building on this theory, 
Hedberg (1981) suggests that, “although organizational learning occurs 
through individuals, it would be a mistake to conclude that organizational 
learning is nothing but the cumulative result of their members' learning. 
Organizations do not have brains, but they have cognitive systems and 
memories. As individuals develop their personalities, personal habits, and 
beliefs over time, organizations develop worldviews and ideologies. Members 
come and go, and leadership changes, but organizations' memories preserve 
certain behaviors, mental maps, norms, and values over time” (1981, p.6). 
Indeed, Levitt and March (1988) argue that the memory of an organisation is 
made up of encoded lessons from organisational activities from the past into 
routines and structures that shape future behaviour. Routines come in the form 
of organisational rules, procedures, conventions, strategies and technologies, 
while structures come in the form of the organisational culture and the 
paradigm of the organisation that acts as a supporting mechanism for these 
routines. Whilst the organisation may develop a memory, retrieval of 
experience is not always straight forward, as only parts of an organisation’s 
memory will be utilised at any one time. Sections of memory referred to 
regularly are more easily accessed. However, organisations find it difficult to 
retrieve older or less frequently used learning (ibid). Huber (1991) argues that 
there are some important influences on the organisational memory and these 
include the rate at which people leave the organisation, the distribution and 
interpretation of information, the normal ways in which information is stored, 
and the way in which information is recovered. Significantly, organisational 
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memory development is argued as being self-reinforcing: the more knowledge 
there is stored in the memory, the more readily new information relating to this 
breadth of existing knowledge is attained and used (Cohen and Levinthal, 
1990). 
Cohen and Levinthal (1990) suggest that an organisation’s absorptive capacity 
relates to its ability to acquire, evaluate, and exploit information. They 
emphasise that prior relevant knowledge that is deep rooted in the organisation 
facilitates learning of new knowledge. The organisation needs this prior 
knowledge to evaluate and utilise new knowledge. “Some psychologists 
suggest that prior knowledge enhances learning because memory – or the 
storage of knowledge – is developed by associative learning in which events 
are recorded into memory by establishing linkages with pre-existing concepts” 
(p.129) Thus the larger the absorptive capacity the larger the potential to learn. 
Cope (2005) reflects upon this at an individual level, arguing that there is an 
inextricable link between learning during the entrepreneurial process and prior 
learning. As individuals build cumulative learning, layer after layer, so this 
influences the extent to which they are prepared for their next entrepreneurial 
activity. Indeed, these collected experiences shape the attitude, beliefs and 
abilities of the entrepreneur. Minniti and Bygrave (2001) assert that 
“entrepreneurs learn by updating a subjective stock of knowledge accumulated 
on the basis of past experience” (p.5), and it is these individual learning 
histories which are highly significant as they create the basis for the ways in 
which entrepreneurs see and understand new experiences (Mezirow, 1991). 
Huber (1991) suggests that at the birth of an organisation the learning from the 
respective industry and society, and the knowledge of the founder are what 
form an organisations ‘inherited knowledge’. When the inherited knowledge is 
built upon with the addition of subsequent knowledge the organisation gains 
‘congenital knowledge’. Significantly, there is universal acknowledgement that 
congenital learning has a strong impact on future learning. 
Developing the discussion, Crossan et al (1999) argue that learning is a 
dynamic process which occurs across organisational levels and over time. 
Specifically, they refer to three levels of learning which they suggest are, 
individual, group, and organisational. They identify four sub-processes that 
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occur across these three levels. The learning process begins with an individual 
‘intuiting’ which, as largely a subconscious phenomenon, relates to the 
individual recognising patterns and possibilities from within their own stream 
of experiences. The individual then endeavours to ‘interpret’ or refine the 
intuitive perception. Whilst this happens at an individual level, it can also occur 
at group level where the combined interpretation may be more vigorous and 
complete. When interpretation offers a new learning of value, the group begin 
the ‘integrating’ process. Integrating relates to the development of collective 
meaning and coordinated group action that, if successful, will be replicated and 
form part of the operation. In time, the group may create more formal 
procedures that become embedded or ‘institutionalised’ in the organisation. In 
this way learning that occurs at the individual level transfers to the group and 
finally the organisation. However, it is also suggested that once the learning is 
institutionalised in rules and procedures at an organisational level, the learning 
passes back through the group level to the individual level. Thus, 
organisational learning is presented as a dynamic process where learning 
flows across the three levels, and where there is a tension between forward 
and backward flows: “Through feed-forward processes, new ideas and actions 
flow from the individual to the group to the organization levels. At the same 
time, what has already been learned feeds back from the organization to group 
and individual levels, affecting how people act and think” (p.532). The dynamic 
process continuously fosters organisational learning. 
Takeuchi and Nonaka (1986) argue that learning by doing occurs across 
multiple layers (individual, group and corporate) and multiple functions creating 
“multiplelearning” within the organisation. Individual learning may be 
encouraged through the allocation of time dedicated to pursuing their own 
ideas, and at group level, through breaking up project teams in sub teams to 
tackle a given problem resulting in fast learning. Also, at corporate level, by 
implementing a companywide program such as “Total Quality Control”. 
Additionally, as part of multiple functional learning, experience and learning is 
accumulated by functional teams being placed with departments other than 
their own during project development. The acquired “multiplelearning” is an 
important part of the organisation’s human resource management program. 
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Building on this work, the empirical study of Bontis et al (2002) establishes a 
positive and strong correlation with each level of learning (individual, group, 
and organisation) with business performance. However, learning at the 
organisational level has a stronger correlation with business performance than 
at individual or group level. Interesting also, is that the study confirms the 
tension between forward (from the shop floor) and backward flows (from senior 
management) of lessons learnt knowledge. Specifically, results indicated a 
negative link between misaligned flows of learning and business performance. 
This implies that the management of flows is an important factor in the 
organisational learning process and, consequently, business performance. 
Argote and Miron-Spektor (2011) put forward a learning cycle as a means to 
explain organisational learning. The cycle starts with experience gained from 
task performance actualised by the organisational members and available 
tools, which leads to new knowledge creation. This new knowledge is 
embedded in the organisations “active context” which is made up of the 
characteristics of organisation (such as culture, structure, and strategy), as 
well as organisational relationships (such as alliances and joint ventures). In 
this cycle, the changed organisational context then affects subsequent task 
performance experiences. Further, they argue that this cycle resides within an 
environmental context (competition, clients, and regulators), and also within a 
“latent context”, an organisational context which includes the makeup of the 
members, tools they have, and which tasks they perform. The theory argues 
that experiential learning has a close relationship with the “active” and “latent” 
context of the organisation and the interaction with the environmental context, 
In other words, the environment and the residual labour, their tools and 
allocation of work, influence learning and are affected by learning gained from 
pragmatic experience of the past. They argue that the learning cycle occurs at 
an individual, group, organisational, and inter-organisational levels. In total, 
this theory offers a wide and holistic explanation as to how organisations learn. 
Fiol and Lyles (1985) also highlight the relevance of the “active context” of the 
organisation and its environment, arguing that there are four contextual factors 
which affect the likelihood that learning will occur, which come in the form of 
the organisation’s culture, strategy, structure, and the environment. They 
suggest that the norms of an organisation will influence organisational 
62 
 
development from a behavioural and cognitive perspective. Strategy 
influences learning by creating objectives to be achieved through a defined 
breadth of actions. An organisational structure is important in facilitating an 
appropriate culture and strategy. A centralised structure reinforces past beliefs 
and is less adaptive, whereas an organic or decentralised structure allows 
change of beliefs and is more adaptive. The internal or external environment 
can influence the ability to learn as too much stability reduces the inducement 
to learn or change, while too much change and turbulence can lead to overload 
and reduced learning. It is suggested therefore, that organisations need to 
consider these factors when thinking about how they will enhance 
organisational learning. Additionally, the support of a learning environment 
also impacts on the likelihood that learning will occur (Choi and Jacobs, 2011). 
Organisational factors that may support a learning environment include the 
value the organisation places on learning and development, the mechanistic 
rewards offered, the resources allocated to learning activities, supervisory 
support, and job complexity. Such a learning environment culture is able to 
facilitate workplace and organisational learning (ibid). 
In developing the organisational learning discussion, Senge (1990) posits the 
idea of a ‘learning organisation’ a place “where people continually expand their 
capacity to create the results they truly desire, where new and expansive 
patterns of thinking are nurtured, where collective aspiration is set free, and 
where people are continually learning how to learn together” (p.3). Further, he 
puts forward eight strategies to assist the creation of a ‘learning organisation: 
1. Integrating learning and working through reflection and action is significant. 
“A culture that integrates action and reflection arrives at better decisions so 
people can genuinely commit, and its people have a more prepared mental 
state” (p. 289). 
 
2. Enforcing leaders who take a strategic perspective and initiate change at 
any level and do not wait for top management, building a team that believes 
change from anywhere in the company is possible, all makes significant 




3. Becoming bicultural. Building a culture of learning recognises and 
accommodates two worlds, the learning-orientated world of the team close 
to the entrepreneur and the world of the traditional mainstream 
organisation. 
 
4. Creating practice fields. As real learning occurs through making many 
mistakes, reflecting, and trying repeatedly, so organisations give 
encouragement to practicing by providing space to experiment and try new 
things. 
 
5. Connecting with the core of the business. Understanding the true identity 
and driving values of the organisation removes the subtle barriers which 
limit change. 
 
6. Building learning communities. “Networks of relationships based on 
common aims and shared meaning, become both a strategy and an 
outcome for leaders” (p.307). 
 
7. Embracing diversity. Recognising that people tend to mix with people like 
themselves, embracing diversity is very significant. Building relationship 
across boundaries and creating inclusive communities enhances the 
prospect and quality of the outcome. 
 
8. Developing learning infrastructures. Training and formal education 
organised and executed to high standard has significant value. The real 
value comes from being part of learning organisational strategy as opposed 
to the only strategy. Developing learning infrastructures are most effective 
within an integrated learning strategy. 
In centring on these eight strategies, Senge (1990) puts forward a pragmatic 
approach for organisations to become ‘learning organisations’ which manifest 
in practices of deep learning “stepping back and attempting to see deeper 
patterns and then choosing to do things differently” (p.287). 
A significant part of theory put forward by Senge (1990) centres on experiential 
learning and reflection, a concept which is discussed in a seminal paper by 
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Kolb (1981). In it, Kolb puts forward a model of experiential learning. The 
theory emphasises the role that experience plays in organisational learning 
and the model illustrates how experience is translated into concepts. ‘The 
Experiential Learning Model’ (Figure 2.2) suggests that there are four iterative 
stages of learning which form a cycle. The first stage is that of concrete 
experience which forms the source off observations and reflections (the 
second stage). In the third stage, the respective observations and reflections 
form the basis for the construction of ideas, abstract concepts or 
generalisations by the learner which shape action. In turn, the action is then 
tested in the fourth stage to offer further concrete experience, which then starts 
a new cycle of learning. In this way, Kolb (1984) asserts that knowledge is 
created by the transformation of experience. 
 
                        
Figure 2.2 The Experiential Learning Model - Kolb (1981) 
 
Kolb (1981) argues that to be effective individuals need the ability to “involve 
themselves fully, openly, and without bias in new experiences; they must be 
able to observe and reflect on these experiences from many perspectives; they 
must be able to create concepts that integrate their observations into logically 
sound theories; and they must be able to use these theories to make decisions 
and solve problems” (p.236). Important also is that he asserts that individuals 
have differing abilities to engage in each of the four stages, that is they have 















learning abilities in abstract conceptualisation and active experimentation, 
‘divergers’ in concrete experimentation and reflective observation, 
‘assimilators’ in abstract conceptualisation and reflective observation, and 
‘accommodators’ in concrete experience and active experimentation. 
Later,  Wolf and Kolb (1984) argue that individuals develop differing learning 
styles which learn from experience in different ways depending on their 
cognitive disposition. Reflecting on the experiential learning model (Kolb, 
1981), they suggest that the ‘diverger’ learns through feeling and watching, the 
‘assimilator’ through watching and thinking, the ‘converger’ through thinking 
and doing, and the ‘accommodator’ through doing and feeling. The theory 
recognises that an individual may not fit neatly into one description but they 
may have more characteristics in common with one style than another. 
Significant to the domain of entrepreneurship, Corbett (2005) argues that 
people with differing learning styles perform at a differing levels during differing 
stages of the entrepreneurial process. He argues that at the early stage of the 
entrepreneurial process (preparation) is the space for the ‘converger’ where 
convergent learning (thinking and doing) occurs. The stage of incubation, 
where individuals are thinking about an idea or problem solving, is where 
assimilators learn by watching and thinking that may lead to insights or ‘eureka’ 
moments where problems are solved or ideas are shared. The stage of 
evaluation where opportunities are tested, divergent learning (feeling and 
watching) occurs, and the final stage, elaboration where the insight becomes 
a reality, accommodative learning (doing and feeling) occurs. 
Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995) engage in the ‘learning through experience’ 
discussion but argue that organisational learning occurs somewhat differently. 
They assert that “organisational knowledge creation is a continuous and 
dynamic interaction between tacit and explicit knowledge” (p.70). Accordingly, 
organisational learning is a process whereby the organisation amplifies 
individual knowledge and embeds it within the organisational knowledge 
network. As such, organisational learning occurs as knowledge conversion 
takes place via the social interaction between individuals and the exchange of 
tacit and explicit knowledge. Nonaka and Takeuchi (1985) argue that there are 
four differing processes of knowledge conversion that form a spiral. 
66 
 
1. In the ‘socialisation’ process, individuals share experience (tacit knowledge 
acquired through experience) and this creates more tacit knowledge. 
2. The ‘externalisation’ process, allows the articulation of tacit knowledge into 
explicit constructs. 
3. In the ‘combination’ process, individuals exchange and combine explicit 
knowledge into a new knowledge system or framework. 
4. In the ‘internalisation’ process, individuals learn by doing, taking existing 
explicit knowledge and creating new tacit knowledge. 
The spiral begins at the socialisation process and then works through the three 
other processes creating knowledge at each stage. However, knowledge 
creation also starts the journey at an individual level before expanding into and 
through communities that may cross section departments and divisions, 
through to inter-organisational communities. It is in this way, they argue, that 
organisational knowledge is created. 
Developing their theory, Nonaka and Kono (1998) introduce a concept of ‘ba’,  
a Japanese word that means ‘space’. They argue that ba is “a shared space 
that serves as a foundation for knowledge creation” (p. 40), comprised of 
physical, virtual, and mental spaces (or any combination of them), providing a 
platform for developing individual and collective knowledge. They argue that 
each of the socialisation, externalisation, combination, internalisation 
processes has a corresponding type of ba that is especially suited it. “Each ba 
supports a particular conversion process and thereby each ba speeds up the 
process of knowledge creation” (p. 46).  
 ‘Originating ba’ represent the socialisation stage in the cycle, and is a 
space where individuals share emotions, experiences and conceptual 
thinking, driving trust and commitment. It is a physical ‘face to face’ 
space where tacit knowledge conversion occurs.  
 ‘Interacting ba’ represents the externalisation stage and is constructed 
through the careful selection of people with a mix of knowledge and 
capabilities. In this space, tacit knowledge becomes explicit as, through 
dialogue, individuals ‘conceptual thoughts are converted into common 
terms, for example, by the use of metaphors. This is the space for 
collective reflection where new meaning and values are co-created, 
becoming institutionalised in the organisational culture 
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 ‘Cyber ba’ represents the combination stage and is a virtual space 
where new explicit knowledge is mixed with existing knowledge to 
create more ‘ready for use’ explicit knowledge across the organisation 
utilisint information technology (for example of intranets, databases 
etc.) 
 ‘Exercising ba’ is a space that supports the conversion of explicit 
knowledge into tacit knowledge found within the internalization stage. 
Learning occurs through on the job (OJB) learning supported by OJB 
training from senior colleagues. The use of explicit knowledge in real 
life applications internalises knowledge within the organisation and 
creates new tacit knowledge 
Significantly, Nonaka and Kono (1998) argue that these spaces can be 
purposefully shaped by organisations, thus enhancing their ability to create 
new knowledge, specifically; they argue that, “ba is a platform to speed up the 
knowledge creation process” (p. 46). Indeed, recognising that knowledge 
needs to be nurtured, it is the role of management to provide ba in a way that 
most positively supports the dynamic spiral of knowledge creation. 
Through further exploration of the cognitive nature of learning from failure, this 
review has considered learning within the organisational behaviour domain. It 
is suggested that a more holistic perspective is taken towards the nature of 
organisational learning in order to shape the discussion (and the thesis) on the 
specific domain of learning from failure. Reviewing some of the seminal 
literature on organisational learning, this section articulates the emerging 
understanding of the domain, reflecting important theories relating to 
organisational memory and varying ways in which individuals and 
organisations learn. A core theme illuminated in the review is the importance 
of experience in creating new knowledge. Experiential learning offers a 
significant learning opportunity for both the individual and the organisation. 
Importantly for the discussion on learning from failure, learning from the 
experience of failure is central to the construct. Perhaps not surprisingly 





2.3.2 Entrepreneurial learning and learning from failure 
 
Entrepreneurial learning occurs when the entrepreneur learns about 
themselves, the business, the environment and entrepreneurial networks,  
business management, and about the nature and management of 
relationships (Cope, 2005). Such entrepreneurial learning can occur in a 
number of ways. Bagheri and Pihie (2011) put forward a model of 
entrepreneurial learning which centres on learning from experience, social 
interaction, observation and reflection. They suggest that it is a dynamic 
process whereby the acquired knowledge from experience, observation, and 
social interaction is transformed by various forms of reflection. The process of 
reflection is highly significant and can lead to fundamental changes in an 
entrepreneur’s self-awareness, and to critical insights related to the venture. 
“In essence, entrepreneurial learning refers to a dynamic and constant process 
of acquiring, assimilating, organizing and linking the new knowledge and 
competencies with pre-existing structures to be retrievable for use in routine 
and strategic actions” (p.452). 
Cope (2005) extends the focus on experiential learning, arguing that it is an 
important entrepreneurial learning mechanism whereby, on a daily basis, 
entrepreneurs reflect on previous events or actions with the aim of ensuring 
better outcomes in the future. As McGill and Beaty (2001) put it, “we all learn 
through experience by thinking through past events, seeking ideas that make 
sense of the event and help us find new ways of behaving in similar situations 
in the future. This thinking through or reflection is the essential link between 
past action and more effective future action… In times of crisis or radical 
change reflection becomes more important and also more difficult; it is at times 
like these we make powerful decisions about our future” (p.21). 
Theory suggests that as learning from experience occurs it enables what Cope 
(2005) terms  ‘generative learning’. Generative learning is “the ability to 
extrapolate and ‘bring forward’ one’s learning from critical events to new 
situations, incidents, and experiences” (p.386) enabling learning from failure. 
Two forms of generative learning are proposed, those that are, ‘adaptive’, and 
those that are ‘proactive’. Adaptive generative learning is the accumulated 
learning through experience, which creates a bank of learning from which the 
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entrepreneur can use in a similar situation. This bank of knowledge accrues 
incrementally and will give the entrepreneur a feeling or “knack” of what to do. 
Alternatively, proactive generative learning relates to the way in which 
entrepreneurs become alert to potential incidents. It enables entrepreneurs to 
develop their own early warning system that allows them to better anticipate 
critical events. This form of learning can give entrepreneurs more control in 
successfully managing their businesses. Specifically, entrepreneurs may 
proactively take measures to avoid replication of bad experiences. Both forms 
of generative learning enable positive use of lessons learned from failure 
adding to the discussion, Huber (1991) argues that experiential learning may 
be heightened in organisations who become ‘experimenting organisations’, 
where there is a constant state of flux in the main structures and ways of 
operating. An ongoing attention to experimenting produces a flow of learning 
opportunities, flexibility and increased adaptability within the organisation. 
Such organisations are comfortable with new findings and environments. 
Further, experiential learning is improved through the analysis of the outcome 
of the experiment and the availability of this analysis. As well as ensuring that 
an analysis of the outcome takes place, which is important, so is the accuracy 
of feedback relating to the cause and effect link between actions and outcomes 
(ibid). Dyer et al (2011) also argue for an experimental approach. They assert 
that questioning, observing, and networking provide information relating to the 
present and the past, and that experimenting provides information about what 
might work in the future. Experimenting enables organisations to see precisely 
how well ideas work in practice. Jeff Bezos, founder of Amazon.com suggests 
that: “Experiments are key to innovation because experiments rarely turn out 
as you expect, and you learn so much” (Dyer et al., 2011 p.134).  
Mullins (2012) suggests that in a start-up scenario the viability of a business 
model can best be determined through experimentation. Rather than accepting 
untested assumptions drawn together in business plans, entrepreneurs test 
these assumptions and learn from the failures until a promising model 
emerges. Developing this discussion, Blank (2013b) argues that in the search 
to discover a customer, the entrepreneur forms a hypothesis and draws a 
‘business model canvas’ outlining the key facets of the potential business. 
Assumptions are tested with real customers to identify problems and solutions. 
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The aim is gain a deeper understanding of the customer, their problems, and 
the business as a whole including workflow, organisation and product needs. 
The testing brings verification of the hypothesis or, more often, disproves the 
assumptions. In other words, the test fails. Learning is integrated and the 
customer and product briefs are revised creating a new hypothesis. The 
process then starts again in an iterative fashion until a business with potential 
emerges. In this way, “failures are not truly failures, per se but an integral part 
of the startup learning process” (Blank and Dorf, 2012 p.33). In a similar way 
‘agile’ methodology relating to software innovation centres on the speed and 
agility of an iterative product development process where customer feedback 
is continually sought and received, which leads to continuous integration of 
changes (learning) into the product. (Blank and Dorf, 2012, Bosch et al., 2013). 
Both these processes centre on continuous learning for the entrepreneur and 
the organisation. 
The hypothesis and test methodology integrates with Lean Startup theory, 
which centres on entrepreneurs learning swiftly from failure (and from 
success). Lean Startup emerged from high tech industry in the U.S and has 
become an important methodology for entrepreneurship (Blank, 2013a):  
“It’s a methodology called the “lean start-up,” and it favors experimentation 
over elaborate planning, customer feedback over intuition and iterative design 
over traditional “big design up front” development. Although the methodology 
is just a few years old, its concepts—such as “minimum viable product” and 
“pivoting”—have quickly taken root in the start-up world, and business schools 
have already begun adapting their curricula to teach them” (Blank, 2013a 
p.56). 
The origins of Lean Startup theory lie within the lean manufacturing system 
pioneered by Taiichi Ohno at Toyota. Whilst ‘lean’ centres on reducing 
organisational waste within the manufacturing process, Lean Startup centres 
on reducing waste (activities that do not generate customer value) involved in 
developing ideas, achieving this through early and continuing testing of 
assumptions (Bosch et al., 2013). The process emphasises continuous 
learning. The Lean Startup method has five principles (Reis, 2011): 
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1. Entrepreneurs are everywhere and the Lean Startup method can work in 
any size of company 
2. Entrepreneurship is management geared for extreme uncertainty 
3. Validated learning: Learning is validated through frequent experimentation 
and is backed up with the empirical data from real customers 
4. Build-Measure-Learn: A fast loop of building (minimal viable) products, 
testing, and learning. 
5. Innovation accounting to measure progress to allow work prioritisation 
The essence of Lean Startup from a learning perspective is the fast iteration 
of experimentation (the build, measure, and learn feedback loop) to drive 
innovation. Learning from success, but most often failure, is the fuel of the 
engine of new idea development. In the Lean Startup model, every activity of 
development is an experiment designed to achieve learning, it works on the 
premise that “if you cannot fail, you cannot learn” (p.57). Entrepreneurs learn 
and learn fast from this approach enabling quicker development of the product 
(ibid). In this way, failure is viewed as a positive, proactive means to create 
success in all organisational sizes: “New ventures of all kinds are attempting 
to improve their chances of success by following its principles of failing fast 
and continually learning. And despite the methodology’s name, in the long term 
some of its biggest payoffs may be gained by the large companies that 
embrace it “(Blank, 2013a). Lean Startup methodology therefore promotes 
learning from experimenting, perhaps embedding the idea of failure and 
learning as a prescriptive methodology for entrepreneurship. 
Entrepreneurs are using the approach to manage uncertainty. According to 
Schlesinger et al (2012), entrepreneurs do not deal with unpredictability by 
thinking there way through as “thinking does not change reality; nor does it 
necessarily need to learning” (p.12). They argue entrepreneurs manage 
unpredictability by, taking a small smart step forward (one that is reflective of 
available resources), pausing to reflect on what has been learned, and then 
building the learning into what is done next. In a similar way to Lean Startup, 
entrepreneurs are learning from action.  
However, experiential learning is not always positive or beneficial. When 
entrepreneurs misunderstand new situations because they are overly reliant 
on insights gained from previous experiences, they can fall into ‘learning traps’. 
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This predicament may be exacerbated when entrepreneurs over-exploit 
actions which have initially been rewarding (Cope, 2005). Indeed, when 
organisations develop robust processes over a period of time (through 
experiential learning) it may be assumed that it has the right process and the 
best solution, failing to recognise that it has developed new competencies 
which are able to deliver an alternative process that may be more effective 
overall (Huber, 1991). 
Desai (2015) argues that learning from failure can increase when the location 
of failure is spread across the organisation, rather than being concentrated. 
Pointing to attribution theory, he asserts that when failure is concentrated 
towards an individual or team, causal explanations become more centred on 
isolated affects. The overweighing of attribution away from the self, acts as a 
means to defend belief systems and self-esteem. These simplified 
explanations may not fully explain the interconnected complexities within 
organisational processes, which may lead to narrow changes. Where failure is 
broadly dispersed, attention is drawn to wider situational factors, beyond the 
dispositional factors. This encourages the exploration of a deeper structural 
analysis, which may lead to broader, long-term solutions. Broader failure 
increase learning from failure. Indeed, this may be exacerbated as the 
organisation size increases, as in larger organisations visibility is enhanced by 
the number of areas not experiencing the failure. 
Rae and Carswell (2000) view learning as being at the heart of the 
entrepreneurial business performance. They assert that entrepreneurs learn 
how to grow high performing businesses by: 
 Developing a set of principles which are effective in goal achievement 
 Accepting the need to work with other people with complementary skills 
 Learning actively, quickly and widely, recognising the potential of learning 
from failure 
 Recognising that entrepreneurial learning is a continuous social process 
They argue that these factors develop the personal values and self-efficacy of 
the entrepreneur, which in turn leads to the creation of ambitious goals, and 
the motivation to achieve these challenging goals drives learning so as they 
can be met. The entrepreneurial paradigm is one that asserts that learning 
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empowers the entrepreneur to achieve. Important to the discussion is that the 
attitude of the entrepreneur towards failure significantly affecting their ability to 
learn from such episodes. The motivation to positively seeking to learn through 
exploration and experimentation demonstrates a willingness to learn from 
failure.  
Indeed, Yu et al (2014) argue that the learning from failure process is important 
to organisational learning from a differing perspective. They argue that the 
learning from failure process (recognising, analysis, conceptualisation, and 
applying lessons learned) enables the organisation to acquire, transfer and 
apply knowledge more efficiently, thus enhancing the organisations ability  to 
learn. Thereby, they argue that these learning from failure behaviours enhance 
NPD performance. Significantly, the learning from failure process is helped by 
organisations with more developed processes of knowledge acquisition (the 
antecedent and basis of learning) that facilitate the identification of failure.  
 
2.3.2.1 Higher level entrepreneurial learning and learning from failure 
 
Argyris and Schon (1978) describe two types of learning as being single loop 
and double loop. Single loop learning centres on effective performance 
whereby individuals respond to the detection of error by adapting paths and 
assumptions. Double loop learning, however, is the response to error detection 
by challenging current organisational norms with a view to create new, more 
effective norms. “There is in this sort of episode a double feedback loop which 
connects the detection of error not only to strategies and assumptions for 
effective performance but the very norms which define effective performance” 
(p.23). Double loop learning yields the opportunity for a fundamental and 
deeper learning. Where as much learning occurs within a frame of reference 
(single-loop learning) in more regular circumstances, a new frame of reference 
(double-loop learning) offers a more holistic approach to a longer term 
outcome (Huber, 1991). As Tucker and Edmondson (2003) put it, “Second-
order problem solving is a way that real change is achieved” (p.62). Fiol and 
Lyles (1985) also suggest that there are two levels of learning, lower and 
higher. Lower level learning, they assert, is, “focused learning that may be 
mere repetition of past behaviors, usually short term, surface, temporary, but 
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with associations being formed. Captures only a certain element—adjustments 
in part of what the organization does. Single-loop. Routine level” (p.810). 
Higher-level learning they deem as being “the development of complex rules 
and associations regarding new actions. Development of an understanding of 
causation. Learning that affects the entire organization. Double-loop learning. 
Central norms, frames of reference, and assumptions changed” (p.810). 
Significantly, entrepreneurs can experience higher level learning from facing, 
overcoming and reflecting on significant problems during the entrepreneurial 
process, including the latter part, the after action review (Cope, 2003). Failures 
can also be the catalyst for ‘transformative learning” for entrepreneurs (ibid).  
This higher order process of transformative learning starts with a critical or 
discontinuous event and ends with an individual viewing themselves very 
differently (Mezirow, 1991): “as we assess our assumptions about the content 
or process of problem solving and find them unjustified, we create new ones 
or transform our old assumptions and hence our interpretations of experience, 
This is the dynamics of everyday reflective learning. When occasionally we are 
forced to assess or reassess the basic premises we have taken for granted 
and find them unjustified, perspective transformation, followed by major life 
changes, may result” (p.193). Thus, it may be argued that failure is a critical or 
discontinued event or as termed by Cope (2005) a “critical learning event” 
which has the potential to deliver transformative learning to the entrepreneur. 
As Deakins and Freel (1998) articulate, “entrepreneurship and the growth 
process is essentially non-linear and discontinuous. It is a process that is 
characterised by significant and critical learning events. The ability of 
entrepreneurs to maximise knowledge as a result of experiencing these 
learning events will determine how successful their firm eventually becomes” 
(p.153). 
Particularly in the event of failure, Cope (2005) argues that critical learning 
events have the capacity to stimulate deep reflection which leads to a higher 
level of experiential learning. As opposed to reflection, deep reflection relates 
to a reflection which is “fundamental and deeply challenging” (Cope, 2003 
p.444). The deep learning experience often involves radical change and can 
transform the assumptions that shape action, creating a paradigm shift. This 
75 
 
in turn may lead to a change to personal identity as well as to awareness of 
improved ways of operating the business (Cope, 2005). 
When it comes to learning from failure Cope (2011) puts forward an argument 
that learning is made of three stages across four dimensions. He argues that 
the three stages are made up of: an initial break to allow the entrepreneur to 
psychologically detach from the failure to allow healing, a period of critical 
reflection which rigorously pursues sense-making of the failure by the 
entrepreneur, and finally, reflective action where the entrepreneur comes to 
terms with the failure and aims to move on to new opportunities. The three-
stage process allows the entrepreneur to learn about (p. 616): 
 Themselves – strengths, weaknesses, skills, attitudes, beliefs and 
development areas 
 The venture and its end – strength and weaknesses of the venture and 
reasons for its failure 
 Networks and relationships – the nature of internal and external 
relationship management 
 Venture management – running and controlling businesses effectively 
 
2.3.3 Managing the process of learning from failure 
 
Understanding the nature of entrepreneurial learning begins to illuminate how 
organisations learn from failure as part of an experiential learning process. 
However, how do organisations organise themselves to assist and support the 
corporate entrepreneur (and indeed the organisation) to learn from failure? As 
Paget (1988) puts it “making mistakes is not an issue; recognising mistakes, 
understanding them, correcting them, and avoiding their repetition is” (p.98). 
In seeking to answer this question, attention centres on the management of 
the process of learning from failure. 
Literature provides a number of differing perspectives towards learning from 
negative outcomes from entrepreneurial activities, with differing stages to the 
various processes, and differing emphasis. 
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Platzek et al (2014) highlight the early perspective of Block and MacMillan 
(1993) who put forward a four stage model to learning from entrepreneurial 
activities. Stage one is the collection of documents relating to the most 
significant events within the activity, which are then recorded chronologically 
in a log book. Stage two is the questioning of the activity manager with a view 
to understanding the origin of the idea, how it was evaluated based on 
“recording of the market research process, the product development, the 
creation of a business plan, organisation of the activity, incentive components, 
and the forming of basic assumptions about the environment” (p.16). A 
chronological history of the activity development, events, and critical decisions 
is then created. The fourth stage centres on assessing the findings to draw 
conclusions for use in future entrepreneurial initiatives: lessons learned. 
Ellis et al (2006) also put forward four stages to the process of explaining event 
outcomes: however they take a generic approach drawing holistic attention to: 
1. Notice the event thereby stimulating the explanation process 
2. Interpret the event in terms of whether it is a success or failure 
3. Problem formulation: attention focuses on finding explanation for the event 
4. Problem resolution: potential explanations are tested 
Liker (2005) highlights the nature of the Toyota system, a management system 
offering a differing process by which learning from failure occurs. The process 
is referred to as ‘practical problem solving’ and has seven stages that centre 
on ‘root cause’ analysis: 
1. Initial recognition of a problem 
2. Clarify the problem to create the ‘real problem’ 
3. Locate the likely area of the point of the cause 
4. Locate the direct cause and then, through five ‘why’ probing, identify the 
root cause of the problem 
5. Determine a countermeasure 
6. Evaluate the performance of the counter measure 
7. Standardise the new routine 
Within U.S. government agencies ‘lessons learned systems’ are a common 
component of knowledge management infrastructures (Weber and Aha, 2003). 
The system starts with a lesson acquired from an experience which is collected 
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and verified by experts in the specialist field to ensure it meets the criteria of a 
‘lesson’. The verified lesson is placed in the lessons learned repository (a 
computer database system) and disseminated to organisation members to 
reuse in the form of new military processes. In this way the system looks to 
maximise the knowledge value from failure episodes. 
Whilst literature offers differing processes by which organisations may manage 
the process of learning from failure, there is some generic alignment in 
addressing the key areas of failure identification, failure analysis and 
reconceptualising, and sharing the new knowledge. Through reflection on 
these stages and looking to understand how organisations manage the 
process, the next section looks at each generic stage of the process 
individually. Firstly, attention focuses on identifying or recognising failure, 
before going on to discover how analysis and learning occurs, finally exploring 
communications of lessons learned. 
 
2.3.3.1 Identifying Failure 
 
From a process perspective, the first stage is the active and timely 
identification of failures (Cannon and Edmondson, 2005), recognising them as 
they occur. Failure identification is an important process as it can lead to 
individual and organisational learning (Edmondson, 2011). Significantly, in 
proactively highlighting problems quickly there is a reduced likelihood that 
these problems will multiply, grow or be incorporated in the wider 
organisational system. Indeed, noticing the event stimulates enquiry as 
“unnoticeable failures will not attract attention and will not stimulate the 
explanation process” (Ellis et al., 2006 p. 670). Without failure detection the 
individual is unable to assess the situation which enables the reporting of 
failure (Zhao and Olivera, 2006). 
Failures may come in the form of: 
 ‘Slips’, whereby despite positive intentions by individuals and teams, 
actions are not carried out as planned. 
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 ‘Rule based mistakes’ when well known procedures are carried out 
appropriately but the procedure is inappropriate to meet the needs of 
the goal. 
 Or ‘knowledge-based mistakes’ where a lack of knowledge may lead to 
faulty causal thinking and subsequent errors. (Zhao and Olivera, 2006) 
Research indicates that ‘slips’, rather than ‘rule based mistakes or ‘knowledge-
based mistakes’ are more likely to be identified (ibid). However, this may be 
due to the context of the industry within which the failures occur as this may 
impact the detection rate of the detection mode (Reason, 1990). 
Failures may be detected in a number of ways including ‘action-based 
detection’ which relates to detection as the failure occurs, ‘outcome-based 
detection’ which centres on the result which does not deliver the intended 
outcome, and through ‘detection by external limiting function’ when signals 
from the external environment communicate failure (Zhao and Olivera, 2006). 
The antecedents of the detection modes are argued as being the visibility of 
the error (and how noticeable the error and its consequences are), the level at 
which the activity is monitored, and the understanding of goals by individuals 
to compare with outcomes (ibid). 
Before failures are made known, individuals assess the situation reflecting on 
the cost and benefit to themselves, their group, or the organisation. The 
assessment may reflect some negative emotions, such as fear, shame, 
embarrassment and guilt (Zhao and Olivera, 2006). Having assessed the 
situation individuals may then report the failure as it is truthfully, rationalise the 
report (editing to disguise or hide aspects of the failure to protect self of others), 
or blame someone else. Alternatively, they may not report the failure choosing 
to cover it up, handle it themselves, or ignore it (ibid). 
When considering pragmatic examples, literature often highlights the Toyota 
production system, where identifying failure is encouraged through a policy of 
‘jidoka’ which focuses on not allowing defects to move up the production line 
(Liker, 2005). If anyone observes an error, a cord is pulled and the whole 
production line is stopped to allow analysis and solving action, leading to 
lessons learned and system adaptation (Syed, 2015). Additionally, at Google 
they use a ‘Game Day’ program, which is used to increase resilience by 
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intentionally creating major failures in critical systems in order to test 
organisational systems, software and the response of the teams. Before, 
during and after the test, individuals are repeatedly reminded to file ‘bug’ 
reports for all visible errors and failures (Limoncelli et al., 2012). 
As well as employees, failure identification may also come from actively 
seeking feedback from customers and other stakeholders (Cannon and 
Edmondson, 2005). For example, in the airline industry customer feedback 
and failure identification is positively encouraged so that it may be addressed 
(and so the customer may be satisfied). This means failures are identified 
quickly (Barkai and Harison, 2012). In a similar way within the hospital sector, 
patients and the general public highlight failures they experience or observe 
(Syed, 2015). 
 
2.3.3.2 Analysing failure 
 
Once failure is identified, the focus turns to analysis providing the means to 
learn from the event. Cannon and Edmondson (2005) argue that a rigorous 
analysis and in-depth probing may ensure that complicated problems are fully 
understood and it may discourage premature conclusions. Such a robust 
process may include a comprehensive analysis centring on the: 
 Diagnosis of the problem 
 Design of the experiment 
 Systematic analysis of data 
 Statistical process controls 
 Analysis of statistics. 
Further, they argue that as a vehicle to rigorously probe, formal after action 
reviews which discuss, analyse, problem solve and apply lessons that occur 
from failure, are fundamental to the process of learning from failure. Formal 
after action reviews may come in differing forms. 
McGrath and MacMillan (2000) assert that “entrepreneurial leaders who are 
successful at promoting deep commitment to continuous development typically 
conduct constructive post-mortems” (p. 333). As an example, the leaders at 
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Nokia are highlighted as placing significant emphasis on venture post-mortems 
as they see that it significantly helps to gain further learning from 
entrepreneurial ventures (McGrath et al., 2006). Further, Kuratko et al (2011) 
argue that each entrepreneurial initiative represents an experiment and that to 
extract the maximum learning from an entrepreneurial experience a systematic 
process effort is required to get the facts, examine them thoroughly, and make 
conclusions about future actions. They assert that “a key task of organisational 
leadership is to enhance the company’s abilities to use intellectual assets both 
strategically and entrepreneurially” (p. 444). Indeed, “organisations can help 
individuals learn important lessons from the valuable information embedded 
not only in failed events but also successful events as well” (Ellis et al., 2006 
p.669). In a similar way, Senge (1990) points out that whilst entrepreneurial 
firms foster organisational learning they can also inhibit learning. Specifically, 
he suggests that entrepreneurs, who by nature tend to be action-orientated, 
do not establish an organisational environment for reflection. Subsequently 
other people can absorb this mentality of continuous action over reflection. 
Therefore, Senge argues that creating structures, such as the after action 
review, support valuable individual and organisational learning. 
The term ‘after action review’ (AAR) originates from a tool developed by the 
U.S army (Senge, 1990). They carry out AAR’s after combat missions or 
training exercises irrespective of whether the outcome is positive or negative 
(Gino and Pisano, 2011). The importance of an AAR rests behind 
uncomplicated protocols which focus on the core questions of what happened, 
what did we expect, and what can we learn from the difference (Senge, 1990). 
Important to the process is a supportive management culture that incorporates 
the process organisation-wide, for example DTE Energy successfully 
integrated AARs into their culture after several years of trying. Integration was 
achieved by leadership that centred on helping managers understand the 
value of deep learning, viewing day-to-day events and larger failures as 
learning opportunities, exposing AARs to organisational grassroots, and 
operating a team of trained facilitators. In this way, AAR’s created significant 
organisational learning: learning from failure (ibid). 
Developing the discussion on the use of AAR’s, Gino and Pisano (2011) argue 
that organisations ‘institute systematic project reviews’ which align with the 
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military AAR’s and act as a means to identify what the organisation set out to 
do, what actually happened, why that happened, and what the organisation 
will do differently next time. Indeed they highlight the animation giant, Pixar, 
who use AAR’s and with some flexibility. Pixar uses different methods to 
maintain employee engagement in the AAR process (for example through 
asking project team members to identify the top five things they would do 
again, and the top five things they would not do again) and it changes the 
structure of the post-mortems so as to maintain its effectiveness. However, 
whatever the structure, data collection from across the productions is 
religiously collected. Interestingly also, Pixar periodically carry out a structured 
review across several productions to gain wider understanding (ibid). 
Significantly, literature also highlights some differing ways in which 
organisations may structure the post-action review process. Lafley and Charan 
(2008) assert that an AAR should “work backwards - process to decisions, 
assumptions, resources, and quality of the team; only then should the 
culpability of people and their judgements be considered” (p. 205). They argue 
that the AAR should describe what occurred with an emphasis on cause and 
effect. Whilst the risk of an AAR is that it may become a blame game, this may 
be overcome by adopting a tone that is analytical, not personal. Further, they 
suggest that an after innovation report (AIR) may be created as an alternative 
or to support the after action review. The AIR report typically contains: 
 A description of the project outcome with reference to original goals set 
 An analysis of major causes reflecting on the effectiveness of the 
research, the team, the technology, resources, and considering whether 
the goals themselves were correct 
 A clear understanding of the unexpected effects which occurred 
 A reflexion of what may have been done differently 
 A clarification of the lessons which have been learned 
Additionally, they argue that there should be a common method of recording 
events, a systematic approach to creating a database which is comprehensive 
and “intellectually honest” (ibid, p.206). 
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Based on research the Harvard Business Review (2015) offers a number of 
tools on how to deliver AAR’s’. They put forward a 75-minute agenda that 
centres on 
 Telling the story: a narrative from one or two individuals focusing on 
intended goals and what actually happened. 
 Capturing the discrepancy: analysing what went well, what didn’t and 
the reasons. 
 What to improve or keep the same; a focus on the future. 
Ellis et al (2006) term the AAR as an ‘after-event review’ or an AER. They 
argue that the purpose of such an AER is “to help individuals and groups 
gather and analyse data that will ultimately improve their performance. More 
specially, they give learners an opportunity to analyse their behaviour 
systematically and to evaluate the contribution of its various components to 
performance outcomes” (p.669). AER’s are significant as not only do 
individuals update or replace existing knowledge, they are able to move on 
from the event, as understanding can facilitate closure. Reflecting on research 
on Israeli Air Force pilots ‘after flight reviews’, they also assert that AER’s may 
lead to more specific failure reasoning than from non-AER reasoning, and, as 
well as encouraging individuals to take responsibility for failures, (as opposed 
to positioning responsibility on external factors) individuals can learn more and 
faster. 
Cannon and Edmondson (2005) assert that to maximise the effectiveness of 
such reviews the AAR groups should include those with relevant technical skill, 
expertise in analysis, and diverse views. The involvement of people with a 
diverse mix of perspectives and skills may generate an in-depth learning 
process. Having a group which is open, enquiring and is skilled in exploring 
the potential differing explanations and interpretations of the causes and 
consequences of the failure is highly effective at creating new knowledge. 
They also recognise that after action reviews have the potential to draw 
conflict, and sometimes this may become personal, and therefore skilled 
facilitators are an important consideration to a successful and productive 
process. Recognising the likelihood of tension and conflict that this may bring, 
the positive trade-off comes in terms of the quality of dialogue. A structure for 
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rigorous review is essential as, without such a body, individuals can 
misunderstand complicated problems and come to hasty, unfounded 
conclusions (ibid). However, attention should be given to periodically 
reassessing these fundamental processes so they do not become a limitation 
to learning by becoming a competency trap (Levitt and March, 1988). 
Birkinshaw and Haas (2016) argue for a specific and painstaking review 
meeting that delivers a complete understanding of benefits and costs of failure 
to enable an increase of return failed projects. An agenda based on exploring 
assets from the failure (insights about customers, markets, the team and 
people involved, future trends, and the organisation’s structure, processes, 
and culture), and liabilities (direct financial costs, external costs e.g. reputation, 
and internal costs e.g. damage to team moral and organisational fallout) is 
used, with the aim of delivering important insights and takeaways for the 
business. 
In summary, literature offers considerable discussion on the differing versions 
of post-performance review. Whilst varying forms (and indeed names) are 
clearly highlighted, it may be argued that there is general alignment. 
Specifically, each of the reviewing platforms offers a structured process of 
analysis and learning which is made up of defined activities and clear 
systematic approaches. Post-performance review in the main is not an ad hoc 
or informal affair. Literature also shows general alignment in the assertion that 
taking a structured approach to the post failure process is more of an effective 
way of learning from failure than an unstructured approach. 
 
2.3.3.3 Communicating lessons learned from failure 
 
Huber (1991) argues that organisational learning is dependent on the way in 
which information is distributed. Indeed the way in which information is 
distributed determines not only whether organisational learning occurs, but 
how widely. The wider the information is distributed, the more likely the 
information will be utilised to create learning for the organisation. He highlights 
some influencing factors that affect the sharing of lessons learned. Specifically 
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he highlights the factors that affect the passing of information, the delay in 
communications, and the extent to which the information becomes distorted: 
 The probability of an organisational member or unit will pass information 
to another member or unit depends on the relevance of the information, 
power and status, the cost of communicating the information, workload, 
the gain from passing the information on, and how often information has 
been passed to the member/unit in the past. 
 
 The probability of delaying the communication depends on the 
member/units workload, number of sequential links in the communication 
chain, and timeliness of the information. 
 
 The probability or the extent to which information becomes distorted 
depends upon the consequent benefit or penalty to the individual/unit, the 
amount of discretion allowed in the way the information is presented, the 
gap between the actual and desired information, work overload,  and 
number of links in the chain of communication. 
Hubber (1991) goes on to highlight the significance of interpretation to the 
communication process. He posits that the way in which information is 
interpreted has a significant effect on what is learned and retained by the 
organisation. He offers four factors that may influence the interpretation of 
information: 
 An individual’s paradigm. Each individual has his or her own mental 
paradigm that acts as a frame of reference to make sense out of new 
information. Significantly, this paradigm may well differ across the units in 
an organisation. 
 The frame of reference. How the information is communicated in the first 
instance, that is, within what frame of reference. 
 The choice of media. 
 Work overload. When there is a situation of work overload, too much 




Failure lessons may be communicated more proactively when stigma is 
attached to entrepreneurial failure. Singh et al (2015) argue that stigma at an 
individual level is a painful and traumatic experience, but that it can stimulate 
a positive reaction. Their research suggests that post entrepreneurial failure 
may experience an epiphany that leads to a different understanding of the 
stigma, transforming it into a more positive perception. In turn, this positive 
disposition towards the failure motivates the entrepreneur to share the lessons 
learned from the failure experience. However, this may be at odds with 
significant volume of literature that argues for an entrepreneurial environment 
that reduces fear of failure (Burns, 2013), thereby reducing the stigma that is 
attached to failure. Literature asserts that the communication of lessons 
learned is enhanced when there is reduced fear of failure; where there is 
psychological safety (Edmondson, 1999). This leaves the question of “does 
reducing the stigma of failure reduce the transference of lessons learned or 
increase it?” unanswered. 
Reflecting on the work of Hubber, Singh, and Edmondson, it may be argued 
that the sharing of information and indeed the sharing of lessons learned is far 
from a straightforward process. Communications are complex and are highly 
dependent on a significant number of factors that affect, the passing of, and 
the speed of communication, and potential distortions that influence the 
interpretation of new knowledge. In considering these challenges, literature 
articulates differing approaches to the sharing of lessons learnt. 
The Harvard Business Review (2015) puts forward three ways of sharing 
lessons learned from the failure process with others in the organisation. Firstly, 
by sharing on a common server or intranet, the list of activities to be continued 
and those to be changed. Secondly, by forwarding the notes (detailing the 
project narrative, analysis of the discrepancy between intended outcome and 
actual outcome, and next steps) to individuals who may be running similar 
projects in the future. And thirdly, by sending an email to the wider team 
summarising and highlighting important lessons. In this way, organisations are 
more likely to effectively share lessons learned. In a similar proposition, Lafley 
and Charan (2008) highlight GE’s use of an intranet to offer webcasts as a 
means to communicate lessons learned. The webcasts communicates which 
of their projects are working and which are failing and are created by the 
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project teams themselves. Indeed, the CEO personally gets involved in 
disseminating learning in this way. 
Literature also highlight findings that show some organisations creating formal 
structures to share lessons to all employees. Birkinshaw and Haas (2016) 
detail one organisation that pulls together an annual ‘failure report’ publicising 
the biggest flops and distributes it to all staff.  However Abu- Shanab et al 
(2014), in their study of 59 employees of the ‘Orange’ communications 
organisation, were unable to establish a significant correlation between 
‘information technology infrastructure’ and ‘ongoing organisational learning’ 
which questions assumptions from previous literature. 
Separately, Lafley and Charan (2008) highlight the significance of internal 
networking through the conscious effort of organisations to build a social 
network which may enable the spread of knowledge gained from project 
failure. As Yang and Wu (2008) put it, “knowledge sharing can be regarded as 
a process of interactions among people” (p.1134), indeed the mobility of 
people is an important way in which experienced base knowledge is spread 
(Jensen et al., 2007)Significantly the empirical research of Abu-Shanab et al 
(2014) suggests that ‘knowledge-sharing practices’ are a significant predictor 
of ‘ongoing organisational learning’. In this instance, knowledge-sharing 
practices are considered as structured interpersonal events or meetings, thus 
the attention centres on person to person sharing of lesson learned (ibid). 
Birkinshaw and Haas (2016) assert that a review cycle, which feeds into a 
broader conversation, allowing the spread of lessons across the organisation. 
They call for ‘Triple F Reviews’: “We recommend bringing senior leaders 
(across a unit or the whole organization) together on a regular basis to talk 
about their respective failures. These reviews work best when they are fast 
and to the point; take place frequently, through good times and bad; and are 
forward-looking, with an emphasis on learning” (p.92).  
Extending the argument, Rubin (2013) argues that a ‘multimodal’ approach 
may be most effective in disseminating lessons learned as it reflects the 
differing ways in which individuals may wish to access information. Lessons 
from failure may be disseminated through ‘lessons learnt’ meetings, 
presentations, web messages, newsletters, e-mails, and posters, or in the form 
of specific training.  
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Additionally, individuals may access lessons learned through organisational 
databases. However, “the most important thing is that the right information 
needs to be available at the right time to the right people” (Rubin, 2013 p.41). 
This perhaps is the biggest challenge. Weber and Aha (2003) also highlight 
the (organisational) ‘push’ and (individual) ‘pull’ mechanisms that may 
disseminate lessons learned but argue that these mechanisms have 
limitations. They assert that a gap remains between an organisations 
repository of lessons learned and the organisations members, and the 
organisational processes.  
This may be due to the situation whereby: 
 The distribution of lessons learned is detached from targeted 
organisational processes. 
 Organisational members may be unaware of the repository or they may 
not recognise the potential of accessing lessons learned data. 
 Individuals may lack time or skills to access and interpret the lessons 
learned, or indeed, they may not have the ability to apply lessons 
successfully. 
They put forward a ‘monitored distribution’ system, which they suggest can 
enable the distribution of lessons learnt on a ‘just-in-time’ basis, when and 
where the knowledge is required. 
Finally, Takeuchi and Nonaka (1986) argue that transfer of learning occurs 
when organisations convert selected project activities into standard routines or 
practices. As an example, they highlight the Canon “Auto Boy”, a format for 
reviewing projects that was adopted for all projects having been used 
successfully in one instance. In this way, learning from failure may be 
transferred across the organisation. 
Literature highlights a variety of mechanisms that disseminate knowledge from 
lessons learned, and the challenges to these processes. What perhaps 
creates some alignment in the domain is the consistent focus on structures, 
processes, and systems as a means to share the lessons learned effectively 
over any unstructured approaches. Even the social networking has a meeting 
structure attached to it. Indeed, literature suggests that the more that 
knowledge is formally encoded in documents, manuals, and software 
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programs, the more likely that knowledge dissemination will occur (Kotnour 




In reviewing literature from the learning from failure domain, an organisational 
process of learning from failure emerges. The review centres on three stages 
that act as a foil to understand the learning from failure process. They are 
failure recognition, analysing failure, and communicating lessons learned. In 
viewing the three stages, the literature is greatly influenced by discussion of a 
highly structured learning process centred on maximising the value from 
entrepreneurial failures. Learning occurs through a disciplined, pragmatic and 
detailed approach that centres on post action meetings, or ‘after action 
reviews’. These meetings are often formal by nature, involving comprehensive 
discussion and analysis of the failure event (Cannon and Edmondson, 2005). 
 
2.3.4 The process of learning from failure and the impact on performance 
 
Literature draws attention to a link between learning and organisational 
performance. Levinthal and March (1993) assert that experienced and trained 
individuals and groups will normally do better than those with less experience 
or training. Organisations accumulate individual experience in the form of rules 
and procedures to effectively transfer to newer members and that “this process 
of routinization is a powerful factor in converting collective experience into 
improved average performance” (p.106), particularly as, “this feature of 
learning makes it a prime contributor to competitive advantage” (p.106). 
“Indeed learning has been considered as the competitive advantage and one 
of the vital tasks of entrepreneurs” (Bagheri and Pihie, 2011 p.452). Crossan 
and Inkpen (1995) also argue that efficient leaning organisations deliver 
healthier performance on a longer term than their competitors. This 
perspective on longer-term performance highlights the nature of organisational 
learning and the transference of new knowledge and shaping of beliefs that is 
not necessarily a short-term process (ibid). Real et (2012) also found in their 
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empirical study of 140 innovative Spanish industrial companies, that there was  
a reliable and strong correlation between organisational learning and 
perceived business performance. Bontis et al (2002) also found a positive 
relationship between learning and business performance as did Spicer and 
Sadler-Smith (2006). Whilst literature provides some alignment in this 
discussion, there is an emphasis on the longer-term association of learning 
and enhanced performance. 
Perhaps the significance of a supportive environment is made more relevant 
when a link with positive organisational outcomes is established. Van Dyck et 
al (2005) in their study of  65 Dutch organisations within differing industry 
sectors, found a reliable and strong correlation between an organisational error 
management culture and firm performance. This study is important as the 
results suggest that where an error management culture exists there is a 
positive effect on organisational survivability, organisational goal achievement, 
and return on assets. Van Dyck et al (2005) argue that, “a one standard 
deviation improvement in error management culture results in an increase in 
firm profitability by approximately 19%– 23%. A company that generates a 
$1,000,000 return on assets could thereby increase its gains by approximately 
$200,000. We believe that organizations should be interested in such 
increases and that programs that cultivate a systematic error management 
approach would most likely prove to be cost-effective.” (p.1238). 
Yamakawa et al (2013) assert that under certain conditions failures can 
stimulate entrepreneurs to learn and that this may lead to new entrepreneurial 
growth. Their research suggests that there is significant and positive 
relationship between entrepreneurs who take ownership of responsibility for 
the failure and the growth of subsequent ventures. Additionally, the research 
shows a significant and positive relationship between entrepreneur’s intrinsic 
motivation to create a new venture after a failure and the growth of subsequent 
ventures. Thus, the entrepreneur’s ability to recover from failure is directly 
related to future venture growth. Indeed “the ability of entrepreneurs to recover 
from failure provides valuable insights into the likelihood of serial 




2.3.5 Barriers to learning from failure 
 
Wilkinson and Mellahi (2005) argue that, “managers need to understand two 
key issues concerning organisational failure. The first relates to understanding 
the causes and processes of organisational failure so as to help them design 
effective strategies to avoid or handle failure in the future. The second issue 
relates to understanding barriers to learning from failure and identifying 
strategies to overcome them’’ (p.233). Therefore, the literature review now 
centres on the barriers to learning from failure that organisations face and how 
they look to address them. In exploring these areas, discussion considers two 
main themes: the psychological factors that impact learning from failure and 
the organisational factors that affect the lessons learned process. 
 
2.3.5.1 Psychological Factors and Learning from Failure 
 
In exploring the barriers to learning from failure, literature suggests that there 
are five factors that may psychologically impact the individual and 
subsequently the process of intelligent failure. They include aversion to failure, 
high and low self-efficacy (and low self-esteem), an internal locus of control, 
cognitive biases, and management reward systems. Each factor is explored 
individually. 
 
2.3.5.1.1 Aversion to failure 
 
Edmondson (2011) argues that in most institutions failure and fault are virtually 
inseparable. The attachment of failure and fault originates from a young age 
when children learn that that failure means taking the blame. Indeed the origins 
of fear of failure are rooted in parental socialisation and parent-child relations  
(McGregor and Elliot, 2005). A number of theories have been put forward to 
explain the phenomenon suggesting it may be due to: 




 Mothers setting high standards of achievement but not seeing their 
offspring as having the required capability to achieve those standards 
(Smith and Crandall, 1969) . 
 Maternal irritability and dependency (Singh, 1992). 
 Paternal absence from home (Greenfeld and Teevan, 1986). 
 Mothers high in fear of failure withholding love when their child fails or 
makes a mistake (Elliot and Thrash, 2004). 
Indeed, McGregor and Elliot (2005) argue, in summarising psychological 
theory on the subject, that: “Overall, the extant data indicates that individuals 
high in fear of failure are socialized in a way that orients them to the possibility 
of failure, that exerts pressure on them to succeed beyond their capacity, and 
that exacts relational costs should failure occur. These individuals appear to 
have learned to define failure as an unacceptable event that carries negative 
implications for their self-worth and relational security, which leads them to 
vigilantly orient to and seek to avoid failure in achievement situations” (p.219). 
Indeed, as individuals grow and socialisation continues, there is considerable 
parental influence to avoid failure as a means to offer protection from any 
physical harm to their offspring. Subsequently this is effectively reinforced by 
schools where reward systems centre around success (Cannon and 
Edmondson, 2001). 
McGregor and Elliot (2005) argue that, in addition to parental influence, shame 
resides at the core of people’s fear of failure. Shame is viewed as a devastating 
emotion because it entails feelings of self-worthlessness, failure, badness and 
of being wholly defective and “this defective self is exposed before a real or 
imagined audience and is judged unworthy of love” (p. 219) thus potentially 
jeopardising important relationships. Shame is inherently associated with 
tendencies to withdraw or avoid and thus, it is argued that, the function of 
shame is to stimulate behaviour which removes the individual from the scrutiny 
of people and so minimise the loss of love and rejection. Having experienced 
the acute pain of shame, the individual learns to avoid failure in achievement 
situations. Shame is a key component of fear of failure and is intrinsically 
avoided by people at almost any cost (ibid). 
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Showing partial alignment, Mitchell and Shepherd (2010) argue that fear of 
failure is made up of five sub-dimensions of which fear of experiencing shame 
and embarrassment is one. However, they put forward four others, those being 
a fear of 
 devaluing one’s self-esteem  
 an uncertain future 
 important others losing interest, 
 and upsetting important others 
They argue that “each of these fear-of-failure sub-dimensions reflects the 
perceived internal, ability-based negative consequences of failure: fear of 
failure is the fear of being a failure” (p.143). 
Self-perception is important to motivation and other people’s perceptions can 
be vital to future career prospects. As such, the fear of being perceived as 
being inept to any degree is a significant barrier to being associated with a 
project failure. Indeed, these individuals are likely to hide failure as a means to 
maintain their credibility and influence within the organisation, and maintain 
their career prospects (Cannon and Edmondson, 2001). 
Therefore, for most people the experience of failure has a significant 
psychological impact. There is a strong and deep-rooted desire for individuals 
to see themselves as being held in high regard by other people, especially with 
those people whom they frequently interact. People implicitly believe that 
revealing failure will negatively impact their self-esteem and this leads to a 
natural aversion to disclosing failure (Cannon and Edmondson, 2005). What 
exacerbates this challenge is that when it comes to failure, people expect to 
be more harshly judged than would normally be the case (Cope, 2011). In 
many circumstances people recognise that even in an environment where 
failure is openly discussed, the positive impressions of individuals can be 
subtly eroded and this results in further aversion to acknowledging failure 
publicly (Cannon and Edmondson, 2005). Goleman (1985) suggests that, 
“…individuals have an instinctive tendency to deny, distort, ignore or 
disassociate themselves from their own failures” (p.34). 
Failure avoidance is a form of personal protection to avoid the blame of others 
who are looking to make themselves look competent. Such is the prominence 
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of societal blame that people tend to look to blame individuals and de-
emphasise evidence of any mitigating circumstances (Alicke, 2000). Blaming, 
therefore, is a barrier to learning as it is unlikely that teams will effectively learn 
from mistakes if their mind-set is centred on blaming others (Tjosvold et al., 
2004). Additionally, within the team framework there rests the potential for 
significant influencing. Therefore, any shared beliefs about failure can 
significantly influence the individual. Indeed, social influences within a work 
group can acutely influence the reaction to failure (Cannon and Edmondson, 
2001). It is this presence of highly ingrained cognitive bias towards failure 
which may explain why so few organisations have moved towards a culture of 
psychological safety, where individuals have no fear of reprisal and intelligent 
failure is an accepted part of  day to day working life (Edmondson, 2011). 
A review of literature highlights the wide and fundamental aversion to failure 
and its impact on the individual and the organisation. The psychological 
distress of failing carries much emotional pain for the individual. Significantly, 
literature asserts that aversion to failure represents a fundamental challenge 
to the process of learning from failure. 
 
2.3.5.1.2 High and low self-efficacy (and low self-esteem) and internal locus of 
control 
 
Literature considers high self-efficacy and internal locus of control as being a 
significant facet in the psychology of the entrepreneur (Boyd and Vozikis, 
1994, Chen et al., 1998, Anderson, 1977). However, when it comes to 
acknowledging failure, Cannon and Edmondson (2005) argue that such 
positive feelings of the self and feelings of control may be unrealistic and 
incompatible with honest reflection. In this way, high self-efficacy and internal 
locus of control act as a hindrance making it difficult to learn from failure. 
Although high self-efficacy can have negative connotations, the same is also 
true of low self-efficacy, which can reduce entrepreneurial activity. Learning 
from failure requires individuals to face up to their failure through critical 
feedback and this can form an unpleasant experience, leading to a reduction 
of self-efficacy. If individuals are unable to manage such psychological issues 
effectively then learning can be inhibited (Cannon and Edmondson, 2001). It 
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is not only self-efficacy that is affected by failure. Edmondson (2011) argues 
that analysing failure is emotionally unpleasant and can have significant knock-
on effects for an individual’s self-esteem. Instinctively, people would prefer to 
speed through failure analysis or even avoid it altogether. Indeed, people 
would rather leave the failure behind rather than painfully dissect it for the 
benefit of individual and organisational learning (Cannon and Edmondson, 
2005). 
Arora et al (2013) argue that some entrepreneurs are more inclined to learn 
from failures than others depending on their ability to harness counterfactual 
thinking (that is, thoughts relating to what might have been if circumstances 
had been different or if individuals had acted differently). Counterfactual 
thinking is principally triggered by negative emotional reactions to failure and 
disappointing outcomes (Baron, 2000). 
Baron (1998) previously argued that “entrepreneurs engage in counterfactual 
thinking about past events less frequently than others” (p. 82) thus reducing 
the negative impact on entrepreneurial self-efficacy. Baron (2000) suggests 
three reasons for not looking backwards: Firstly, entrepreneurs have a 
stronger present or future-orientated perspective. Secondly, entrepreneurs 
have cognitive biases, such as excessive optimism and overconfidence, which 
leads to foreseeing positive outcomes. Thirdly, entrepreneurs maintain 
optimism even when having experienced repeated failures. 
However, Arora et al (2013), in their survey of 138 entrepreneurs from across 
the United States, find that the negative impact of counterfactual thoughts on 
self-efficacy are moderated by positive affect (an instinctive cognitive reaction 
to see matters in a positive light) and high self-esteem. The results suggest 
that entrepreneurs with high positive affect and high levels of self-esteem lead 
to higher levels of entrepreneurial self-efficacy. Additionally, the results 
suggest that, in this instance, entrepreneurs benefit from counterfactual 
thinking and learning from the past. However, those entrepreneurs who have 
a negative affect (see matters in a negative light) and lower levels of self-
esteem have reduced levels of self-efficacy and do not benefit from 
counterfactual thinking, thus losing the opportunity to learn. With a positive 
affect and higher self-esteem, the entrepreneur gains increased levels of self-
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efficacy from counterfactual thinking, thus encouraging continued reflection on 
the past and learning for the individual and the organisation. 
 
2.3.5.1.3 Cognitive biases 
 
McGrath (1999) argues that cognitive biases further inhibit the ability to learn 
from failures, specifically, confirmation bias, misattribution of success (and 
failure), negative perceptions of events, and negative retrospective 
recollection. Confirmation bias, whereby evidence that disconfirms the 
individual’s viewpoint is rejected, tends to make information associated with 
failure less vivid, less visible and less believable and tends not to be presented. 
Indeed, as the intelligence is distorted so the information can be 
misinterpreted. 
The cognitive bias of misattribution of success is the perception that success 
is the result of the individual’s owns action and failure is the result of 
exogenous factors. This bias can lead to incorrect correlations between 
actions and results (ibid).  Levinthal and March (1993) suggest that “research 
on individual attributions of causality to events indicates that individuals are 
more likely to attribute their successes to ability and their failures to luck than 
they are to attribute their successes to luck and their failures to ability” (p.105). 
Additionally, the negative perception of events related to failure can lead to 
pessimistic after action views of events and behaviours and thus distort 
outcomes. Finally, the negative retrospective recollection of events associated 
with failure can lead to them being avoided, not discussed and suppressed 
which can mean that the same mistakes occur again and again (McGrath, 
1999). These biases together represent a substantial barrier to effective 
learning. 
Mantere et al (2013), having conducted an intensive cross-case analysis of 
three hi-tech organisations which went bankrupt, conclude that attributions of 
entrepreneurial failure do not conform to attribution theory. They argue that the 
attributions cannot be viewed as a self-serving tendency to avoid 
responsibility. Indeed, they argue that entrepreneurs use self-justification to 
make sense of entrepreneurial failures. In this way, they maintain self-esteem 
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and are able to learn from the failure more effectively. Principally the study 
found that 63% of entrepreneurs accepted personal or collective responsibility 
for failure (the remainder, however, did blame others outside the organisation 
or blamed the hand of fate). Entrepreneurs using self-justification assigned 
faults to the ‘old me’ and insights gained to the ‘new me’, thus previously held 
beliefs about themselves are discarded to retain rationality and self-esteem. 
The positive outcome is that this cognitive approach diminishes negative 
emotions and facilitates learning from the failure. This theory is in part 
supported by Baron (2000) whose research indicates that entrepreneurs find 
it easier to admit mistakes to themselves and those around them than non-
entrepreneurs.  
The research of Yamakawa et al (2010) suggest that entrepreneurs who blame 
themselves for intelligent failure (internal attribution), rather than a factor 
outside of their control, are more likely to be successful with future ventures. 
They argue, however, that this relationship continues until the number of 
failures amount to a level that reduces the effectiveness of learning, self-
efficacy, and subsequent new venture success. When failure levels are not 
affecting self-efficacy, it is argued that internal attribution stimulates 
entrepreneurs to learn. Additionally, Yamakawa and Cardon (2015) find that 
‘unstable’ internal attribution is positively associated with how much 
entrepreneurs perceive that they learned from their failure episode. The term 
‘unstable’ refers to the causation factor, and whether it can change over time, 
or not (for example, lack of knowledge on how to manage the business).  
Indeed, they also find that when unstable internal attribution occurs, 
entrepreneurs who start a new venture more quickly after venture failure, 
perceive they learned more from failure. Their finding that stable external 
attribution is negatively associated with perceived learning from venture failure 
perhaps supports the argued relationship between attribution and learning 
from failure. 
Whist there is significant literature on psychological reasons for failure 
avoidance, McGrath (1999) suggests that anti-failure biases can lead to 
behaviour which centre on avoiding failure by dishonest means; specifically, 
through metrics manipulation, and diverting resources. Individuals can directly 
intervene in the evaluation of a project by manipulating relevant metrics to 
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produce favourable results, which means the failure may never be detected. 
She also adds that for reasons of a non-economic intrinsic or psychological 
nature, the life of partially or wholly failed projects may be extended by 
diverting resources to support underperforming projects, and this reduces the 
learning opportunity.  
Due to attributional cognitive biases, Kc et al, (2013) argue that individuals are 
more likely to learn from other people’s failure episodes than from their own 
failures. Individuals will attribute cause of the failed venture to the 
entrepreneur, and this encourages effort to understand the reasons behind the 
failure. Individuals are more likely to take note of other people’s failures and 
process data in a manner to create learning and new knowledge. In this way, 
individuals generate significant learning from failure, and in some instances, 




Entrepreneurial failure can create a mix of negative emotions which may affect 
the way the entrepreneur processes information and which negatively impacts 
on their ability to learn from such a negative event (Shepherd, 2003). Shepherd 
et al (2009) argue that grief is a negative emotion which is linked to the loss of 
something special and that managing the grief process associated with 
entrepreneurial failure impacts on both the ability to learn from failure, and the 
commitment to future projects. Entrepreneurs are often passionate about the 
projects they initiate and drive individuals and teams who are more creative 
when they are passionate about what they are doing. The more energy, 
passion and commitment that go into a project, the higher the level of grief 
when the project fails, which can then negatively affect the entrepreneur, their 
ability to learn and their commitment to future projects. Additionally Shepherd 
(2003) argues that the interference of grief on learning is higher when the 
volume of feedback information is greater. 
Shepherd et al (2013) argue that higher levels of negative emotion occur from 
corporate entrepreneurial project failure when an individual: 
 places more importance on the project 
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 is not expecting the project to fail 
 has a lower level of emotional intelligence to enable emotion regulation 
 has limited exposure to project failure 
The higher the levels of negative emotion affect the individual as it ‘”narrows 
their attention, interferes with their information processing capabilities, and 
reduces feelings of control; these consequences, in turn, adversely impact 
learning” (p.888). Indeed, on an accumulated basis, the more project failures 
experienced by an individual, the more negative emotions accumulate, which 
in turn reduces the ability of the individual to learn from failure.  
Viewing failure with a differing perspective enhances the ability for an 
individual to learn. To enable this process, individuals may be encouraged to 
engage in counterfactual thinking to enhance learning (ibid). Indeed, Arora et 
al (2013) suggest that training aspiring entrepreneurs in counterfactual thinking 
would have a positive impact. They argue that, as entrepreneurs understand 
themselves better so they can learn how this developed self-understanding 
impacts on their perspective of past events.  Thus, this self-reflection and self-
regulation will provide the opportunity to maintain and develop self-efficacy, 
and most significantly, their ability to learn from failure. 
Aversion to failure, self-efficacy, cognitive biases and grieving represent 
psychological issues that affect the process of learning from failure. When 
considered together, these psychological factors suggest that managing the 
intelligent failure process is laden with substantial complexity and difficulty. 
Whilst the psychological barriers are significant to learning from failure there 
are some important organisational barriers that also add to the overriding 
challenge of gaining lessons from failure. 
 
2.3.5.2 Organisational factors and learning from failure 
 
A review of entrepreneurial literature suggests there are a number of factors 
that act as an obstacle to learning from failure which reside within an 
organisational context. Organisational barriers to the process of learning from 
failure principally reside in matters relating to management, the detection of 
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failure, post-failure meetings, small and large failure, termination of projects, 




Centring on the management issues, Cannon and Edmondson (2005) suggest 
that managers find it difficult to engage in effective learning from failure. They 
argue that the tendencies of individual denial, distortion, avoidance or 
disassociation from failures are heightened in the ranks of management who 
tend to reward success and penalise failure. This can be compounded when 
senior management behaviour, organisational structures, culture, policies and 
procedures reflect a low propensity of failure tolerance. They add that 
management reward systems can impact negatively on effective failure 
analysis as the process requires a depth of reflection, openness, patience and 
a tolerance for ambiguity. Managers, however, are often institutionally 
rewarded for decisiveness, efficiency and action, thus the juxtaposition 
represents a significant barrier for organisational learning. 
Even when new lessons are learned there remains the challenge of 
transferring the new knowledge from one unit to another within an organisation 
which may not occur due to inefficient communication and operational 
systems, and due to organisational politics (Huber, 1991). Indeed, internal 
politics also is a significant factor that is influential in the process of learning 
from failure. Senior managers who seek to maintain their political power 
protect their interests and this can show itself in the form of non-disclosure of 
failure (Baumard and Starbuck, 2005). Further, the involvement of influential 
personnel combined with significant investment in the project can lead to the 
hiding of or non-analysis of  intelligent failure (Manimala et al., 2006). Even at 
Nokia, with its well proven management systems in capturing insights and 
learning from failed ventures, found organisational politics difficult to manage 
(McGrath et al., 2006). At times politics made objective discussion of venture 
failure difficult and so subsequent recouping challenging. In one case a 
venture that was spun off was later deemed to be an attractive area of 
opportunity and the organisation had to relearn the knowledge gained in the 




2.3.5.2.2 Detection of failure 
 
Whist the process of learning from failure can be hindered by organisational 
politics, research suggests difficulty also rests within failure detection. 
Edmondson (2011) argues that the fundamental problem of intelligent failure 
detection is that despite the existence of sophisticated methods and systems 
for detection, they are prolifically underused. However, messengers of failure 
continue to be reticent in coming forward to communicate to their bosses and 
colleagues, even if they are new to the organisation. Often it is the behaviour 
of middle management that is a critical determinant in how detection of failure 
is communicated. Middle management response, encouragement of open 
discussion and showing of both humility and curiosity impacts on reporting 
teams and individuals (2011). McGrath and McMillan (2000) suggest that there 
are external pressures which lead to managers resisting recognition. They 
observed some powerful distributors that were pressurising a development 
manager to continue with a project regardless of the poor performance of the 
venture for the firm. Other failure detection problems exist particularly when it 
relates to customer feedback. Tax and Brown (1998) in their study of service 
failure found that within the service industry the biggest barrier to 
organisational learning is the very low percentage (5 – 10 %) of unhappy 
customers who register a complaint. Customers can fail to complain due to: 
a) Belief that the organisation will do nothing about it 
b) Not wanting to confront the responsible individual 
c) Uncertainty about their rights 
d) Concern over the personal cost in time and effort 
e) Anticipation of negative ramifications relating to future service provision. 
Even when customers do make a complaint, the study suggests that most firms 
fail to actually document and categorise complaints effectively, which makes 
learning difficult. The lack of documentation is due to staff having little interest 
in listening to negative customer feedback, treating complaints as an isolated 
event not requiring disclosure to management, avoiding taking responsibility 
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for the issue - blaming the customer, and having no systems in place in which 
to disclose information regarding complaints to those responsible for the 
failure. 
 
2.3.5.2.3 Post failure meetings 
 
Even when failure is effectively detected, there is the tricky process of 
managing the post-failure meetings. Indeed, Cannon and Edmondson (2005) 
argue that inability of management to effectively manage the post failure 
meetings can mean that little shared learning is achieved. Social factors can 
frustrate constructive dialogue and analysis, which can lead to disintegration 
of reviews into finger pointing, name-calling, and an opportunity to reprimand. 
Individuals can be derided and embarrassed in public, which can leave ill 
feeling and strained relationships. Essentially, most managers do not have the 
skills to manage such hot emotions in a way that maximises the learning 
potential of such a session (ibid). 
 
2.3.5.2.4 Small and large failures 
 
Research suggests that the size of the failure, whether it is large or small, is 
relevant to the discussion. Indeed, the empirical research of Baumard and 
Starbuck (2005) suggest that the propensity to learn is significantly reduced in 
both large and small intelligent failures. In the case of a large failure, managers 
offer general explanations for the failure, centring on idiosyncratic and 
exogenous factors such as wider societal trends or outside involvement thus 
negating any further enquiry. Additionally, larger failures occur over a longer 
period that may dilute accountability (due to management turnover) and create 
the opportunity to conceal the failure for a considerable time. In the case of 
small failures, management interpretation can also inhibit effective learning. 
Managers can interpret event failures as illustrative of the idiocy of moving 
away from the core mantra of the organisation. Indeed, the natural reaction of 
managers is to dismiss failures that contest core beliefs. In both cases, the 
lack of analysis negates the opportunity to learn from failure. The differing sizes 
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of intelligent failure affect the ability to learn and this argument has synergies 
with research on failure size through the lens of project termination. 
 
2.3.5.2.5 Termination of projects 
 
Corbett et al (2007) suggest that failure can be difficult to learn from as lead 
entrepreneurs lack effectiveness in choosing the best time to terminate a 
project. They argue that there are three termination points or ‘scripts’ that affect 
an organisation’s ability to learn from failure: undisciplined termination, 
strategic termination, and innovation drift. Undisciplined termination relates to 
the quick decision to end the project, which can mean learning is reduced as 
the projects are not allowed to develop. Innovation drift relates to organisations 
letting projects with less strong prospects continue when termination would be 
more appropriate. In this instance, learning may be reduced due to, firstly, the 
time lag involved which diminishes the memory of the organisation, secondly 
the lack of ownership of the project, and thirdly, the non-commercialisation of 
the innovation. Royer (2003) asserts that innovation drift can also occur due to 
the collective belief within the organisation. The widespread belief of managers 
in a project to ultimately succeed becomes so strong that their faith blinds them 
from seeing the reality of the situation. This blind faith is driven by the passion 
of individual belief that can spread rapidly, particularly if it reinforces the 
desires or perceptions of other people. Further, she suggests that as blind faith 
spreads to the project decision makers, the ability to end a project significantly 
diminishes and termination drift occurs. McGrath and MacMillan (2000) refer 
to termination drift as ‘entrapment’ suggesting that it can occur when there is 
a mass of optimism within the venture team, or when the development 
manager cannot terminate the project because of the emotional burden of 
recognising the personal commitment and sacrifice made by the venture team. 
Corbett et al (2007) argue that strategic termination is the balance between 
the undisciplined termination and innovation drift, whereby a structured 
approach provides sufficient information to make a timely decision on 
termination or otherwise. Strategic termination maximises learning for the 
entrepreneur because there is a willingness to reflect on, and learn, what went 
wrong in order to progress future projects. Undisciplined termination and 
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innovation drift, therefore, lead to a significantly reduced opportunity to learn 
from intelligent failure. An example would be the approach of Nokia as 
illustrated by McGrath et al (2006). Nokia managed termination decisions 
decisively, usually making discontinuation rulings within the first year of the 
venture. By so doing, those close to the venture did not become too personally 
attached and were protected from any stigma that might be attached to the 
venture. 
 
2.3.5.2.6 Technical factors 
 
Cannon and Edmondson (2005) suggest that there are significant technical 
barriers to learning from failure. There can be an inadequate understanding of 
the relevant scientific method and this limitation to an individual’s intuition and 
‘sense making’ ability can lead to false conclusions. They also argue that, at a 
pragmatic level, one of the most important factors in identifying failure is the 
accessibility of necessary data and the ability to interpret it and engage in a 
robust process of analysis. Without this ability, the learning process is 
significantly impaired. Indeed, in a more generic perspective, Muehlfield et al 
(2012) assert that it is the complexity of organisational activities that makes it 
harder to learn from failure. 
 
2.3.5.3 Summary – Barriers to learning from failure 
 
A review of literature highlights a significant number of challenges that 
organisations face in trying to create and maintain an effective process of 
learning from failure. The challenges or barriers to learning rest within the 
psychological and organisational contexts and are often complex as well as 
difficult to address.  The combination of the identified psychological and 
organisation factors present a fundamental challenge and it may be argued 
therefore, that it is perhaps not surprising that organisations find it so difficult 
to achieve the desired learning from failure. However, literature does offer 





2.3.6 Managing the barriers to learning from failure 
 
Barriers to learning from failure are significant in volume and in complexity, so 
how can organisations break through them? What can organisations do to 
normalise the process of learning from failure? In this section attention centres 
on managing the psychological and organisational facets to enable an effective 
process of learning from failure. 
Farson and Keyes (2002) argue that in order to create a culture that accepts 
failure, where people are comfortable with the concept, the organisation must 
abandon the current inherent idea of personal competition. The concept of 
competition focuses on winning as the goal, which then heightens the negative 
connotations of losing, and this can stifle creativity, openness and honesty. A 
collaborative approach centres on problem solving, sharing information and 
project advancement. This collaborative approach leads the way to maximising 
the failure opportunity and true innovation. Also important is management’s 
approach towards communication: “Failure-tolerant leaders send clear 
messages to their organisations that constructive mistakes are not only 
acceptable but worthwhile. Employees feel that they have been given the 
green light to set out and explore, no longer thinking in terms of success or 
failure but instead in terms of learning and experience” (p.71). This 
legitimisation is important. McGrath and MacMillan (2000) suggest that 
successful entrepreneurs ‘recoup’ knowledge with constructive post mortems 
which legitimise entrepreneurial failure: “recouping helps convey to those on 
the venture team – valuable talent whom the firm could ill afford to have 
crippled by a feeling of failure – that it was the venture that failed, not them” 
(p.333). 
Indeed, in a study of the venture program at Nokia, McGrath et al (2006) 
identifies that high performers sought opportunities to be part of new ventures. 
At Nokia, first-hand experience of failure was seen as an essential 
management development practice. Nokia created an environment where 
failure and lessons learned were openly discussed and could therefore be 
transferred to other ventures. Indeed, failure was accepted by management to 
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the extent that those people involved in processes of intelligent failure were 
promoted because of their involvement. 
An important part of normalising failure is for managers to respond supportively 
when individuals report failures, showing a questioning, enquiring mind. In 
order to create a climate of blameless reporting, leaders should focus on 
reward first and addressing the problems second (Edmondson, 2011). When 
managers ‘shoot the messenger’ it has a significant impact on the individual 
and the organisation and dissuades people from bringing attention to their own 
and other’s failures in the future, thus weakening the process (Cannon and 
Edmondson, 2005). Kriegesmann et al (2005) highlight the approach of BMW 
AG in Regensburg in 1990, where the head of personnel, Gerhard Bihil, 
initiated a ‘flop of the month’ program. Employees who won the award 
demonstrated that they had developed an innovative idea even though they 
eventually failed at the stage of implementation. Significantly the award was 
made by Bihil and thus he took personal responsibility for the successful 
failure. As Bihil puts it, “as a managerial team, we regard this as a fine thing. It 
is a pity it didn’t work, but don’t let that get you down and try something else” 
(ibid, p. 61). Further, Kriegesmann et al (2005) also highlight an initiative at the 
car manufacturer called “Creative Error of the Month.” The initiative goes 
beyond lip service to elicit genuine toleration of failure. Whilst recognising the 
economic need to avoid routine business process errors, the aim of the 
programme is achieve cultural change, “from a climate of fear to one of trust 
and confidence in which innovative commitment is treated fairly even if it does 
not in fact succeed” (p.63). By removing the punitive climate of fear of failure 
and offering safety nets, the organisation is positioned to increase 
entrepreneurial activity (Levinthal and March, 1993). 
Indeed, leaders need to build a psychologically safe environment to be able to 
encourage employees to speak up when they identify problems, (Edmondson, 
2011). “In a psychologically safe environment, members share a general 
sense that others will not punish them because of their mistakes” (Gu et al., 
2013 p. 91). 
Kahn (1990) sees psychological safety as a feeling whereby people can 
express themselves “without fear of negative consequences to self-image, 
status or career” (p. 708). People feel safe in situations where they believe and 
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trust that they will not suffer for their personal engagement. When people feel 
their situation is secure, trustworthy, predictable, and where behavioural 
consequences are transparent, psychological safety is prevalent. He goes on 
to identify four influences: 
1. Interpersonal relationships, where there exists a state in which ongoing 
relationships offer support, trust, openness, and flexibility, with no presence of 
any threat. Stronger interpersonal relationships allow flexibility that in turn 
allows people to try, and fail, without fear of the consequences. It is safe to 
share ideas and concepts and criticism is constructive not destructive. 
2. Group and intergroup dynamics, where informal and unconscious roles leave 
space for self-expression within and between inter organisational groups. In 
differing groups, individuals unconsciously find themselves in differing roles 
and, depending on the role and the situation, will feel more or less likely to 
engage personally. 
3. Management style and process, where leadership behaviours demonstrate 
support, resilience, consistency, trust, and competence. Where management 
environments are supportive so people can try, and fail, without fear. Indeed, 
when management allow people some control over their work, so the feeling 
of safety increases. However, when managers are unpredictable, inconsistent 
or hypercritical, they create uncertainty that reduces people’s propensity to 
engage. 
4. Organisational norms, where those that conform to general behaviours 
experience safety, and those that deviate from behavioural norms experience 
anxiety. Norms may regulate emotional or physical action. So questioning 
customary thoughts or behaviours patterns tends to lead people to a feeling of 
less safety. 
Managers are instrumental in maintaining a climate that encourages and 
fosters learning from failure and, to enable team learning from mistakes, social 
capital is required to a certain extent (Gu et al., 2013). Nahapiet and Ghoshal 
(1998) determine social capital as “the sum of the actual and potential 
resources embedded within, available through, and derived from the network 
of relationships possessed by an individual or social unit” (p.243), and argue 
that there are three individual dimensions of social capital; structural (a social 
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structure), relational (trust) and cognitive (a common understanding). In their 
research, Gu et al (2013) discovered a reliable and strong correlation between 
the three dimensions and team learning from mistakes. Thus, an 
organisational environment that can support and develop levels of social 
capital is well placed to enhance learning from intelligent failure (ibid). 
Carmeli and Gittel (2009) assert that high quality relationships which are 
inclusive of shared goals, shared knowledge, and mutual respect lead to an 
increased propensity to learn from failure. Where there is a web of good quality 
internal and external relationships (strong positive social capital), so people 
feel safe to speak openly. Where psychological safety is prevalent, members 
are willing to voice concerns and act on important information from each other 
(Gu et al., 2013). In this way, failures are brought to the organisation’s 
attention, which leads to analysis, new conceptions, and new knowledge. 
Competing goals, a lack of understanding of, and a lack of respect for each 
other’s roles is likely to lead to blaming, reduced psychological safety and 
reduced learning from failure (Carmeli and Gittell, 2009). 
Morand (1995) suggests that the organisational culture and organisational 
structure can affect an environment supportive of innovation and 
entrepreneurship through the medium of “interaction orders.” These 
“interaction orders” or behaviours may be visible in: 
 linguistic elements (e.g. formal: fully articulated speech, or informal: 
phonological slurring),  
 conversational turn taking and topic selection (e.g. formal is regulated 
and informal is unregulated),  
 emotional and proxemics gestures (e.g. formal sober facial expressions 
or informal latitude of emotional expression),  
 and physical and contextual (e.g. formal versus informal clothing, 
symmetrical versus asymmetrical arrangement of furniture) 
He argues that culture and structure affect these “interaction orders” that in 
turn affect the organisational entrepreneurial environment, such as in the free 
flow of information, creativity, familiarity and affective involvement of people, 
dynamic systems, and the levelling of status. Therefore, to influence these 
factors towards achieving the desired organised environment, management 
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may focus on developing appropriate attention towards the organisational 
culture and structure. Additionally, Carmeli and Gittell (2009) argue that the 
shaping of the organisational structure can positively impact on the 
development and continuation of a psychological safe environment. Where 
distinct divisional roles, accountable for different work activity exist, so the 
potential for blaming increases. Therefore, hierarchies that are by nature flat 
are encouraged. Additionally, the formation of a strong social structure, where 
high levels of trust and a shared paradigm exist, can support and enhance 
psychological safety (Gu et al., 2013).  
Structures that support such social networking and collaboration can be 
effective in communicating lessons learned. As highlighted by McGrath et al 
(2006) Nokia were very effective at dispersing lessons learnt across the 
organisation. Internal structures centred on networking whereby management 
take pride in collaboration: 
 Extensive training and networking events 
 Personnel rotation to different divisions 
 Documentation of codified knowledge 
 Temporary assignments for skilled, experienced people 
By driving collaboration (and a psychologically safe environment), Nokia 
effectively created a way for knowledge to be widely disseminated. 
Cannon and Edmondson (2005) add that to develop this state of psychological 
safety leaders need to model the behaviours they desire. Firstly ‘walking the 
talk’ is an important part of communicating appropriate behaviour and 
secondly, modelling can assist in the process of showing individuals how to 
enact the desired behaviour by identifying and analysing failure, creating ideas 
and inviting different explanations and constructive criticism, and then 
capturing and using the learning. Further Cannon and Edmondson (2005) 
suggest that psychological safety is created one work group at a time, with 
managers and peers disseminating appropriate attitudes and activities. 
Indeed, developing management skills in coaching can facilitate the 
progression of an established learning environment. Important in the first 
instance, however, is that leaders accurately frame the work so that there is a 
shared understanding of the kind of failures that are deemed ‘intelligent’. 
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As part of developing the psychological safety needed by individuals, leaders 
need to create a vision that reinforces the entrepreneurial focus of the 
organisation, highlighting the importance of intelligent failure, experimentation 
and learning from failure. A strong entrepreneurial vision is fundamental to the 
ability of the entrepreneur to make sense of, and learn from failure. When 
confronted by failure, it is this vision that reinforces the commitment of the 
entrepreneur towards a successful conclusion (McKenzie and Sud, 2008). 
Furthermore Lafley and Charan (2008) argue organisations should foster good 
innovation leaders. They argue that good innovation leaders are hard to find 
and therefore companies need to preserve, protect and promote them even in 
the light of failure. Companies that display authentic commitment to 
fearlessness towards failure, openly promote individuals whose projects may 
have failed despite effective leadership. This action speaks louder than any 
company communication and shows commitment to rewarding risk-taking. 
Cannon and Edmondson (2005) assert that reframing the managerial mind-set 
may help to enhance an appropriate paradigm for organisations to manage 
failure effectively. The mind-set changes include: 
 A learning-centred approach, which sees failure as a natural occurrence of 
a healthy experimentation and learning process, rather than a traditional 
stance where failure is deemed as unacceptable. 
 
 The belief that effective performance involves failure avoidance should be 
repositioned. The new mind-set should emphasise that effective 
performance involves learning from intelligent failure and communicating 
lessons learned across the organisation. 
 
 From a psychological perspective, curiosity, humour and a mind-set that 
sees capturing learning as progressive for both the individual and the 
organisation is the goal, rather than the normal mind-set of self-protection. 
 
 The leadership approach should move from efficient daily management to 




Indeed, Farson and Keyes (2002) argue that the best leaders focus on 
increasing the experience, knowledge, and creativity of the workforce through 
taking a tangible interest in the projects of their employees, analysing projects 
supportively rather than manipulative praising (which demotivates people), and 
earning empathy by exhibiting their own failings. 
Van Dyck et al (2005) argue that there are seven common practices which 
positively support an error management culture. These include: 
 Communication about errors 
 Sharing error knowledge 
 Helping in error situations 
 Quick error decision and damage control 
 Analysing errors 
 Coordinating error handling 
 Effective error handling 
Over and above these practices Carmeli and Sheaffer (2008) identify in their 
research a positive and significant relationship between organisational 
learning from failure and what they term ‘learning leadership’ which, they 
argue, consists of top management teams who work to: 
 Exchange high quality ideas and solutions with each other 
 Encourage individual initiatives 
 Instil trust among employees 
 Defuse the political agenda to focus on truly essential issues. 
 Downplay information and indications from financial data. 
Top management working this way, provides a learning leadership approach 
that supports effective organisational learning from failure. 
In summary, the review of literature offers a number of possible suggestions 
that organisations can apply to help them tackle some of the barriers 
associated with learning from failure. A strong theme emerges around the 
creation of a climate that offers psychological safety, where leaders tolerate 
failure, encourage collaboration and socialisation. Additionally, the managerial 
mind-set addresses some organisational challenges centring on shaping a 
culture that effectively supports learning form failure. Combining these 
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suggestions literature offers significant insight into how organisations may 
overcome barriers within the ‘lessons learned’ process. 
 
2.4 Managing intelligent failure 
 
In the exploration of literature within the entrepreneurship domain, the review 
discovers discourse relating to three main themes in the area of learning from 
failure. The themes are the process of learning from failure, the psychological 
and organisational barriers, and an environment that supports learning from 
failure. It is argued that these themes create the components of intelligent 
failure that require managing. 
 
2.4.1 The process of learning from failure 
 
Within this first theme, literature centres on three streams of discussion: 
identifying failure, analysing failure, and communicating lessons learned from 
failure. It is argued that the three streams represent a process by which 
individuals and organisations learn from failure. 
Identifying failure: active and timely identification (Cannon and Edmondson, 
2005) stimulates the explanation process (Zhao and Seibert, 2006), reduces 
the likelihood of problem growth, multiplication, or incorporation in 
organisational wide system (Cannon and Edmondson, 2001) failures detection 
forms include ‘action-based detection’‘, outcome-based detection’, and 
‘detection by external limiting function’ (Zhao and Olivera, 2006), and also by 
customer identification (Barkai and Harison, 2012). Identifying failure 
represents the first stage of the learning from failure process. 
Analysing failure: to extract the maximum learning from an entrepreneurial 
failure a systematic process effort is required to acquire the facts, examine 
them thoroughly, and make conclusions about future actions (Kuratko et al., 
2011). Rigorous analysis and in-depth probing may discourage premature 
conclusions to allow complicated problems to be fully understood (Cannon and 
Edmondson, 2005). Analysis may come in the form of ‘post mortems’ (McGrath 
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and MacMillan, 2000), ‘after action reviews’ (Senge, 1990), ‘institute 
systematic project reviews’ (Gino and Pisano, 2011) or  ‘after innovation report’ 
(Lafley and Charan, 2008). 
Communicating lessons learned from failure: Organisational learning is 
dependent on the way in which information is distributed (Huber 1991). 
Influencing factors include those factors that affect the passing of information 
(such as relevance, workload, and gain from passing it on), the delay in 
communications, and the extent to which the information becomes distorted 
(ibid). Sharing of a common server, webcasts, emailing all assist the process 
(Lafley and Charan, 2008), as do ‘failure reports’ (Birkinshaw and Haas, 2016), 
knowledge sharing networks (Abu-Shanab et al, 2014) and a ‘monitored 
distribution’ system, enabling the distribution of lessons learnt on a ‘just-in-
time’ basis, when and where the knowledge is required (Weber and Aha 2003). 
Literature in the entrepreneurship domain suggests that in the process of 
learning from failure, identification is a prerequisite to the analysis of the failure, 
where learning occurs, before the new knowledge is shared across the 
organisation, leading to enhanced individual and organisational learning.  
However, in the exploration of ‘organisational learning’ literature, the review 
uncovers Kolb’s seminal ‘theory of experiential learning’ (1981) asserts that 
knowledge is created by the transformation of experience into new learning. 
He argues, “Learning is a continuous process grounded in experience” (Kolb, 
1984, p.21). He presents a theory in the form of a four stage cyclical process: 
Stage 1 relates to the concrete experience that forms the source of 
observations and reflections (the second stage). In stage 3, the respective 
observations and reflections form the platform for the construction of ideas, 
abstract concepts or generalisations by the learner that shape future action. 
The action is then tested in stage four to offer a further concrete experience, 




Figure 2.1 The experiential learning model - Kolb (1981) 
 
Kolb (1984) argues that “immediate personal experience is the focal point of 
learning” (p.21). In developing his theory he draws significant engagement 
from authors in enhancing and expanding the discussion on experiential 
learning across the years within the ‘organisational learning’ domain. This 
includes Senge (1990) Wolf and Kolb (1984) Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995) 
McGill and Beaty (2001) and Huber (1991) to name a few. Indeed, even within 
the entrepreneurship domain Jason Cope (2000, 2003, 2005, 2011), a 
prominent author in entrepreneurial learning adds to experiential learning and 
learning from failure theory. 
Perhaps, therefore, it may be argued that the literature review highlights two 
processes that add to the understanding of how organisations may learn from 
failure: One centring on organisational processes and another centring on a 
cognitive process. It may be further argued therefore, that the two may be 
combined to create a model that sees the learning from failure process as a 




Figure 2.2 The Process of learning from failure - adapted from Kolb (1981) 
The adapted model of Kolb (1981) above shows the amalgamation of both 
cognitive and organisational processes to deliver a five-stage model that 
illustrates the nature of the process of learning from failure. 
Stage 1: Taking Kolb’s (1981) model, the conceptual of a ‘concrete experience’ 
is extended to reflect a concrete experience centre around an intelligent failure. 
That is, an outcome where failure occurrence is recognised 
Stage 2: ‘Reflection’ replicates the ‘observation and reflection’ stage of Kolb’s 
model (and is supported by numerous authors for example Daudelin, (1996), 
Cope, (2003), Pittaway and Cope, (2007), and Bagheri and Pihie, (2011). 
Stage 3: ‘Analyses and conceptualise’ reflects Kolb’s ‘formation of abstract 
concepts and generalisations’ incorporating the nature of the pragmatic 
organisational process of analysis and the ‘after action review’. 
Stage 4: ‘Sharing knowledge and concepts’ is an additional facet to Kolb’s 
model and reflects the organisational process of sharing lessons learnt 
highlighted in entrepreneurial failure literature. As an example, in exploring a 
‘Lessons Learnt System’ used by  U.S. Government agencies, Weber and Aha 
(2003) identify a process for storing and distributing the lesson learned. The 
process is made up of four stages. As lessons come from experience, they are 
collected from those who lived the experiences. These ‘collected’ experiences 















in the ‘Lessons Learnt’ computer software. ‘Dissemination’ the last stage 
follows before the lessons are reused within the organisation.  
Stage five: ‘Testing implications of new concepts’ from Kolb’s model is shaped 
to ‘try a new approach’ in the adapted model. ‘Try a new approach’ relates to 
entrepreneurship theory centred on redirection of initiatives when failure 
occurs, specifically lean startup theory. As a new venture is developed through 
a process of iterative experimentation, when an experiment delivers a negative 
result, the venture may ‘pivot’ in a new direction utilising the lessons learned 
from that experiment (Ries, 2011, Blank and Dorf, 2012 Furr et al., 2014). 
In the adapted model, if the new approach ends in a failure occurrence the 5 
stage-cycle starts again. 
In this way, it is argued that the adapted model reflects the important constructs 
identified in literature and provides understanding as to the process of learning 
from failure.  
 
2.4.2 Psychological and organisational barriers to learning from failure 
 
From the review of literature, theory is discovered which purports that barriers 
to learning from failure are predominantly psychological or organisational by 
nature. Psychological barriers include aversion to failure (Edmondson, 2011), 
high and low self-efficacy (Cannon and Edmondson, 2001), cognitive biases 
(McGrath, 1999), and grieving (Shepherd et al., 2009). Organisational barriers 
include management behaviours (Baumard and Starbuck, 2005), detection of 
failure (McGrath and MacMillan, 2000), post failure meetings (Cannon and 
Edmondson, 2005), termination of projects (Corbett et al., 2007), and technical 
factors (Muehlfeld et al., 2012). Each of these barriers have individual 







2.4.3 An environment which supports learning from failure 
 
Literature suggests that these barriers to learning from failure may be 
addressed by creating and maintaining an environment that supports learning 
from failure. Specifically, an environment which normalises failure, a climate 
that offers psychological safety (Edmondson, 2011), where leaders tolerate 
failure (Kriegesmann et al., 2005), encourage collaboration and socialisation 
(Farson and Keyes, 2002), and where a managerial mindset is developed 
which shapes the culture to manage organisational failure processes 
effectively (Van Dyck et al., 2005). 
 
2.4.4 Managing intelligent failure – the review of literature 
 
The review of literature shapes current understanding in the area of learning 
from intelligent failure. Discussion predominantly lies within three areas: The 
process of learning from failure (made of organisational and cognitive 
processes), psychological and organisational barriers to learning from failure, 
and an environment that supports learning from failure. Essentially literature 
purports that in order to effectively manage intelligent failure, organisations 
need to strategically manage the three areas (Figure 2.3). 
 
Figure 2.3 Managing intelligent failure 
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Literature also argues that managing intelligent failure leads to individual and 
organisational learning from failure episodes (Huber, 1991, McGrath, 1999, 
Cope, 2005, Cannon and Edmondson 2005, Bagheri and Pihie, 2011, 
Edmondson 2011), therefore offer an output as in figure 2.4. 
 
Figure 2.4 Managing intelligent failure and individual and organisational 
learning 
 
2.4.5 The organisation’s entrepreneurial capability 
 
Literature suggests that an organisation’s entrepreneurial capability is its 
overall capacity to utilise internal and external resources to explore (recognise, 
discover, create) and exploit opportunities (Abdelgawad et al., 2013). It also 
suggests that entrepreneurial capability is predominantly effected by the 
nature of the environment of the organisation, and the nature of the corporate 
entrepreneur.  
The nature of environment may affect the organisation’s entrepreneurial 
capability as it may affect corporate entrepreneurs within the organisation 
ability to operate. Literature puts forward a number of climates that may be 
supportive to corporate entrepreneurs and, therefore, the organisation’s 
entrepreneurial capability. The climates include openness and trust (Isaksen 
and Lauer, 2002), autonomy (Kuratko et al., 2014), risk-taking (Hornsby et al., 
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2002), tolerance of failure (Lafley and Charan, 2008), rewards (Ahmed, 1998), 
team collaboration (Treuer and McMurray, 2012), and learning, time for 
entrepreneurial activity (Bessant and Tidd, 2011), positive emotions 
(Vacharkulksemsuk et al., 2011), and commitment from top management 
(Burns, 2013). When considered together, the climates offer a clear indication 
of the nature of an entrepreneurial environment. 
The presence of corporate entrepreneurs within the organisation also 
enhances the entrepreneurial capability of the organisation. Literature argues 
that the predominant characteristics of the corporate entrepreneur relate to 
their need for achievement (McClelland, 1961, Collins et al., 2004), risk taking 
propensity (Brockhaus, 1980, Zhao et al., 2010), self-efficacy (Bandura, 1977, 
Chen et al., 1998), internal locus of control (Rotter, 1966, Mueller and Thomas, 
2001), tolerance of ambiguity (Norton, 1975, Schere, 1982) and need for 
autonomy (Rauch and Frese, 2007b, Thapa, 2015).  
In consideration of current entrepreneurship literature, it may be argued that 
the combination of entrepreneurs and the nature of the entrepreneurial 
environment affect the entrepreneurial capability of the organisation and forms 
the construct within which entrepreneurial initiatives materialise. Some of 
these entrepreneurial initiatives end in failure. Thus, the organisation’s 
entrepreneurial capability embeds the generation of initiatives and ventures, 






Figure 2.5 The organisation’s entrepreneurial capability 
 
2.4.6 The conceptual framework 
 
In considering the above components together, it is possible to conceive a 
conceptual framework showing possible linkage (figure 2.6).  
 




2.4.6.1 The relationship between entrepreneurial capability and managing 
intelligent failure 
 
In the conceptual framework, intelligent failure resides within a level of 
entrepreneurial capability which, as a construct affects managing intelligent 
failure. Indeed, for some elements within the managing intelligent failure 
process, the relationship is vice versa. For example: 
Levels of openness and trust affect the management of intelligent failure 
because it can reduce or increase the psychological barrier of failure aversion 
(Cannon and Edmondson, 2001). In an opposing direction, managing failure 
aversion, as part of the managing intelligent failure process, affects levels of 
openness and trust within the entrepreneurial environment, which encourages 
or discourages entrepreneurs to act (ibid), thus affecting the entrepreneurial 
capability of the organisation. Other elements that affect the entrepreneurial 
capability may include collaboration, learning, and tolerance of failure, self-
efficacy, and internal locus of control. 
 
2.4.6.2 The relationship between individual and organisational learning, and 
entrepreneurial capability 
 
The conceptual framework also illustrates that individual and organisational 
learning gained from failure episodes affect certain elements within the 
organisation’s entrepreneurial capability. For example, learning may affect the 
corporate entrepreneur by enhancing their self-efficacy, that is, they believe in 
their own capability to perform a task in a similar domain to a higher level. 
Learning may also affect the corporate entrepreneur’s internal locus of control 
by reinforcing their natural ‘internal’ disposition by enhancing their ability. 
Within the entrepreneurial environment context, individual and organisational 
learning may enhance the climate of learning (Cannon and Edmondson, 2005) 
and enhance the readiness of the organisation to learn, (Sitkin, 1992). It may 
also enhance management commitment to entrepreneurship as learning 
creates a valuable result and may be added to the existing stock of 




2.4.7 The managing intelligent failure conceptual framework 
 
A summary of the conceptual framework: 
Intelligent failure is embedded within the entrepreneurial capability of the 
organisation. 
The entrepreneurial capability affects, and is partially affected by, the 
managing of intelligent failure. 
Entrepreneurial literature centres on three elements that are argued as making 
up the managing intelligent failure construct: 
1. The process of learning from failure (inclusive of both cognitive and 
organisational mechanisms) 
2. Psychological and organisational barriers to learning from failure 
3. An environment which supports learning from failure 
It argued that to engage in learning from failure intelligently, each of these 
elements are addressed by management. As managers address each 
element, so they are “managing intelligent failure”. 
The outcome of managing intelligent failure is argued as being enhanced 
individual and organisational learning. Learning feeds back into the existing 
levels of entrepreneurial capability within the organisation. In this way, the 
management of intelligent failure affects the development of the organisation’s 
entrepreneurial capability (as well as enhancing organisational knowledge 
stocks). 
After consideration of the proposed arguments, it is possible to develop the 
initial theoretical framework put forward at the beginning of the review by 








2.4.8 Managing intelligent failure: Conclusion 
 
2.4.8.1 Augmenting the learning from failure domain 
 
Baumard and Starbuck (2005) assert that “there has been so few studies of 
learning from failure” (p.282). Whilst research offers insights into important 
aspects of the learning from entrepreneurial failure domain, literature suggests 
that a relatively small number of academics have addressed the phenomenon. 
McGrath (1999) and Shepherd (2003) argue that there is an absence of 
developed theory on literature in entrepreneurial failure. Indeed, recently, 
Harrison and Leitch (2005), in their review of existing literature conclude that 
research on learning from failure remains in its infancy: “Despite the recent 
upsurge in interest, organisational learning from failures has received only 
scant attention by management investigators despite its avowedly pivotal role 
in prevention of escalation into ineffective systems” (Carmeli and Sheaffer, 
2008 p.468). In an interpretive phenomenological analysis of entrepreneurial 
learning from failure, focusing on ‘key contributions’, Cope (2005), a prominent 
author in the learning from failure domain, posits that, “reflecting on these 
contributions to understanding learning from failure, what emerges is a lack of 
rich substantive evidence to support conceptualisations, particularly within the 
entrepreneurial context” (p.206). At a holistic level Rae and Carswell (2000) 
argue that, “greater understanding of the ways in which people learn to work 
in entrepreneurial ways is needed if significant advance in entrepreneurial 
activity is to take place since, in our view, learning is critical to entrepreneurial 
effectiveness” (p.220). It may therefore be argued that additional research is 
required to develop understanding across the width and depth of the learning 
from failure domain. 
Further, Cannon and Edmondson (2001) argue that “another limitation in the 
literature is that the process of learning from failure has not been clearly 
described” (p.162) and that the knowledge of the conditions under which 
management of failure takes place is lacking. Ten years later and it is 
suggested that the gap in literature remains: “It appears almost axiomatic that 
learning occurs in relation to failure, and yet a clear articulation of the specific 
learning processes and outcomes of venture failure remains elusive” (Cope, 
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2011 p.606). In this article Cope continues: “Despite enlightening the personal 
and social dimensions of learning from failure, what is missing from these 
studies is a committed engagement with wider learning theory that can aid a 
deeper conceptualisation of what entrepreneurs learn from failure as well as 
how they learn it” (p.606), “if learning from failure is indeed a journey then 
further research is required to understand what this journey entails, what 
stages are involved and what obstacles may line the way” (p.606). 
Reflecting on the need for further research in the learning from failure domain, 
and specifically on the heightened need for further research into the process 
of learning from failure itself, this thesis seeks to address this gap by empirical 





This chapter has reviewed existing literature with the aim of increasing 
understanding of entrepreneurial failure learning. It looks to explain how 
organisations learn from failure. In seeking to develop an enriched 
understanding of the learning from failure process, it first explores the nature 
of entrepreneurship, corporate entrepreneurship, and the entrepreneurial 
process, as a means to provide a base of theoretical knowledge to underpin 
the thesis. The review then seeks to illuminate the setting for entrepreneurial 
failures by centring attention on the corporate entrepreneur and the nature of 
the organisation that enables entrepreneurship. 
With an enhanced understanding of the entrepreneurial organisation the 
review highlights literature that explores the cognitive and organisational 
processes that shape and influence learning from failure. It articulates the 
nature of organisational learning from failure, the challenges to the process 
and how they may be overcome. Importantly, it also highlights from a cognitive 
perspective how individuals may learn from failure. Finally, the review delivers 
a conceptual framework that pulls together the central facets of attention from 
literature to tentatively propose a holistic perspective of how organisations may 
manage intelligent failure. 
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The review highlights that: 
• The theory of entrepreneurship is beset with ambiguity, differing 
arguments and lack of alignment. Attention centres on innovation 
(Schumpeter, 1934), perception and exploitation (Kirzner, 1979), the strong 
relationship between the opportunity and the entrepreneur (Knight, 2012 
(1921), Timmons and Spinelli, 2004, Shane, 2012), and resources, (Casson, 
2003 (1982), Say et al., 1843, Penrose, 2011 (1959), Ireland et al., 2003), as 
a means to bring clarity to the nature of entrepreneurship. 
 
• The entrepreneurial organisation hosts a corporate entrepreneur who may 
have a need for achievement (McClelland, 1961, Collins et al., 2004), risk 
taking propensity (Brockhaus, 1980, Zhao et al., 2010), self-efficacy (Bandura, 
1977, Chen et al., 1998), an internal locus of control (Rotter, 1966, Mueller and 
Thomas, 2001), tolerance of ambiguity (Norton, 1975, Schere, 1982) and need 
for autonomy (Rauch and Frese, 2007b, Thapa, 2015). In order to support the 
traits of the entrepreneur the entrepreneurial organisation may create 
supporting climates such as, openness and trust (Isaksen and Lauer, 2002), 
autonomy (Kuratko et al., 2014), risk-taking (Hornsby et al., 2002), tolerance 
of failure (Lafley and Charan, 2008), rewards (Ahmed, 1998), team 
collaboration (Treuer and McMurray, 2012), and learning, time for 
entrepreneurial activity (Bessant and Tidd, 2011), positive emotions 
(Vacharkulksemsuk et al., 2011), and commitment from top management 
(Burns, 2013). 
 
• Cognitive learning from failure is heavily centred on experiential learning 
and centres on a dynamic process where knowledge is gained from 
experience, observation, and social interaction (Huber, 1991, Cope, 2005, 
Bagheri and Pihie, 2011). The organisational process of learning from failure 
centres on the stages of identification, analysis and communications of lessons 




• Barriers to learning from failure are psychological or organisational by 
nature. Psychological barriers include aversion to failure (Edmondson, 2011), 
high and low self-efficacy (Cannon and Edmondson, 2001), cognitive biases 
(McGrath, 1999), and grieving (Shepherd et al., 2009). Organisational barriers 
include management behaviours (Baumard and Starbuck, 2005), detection of 
failure (McGrath and MacMillan, 2000), post failure meetings (Cannon and 
Edmondson, 2005), termination of projects (Corbett et al., 2007) , and 
technical factors (Muehlfeld et al., 2012). 
 
• Barriers to learning from failure may be addressed by generating an 
environment which normalises failure creating a climate that offers 
psychological safety (Edmondson, 2011), where leaders tolerate failure 
(Kriegesmann et al., 2005), encourage collaboration and socialisation (Farson 
and Keyes, 2002), and by developing a managerial mindset which shapes the 
culture to manage organisational failure processes effectively (Van Dyck et al., 
2005). 
The review of literature provides a means to create a conceptual model that 
draws together on significant theories that relate to organisational learning 
from failure. The conceptual model creates a framework for the empirical 
exploration of learning from failure, the next stage of the research. The review 
also illuminates the necessity for research into the cognitive and organisational 
processes of learning from failure (Cope, 2011). This thesis responds by 
centring research in this area to develop further the explanation of how 












The aim of this research project is to explore how organisations manage 
intelligent failure in order to enhance their entrepreneurial capability. Primarily 
through interviews with individuals, and supported by a survey, this research 
aims to interpret findings in order to shed new light on how learning from 
intelligent failure occurs, and how the process is managed. Subsequently, the 
project will compare the findings with entrepreneurial literature, particularly 
relating to the process of learning from failure. The aim of this chapter is to 
address the nature of empirical exploration and the research methodology. 
The chapter discusses the nature of the study and the nature of the research 
phenomenon, that being the management of intelligent failure. It builds upon a 
conceptual model derived from literature to explain the complexities inherent 
in the process of managing intelligent failure domain. The philosophical 
approach of the research project is addressed through consideration of the 
philosophical influences of the researcher before centring on the research 
philosophy, ontology, and epistemology. This forms the philosophical 
approach that encompasses the whole research project and suggests that the 
research is appropriately served taking an inductive approach. 
Discussion will move on to explain and justify the use of a multiple case study 
strategy using mixed methods and the detail of how the research was 
executed. It is argued that a predominantly qualitative approach, centring on 
semi structured interviews, suits the exploration of the social complexity 
entwined in the research area, however, some use of quantitative data is also 
justified within the overall case study strategy. The chapter then explains how 
data is analysed with a full discussion that argues for the quality of the research 
design of this project. The ethics and limitations of this research are also 
discussed. In the first instance, attention centres on the nature of the research 




3.2 The nature of the research object 
 
From the review of existing literature a conceptual framework (figure 3.1) is 
considered, discussed, and utilised as means of shaping the subject of 
enquiry. In seeking to explore the identified areas of enquiry through empirical 




Figure 3.1: A conceptual framework based on a review of literature 
 
According to the review of literature, the process of managing intelligent failure 
is a structured process involving failure identification, analysis, learning from 
failure, and communication of those lessons. The process is supported by an 
environment that is specifically supportive to intelligent failure, and by the 
management of the negative emotions that are attached to failure. 
Literature asserts that learning from failure proves elusive (Manimala et al., 
2006, Corbett et al., 2007). Further reading offers a number of potential 
reasons as to why learning from failure is problematic. Indeed, literature 
elucidates that the principle barriers to the process fall into two main areas, 
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those being psychological, and organisational (Cannon and Edmondson, 
2005). 
Literature informs us that the psychological barriers centre on the inherent fear 
individuals have of failure which, derived from early child influences, heavily 
influences individual response when failure arises, or when the potential for 
failure arises (Carmeli, 2007). In this way, how people react when faced with 
failure, or the potential to fail, is heavily weighted in the psychology of the 
person and their individual exposure to failure and their experiences (ibid). 
Additionally, there are social influences that affect the research object. How 
society and organisations consider failure bears on the mind of the individual 
and their actions (Baumard and Starbuck, 2005). In this way, the psychological 
barriers also form part of the organisational barriers to learning from failure. 
Where organisational structures, culture and policies and procedures reflect 
low tolerance of failure, individuals are more likely to fear failure and avoid it, 
or association with it, at almost all costs (Farson and Keyes, 2002). Other 
organisational barriers include internal politics, senior management behaviour, 
dishonest avoidance of failure, and the subtle people management skills 
required to manage after action reviews (Cannon and Edmondson, 2005). 
By reflecting on the significant number of psychological and organisational 
facets offered by literature, the researcher argues that managing intelligent 
failure is both a highly emotive and highly complex phenomenon, and this is 
an important concern within the project design. As Cope (2011) highlights, 
“studies have been vital in building a clearer appreciation of failure as a 
complex process rather than an isolated event” (p.606). Within the research 
design, therefore, the very distinct nature of the process of management of 
failure domain shapes the empirical process at each stage. 
 
3.3 Philosophical approach 
 
3.3.1 Philosophical influences of the researcher 
 
The researcher comes from a background in industry. He has twenty-eight 
years of experience in the retail industry, across a mix of sectors, sixteen years 
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as a senior manager, of which six as a managing director. In consideration of 
this research project this is highly significant, as Delbridge and Kirkpatrick 
(1994) put it, “because we are part of a social world we are studying we cannot 
detach ourselves from it, or for that matter avoid relying on our common sense 
knowledge and life experiences when we try to interpret it” (p.43). A pragmatic 
paradigm influences the researcher’s view of the nature of reality, and what 
constitutes knowledge. 
Having worked with many people in many contexts the researcher, reflecting 
on his experience, views reality as an entity that is multifaceted, colourful, 
shifting and multidimensional. Reality is not black or white, yes or no, or indeed 
static. Reality is based upon an individual’s interpretation of a phenomenon in 
a moment of time. In many ways much of the man management work of the 
researcher has been managing reality where one person’s perspective of 
reality does not concur with another’s, generating confusion and sometimes 
conflict. 
In this way, the researcher considers meaning and knowledge to be shaped 
by social interpretation and social influences, and is therefore highly 
subjective. In managing business, observations and data analysis offer 
extracted interpretation at a moment in time, but often, in the experience of the 
researcher, it is pragmatic and open discussion with the team members, which 
create deep and meaningful insights that create real meaning and new 
knowledge. The researcher sees numerical simplicity as a foil for the 
knowledge creation that comes with deep and meaningful enquiry engaging in 
the detail and nuances of a highly complex social world. The researcher 
considers much of his knowledge, which has been supportive in his career 
progression, has come from his subjective enquiry. Therefore, it is perhaps not 
surprising that the researcher adopts an interpretivist philosophy when 
considering the nature of the research project. Weber (2004) argues that within 
an interpretivist research approach, the research object is interpreted in light 
of the meaning structure of the researchers lived experience. In this way, the 





3.3.2 Research Philosophy 
 
In reflection of literature within the managing intelligent failure domain, and his 
own experience of managing organisations, the researcher views the nature 
of reality in the managing intelligent failure domain as being a subjective 
phenomenon rather than an objective phenomenon. Whereas objectivism 
“represents the position that social entities exist in reality external to and 
independent of social actors” (Saunders et al., 2012 p.131), subjectivism 
“asserts that social phenomenon are created from the perceptions and 
consequent actions of social actions” (ibid p.132). The researcher considers 
that the reality of managing intelligent failure lies within a highly emotional and 
complex social organisational phenomenon, one which is not static by nature 
but constantly evolving, changing, and in a highly dynamic fashion. Indeed, 
one that is full of opaque, obscure and indistinct components. 
In perceiving the reality of managing intelligent failure as a subjective 
phenomenon, the researcher also perceives reality as being socially 
constructed. ‘Social constructionism’, according to Creswell (2013), in the 
discussion on the work of Crotty (1998), asserts that humans create meaning 
through engagement with the world they are interpreting, making sense of it 
based on their historical and social perspectives, and that meaning is 
generated by social interaction. Indeed, “social phenomena and their 
meanings are continually being accomplished through social interaction” 
(Bryman and Bell, 2007 p.22). The researcher considers that reality within the 
managing intelligent failure construct arises where social actors within the 
organisation place differing interpretations on intelligent failure and intelligent 
failure situations, which is dependent on their perceptions of the situations and 
how they view the organisational world. Consequently, the behaviours, actions 
and social interactions within the management of intelligent failure domain will 
be shaped by the differing interpretations of these social actors.  
In essence, the researcher sees the reality of managing intelligent failure as 
being a subjective and socially constructed phenomenon and takes an 




3.3.3 Epistemological Approach 
 
Interpretivism “focuses on reality as a human construct which can only be 
understood subjectively. Although it is possible and even probable that there 
is an independent, concrete reality out there, humans can only know it through 
the filtering lenses of their sensory organs and a priori assumptions. We could 
never be one hundred percent sure that the world exists as we perceive it. 
Social realities are even less concrete since they are created by cultural 
communities” Kroeze (2012 p.2). Further, “interpretive philosophy is premised 
on the epistemological belief that, "social process is not captured in 
hypothetical deductions, covariances, and degrees of freedom (as inherent 
within a ‘positivist’ philosophy). Instead, understanding social process involves 
getting inside the world of those generating it" (Rosen, 1991) within Orlikowski 
and Baroudi (1991 p.14). Interpretivists centre on subjective meanings and 
social occurrences, situational detail, the reality behind these details, and 
subjective meaning leading to actions. Positivists, however, centre on 
observable reality to provide credible data, causality and law like 
generalisations, and reduce phenomenon to their simplest elements 
(Saunders et al., 2012). Weber (2004) argues that interpretivists intentionally 
constitute knowledge as they, “try to make sense of the world, recognising their 
sense-making activities occur within the framework of their life-worlds and the 
particular goals they have for their work” (p.6), whereas positivists “believe that 
human experience of the world reflects an objective independent reality and 
that this really provides the foundation for human knowledge” (ibid p.6). In this 
way, interpretivist research centres on subjective propositions in the search for 
new knowledge whilst positivist researches centre on objective propositions 
(Becker and Niehaves, 2007). Interpretivists conduct research among people 
rather than objects. They interpret their everyday social roles with the meaning 
they give to these roles, and the social roles of others in accordance with their 
own set of meanings (Saunders et al., 2012 p.137). Therefore, the study of the 
social world “requires a different logic of research procedure, one that reflects 
the distinctiveness of humans as against the natural order” (Bryman and Bell, 
2007 p.30). Whereas positivists believe that reality is separate from the 




The phenomenon of managing intelligent failure is a highly emotional and 
socially complex entity. The complexity lies within the psychological and 
sociological influence on individuals and within differing organisational 
environments. The phenomenon is made more complex as perception of 
intelligent failure may also be highly contextual.  The researcher argues that 
the subjective proposition presented within the scope of this thesis beckons an 
interpretivist approach and that, in order to gain understanding of this 
multifaceted subject, only exploratory research conducted in and amongst 
people will reveal the required rich and deep insights. In this way, the research 
may create the opportunity to develop new meaning and knowledge in the 
management of learning from failure domain on which to build. 
 
3.4 Inductive approach and qualitative research  
 
Whereas deductive reasoning requires a set of premises to create a 
conclusion, “inductive conclusions contain knowledge claims not analytically 
implied by the premises” (Ketokivi and Mantere, 2010 p.316). In other words, 
deductive reasoning is conclusive, whereas inductive reasoning is 
inconclusive. “Deduction is conclusive reasoning, because the conclusion 
never states more than is contained in the assumptions that make up the 
argument, whereas an inductive argument always does” (Greetham, 2006 
p.28). Whereas the deductive cause-effect link is restrictive of alternative 
explanations, an inductive approach engages in understanding the way 
humans interpret the social world they live in, yielding differing and multiple 
explanations (Saunders et al., 2012). Indeed, inductive reasoning begins with 
observations which lead to the development of general laws, “inducing the 
universal from the particular” (Schwartz-Shea and Yanow, 2013 p.27). Where 
collected data is used to explore phenomena, identify themes and patterns and 
create conceptual frameworks, this leads to theory generation (Saunders et 
al., 2012). In line with the interpretivist paradigm, the researcher argues for an 
inductive approach to explore managing intelligent failure and thereby 
generate and build theory. Rather than seek falsification or confirmation of 
existing theory, as is preferred by the deductive paradigm, this research aims 
to explore how people interpret the identified complexities of the managing 
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intelligent failure construct, and how this could offer many different 
explanations, new meanings and new knowledge. 
In alignment with an inductive paradigm and the aims of inductive research, a 
qualitative research design is preferred as the primary research design. 
Qualitative research is inherently inductivist, constructivist, and interpretivist 
by nature (Bryman and Bell, 2007), thereby reflecting the philosophical nature 
of this thesis. “Qualitative researchers stress the socially constructed nature of 
reality, the intimate relationship between the researcher and what is studied, 
and the situational constraints that shape inquiry. Such researchers 
emphasize the value-laden nature of inquiry. They seek answers to questions 
that stress how social experience is created and given meaning” (Denzin and 
Lincoln, 2011). In trying to understand the social complexities and how they 
affect (or are affected by) the way in which organisations manage intelligent 
failure, the researcher argues that the open and exploratory nature of 
qualitative research is more appropriate to the discovery of multiple 
explanations, and to the generation of theory in this domain. Qualitative 
methods have the capacity to enhance peripheral vision and provide rich 
descriptions of phenomena which enhances contextual understanding, as well 
as offering a means to explain significant realities and relationships (Sofaer, 
1999). Indeed, qualitative data has a strong potential for revealing complexity, 
providing clear “thick descriptions” immersed in a real context (Miles and 
Huberman, 2014). Also, such qualitative data, “with the emphasis on people’s 
lived experiences, are fundamentally well suited for locating the meanings 
people place on the events, processes, and structures of their lives and for 
connecting these meanings to the social world around” (ibid p.11). On this 
basis, the researcher argues that a qualitative enquiry is suited to unravelling 
the complexities and contextual nature of the management of intelligent failure 
domain and delivering rich insights that may inform future theory. In addition, 
the researcher argues that the management of intelligent failure domain is in 
its infancy meaning there is less theory to test in a manner more appropriate 
to quantitative enquiry. In this way, the management of intelligent failure 
domain is more suitable of a qualitative approach. As Creswell (2013) puts it 
“if a concept or phenomenon needs to be understood because little research 
has been done on it, then it merits a qualitative approach” (p.18). 
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However, whilst qualitative research is argued as the dominant and preferred 
method, the researcher also sees the value of quantitative research, as part of 
a mixed methods approach within a case study research strategy, as a means 
to assist in achieving the overall aims of the thesis. Quantitative research 
“embodies a view of social reality as an external, objectivity reality” (Bryman 
and Bell, 2007 p.27). Creswell (2013) argues that in seeking to identify the 
factors which influence an outcome, a quantitative approach may be 
warranted. Quantitative research is used as a means to elucidate the 
organisational factors that influence the entrepreneurial environment of each 
organisation within the study. Whilst quantitative research may not be suited 
to delivering the rich texts of the complexities within the management of 
intelligent failure domain, it can assist by numerically measuring data to offer 
supportive holistic insights and understanding towards some of the constructs 
of the management of intelligent failure process for purposes of comparison 
with the main qualitative data. 
 
3.5 Case study research strategy 
 
Eisenhardt (1989) argues that, “the case study is a research strategy which 
focuses on understanding the dynamics present within single settings” (p.534). 
Case studies explore the dynamics of a research subject in its own real life 
natural context in a single or multiple case format providing the research 
project with a rich data source (Saunders et al., 2012). Indeed case studies 
can take on an embedded design where multiple level analysis occurs within 
each study. The term case study is also referred to as a research strategy as 
it may involve more than just a choice of method, using a variety of data 
sources (Piekkari et al., 2008). Indeed, as there may be many variables of 
interest, rather than just data points, the use of multiple sources of evidence is 
important (Yin, 2013). Case studies are often the preferred method of choice 
when, the phenomenon of focus is within a real-life context and is 
contemporary, where the researcher has limited control of events, and where 
the research questions are prefixed with ‘when’, ‘how’, or ‘why’(ibid). “The case 
study method allows investigators to retain the holistic and meaningful 
characteristics of real-life events” (Yin, 2013 p.4). 
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As a research method, the case study has a unique strength in that it has the 
ability to deal with a wide variety of evidence including interviews, documents, 
observations and attributes. Yin (2013) suggests a single-case study is more 
suited to specific situations such as when it represents: the critical case in 
testing a well formulated theory, an extreme or unique case, the representative 
or typical case, or it is a revelatory case previously inaccessible to academic 
enquiry, or when it is longitudinal. Single case study allows for deeper and 
longer research delivering rich contextual insights into the dynamics of 
phenomena, and has the capacity to create or challenge existing paradigms 
(Dyer and Wilkins, 1991). However, the single case study is even more prone 
to criticism of validity due to the singular nature of the research and the findings 
(Yin, 2013). 
The inclusion of multiple cases (between 4 and 10 cases according to 
Eisenhardt (1989)) allows the case researcher to increase the robustness of a 
finding by replicating it across cases. Multiple case studies with a variety of 
data collection can improve the validity of the study (Piekkari et al., 2008). 
Indeed, it is argued that the researcher should select additional cases 
according to whether similar (literal replication) or different (theoretical 
replication) results are predicted by emerging theory (Piekkari et al., 2008). 
However, Dyer and Wilkins (1991) are less convinced by the argument of 
Eisenhardt and view her multiple  case study approach as a hybrid and of being 
superficial because of its thin description and lack of context, and argues that 
it can do no more than build on existing theory. However, in a reply to Dyer 
and Wilkins, Eisenhardt (1991) rebuts the argument, insisting that “the 
theoretical insights of case studies arise from methodological rigor and 
multiple-case comparative logic” (p.626). Miles and Huberman (2014) argue 
that whilst not to quantitative standards, cross case analysis can enhance 
generalisability and or transferability to other contexts, thus supporting the use  
of a multiple case study approach. In perhaps summarising the strengths and 
weaknesses, Denzin and Lincoln (2011) argue that the strengths of case 
studies lie within their depth, their high conceptual validity, their understanding 
of context and process, and their ability to foster new hypotheses and new 
research questions. They argue that as weaknesses, case studies may include 
selection bias, which may overstate or understate relationships, they yield 
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weak understanding of occurrence in the population, and that statistical 
significance is often unknown or unclear. 
In reflection of these arguments, this research project utilises the multiple case 
study strategy to engage in a mix of research methods across a mix of 
organisations. Within the real life context of six organisations, it seeks to study 
where the contemporary phenomenon of managing intelligent failure is 
explored with the ‘how’ prefix: How do organisations manage intelligent 
failure? The aim of the research is to explore more deeply the phenomenon 
within its natural setting, seeking to elucidate some of the complexities to offer 
deep and meaningful insights. A case study strategy is an appropriate 
research strategy to support the enquiry of such a highly complex domain 
(Piekkari et al., 2008). The aim of the research is also to explore polarities of 
organisational types to gain further insights into the phenomenon and 
enhancing the robustness and offering increased validity. A multi-case study 
has the capacity to demonstrate replication (Saunders et al., 2012). 
Recognising the dual aims of depth of enquiry and replicability, a cross 
sectional multiple case study approach is argued as being the most effective 
means to meeting the needs of this research. 
 
3.5.1 Mixed methods 
 
Eisenhardt (1989) argues that, “case studies typically combine data collection 
methods such as interviews, questionnaires, and observations. The evidence 
may be qualitative (e.g., words), quantitative (e.g. numbers), or both” (p.835). 
In following a multiple case study approach with the aim of deep enquiry with 
the potential for significant replication, research takes a mixed methods 
approach to research. Patton (1990) argues that, “in real-world practice, 
methods can be separated from the epistemology out of which they have 
emerged” (p.136). Indeed, “multiple methods is increasingly associated within 
business research because it is likely to overcome weaknesses associated 
with using only one method as well as providing scope for a richer approach 
to data collection, analysis and interpretation” (Saunders et al., 2012 p.164).  
Mixed methods addresses the potential problems of validity as “the multiple 
sources of evidence essentially provide multiple measures of the same 
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phenomenon” (Yin, 2013 p.117). In this way, the research project has balance 
of depth and replicability and for these reasons the mixed methods approach 
is utilised by this research. 
 
3.6 The empirical research 
 
3.6.1 Sampling approach 
 
Research takes a convenience sampling approach that provides a range of 
organisations that are entrepreneurially diverse and from a mix of sectors. 
“Convenience sampling is probably the most common sampling strategy” 
(Patton, 1990 p.242). The researcher approached organisations within his 
wide network to facilitate savings in research time and cost, and because of 
the increased likelihood that these organisations would be high quality 
research vehicles. Of the six organisations within the study, one demonstrates 
an environment supportive of entrepreneurial activity, a high tech Epos 
supplier, and one that demonstrates an environment that is unsupportive of 
entrepreneurial activity, a division of a government department, which is 
bureaucratic by nature. The other four organisations demonstrate 
environments that offer varying degrees of support for entrepreneurial activity 
and sit between these two organisations. The intention is to include 
organisations at polar ends of the entrepreneurial spectrum (and in between) 
within the convenience sample. As Eisenhardt (1989) argues “given the limited 
number of cases which can usually be studied, it makes sense to choose cases 
such as extreme situations and polar types in which the process of interest is 
“transparently observable”” (p.537). The maximum variation approach can 
yield high quality and detailed descriptions of each case and its uniqueness, 
as well as significant shared findings which cut across cases which are 
valuable because they are derived from their heterogeneity (Patton, 1990). To 
enhance case study selection further, organisations from differing industries 
were included. By ensuring representation of the levels of hierarchy and a mix 
of functions within each organisation, a representative perspective overall is 
offered, allowing the converging or diverging evidence to be uncovered and 
explored, to deliver rich insights into the managing intelligent failure domain. 
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In both the survey and interview, research process respondents within each 
organisation were approached on as random a basis (within the 
hierarchy/function criteria) as operationally achievable by the organisation’s 
coordinator. In essence, the sample strategy, whilst ‘convenient’ aims to obtain 
data from a mix of organisations with very differing entrepreneurial natures, 
from differing industry sectors. Within each organisation, data are captured at 
each hierarchal level and across organisational functions. The sampling 
method aims to support a multiple and deep enquiry approach supportive of 
an effective multi-case strategy. 
 
3.7 Quantitative research 
 
Within the convenience sampling approach, the researcher made an 
instinctive assessment of each organisation and the presence (or non-
presence) of an environment supportive of entrepreneurship. To move towards 
verification of the assessment, a Corporate Entrepreneurship Audit (CEA) 
(Burns, 2013) was undertaken to assess the entrepreneurial  nature of each 
organisation. Additionally, the quantitative research is used to assist the 
analysis of findings from the interviews. The audit is based on self-
assessment/perception from participants and is therefore not an exact 
measure.  
Burns (2013) argues that organisations have four architectures which are 
those of leadership, culture, structure, and strategy. Combined, these four 
architectures create an overarching organisational entrepreneurial 
architecture. With the aim of indicatively assessing each organisations 
entrepreneurial nature, an average is taken of the four architecture results that 
offers an indicative overall score (an overarching organisational 
entrepreneurial architecture). The higher the score, the more prominent the 
entrepreneurial environment. The percentage scores of the organisation were 
spread as follows: 72.5 (most entrepreneurial environment), 69.9, 66.0, 60.3, 
56.8, and 54.4 (least entrepreneurial environment). The CEA is described in 
detail below and the full survey results are available as appendices 1 to 6. It 
must be highlighted that these results are of a low level of statistical 
significance; however, they are supportive in creating some understanding of 
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the entrepreneurial nature of the sample, and later in this study, in the 
discussion on environments that may support the process of learning from 
failure. 
 
3.7.1 Corporate Entrepreneurship Audit (CEA) 
 
The audit replicates a survey created by Burns (2013). Each organisational 
architecture has key characteristics, which if present to a high level, indicate 
an advanced entrepreneurial nature within that architecture. The key 
characteristics of support of for organisational entrepreneurship are identified 
within the architectures of leadership, culture, structure, and strategy: 
Leadership: 
Visionary, good communicator/motivator, strategic thinker and learner, 
emotionally intelligent with strong interpersonal skills, relationship builder, 
team player, builder of confidence, builder of an open organisation that shares 
information, clarifier of ambiguity and uncertainty, and builder of empowering 
opportunities. 
Culture: 
 A balance between individualism and collectivism, reflecting the 
importance of individual contribution and collaboration 
 Low power distance, reflecting egalitarianism and flat and open 
relationships and knowledge flows 
 Low uncertainty avoidance, reflecting tolerance of risk, a preference for 
flexibility, and individual and team empowerment 
 A balance of achievement focus and cooperation, networks and 
relationships 
Structure: 
 Structures to encourage and facilitate entrepreneurial activity 
 Facilitates that can be utilised to encourage creative thinking 
 Participation in significant networking activity and open innovation 





 Strategy development is deliberate or emergent, but is continuous and 
under pinned by a strong vision 
 Decentralised decision making, incremental and adaptive, maximising 
flexibility, underpinned by a strong direction 
 An understanding of organisational strengths and competences at both 
corporate and business levels 
 An inherent understanding at business level of the basis of its competitive 
market and how customer value can be enhanced 
 The presence of strategies to encourage innovation and internal growth, 
and creativity with a commercial edge 
The CEA is a survey which has 100 statements (25 statements per 
architecture) randomly assembled (appendix 7). Respondents indicate a score 
for each statement dependent on how true they believe the statement to be. 
The score range is from 0 to 6. A score of 0 indicates a statement is not true 
at all, and 6 indicates that it is very true. The survey was uploaded to the 
internet via the software ‘Lime Survey’ where respondents completed the audit 
in one sitting, on line, at their place of work. All responses were anonymous, 
voluntary and given over a 3 week period. A minimum of 10 (up to 20) 
respondents were conveniently sampled from across the hierarchy of each 
organisation from across organisational departments, on a ratio of  2 from the 
senior team, 3 from middle management, and 5 from department teams for 
every 10 respondents. The research accentuated quality (100 questions) over 
quantity (a small percentage of organisational members). Each organisation 
had a ‘coordinator’ who acted as the point of contact, and liaised with the 
researcher to ensure the approach was consistent. 
Data was transferred from LimeSurvey to SPSS (Statistical Package for the 
Social Sciences) software for analysis. SPSS analysis produced results on 
each architecture responses focusing on the minimum, maximum, mean, and 
percentage scores, as well as producing a cluster analysis and a frequency 
table. Additionally, the mean score was established for each statement within 
each architecture, and then averaged to provide an overall score. 




3.7.2 Data analysis 
 
The survey data from the CEA was analysed to meet two separate aims: to 
assist the selection of cases to be engaged within the study, and to provide 
additional data to consider alongside the data gained from the interviews. 
Analysis centres on the four organisational architectures (leadership, culture, 
structure, and strategy) and organisational data. All data was analysed using 
the SPSS tool to produce analysis in the following forms: 
1. Mean score results – bar chart. 
2. Percentage results – bar chart. 
3. Average combined architecture result – bar chart. 
4. Descriptive statistics – indicating number of completed responses, 
minimum, maximum and mean scores, and standard deviation. 
5. A cluster analysis. 
6. A frequency table – indicating frequency of each score between 0 and 6. 
7. Leadership (architecture) – mean score for each of the 25 questions – bar 
chart. 
8. Culture (architecture) – mean score for each of the 25 questions – bar 
chart. 
9. Structure (architecture) – mean score for each of the 25 questions – bar 
chart. 
10. Strategy (architecture) – mean score for each of the 25 questions – bar 
chart. 
The average combined architecture results figure is used to indicate how 
entrepreneurial the environment is within each organisation. The higher the 
average (percentage) score, the more prominent the entrepreneurial 
environment. 
The main part of the analysis centres on the detail of each architecture to 
provide indicative insights into the environment of the organisation and its 
appropriateness as a means to support entrepreneurship. The analysis is 
considered alongside the prime research approach of semi-structured 
interviews as it has only limited statistical significance. 
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3.8 Qualitative research – Semi structured interviews 
 
As has been highlighted, research predominantly takes a qualitative approach, 
using semi-structured interviews as part of a multi-case study strategy. 
 
3.8.1 Semi-structured interviews and the research question. 
 
Semi-structured interviews relate to the research question of “how do 
organisations manage intelligent failure,” because of the nature of the research 
area, specifically, its complexity, and its newness (and its appropriateness 
within this multi-case study strategy): 
 Complexity: Semi-structured interviews as an appropriate choice for 
exploring complexity.  
This thesis argues that the phenomenon of managing intelligent failure is a 
highly complex entity. The complexity lies within the psychological and 
sociological nature of the failure construct and the influence on individuals, and 
within differing organisational environments. The phenomenon is made more 
complex as perception of intelligent failure may also be highly contextual. 
Saunders et al (2012) argue that semi-structured interviews that ask open 
questions enable exploration of multifaceted and complex constructs offering 
the opportunity to gain insights and an understanding as to what is happening. 
Therefore, the open and exploratory nature of semi-structured interviews is 
more appropriate to the discovery of multiple explanations, and has the 
capacity to enhance peripheral vision, providing rich descriptions of 
phenomena, enhancing contextual understanding (Safaer, 1999). Additionally 
semi-structured interviews are suited to gaining understanding of the meaning 
respondents place on their experiences of events, processes, and structures 
(Miles and Huberman, 2014). In essence, “qualitative research is able to draw 
a more complete picture of an organisation” (Buschgens et al, (2013 p.765) as 
it can reveal the idiosyncrasies and basic assumptions in the minds of 
individuals within that organisation (ibid). 
 Newness: Semi-structured interviews as an appropriate choice for 
exploring new concepts.  
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It is argued that the management of intelligent failure domain is in its infancy 
(Cope 2011), which means that there is less theory to test in a manner more 
appropriate to quantitative methods. Literature argues that the most 
appropriate way to gain  understanding of a concept that has had little research 
into it, is to take a qualitative approach (Creswell, (2013). Therefore, semi-
structured interviews offer a means to explore this underexplored 
phenomenon. 
 Appropriateness within this multi-case study strategy: Semi-structured as 
a preference over structure and in-depth interviews 
As part of a case study strategy, an open ended, unstructured, or in-depth 
interview approach may not sufficiently allow for case comparison (Yin, 2013). 
Additionally, a structured interview may be restrictive by nature, thereby 
reducing the exploratory nature of the research (Saunders et al., 2012). 
However, semi-structured interviews, within a loose comparative framework, 
offer the opportunity to explore the real world through a similar lens, collecting 
rich and detailed data. Semi-structure interviews allow significant variation 
(and probing) within the interview structure, whilst also allowing sufficient 
structure in order to compare responses.  
 
In consideration of these factors it is argued that, as a method of enquiry, semi-
structured interviews provides an effective means as to explain “how 
organisations manage intelligent failure,” as well as to explore: 
 The processes that organisations use to learn from failure 
 The importance of a process for managing intelligent failure to the 
organisation 
 How failures are recognised and how they are analysed 
 How individuals and organisations learn from failure 
 How lessons learned are disseminated across the organisation 
 The nature of the outcomes of the process of learning from failure 
 How environments can support learning from failure 
 Why organisations do not learn from failure 




3.8.2 The practicalities of the interview process 
 
The research involved between 10 and 13 (mostly 12) interviews which were 
conducted in each organisation over three or four visits over two or three 
weeks, with all organisational interviews completed within a five month period. 
71 interviews in total. The interviews ranged in length from 35 minutes to 70 
minutes with most taking between 55 and 65 minutes, all of them recorded. 
Interviews took place on site within the premises of the various organisations. 
Subsequently, interview recordings were fully transcribed. Transcribed 
interviews were imported to NVivo software for coding. 
Interviews are semi-structured and centre on the main themes identified in the 
conceptual framework derived from the literature review as in figure 2.6. The 
conceptual framework focuses enquiry on the entrepreneurial capability, the 
process of learning from failure, the environment that supports intelligent 
failure, the management of emotions, and individual and organisational 
learning. Questions were drafted, peer reviewed and test answered by the 
researcher, before being accepted. More questions were prepared than could 
be answered with the aim of offering some flexibility to theme enquiry. 
Questions are available as appendix 8. 
Due to the nature of semi-structured interviews, the open questions allowed 
for variance. Open and flowing conversations were encouraged and, as 
conversations developed, the prepared questions acted as reference point to 
the researcher to ensure consistent enquiry across each theme. Questions 
were used to shape theme discussion. However, not all the questions were 
used and often questions flexed to reflect responses from the interviewee 
(including follow up questions in order to probe and build upon responses). 
 
3.8.3 Challenges to the interview process 
 
Yin (2013) argues that whilst interviews have the advantage of focusing 
directly on the topic of the case study and are insightful in that they provide 
perceived causal inferences and explanations they also have disadvantages. 
The disadvantages are that interviews can be bias due to badly asked 
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questions, bias from the interviewees, inaccuracies due to respondent recall 
errors, and reflexivity where the interviewee gives the interviewer the answer 
they want to hear. Alvesson (2010 p.76) goes into depth suggesting the 
principal challenges to collecting accurate data from an interview are complex 
and include: 
1. The social challenge of coping with an interpersonal relation and complex 
interaction in a non-routine situation. 
2. The cognitive challenge of finding out what it is all about (beyond the level 
of the espoused). 
3. The identity challenge of adapting a self-position that is contextually 
relevant (and/or comfortable for the interviewee). 
4. The ‘institutional’ challenge of adapting to normative pressure and cognitive 
uncertainty through mimicking standard forms of expression. 
5. The challenge (or option) of maintaining and increasing self-esteem that 
emerges in any situation involving examination and calling for performance. 
6. The motivation problem of developing an interest or rational for active 
participation in the interview. 
7. The representation/construction challenge of how to account for complex 
phenomena through language. 
Bryman and Bell (2007) argue that, based on the work of Kvale (1996), the 
criteria of a successful interviewer include being: knowledgeable (in the subject 
area), structuring, clear, gentle, sensitive, open, steering, critical, 
remembering, interpreting, balanced, and ethically sensitive. The researcher 
centred attention on these facets as a means to face the inherent challenges 
within the interview process. Preparation time was given before each interview 
to compose and focus on the intricacies of interviewing taking consideration of 
the organisational context. Reflection on previous interviews also aided pre-
interview preparations. Saunders et al (2012)  argue that forms of bias may be 
overcome by “recognising that all research methods have limitations and 
through careful preparation to conduct interviews to avoid bias that would 
threaten the reliability and validity of your data” (p.408). As well as attempting 
to apply appropriate techniques encouraged by literature (for example 
“Interviews – Learning the Craft of Qualitative Research Interviewing” by Kvale 
and Brinkmann (2009)), the researcher also used embedded communication 
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skills gained from the prior experience of 25 years of people management 
within industry, towards maximising the potential of the interviews. In this way, 
awareness of the challenges of interviewing and the awareness of approaches 
to tackle them and minimise their impact were considered and applied. 
 
3.9 Data analysis 
 
Semi structured interviews were recorded, transcribed and exported to NVivo 
software for coding. For all 71 interviews, within NVivo each interview is coded 
into themes. Qualitative template analysis is used. King (2004) asserts that 
template analysis is a technique whereby the researcher creates a list of codes 
(the template) that represent the themes identified within the transcribed text. 
The advantage of template analysis is that it is “a more flexible technique with 
fewer specified procedures, permitting researchers to tailor it to match their 
own requirements” (p.267). He argues that this approach to data analysis is 
appropriate for explorative research and for seeking objectivity to demonstrate 
the reliability of the coding. 
The analysis began with the creation of an initial template before being revised 
in response to the analysis, as it progressed. In the first instance, first order 
codes emerged that largely remain within the four key areas of enquiry 
(reflecting the themes from the conceptual framework, and subsequent 
questions within these themes) “as often the best starting point for constructing 
an initial template is the interview topic guide” (King, 2004 p.259). The volume 
of data found on the fear of failure (within the ‘Intelligent failure and individual’ 
enquiry space) led to a specific code, as did the significant material 
surrounding the entrepreneurial process that emerged. Thus, in the hierarchy 
of coding, the first order NVivo nodes are: 
 Entrepreneurial architecture 
 Entrepreneurial process & innovation 
 Fear of failure 
 Management of intelligent failure 
 Outcomes (from managing intelligent failure) 
From these broader, higher order codes emerged 61 sub nodes.  
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Having identified this initial template, the template was revised to include 
insertions, deletions, changing scope, and changing higher order (King 2004):  
 Insertions where an issue in the text relevant to the research question 
is not covered by a code, requires a code. 
 Deletions where a code has been created but it is found to have no use. 
 Changing scope of a code by redefining it from being too narrow or too 
broad 
 Changing higher order classification of a code to reflect its best fit 
The final template reflected the iterative movement between emerging data, 
themes, concepts, and relevant literature to enable categories to be 
rationalised, reorganised, and reduced down to two principle concepts more 
relevant to the thesis, making the level of data more manageable (Gioia et al, 
2013).  
Within the two principle concepts of ‘managing intelligent failure’ and the 
‘entrepreneurial environment’, an individual organisational level analysis and 
a cross case analysis occurs. Each case was written up independently before 
cross case analysis pursued combined themes, as is commiserate with the 
inductive approach (Patton, 1990). 
For each stage of the principle concept ‘managing intelligent failure’ 
(identifying failure, analysing failure, and communicating lessons learned from 
failure) cross case analysis centres on themes similar to each stage across all 
organisations, similar to all stages across all organisations, as well as other 
themes that are identified as of interest. For the concept of the ‘entrepreneurial 









3.10 The quality of the research design 
 
Lincoln and Guba (1985) assert that establishing trustworthiness of enquiry 
defends it against criticism of lack of rigor. Trustworthiness they argue can be 
gained through establishing ‘truth value’ (establishing confidence in the truth 
of the findings), applicability (the extent to which the findings may be applicable 
in other contexts), consistency (determining whether similar outcomes would 
reoccur if the enquiry was replicated in the same context), and neutrality 
(establishing the degree that the findings are effected by the respondents over 
biases and motivations of the enquirer). Further, they argue that this criteria 
for trustworthiness may be obtained through focusing on four facets, those 
being credibility, transferability, dependability, and confirmability. This 
theoretical template is used to explain the research design and how it 




Credibility is established in a number of ways: 
 The investment of significant time within the organisation to gain an 
understanding of the nature of the culture as “it is not possible to 
understand any phenomenon without reference to the context it is 
embedded” (Lincoln and Guba, 1985 p.302). 
 
 Establishing a relationship of trust by strictly adhering to the agreed 
approach (with each organisation) to the research design and ethics (as 
described below), and by being consistent, transparent, and professional 
at all times, continuously building positive rapport. 
 
 Peer debriefing. The thesis supervisors played an important role in 
exposing the researcher to searching questions, testing and working 
emerging hypotheses, developing and testing steps of the methodological 
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design, and relieving the strong emotions of the researcher to enable 
consistent quality of judgement. 
 
 By continuously refining the hypothesis so that it accounts for all the 
organisations of the study without exception. 
 
 Member check: key informants reviewed a draft case study report. In order 
to gain feedback as to the validity of the findings from the key informants 
from each of the organisations, presentations were made in person. The 
approach of personal presentations was used as organisational leadership 
demonstrated a general reluctance to read material from this research. 
Organisations gave verbal acknowledgement as to the validity of the facts 




Lincoln and Guba (1985) argue that, “the naturalist cannot specify external 
validity; only he or she can provide only the thick description necessary to 
enable someone interested in making a transfer to reach a conclusion about 
whether transfer can be contemplated as a possibility” (p316). In this way, the 
enquiry achieves a ‘thick description’ to harness a conclusion towards 
transferability by engaging in multiple sources of evidence. 
Research centres on six organisations with differing characteristics. A mix of 
manufacturing and service organisations of differing sizes were included in the 
research. They range from a high tech epos supplier with an environment 
supportive of entrepreneurship to a government service body with an 
environment that is generally unsupportive of entrepreneurship, thus offering 
a wide mix to the enquiry. The use of multiple case study evidence is often 
judged  as being more convincing and can lead to a more robust study  
(Herriott and Firestone, 1983). In studying six organisations the study centres 
on analytical generalisation (rather than statistical generalisation) offering 
similar evidence. Additionally, this research project compares empirical 
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research to literature which indicatively suggests that findings have a broader 





To address dependability this research project establishes a chain of evidence. 
In the first instance, the thesis makes extensive citations from the case study 
database to enhance the discussion. Secondly, the use of software enhances 
the process of record keeping and analysis. Thirdly, the database shows the 
evidence indicating the time of capture, e.g. the date and time of each 
interview. In addition, the process of data collection follows the procedures laid 
out in the case study protocol (appendix 9) and additionally, the content of the 
protocol links with the initial study question. Finally, the use of a semi 
structured interview approach enhances dependability using carefully 
conducted questioning which can explore responses from a variety of angles 




In line with literature and following the case study protocol, this research 
project creates a path for others to review offering the potential to replicate the 
approach in order to arrive at the same findings and conclusion (Saunders et 
al., 2012, Yin, 2013), and to ensure the findings are substantiated within the 
data (Lincoln and Guba, 1985). 
 
3.10.5 Additional framework 
 
Hogg and Maclaran (2008) argue that the quality of research may be 
established based upon the authenticity, plausibility and criticality of the 
enquiry. Whilst there is overlaps to the previous framework of (Lincoln and 
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Guba, 1985), it highlights some different factors that act as a foil to elucidate 
the quality of this research. The project exhibits: 
 
 Authenticity, which derives from clearly identifying the data collection and 
analysis processes, demonstrating the thoroughness in carrying out these 
processes, whilst highlighting potential personal bias. 
 
 Plausibility, which derives from aligning research processes with 
established methodological practices, the significant experience at senior 
organisational level of the author, and the differentiating of the findings as 
singular contribution, thus addressing a gap in literature. 
 
 Criticality, which derives from provoking the recognition of differences and 
examining those differences, using a subjunctive mode, and encouraging 




This section utilises the two seminal frameworks of Lincoln and Guba (1985), 
and Hogg and Maclaran (2008) that centre on credibility, transferability, 
dependability, confirmability, authenticity, plausibility, and criticality; theory 
which forms the basis of later theory put forward by Yin (2013). The elements 
of the two frameworks are used as a foil to illuminate how the research has 




In consideration of the ethics related to this research, reference to the 
principles and expectations for ethical research demanded by the Economic 
and Social Research Council (ESRC) are considered. Specifically the “ESRC 
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Framework for research ethics - Updated January 2015” is used as a form of 
reference, reflection and compliance (ESRC, 2015). 
Additional literature embellishes the researchers understanding and is used in 
addressing the ethics issues pragmatically, principally Bryman and Bell (2007), 
Miles and Huberman (2014), and Patton (1990). 
Research has been carefully designed to ensure recognised standards of 
integrity, objectivity, and quality. Potential risk of harm to participants and 
researchers is mitigated by reflection, planning and action throughout the 
process. The research is independent and has no conflict of interests with any 
of the organisations within the study, or individuals there within. 
An overview of the research project highlights the potential psychological risk 
related to the research subject of organisational failure. Fear of failure, 
association with failure, and the revisiting of negative emotions due to failure 
were identified as a potential reason why individuals may not wish to 
participate or withdraw from the research. The issue was made clear and 
assurances were given before each interview that participants could withdraw 
at any stage. Separate to the sensitivities aligned within the discussion of 
organisational failure, and reflecting on its purpose and nature, it is argued that 
the research generally offers a lower level of risk of transcending ethical 
standards of study. 
At each stage of the research process thought and action was given to 
research participants. At the earliest stages of contact with participating 
organisations, assurances were made in writing as to the ethical framework to 
be used, that being the “ESRC Framework for research ethics”. Within the 
written communication to organisational leads (in the main CEOs) included 
were the “six key principles of ethical research”. During discussions with 
organisational coordinators (often personal assistants) with regard to 
respondent selection, reference was further made to ensure voluntary 
participation, free from undue influence. At the beginning of each interview, 
confirmation was taken of their voluntary participation and informed consent. 
Throughout the interview the rights, dignity and autonomy were respected and 
appropriately protected. As a follow up to the pre-interview written 
communication and to ensure understanding, at the beginning of each 
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interview, interviewees were given information about the research including 
the purpose, methods and its intended use. Discussion also centred on what 
was required from themselves, the confidentiality through the qualitative 
research process and their anonymity through the quantitative research 
process. Permission was requested for the recording of the interview. 
Interviewees were informed that the recordings would be anonymously 
labelled and transcribed. The recordings would only be accessible to the 
researcher and be stored safely for up to 5 years (Sieber, 1998) when they 
would be deleted. It was emphasised that no one in their organisation would 
ever know of the details of their personal contribution. The researcher offered 
complete transparency to research work protocols at all times throughout the 
data gathering, analysis, and feedback processes. In taking this assertive 
approach to the consideration of ethics, the researcher argues that the 
research has been carried out to a high ethical standard. 
 
3.12 Research limitations 
 
Whilst the research aimed to enhance transferability through a multi case study 
strategy, it may be argued that including six organisations in the study may 
have spread the focus of the enquiry too wide at the expense of the depth of 
analysis. This highly socially complex and multi-faceted phenomenon may 
have benefited from a centred approach to uncover deeper, richer insights. 
The data from the six organisations, whilst showing some replicability and 
therefore adding to the validity of the research, does not offer the 
generalisability of a quantitative research method. It would appear that 
qualitative research constantly experiences this tension between breadth and 
depth. Patton (1990) argues that broad or narrow is contextual to the nature of 
the research and cannot be viewed as good or bad choices. He posits that it 
should be viewed as choices among alternatives. 
This research project took the approach of sampling by convenience. 
Convenience sampling is an approach that, by its very nature, lacks strategic 
intent and this may lead to the non-inclusion of relevant and significant data in 
a way that a ‘purposeful’ sampling approach might deliver. By being strategic 
in case selection additional meaning may have been uncovered. As Patton 
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(1990) puts it “convenience sampling is neither purposeful or strategic” (p.242). 
So whilst the sampling approach may have been appropriate to this research 
project it may also have been limiting. 
Whilst the researcher argues that his significant business and managerial 
experiences may enhance the quality of the research process (for example a 
developed emotional intelligence to improve the quality of data collection within 
the interview process), it is recognised that it may also be a limiting factor. The 
researcher has been immersed in a commercial business culture for a long 
period and it is recognised that this cultural lens as part of his own lens of the 
world may affect the research project. As Denzin (1989) puts it “every 
researcher brings preconceptions to the problem being studied.” These 
preconceptions impact the assumptions of the researcher which may create 
bias in the way that questions are formulated and asked, the way the 
researchers hears and understands the answers to the questions, and the way 
the researcher analyses and synthesises the data in the generation of new 
knowledge. Whilst findings have been verified by the respective organisations 
in the study and alternative perspectives of the findings have been considered 
in the discussion chapter to mitigate potential bias, it is recognised that the 
researcher’s cognitive biases may act as a limitation to the research project. 
 
3.13 Reflections on methodology 
 
Patton (1990) argues that, “There are no perfect research designs” (p.223). 
Reflecting on the executed methodology of this thesis, and whilst confident of 
the overall quality of the research design, it is recognised that there are a 
number of ways in which the researcher may have enhanced this research 
project. 
At a holistic level, research may have further benefitted from an approach that 
centred on less width and more depth. Reading widely ended with the creation 
of a wider conceptual model and, in exploring the wider conceptual model, 
provided tension with gaining depth of enquiry. Literature highlights this 
phenomenon as the classic trade-off between depth and breadth (Patton, 
1990). A tighter focus may have delivered more in-depth data of value for this 
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project. To that end a pilot study, may have provided “some conceptual 
clarification for the research design” (Yin, 2013 p.92) and helped centre the 
research more precisely. 
In a similar way, during the data analysis stage, the researcher may have 
grouped material together more tightly by coding more efficiently. Less coded 
groups may have assisted in achieving depth at an earlier stage, saving time 
and channelling interpretative energy. 
Whilst an approach engaging multiple sources of evidence was utilised, 
triangulation may have enhanced the project still further. Triangulation of 
sources has the advantage of converging lines of enquiry (Yin, 2013). The 
researcher considered triangulation as a means to improve the credibility of 
the findings and subsequent interpretations (Lincoln and Guba, 1985). 
However, not satisfied with the quality of empirical observations, the 
researcher decided to centre on the significant volume of interview data and 
achieve additional depth of analysis instead. 
Purposeful sampling may have added to the effectiveness of the research 
enquiry. Organisations selected by ‘maxim variation’ or ‘heterogeneity’ 
sampling may have delivered some additional variation to the concepts and 
their interrelationships (Patton, 1990). For example, it may have been of 
empirical value to note the diverse variations that emerge from organisations 




This chapter has examined the methodological approach applied to this 
research project and the philosophical approach that underpins the study. In 
reflection of the philosophical influences of the researcher and the nature of 
the research object, the researcher argues that the ontology of the 
management of intelligent failure process is socially constructed. He also 
argues that an interpretive methodological approach is most appropriate to 
elucidate the deep complexities which reside in this multifaceted research 
object. Further, this chapter justifies an inductive approach and the 
predominant use of a qualitative method as part of multiple case study 
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strategy. The use of semi-structured interviews is argued as being best suited 
to addressing the research question; “how do organisations manage intelligent 
failure?” This area of research is deemed as both new and complex (Cope 
2011), and literature supports the use of the semi-structured interview to 
explore such spaces (Saunders et al 2012, Buschgens et al, 2013,Creswell, 
2013). In this way, this chosen method is well placed to explore this 
multifaceted and complex construct to gain understanding as to what is 
happening: explaining how organisations go about managing intelligent failure. 
Whilst recognising the limitations of this research, the detailed description of 
the data collection and analysis show the process as being robust. An 
assertive approach towards the ethics of the research is taken. 
In setting out a clear logic to the approach to this research project, and by 
clearly detailing the protocols of the research design, and arguing for the 
quality of the approach taken, this chapter asserts that the data collection 




















Chapter 4 Findings 
 
“The intent of the findings sections is to narrate an informative story that is 
driving forward some new concept development and theoretical discovery with 
the careful presentation of evidence” (Gioia et al, 2013 p.23.) 
This chapter lays out the findings in a manner that reflects the journey of the 
enquiry, and follows a strategic (and yet highly emergent) path relating closely 
to the analysis of data, specifically, the qualitative coding process. In this way, 
the chapter intends to provide a foil for new concept development with careful 
presentation of evidence. It lays down the findings from empirical enquiry 
within six differing organisations reflecting the principle constructs of interest. 
The six organisations include an epos (electronic point of sale) systems 
supplier, a processed juice supplier, a public house operator, a regional wildlife 
organisation, an area development agency, and area division of a government 
agency. 
 
4.1 The coding process and layout of findings. 
 
With the aim of exploring elements of the conceptual framework, the semi-
structured interviews explore four key areas across all six organisations: 
 The nature of entrepreneurship within the organisation 
 The process of managing intelligent failure 
 Intelligent failure and the individual 
 Outcomes from managing intelligent failure 
Having transcribed the interviews, NVivo software was used to code material. 
 
4.1.1 The initial template, hierarchy and coding 
 
In the first instance, first order codes emerged that largely remained within the 
four key areas of enquiry. The volume of data found on the fear of failure (within 
the ‘Intelligent failure and individual’ enquiry space) led to a specific code, as 
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did the significant material surrounding the entrepreneurial process that 
emerged. Thus the initial template, first order nodes are: 
 Entrepreneurial architecture  
 The entrepreneurial process 
 Fear of failure 
 Management of intelligent failure 
 Outcomes of managing intelligent failure 





 Culture (sub sub nodes of autonomy, 
collaboration, control, hierarchy, learning, 







 Corporate idea systems 
 Experimenting 
 Idea generation 
 Lack of a process 
 Problem solving 
 Resources 
 Sources of entrepreneurship 
 Volume of ideas 
 
3. Fear of failure 
 
 Blame 
 Levels of hierarchy 
 Failure acceptance 
 Failure non acceptance 
 Negative impact 
 No fear of failure 
 Ok to fail 
 Positive impact 
 Risk taking 
 Sustaining success 
 Tolerance of failure 
 
4. Management of 
intelligent failure 
 Avoiding failure 
 Identifying failure 
 Analysing failure 
 Learning from failure (sub sub nodes of 
barriers, communications of lessons 
learned, deep learning, single loop learning, 
and personal reflective learning) 




 Review structure (sub sub nodes of formal, 
informal, timing, guidelines) 
 Significance of failure 
 Non perception of failure 
 Management support of the process 
 
5. Outcomes of 
managing 
intelligent failure 
 For the corporate entrepreneur (sub sub 
nodes of resilience (drive to do better), need 
for achievement, need for autonomy, 
passion, positivity, risk taking, self-efficacy) 
 Entrepreneurial intensity 
 Individual learning 




4.1.2 The revised template 
 
Seeking similarities and differences amongst the nodes, sub nodes, categories 
are rationalised, reorganised, and reduced down to the more relevant 
categories making the level of data more manageable. Attention centres on 
‘Managing Intelligent Failure’ and the ‘Entrepreneurial environment’.  
The revised template and codes are reduced as follows: 
Managing Intelligent Failure 
 
 
Significance of managing intelligent failure 
(MIF)  
Recognition of intelligent failure  
Non recognition of intelligent failure  
Identifying failure  
Use of 'failure' word  
Analysing failure  
Structure  
Learning from failure  
Deep learning from failure  
Cross dept. learning from failure  
Personal reflection/learning  
Managing the after action review  
Communications of lessons learnt  
Managing failure emotions  
Localised MIF (at department level)  




Entrepreneurial Environment  
 Culture  
(Client centric, innovative nature, 
experimenting, vibrant working atmosphere, 
family values, informality, autonomy, 
collaboration, bureaucratic, hierarchy, 
learning culture, openness , trust, politics, risk 
taking, pace of change, impulsive, fear of 





To enable case comparison, the newly defined themes are compared with 
each case individually within a Conceptual Clustered Matrix (appendix 11) 
confirming the presence (or otherwise) of the themes and relevant comments, 
as “conceptual clustered matrices are most helpful when some clear concepts 
or themes have emerged from the initial analysis” (Miles and Huberman, 2014 
p.174).  
 
4.1.3 The final template revision: Iterative cognitive movement between 
emerging data, themes, concepts, and relevant literature 
 
4.1.3.1 Thematic focus  
 
Upon reviewing the “Managing Intelligent Failure” matrix (appendix 11), 
common data to all organisations was identified that potentially differed to 
current literature. This encouraged the further exploration of the specific and 
individual stages of the process of managing intelligent failure (as identified by 
literature): 
 Identifying failure 
 Analysing failure 
 Communication of lessons learned 
 
4.1.3.2 Similar to each stage across all organisations 
 
Next, as a means to analyse the data for each stage, a table highlighting cross 
case similarities for each stage is created, also showing dissimilarities (table 
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4.14). The cross case similarities of each stage emerge and offer some 
propositions that may be new to existing literature. 
 
4.1.3.3 Similar to all stages across all organisations 
 
As well as similarities at each stage, upon reviewing these tables, analysis 
emerges that certain data can be found in all stages across all organisations. 
Thus, the data becomes relevant to the entire process of managing intelligent 
failure for all organisations in the study. Four such themes are identified. 
Findings predominately indicate that, across all cases, the processes of failure 
identification, analysis and learning, and communication of lesson learned are: 
1. Unstructured 
2. Informal 
3. Ad hoc.  
4. Ongoing within regular operational activity. 
Again, adding to the relevance of the findings is that the data offers a variation 
to current literature. These findings are explained in full later in this chapter. 
 
4.1.3.4 Other identified themes   
 
Three other themes in the cross case comparison (appendix 11) within the 
‘managing intelligent failure’ data deemed as being relevant to all cases are 
also highlighted and explained in full. These are: 
 Management of negative emotions:  
 Management priorities: 
 The word ‘failure’ 
 
4.1.3.5 Additional focus: the entrepreneurial environment 
 
From the cross case comparison (appendix 11), components of the 
“Entrepreneurial Environment” are compared and a collated summary of 
selected organisational factors supportive of entrepreneurship evidenced 
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within the six organisations is created. This is presented in a case ordered 
matrix, starting with cases where the environment is more supportive of 
entrepreneurship. This presentation is a powerful way of understanding the 
differences across cases (Miles and Huberman, 2014 p.215), enabling. Upon 
examination of the matrix, it is possible to see that each organisation has 
differing environments. Therefore, it is possible to identify that the 
‘management of intelligent failure’ findings are irrespective of the 
entrepreneurial nature of the organisations. 
The section on the entrepreneurial environment summarises findings from 
both the interviews and the survey relating to the respective culture, 
leadership, strategy and structure of each organisation. It should be noted that 
survey results are of a low level of statistical significance but add to the general 
review of findings. They can be found in appendices 1-6. 
 
4.1.3.6 Chapter layout 
 
In line with the identified coding process and emergent analysis, findings are 
presented on a case-by-case basis initially. Following a full explanation of each 
organisation, tables summarise principle findings for each organisation in the 
area of the ‘entrepreneurial environment’ and the process of ‘managing 
intelligent failure’. 
A cross case analysis follows that reviews findings across all six organisations 
and presents a summary of entrepreneurial environments, common traits to 
the managing intelligent failure process, evidence of unstructured and informal 
learning from failure, cross case consistencies within each stage of learning 
from intelligent failure, and finally, other consistencies across the cases. In this 
way, the coding process and analysis shape the presentation of the findings 
(simultaneously enhancing the qualitative rigor (Gioia et al., 2013)) to a 
position of interest to be explored in the subsequent ‘Discussion’ chapter thus 
enabling concept development.  
The essence of this chapter rests within the presentation of findings as to how 
organisational entrepreneurs learn from failure within different environments, 
and how organisations manage the process of intelligent failure.  
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This organisation is the No1 supplier of EPoS (Electronic Point of Sale) 
systems to the hospitality industry in the UK. The business was founded in 
1979 by the current CEO and has been run as an independent family business 
ever since. It centres on manufacturing and supplying EPoS systems (software 
and hardware) to help large and small pubs, bars, restaurants, hotels or leisure 
venues improve the quality of service, and profit margins. From a straight 
forward EPoS system the integrated hospitality management system has been 
developed and also offers ‘guest management’, ‘kitchen management’, ‘stock 
management’, and ‘purchase to pay management’. In this way, the system 
allows hospitality operators to manage their sites/estates effectively 
The organisation has experienced significant growth in the last seven years 
(£10m to £54m turnover) and has recently relocated to an enlarged office 
space that is more supportive of innovation and entrepreneurship. The 
workforce has risen to approximately 350 people across five locations 
however; the Head Office is the principle location holding over 200 staff. The 
business has an extensive list of clients and business partners. 
The organisation offers an environment that is supportive of the entrepreneur 
and entrepreneurial activity. As a high technological business, it is situated in 
a fast moving and highly competitive market where product life cycles are 
short. Innovation and entrepreneurial activity therefore is very significant to the 
organisation. Data suggests that the organisation is forward thinking, 
constantly evolving and continuously striving to achieve extra excellence and 
change.  
Entrepreneurial initiatives of a mix of sizes are frequent and across most 
departments. Whilst the level of entrepreneurial intensity is driving the 
business forward, the consistent surge of new ideas is creating significant 
pressure within the organisation. There is an ongoing tension between keeping 
effective maintenance of existing products with the focus on new product 
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development. Clearly, the volume of activity is affecting product delivery 
schedules and product quality. 
There is a highly creative workforce particularly in the front end of the 
organisation’s innovation process. Significantly, there is evidence of creativity 
in supportive functions such as the Help Desk, and also supportive business 
functions such as HR and Finance which may be generally be perceived as 
less creative areas. Entrepreneurs have the opportunity to create ideas in most 
settings, freely and continuously expressing their creative energies and 
instincts. Individuals are encouraged to create and develop initiatives in a 
number of ways and generally find supporting resources available. 
 
4.2.2 Entrepreneurial environment - summary 
 
To understand the nature of the organisation, findings are summarised within 
the headings of culture, leadership, strategy, and structure. Supporting data 
under these same headings can be found in appendix 10, and surveys 
appendix 1. 
 




Table 4.1 Epos supplier entrepreneurial environment summary  
 




  Innovation 
 Experimentation 
 Client centricity 
 Vibrancy / fast pace of change 
 Informality and collaboration 
 Autonomy 
 Learning 
 Openness and trust 
 Managed risk-taking 




Leadership   Informal, non-hierarchal, friendly and approachable 
 Leadership based on trust and clear principles 
 CEO and COO driving force 
 Innovation focused 
 Strongly based on a clear and guiding ‘vision’ 
 Dynamic and passionate 
 Highly supportive of entrepreneurial activity and 
opportunity focused 
 
Strategy   Encased in a strong ‘vision’ 
 Partly formal and structured 
 Largely emergent and centred on opportunity seeking 
actions, sometimes impulsive and often instigated by 
external sources (suppliers/customers) 
 Considered with a long term approach 
 
Structure   Non hierarchal  
 Open 
 Collaborative 
 Unstructured and informal 
 Flexible to the needs of the individual initiative 
 
 
Qualitative evidence indicates that there is an environment supportive of 
entrepreneurship. This is supported by the data below that indicates the level of 
spend on R&D. According to the organisation, the money spent on R&D has 
fluctuated as it has moved from having some outsourced expensive resource to 




























Epos system supplier investment in R&D 2011-16 
The company argues that the turnover graph below suggests that the 




Epos system turnover 2000-15 
 
4.2.3 Management of intelligent failure 
 
“We don’t use the word ‘failure’. We use the word, ‘that didn’t work, let’s move 
on’” (Property Director). Within the organisation, failure is generally 
unrecognised, particularly in the creative and development areas. The postive 
energy from the senior team means that when entrepreneurial failure occurs, 
one of two scenarios take place. Projects can drift, becoming less and less 
visible, meanwhile the organisation’s energy becomes focused on more 
current and promising initiatives, or the initiative pivots in another direction 
towards eventual success: “We probably haven’t failed at all to be honest. We’ll 
just adjust what our plan is and carry on” (CEO). In the operational support 
departments however, failure is recognised as a construct and is generally 
frowned upon. 
Within the organisation, there is a broad recognition of the value of learning 
from failure. The client centric nature of the organisation heightens the 
perceived importance of learning from failure particularly as a means to ensure 
the failure is not repeated. Learning from failure is most prominent when it is 
customer related: “(Company name) has always been very focused on what 
the clients think so the fact that… if your clients are not happy you know that’s 
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again defining your failure and you do learn from that” (Technical and 
Marketing Communication Manager). 
The recognition of the value of learning from failure starts at the top of the 
organisation, however there is also recognition that a process of managing 
intelligent failure is largely lacking. The lack of a process is in part due to 
management wariness of processes and structures: “having it in the mix is 
important but putting it in the front of the mix would tend to drive analytical 
behaviour and we’re a relatively small, relatively agile company,” (COO). 
The organisation has learned to reduce the risk of large failure by applying 
significant effort at the front of the entrepreneurial process, when a new 
entrepreneurial initiative is put forward. This involves significant discussion, 
collaboration and strategic review. Additionally product quality is fully tested at 
each stage of development and is identified as a crucial part of the operation. 
The organisation believes its focus on product quality has been highly 
significant to the recent successes of the organisation.  
In the operational areas of the organisation, the growth of the company and 
the level of success achieved creates an attitude that reduces the importance 
of failures, and therefore the need to address them: “in the grand scheme of 
things it’s probably been ninety percent success and ten percent failure, which 
is near enough to not have any lights shining down in the corners, looking for 
where things are failing” (Deputy Help Centre Manager). Clearly, findings 
suggest that learning from failure is sometimes absent: “There seems to be a 
lack of awareness to when things aren’t working” (ibid) and therefore, there is 
a “cycle where every new release has got the same issues” (ibid). However, 
generally issues of failure brought to the attention of the Help Centre, are often 
then resolved by the Development team. This is where the learning takes 
place. 
The process of the management of intelligent failure is not prevalent or a 
priority for the organisation, although it does occur. However, at an operational 
level enquiry can often be limited to: “this is working, this is not working, forget 
that bit, do that bit … move on” (Deputy Help Centre Manager) and at a senior 
level there is sometimes even less enquiry: “If something doesn’t work, we just 
move onto something else, and I suppose we don’t really retrospectively sit 
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and look back why” (Property Director). The forward drive of the organisation 
onto new initiatives is a significant challenge for the learning from failure 
process. 
Time availability is a challenge to the learning process for the organisation. A 
tension exists between the time needed to carry out existing operational 
activity and the time required to deliver new initiatives. This is heightened by 
the number of initiatives being driven by the organisation as it is consistently 
looking towards the next new opportunity. Communication is also a challenge. 
The organisation has a number of external locations and when it comes to 
venture failure there is often limited communication between each team. Any 
learning from failure tends to stay within each location. 
 
4.2.3.1 Identifying failure 
 
The organisation has trouble identifying failure occurrences: “I think that’s 
probably our biggest failing; actually recognising to say, “That hasn’t worked 
out. What are we doing about it?”” (Property Director).  
When identification does occur, it is the organisation’s customers who 
principally identify failures. The main mechanism by which customers 
communicate failure issues is through the Help Centre. Calls are logged onto 
the computer system and brought to the attention of the Development team 
when the issue cannot be dealt with by Help Centre staff. The system allows 
data to be analysed and used to communicate problems. As the Technical 
Manager puts it: “we do have really good processes in place for logging bugs 
and calls, you know, when we attend a field trip and we take four Aztec 36s as 
we did, the help centre will say “ok in the last week we have had 231 calls 
about this release” or whatever so we have quantifiable … we have metrics - 
really easily understood metrics on problems and issues with the software 
product……We have a process in here for recording everything that we find, 
so nothing ever gets swept under the carpet.” 
When larger failure occurs which significantly impacts on the operations of the 
customer, communication often is directly to a member of the senior 
management team, and often, the CEO. 
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Separate to customer identification of failure, sales and profit figure variations 
to expectations act as a trigger to identifying failure. This may occur by an 
individual or through analysis in a routine management meeting or at a Board 
meeting. There is no formal process of reviewing initiatives that might enable 
identification in a structured manner. 
 
4.2.3.2 Analysing failure 
 
Within the organisation there is sometimes little analysis of failure particularly 
at senior management level, where there is an averse attitude towards 
operating the business using a systematic approach, and instead, a strong 
entrepreneurial forward force: “I suppose, in some ways, our culture is ‘we 
f****d it up, okay, we kind of understand why let’s just move on’, in some ways, 
rather than sitting there analysing our arse for two month’s thinking about stuff.” 
However, there is a degree of holistic analysis which is engaged with informally 
often out of hours and in a social setting. A significant venue for senior 
managers to meet after hours and discuss business activity is in a public house 
adjacent to the offices. The very informal nature of the process is in keeping 
with the culture of the organisation. Analysis also occurs through ongoing 
dialogue between senior team members during normal day-to-day activities. 
Whilst informal structures of failure analysis are more common and preferred, 
a more formal approach exists in the form of the organisation’s senior team 
monthly meetings. Whilst not specifically formed to discuss entrepreneurial 
activity, the senior team discuss larger initiatives and project failure as it 
materialises. Additionally, the senior team engage with the whole organisation 
by completing a tour of the UK offices. As part of the open session that includes 
discussion of the vision, current priorities, and successful initiatives, there is 
an opportunity for reflection on initiatives that have failed where staff can 
express their thoughts on why failures have occurred. These sessions add to 
the analysis of failure. 
Within the development departments, ad hoc meetings occur as failure is 
identified. The meetings are open and support team members to communicate 
freely and without risk of blame. The energy centres on understanding the 
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nature of the failure and what lessons can be learned. The manager reduces 
any emotion attached to the failure and honesty and openness are 
encouraged. A set of minutes of actions are created as a record of the meeting. 
In some of the support operations analysis of failure does take place and is 
supported by a software system. When an issue is identified, the system offers 
up a ‘ticket number’. The details of the failure are then logged under the 
number and saved. The software enables wide access to the ticket number 
that allows different individuals to analyse, learn and assist in the resolution 
process. ‘Stand up’ meetings are held each day in a nearby open office where 
‘ticket’ failures are discussed as a team. Attention centres on the potential 
resolutions and what has been learnt. Often potential resolutions are tested to 
provide further learning. When new initiatives are deployed, there are weekly 
meetings with the project manager to gain feedback on the new initiative. Any 
failures are worked through collaboratively with the aim that the failure does 
not reoccur. The essence of the system is resolution first, then learn: “From an 
organisational perspective, its reaction first, fix the problem, and then try and 
learn what went wrong, and ensure that those don’t happen again in the future. 
So it’s like an ongoing process” (Operations Director). Accepting the ‘ticket 
system’, there is very limited evidence of documentation of the analysis of 
failure generally. 
As customers are an important mechanism in failure identification, interacting 
with team members, they are sometimes important in assisting in resolving the 
failure and analysing what happened prior to the failure. This collaborative 
approach often occurs through open discussion without the intermediary of a 
project manager. This enables direct dialogue between the programmers and 
customers which can deliver a more precise and in-depth analysis of the failure 
creating more in-depth learning. Customer engagement therefore offers an 
enhanced level of analysis and learning. 
The organisation experiences single and double loop learning. Double loop 
learning is found to occur at a senior level where a more holistic mindset 
engages in the learning experience: “I think the takeaway from it (a failed £1m 
venture called Sigma), from my perspective and I think to an extent (name of 
CEO) is we shouldn’t ever underestimate the role our person…collective 
personality and culture and business ethics have on the success or otherwise 
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of the product.” The organisation generally sees itself as analysing bigger 
failures better than smaller failures. Single loop learning is found in the core 
operational areas of the business. When issues occur the focus centres on 
how to recover the situation and make sure the failure does not reoccur. 
 
4.2.3.3 Communication of lessons learned 
 
There is little evidence of a structured approach to the dissemination of new 
knowledge gained through failure episodes across the organisation: “As for 
communicating intelligent failures, that’s a difficult one because it’s not 
something we would do normally and there’s no mechanism in place” 
(Technical and Marketing Communications Manager). However, when 
software issues are resolved the product manager releases a ‘manifest’ that 
details changes to the software and lessons learnt which goes to the 
development team. The new knowledge may be shared informally. As the 
Office and Fleet Manager puts it, “we don’t keep a logbook of lessons learnt, 
or anything like that, but just generally, we try, through discussion around the 
department, to make sure everyone’s aware of what’s happening.” Further, 
“we have quite an open-plan office. In the finance department, we all sit 
together, so we’d normally have a little chat. We do have occasional team 
meetings where we’ll sit and have a proper discussion, but it’s usually just, “By 
the way, guys, this is what’s happening.” It’s quite informal” (Office and Fleet 
Manager). 
Communication is largely centred on ad hoc discussion and meetings although 
there are some regularly scheduled meetings where informal conversation 
occurs. These usually takes place within departments. However, one manager 
did articulate that he did operate a lessons learnt document: “There’s lessons 
learnt documents that don’t necessarily get shared to everybody in the 
business, but they will get shared with, let’s say, for example, by my teams” 
(Operations Manager). At an organisational level, there was no evidence of 
communication of larger failures and, within the organisation, no evidence of 
learning from failure from other departments. As the COO puts it, “we’re having 
to be a lot more trusting that this knowledge transfer is actually taking place in 




4.2.3.4 Emotional management 
 
There is little structure in the management of the negative emotions relating to 
entrepreneurial failure. At the senior level, informal support is effective in 
managing the emotions related to failure. The CEO describes the team as 
being “like family” and “you’ll see us later on when we’ve had a few beers in 
us.” However, he also realises that “further down the organisation maybe 
slightly different” and evidence supports this view: “I would say the business is 
not great at supporting that (emotional support after failure) always, you know, 
and I think it’s because…..there’s nothing personal there; it’s just the business 
has very high expectations” (Operations Director). However, within the 
organisation, the friendly and supportive nature of the culture does positively 
affect individuals facing failure, and additionally, middle management are 


















 4.2.3.5 Summary of findings relating to the process of managing 
intelligent failure 
 






  Customer feedback highly significant whether via helpdesk or 
direct to middle and senior management.  
 Internal identification predominantly informal, ongoing and ad 
hoc by nature.  




  Some lack of tolerance of ‘analysing’ activities by SMT. 
 Analysis by SMT is mainly informal and often in an informal 
setting 
 SMT monthly meeting incorporates some failure discussion 
 Ad hoc meetings occur as failures are identified 
 Software system allows wide access allowing individuals to 
contribute to analysis and learning 
 Co-analysis and learning direct with customers 
 Analysis also occurs in teams - often unprompted ‘stand up’ 
discussions.  
 SMT organise annual roadshow to discuss initiatives 
development activity.  
 Limited in-depth learning 
 Limited focus on a process for learning from failure 
 Generally weak at analysing failure as an organisation.  
Communicati
on of lessons 
learned  
  Software system to store product failure data and resolutions.  
 No mechanism for sharing non product lessons leaned 
 However, generally sharing of lessons occurs on an ongoing 
and ad hoc basis within open plan office space (stand up 
meetings), or informal meetings.  
 Large failure lessons not openly shared. 
 Mainly informal and unstructured.  
Emotional 
Management 
  Mixed level of organisational support 
 Development functions supported, however implementation 
functions less supported (fear of failure).  
 Generally the family and friendly feel offers a supportive 










Founded in 1999 by the current Chairman and his wife, the organisation is a 
provider of processed fruit and vegetable juices. In recent times the 
organisation has experienced significant growth with sales in the last 10 years 
increasing from £2m to £55m+. It is now the top supplier in the UK. As one of 
Europe's leading processed fruit suppliers it, imports, blends, stocks, re-packs 
and distributes high quality processed fruit ingredients which are sourced 
directly from suppliers around the world. The organisation is able to provide 
the customer with any quantity of chosen fruit ingredients in almost any 
packaging with tight adherence to stringent supplier and accreditation 
guidelines. The business has an important capability in the area of new product 
development (NPD) where it has a reputation for providing creative product 
solutions. The organisation successfully develops products with UK major 
multiples such as Waitrose, Sainsbury's, Marks and Spencer, Tesco, and 
Asda. Recently the business purchased a large distribution centre to manage 
anticipated demand. Staffing numbers have now reached 175 and the senior 
team has increased to 6 directors reflecting the needs of the business as it has 
grown and its future ambitions which mainly rest in Europe and markets 
beyond. The company now has a partner structure with four partners each 
holding 25% of the business. The partners are made of the Founder (and also 
Chairman) and three of executive directors. 
 
4.3.2 Entrepreneurial environment - summary 
 
To understand the nature of the organisation, findings are summarised within 
the headings of culture, leadership, strategy, and structure. Supporting data 
under these same headings can be found in appendix 10, and surveys 




4.3.2.1 Summary of the findings relating to the entrepreneurial 
environment  
 







  Opportunity seeking and impulsive 
 Innovation 
 Client centric 
 Family values 
 Informality and collaboration 
 Autonomy 
 Learning 
 Openness & trust 
 Risk taking 
 Tolerance of failure and low fear of failure 
 
Leadership   Entrepreneurial mindset 
 Leadership by example 
 Supports individual entrepreneurial activity 
 Close working relationships with staff 
 Strong team ethos 
 On occasion can overpower organisation 
 
Strategy   Highly emergent 
 Predominantly unstructured 
 Mainly short term focus and dependant on the next 
venture, however, long term goals drive a vision 
 
Structure   Low levels of structure - non hierarchal management 
structure 
 Predominantly informal structures 
 Open communication channels 
 Increasing level of structure as the organisation 
grows 









4.3.3 Management of intelligent failure 
 
“We're not very accepting of intelligent failure. We will tend to try and make it 
work- I think it's a function of the nature of the business. So we might steer it 
into a different direction from the original intention” (MD). Findings suggest that 
little intelligent failure is recognised as, in the main, if the initiative is not 
achieving it will be channelled in a different direction until it does succeed or, 
the initiative loses traction within the organisation and fades until it disappears. 
Nonetheless, there is a persistent approach to bringing the initiative to fruition. 
As the Business Development Manager (2) puts it, “failure is not really an 
option. You've just got to keep going until, you know, you get to where you 
need to be.” There is a consistently positive outlook; “It's not worked this time 
but, you know, it may work in the future. It's, you know, they never 
wholeheartedly cut something short and say ‘okay that's it, we're never doing 
that again’, it just wasn't the right time” (Ibid). The organisational expectation 
is that the initiative will eventually work. The organisation does not recognise 
when intelligent failure occurs, and the word ‘failure’ is not generally used very 
much. The word is not a natural part of the organisational vocabulary because, 
as the MD, when talk about the company, puts it, “I think psychologically it's 
very much success driven and we're very much a commercially, sales driven 
and in that world that's not a term considered appropriate.” 
There is evidence to suggest that the organisation’s recruitment strategy is a 
factor that limits entrepreneurial failure. The organisation has invested in 
recruiting experienced individuals with significant talent in important areas of 
the company, including the senior team. The recruitment strategy is deemed 
as important in the development of the organisation. 
When it comes to recognising the importance of managing intelligent failure, 
there are mixed responses from the interviewees, however, generally people 
see the importance of learning outcomes. There is evidence of a change in 
approach as the organisation grows. The Founder and Chairman views a 
process for managing failure with some caution; “I think it’s important that we 
don’t put a big emphasis on it. I think it’s one of those, really - we just have a 
very honest approach to it that didn’t work. Why didn’t it work? Fine! And within 
literally minutes it’s put to one side, because we’re already spinning another 
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plate anyway, or plates.” However, the organisation sees change: “probably a 
while ago, it would have been ‘move on to the next new exciting project’, 
whereas now there is more reflection and more drive in the sense of ‘Let's have 
a look at that in a different way to make a success of that, let's consider the 
lessons that have been learnt, positive or negative in terms of future project’. 
So that is considered at a strategic level on a regular basis” (Operations 
Director). The MD sees a process of learning from failure as “vitally important”; 
“You know, you can’t have success without an element of failure along the way 
and I think it’s just recognising that.” Whilst there is view within the senior team 
that managing intelligent failure has varying degrees of importance it is not 
recognised by all on the ground. As the Business Development Manager puts 
it, “when somebody fails here or something goes wrong, I think it’s forgotten 
quite quickly, and truthfully I would say I’m not sure an awful lot is taken from 
that at the moment.  I would say at the moment it’s probably not very 
important.” 
Significantly, the approach towards failure management is evolving or, as the 
MD puts it, “I think it was probably perfectly ok in the entrepreneurial phase (to 
not learn from intelligent failure) because it was always onto the next thing, 
onto the next thing, and the next things very exciting isn't it. So, it's almost not 
considered, and instantly forgotten. And then you move into the transition 
phase where it probably would be more negatively considered, and I think 
we're now coming out into the next phase and the growth of the business 
where it (a process for learning from failure) would be constructively viewed.” 
Evidence suggests that there is a very limited structured format to the 
management of intelligent failure within the organisation. When learning from 
failure does occur it is informal and happens in an ad hoc way. The emphasis 
of the business generally is to not linger on failure and move on to the next 
entrepreneurial initiative. A quick ‘wash up’ and then move on towards turning 
the next idea into a reality. 
Findings suggest that the organisation is highly entrepreneurial, being driven 
forward by a highly entrepreneurial Founder and Chairman. From the 
perspective of developing an enhanced learning process, the highly 
entrepreneurial nature creates a challenge in itself: “you very rarely go back 
and review - and learn the lessons from intelligent failure of some of the 
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previous ones (initiatives). As the next one's much more exciting and it's onto 
the next - and there's always a next. And that' much more fun - or potentially 
much more fun than a considered review” (Operations director). In essence, 
there is a limited willingness to engage in enhancing the failure learning 
process and, additionally, there is evidence that the lack of time is also a 
challenge. The entrepreneurial process does not currently promote failure-
learning processes, however, there is recognition that, as the business is 
getting bigger, these processes may add value and that they should be 
developed. The challenge is how to manage an organisation “that's trying to 
pull in two different directions (being entrepreneurial and corporate) at the 
same time” (Operations Director). 
 
4.3.3.1 Identifying failure 
 
The organisation often views failure as a state whereby correction and further 
direction will lead to eventual success rather than an endpoint. However, within 
the entrepreneurial process failure is identified (even if the ‘failure’ word is not 
used) in a number of informal ways. Separate to individual or team 
identification, customer feedback is a principle mechanism to understand that 
a failure has occurred; supplier feedback is an additional mechanism.  
The process of identifying failure within the organisation is largely ad hoc, 
informal and on an ongoing basis. The size of the organisation, the open 
workspaces and the lack of fear of failure by individuals allows failures to be 
identified quickly as a part of an open ongoing dialogue. Generally, individuals 
are close to their work, therefore constant assessment of the initiative is taking 
place. This leads to management being aware of most situations. The open 
nature of the organisation means ongoing informal monitoring is constant. 
At a senior level there are open and continuous discussions going on in the 
form of back-chanel and impromptu conversations where new ventures are 
discussed. The ongoing monitoring of activity assists failure identification. 
Whilst there may be no detailed targets created, there is an expectation of the 
likely performance level for the initiative and discussion forms if these levels 
do not materialise. Within the operations department there is a more structured 
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approach to the assessment of performance with the use of KPI’s, and SMART 
goals which are reviewed regularly. 
However, there are formal review processes that manifest in regular 
management meetings when significant projects are discussed within the 
team. There is also an all-day Senior Management meeting that occurs in a 
monthly basis where initiatives are reviewed as part of the agenda. Discussion 
is lengthy by nature and in detail and minutes are produced: “Many of the 
strategic projects, the bigger business projects would be considered within this 
SMT, the senior management team. And those would be presented on a 
monthly basis. So, the level of progress would be presented, discussed, and 
that would be dependent on - you know, what was the target, the financial 
target, what was the level of success” (Group MD).  
 
4.3.3.2 Analysing failure 
 
The larger business ventures are considered by the senior management team 
and this may occur in the more formal monthly senior management meetings 
or, more often informally. The senior team may hold an after action review 
which is termed as a mini post mortem: “Where are we?  You know, how have 
we arrived at where we’re about?  Where are the recognisable failings in us as 
a management team to manage properly or to direct properly in certain 
circumstances and what are our corrective actions now? So you know, you’re 
talking about a mature, experienced, professional people that, you know, will 
understand the topics” (Managing Director). 
However, analysis is also on an informal level and often external to the 
business in a social setting. Essentially the entrepreneurial mindset of the 
organisation has limited time and low tolerance of data analysis. “For every 
intelligent failure, we’ve got six positive things happening at that one moment 
so we give it very scant time and we rely on the fact that within our tighter 
group, we all know what we did and how we did it and that’s in that memory 
bank that we wouldn’t necessarily make those mistakes again. So we don’t 
spend too long analysing the failure, because we’re already too busy on the 
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new thing. Our attention span to it (analysing failure), led by me who’s got a 
very short attention span…..we just move on.”  
Where analysis does occur within the core of the organisation, it is informal 
and unstructured. Rather than book a meeting room, discussion breaks out in 
the open workspaces. However, generally there was little evidence of any in-
depth analysis of failure within the organisation leading to deep learning. The 
nature of the organisation is not to stop and analyse the situation fully and 
discussion is not recorded. The organisation prefers to move forward quickly, 
either to forget the event, or to start on the next venture. 
Individuals often have a mindset that engages in the process of learning from 
failure at a personal level. This involves individuals analysing events in their 
own mind with the aim of making sense of failure episodes. From this analysis 
comes personal learning which is then available for sharing with teams. The 
culture positively supports this approach to learning by encouraging 
experimentation. 
However, as a whole the analysis of failure within this organisation is generally 
weak, lacking depth and a focused a mindset. This is part due to a limited focus 
on the process of learning from failure by management, but mainly due to the 
opportunity seeking mindset of the organisation, which relentlessly drives new 
venture development. 
 
4.3.3.3 Communication of lessons learned 
 
The organisation has informal channels of communication that are open and 
unstructured. This is supported by the management approach and by the open 
workspace. When analysis of initiatives does occur, the lessons learned from 
the failure experience are generally shared as part of usual ongoing dialogue 
within teams and indeed between departments. There is a significant volume 
of communication taking place on a daily basis, and these informal 
conversations move knowledge around the business. As the different teams 
are generally physically and psychologically close to one another, there is 
awareness of failure in other sections and therefore lessons learned may be 
communicated. However, more often lessons learned remain with individuals 
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and the teams and are not documented in a way that means they can be 
referenced to in the future.  
The senior team in the organisation is less effective at communicating lessons 
learnt from intelligent failure. The Founder and Chairman asserts; “I think we 
are poor, as a business, of communicating intelligent success, or intelligent 
failure. One of our criticisms, as the four partners, we’re not brilliant at talking 
to our team.” So whilst there is no evidence of significant structural barriers to 
the communication of lessons learnt from failure, the necessary emphasis and 
energy may be lacking. 
 
4.3.3.4 Emotional management 
 
There is little evidence of a structured approach to the emotional management 
of intelligent failure. The organisation has an environment where there is very 
little fear of failure that means there is minimal emotion to manage when failure 
does occur, however, some individuals overly self-chastise causing 
unpleasant emotions. The opportunity seeking culture of the organisation 
drives individuals to move on quickly, forget the failure and move on to the next 
initiative. In this way, thoughts do not rest long on the failure occurrence. 
Support comes from the closeness of teams who help individuals through any 
moments of unhappiness by encouraging them with supportive words. 
Emotional management is not a structured process. The caring culture 
provides emotional support in the main and this starts at the top from the senior 









4.3.3.5 Summary of findings relating to the process of managing 
intelligent failure  
 






  Customer feedback 
 Supplier feedback 
 Individual and team identification 
 Ad hoc 
 Largely informal and unstructured process 
 Continuous “picking up messages" via email chatter, 
informal discussion, ongoing monitoring. 
Analysing 
failure 
  Some lack of tolerance of ‘analysing’ activities by SMT. 
 Analysis by SMT is mainly informal and often in an 
informal setting 
 SMT monthly formal meeting  
 Ad hoc meetings occur as failures are identified 
 Analysis also occurs in teams - often unprompted ‘stand 
up’ discussions.  
 Limited deeper learning 
 Limited focus on a process for learning from failure 
 Generally weak at analysing failure as an organisation. 
Communicati
on of lessons 
learned  
  Some communication of lessons 
 Informal 
 Ad hoc 
 Within teams and across departments 
 Mainly through on going dialogues 
 Little communication from senior team 
 Little documentation of lessons learned  
 No electronic mechanism for lessons learnt storage 
 Lack of management focus or emphasis 
Emotional 
Management 
  Very low fear of failure therefore reduced failure emotions 
 However self-chastising evident 
 Support derives from the closeness of teams and also 
from management 
 Ad hoc and informal 









The company was founded in 1777 brewing beer for the local community. The 
business has been run by subsequent generations of the founder, without a 
break in the lineage, ever since. The current CEO is the 11th family member to 
run the company. The organisation has continuously expanded enlarging the 
brewery and acquiring pubs. The company now owns over 200 pubs of which 
just under 50 are ‘managed’. The other 150+ pubs are ‘tied’ and are run by 
tenants. The organisation remains an independent company and is a leading 
operative in the brewing and hospitality industry.  The Head Office and 
Managed House Division represent the core of business operations 
(notwithstanding the importance of the brewery) and are the focus of this 
research. In the hospitality industry, the organisation is recognised as being 
innovative, all be it in a relatively traditional market. 
The aim of the organisation is continue to grow whilst remaining an 
independent family company and to lead the UK market in brewing and 
hospitality. In the Head Office and Managed House Division, there is just under 
400 staff. 
The organisation hosts an environment, which is both entrepreneurial and yet 
process led and bureaucratic. The firm has a shorter line on decision-making 
and can move faster than big organisations in the industry; the systems and 
procedures help ensure effective implementation. However, the bureaucracy 
and lack of resources are a restraint on entrepreneurial activity. So while the 
organisation is highly entrepreneurial in some aspects, for example creating a 
public house out of 15 shipping containers, in other ways the organisation is 
not so entrepreneurial, particularly away from the centre in the branches. While 
entrepreneurship is promoted in Head Office, it is very different for the 
branches where there is a different climate within which entrepreneurs to 
operate. For the branches, the priority is the effective delivery of operational 
processes as opposed to new ideas and initiatives. Generally, the organisation 
engages in entrepreneurship with less risk.  
184 
 
Entrepreneurship and idea generation occurs under the backdrop of an 
approach that challenges current thinking. The organisation has demonstrated 
its ability to transform in recent company history. At the centre, the Retail 
Director who is responsible for product development drives idea generation. 
There is a constant flow of initiatives of varying size within the centre. In the 
branches, larger initiatives are advanced by General Managers and taken to 
the centre. Within the branches there is evidence of an open collaborative 
approach to the creation of event based activities. There is also significant low-
level ideas arising from across the sections some of which are driven by 
problem solving. These ideas may be referred to the general manager 
depending on their significance. The larger the change the more authority 
required. 
There is evidence that resources are available to the organisation to support 
entrepreneurial activity at company level; at branch level, there is significantly 
less resource. The organisation is comfortable investing large sums in new 
market initiatives. Much of the invested money comes from accumulated 
funds. The company takes a long-term approach to strategy and finance.  
 
4.4.2 Entrepreneurial environment - summary 
 
To understand the nature of the organisation, findings are summarised within 
the headings of culture, leadership, strategy, and structure. Supporting data 
under these same headings can be found in appendix 10, and surveys 









4.4.2.1 Summary of the findings relating to the entrepreneurial 
environment  
 








  Family values 
 Entrepreneurship (with some innovation) 
 Mostly informal 
 Client centric 
 Autonomy 
 Often collaborative 
 Moderate levels of  bureaucracy 
 Moderate hierarchal approach 
 Learning 
 Openness & trust 
 Managed risk taking 
 Tolerance of failure and low fear of failure 
 
Leadership   Non hierarchal approach 
 "Custodian” leadership style (CEO) 
 Through a strong vision 
 Visible, open and approachable 
 Centred on supporting staff to fulfil their own potential 
 Centred on creating entrepreneurial environment 
 
Strategy   Strong direct approach 
 Mainly top down 
 Long term approach 
 Structured and emergent strategy 
 Vison and values align both emergent and structured 
strategy 
 
Structure   Traditional management structure (softened by 
management approach) 
 Cross functional collaboration mainly at HO 
 Open communication structures generally 







4.4.3 Management of intelligent failure 
 
Failure as a concept is not generally recognised within the organisation and is 
a word that is not used. ‘Not working and didn’t work are used to replace the 
word ‘failure’; “I guess because failed is final, and it’s just game over; forget it. 
Whereas ‘didn’t work’ kind of insinuates ‘didn’t work but possibly could’. So 
there is sort of a get-out clause, as opposed to failure is final” (GM location P). 
Failure is perceived as a moment in time before a new action is engaged to 
move the initiative towards success. The moment of ‘not working’ is part of the 
entrepreneurial process and not an end in itself; “it (failure) doesn’t happen, 
because a lot of the time everyone’s adapting” (Assistant Manager, location 
T). There is also a positive energy that prevails: “as an organisation they don’t 
want you to think you’ve failed. They are very upbeat, making people’s day 
and making sure they’ve got a happy, friendly team that are going to deliver” 
(Shift Manager at location P). Significant also is the link between failure and 
learning: “there isn’t a lot of room for failure. It’s all very much learning” 
(Assistant Manager at location T).  
Large failures are avoided by significant effort applied to the front of a new 
entrepreneurial process. Avoiding failure is pursued through vigorous 
discussion before the idea is developed, as the Retail Director puts it, “we get 
a consensus agreement upfront, a lot of consensus, a lot of discussion about 
something upfront, so it’s a collegial decision to progress with 
something…….so I think it’s almost the George Washington thing, ‘if I had 
seven hours to cut down a tree I’d spend six hours sharpening the axe’ and 
that’s…I think that’s a very good quote and it applies very much to what we 
are doing.”  
The management of failure as a process is not prevalent or a priority for the 
organisation, although it does occur especially at the centre. Generally, the 
management of intelligent failure is unstructured and informal. Whilst it is 
largely recognised as being something which would support the organisations 
growth, failure management is seen as an opportunity rather than a current 
reality; “I think the after action review we’ve got to think much more about the 
process of how to track and disseminate the learnings….and how do we make 
sure that we don’t repeat the mistakes” (Retail Director). However, there is also 
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evidence that learning from failure has only limited traction: “in essence, it’s 
(the initiative) failed and I’m comfortable, I don’t really need to know the exact 
reason it’s failed. It’s probably because, you know, our time is limited and I 
know if I use my time somewhere else it’ll get more benefit, if that makes 
sense. So, I think that’s why I’m happy to just let things drop” (General 
Manager of location P). 
 
4.4.3.1 Identifying failure 
 
When new entrepreneurial initiatives are implemented the organisation 
identifies outcomes in three main ways; firstly, by the company’s Management 
Information System (MIS), which provides relevant sales, costs and profit data 
on a daily, monthly or yearly basis to directly inform management of the 
performance of the new venture. Lack of footfall is also monitored. This is 
important because, as the CEO puts it “we have clear parameters of what 
we’re trying to achieve; what we’re expecting to achieve. So we’d be able to 
review that against the numbers and also experientially as well.  I mean, we 
would all visit the place (location of the initiative) many times.” A quarterly 
review of developments is held by the Director of Development that highlights 
initiative failure. Secondly, outcomes are identified through customer feedback 
whereby customers express their view via the ‘trip advisor’ app, in person, or 
by email. Customers are given the CEO’s direct email address on the back of 
every menu in the branches. Trip Advisor is reviewed for people’s reactions 
and “if we are seeing a constant theme or something that’s just not, right not 
working, then things normally change quite quickly” (Retail Director). Thirdly, 
by experience and feel. Being in the new venture or being in and amongst the 
event offers intuitive data as to the performance of the initiative. It is possible 
to see the numbers of customers and their reaction to the new initiative actually 
on location. This may include the lack of atmosphere, the customer’s lack of 
engagement, or that they appear to be uncomfortable in the surroundings. 
New initiatives are monitored on an ongoing basis through a collaborative and 
informal approach. There is no evidence of a structured process to identify 
failure except the quarterly update on developments by the Retail Director. 
Most failure identification happens outside of this meeting through week-to-
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week informal conversations discussing matters continuously as the initiative 
progressed. 
Identify failure can sometime be a challenge for the organisation, which 
experiences termination drift. When project failure does occur the situation is 
not fully recognised as discussion, interest, and activity slows to an eventual 
stop and then the project loses all visibility to the organisation. However, failure 
is recognised but sometimes after only exhaustive engagement: “the nature of 
our company, or the nature of our heritage, and the nature of [name of CEO], 
is to keep going until we actually get to that point where somebody says ‘do 
you know what? This is a failure. Let’s just get out’” (General Manager at 
location P) 
 
4.4.3.2 Analysing failure 
 
Analysis and learning from failure is predominantly an informal and ad hoc 
process. At a top tier level, informal analysis occurs on a week-by-week 
ongoing basis when the CEO and Retail Director (responsible for product 
development) converse. Analysis of quantitative and qualitative data is 
continuous, taken seriously, and drives future action to remedy and improve 
the performance of the initiative. Reasons for lack of progress or failure are 
considered based on anecdotal evidence, sales or cost data. There is a 
general expectation of what is expected and significant time is invested with 
other senior directors in analysing new developments and this partially 
formalised on the Board’s two ‘away days’. There is a quasi-formal quarterly 
business review process by the Director of Development, where all new 
developments are discussed. The review centres on performance, a reflection 
on what action has occurred and lessons learned. There is no evidence that 
there is any set agenda for discussion. Subsequent analysis at Board level is 
on an informal basis.  
Within the centre, there is a mix of differing forms of analysing failure and 
learning from failure, which incorporates some structure, but mainly the 
process is informal and more ad hoc. This can involve impromptu stand up 
discussion or informal meetings. Building project management has the most 
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developed approach to managing failure following the introduction of a 
‘standard project methodology’. The new approach centres on effective 
monitoring and reviewing of building projects. Review structures in this 
instance are both formal (meetings with an agenda, checklists, and surveys) 
and informal (on site discussions). 
Initiatives within the branches are informally reviewed for learning points 
through weekly meetings with discussion generally centring on answering 
questions such as: “Did we think it was a success? What were the positives, 
what were the negatives, what could have been improved on? How could we 
have done that? What could I have done to have marketed better or pushed it 
further or got more bodies down? Next time, what do we think we should be 
doing?” (GM of location T). The points are then “kept in mind and go on board 
for the next event” (ibid). There was no evidence of written documentation 
relating to discussion in formal or informal analysis of failure. 
There is evidence that where learning from failure occurs the learning is of a 
‘single loop’ nature rather than ‘double loop’ learning nature. This is particularly 
the case within the main body of the organisation. Generally, analysis and 
learning remains close to the detail and specifics of the venture rather than 
examining the lessons learned within the wider context. There is also evidence 
that some lessons are not being learned and that mistakes reoccur. However, 
the CEO does demonstrate deeper learning and was able to express an 
example of a third party failure, which has provoked him to, “fundamentally re-
think how we ran our whole managed division.” 
 
4.4.3.3 Communication of lessons learned 
 
Where lesson are learned from failure, there is little formal communication 
within the project team, or department, or branch. In most instances, there are 
no written notes of discussions relating to lessons learnt. Where written notes 
occur they are personal and are not distributed or, at a senior level, some 
formal notes are taken at some meetings and circulated to the Chairman and 
the Board. However, there was evidence of a structured approach in the 
Building Surveying section where there is a formal survey tool to identify and 
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communicate failures to the organisation.  Predominantly informal 
communication is the most usual form of dissemination of lessons learned. 
This occurs through person-to-person conversations, in the form of ad hoc 
stand up meetings and team updates on continuous basis. In some instances, 
people are referred to individuals who have experience in a relevant project 
area and this acts as means to share lessons learned in the past. This personal 
approach is preferred to reading written reports. 
In the main where lessons are shared, this occurs within teams or 
departments. There is little evidence to suggest that lessons learnt are shared 
across internal organisational boundaries. An informal monthly meeting takes 
place where regional managers meet for lunch. A loose agenda may include 
some communication of lessons learned. However, branches view themselves 
as separate and independent and are therefore not sharing lessons learnt, 
except where the general manager is more outgoing and well connected. The 
findings suggest that overall there is little sharing of lessons learnt from failure. 
The main challenges to the communication of lessons learned are:  
 A lack of time due to the ongoing operational activity. There is evidence that 
increasing time is being spent on implementation over innovation with a view 
to catching up with the ideas already in the pipeline: “There is a slight wariness 
of too many initiatives……..there is a danger of us trying to do too much” 
(Retail Director). 
 A fear of the centre and the Retail Director.  
 The feeling of independence in the branches that creates a mind-set of 
isolation, which is restrictive of outward communication.  
 The working relationship between the centre and the branches  
 The lack of a planned management of intelligent failure process. Whilst there 
is a process that has emerged and that is adding value to the entrepreneurial 






4.4.3.4 Emotional management 
 
Emotional management is unstructured, informal and instinctive. In the centre 
where most entrepreneurial activity takes place, the collaborative nature of 
venture creation creates ‘team responsibility’ over and above ‘individual 
responsibility’. Evidence suggests that collaboration significantly reduces the 
likelihood of failure episodes and acts as a support mechanism when failure 
does occur. As the CEO puts it “everyone rallies round them (those individuals 
caught up in failure). They know it’s….absolutely fine. There are…these things 
do happen and I think….Yes, I think people rally around and are supportive. I 
mean did the director involved in that retail trial at one of our pubs get 
lambasted for it? No. He was very open about it and he said ‘I’ve cocked up’, 
and everyone moved on and that was fine.” Within the branches teams are 
close so when failure does occur (even when it is a low-level initiative): 
“There’s always going to be people there to support you” (Bar supervisor). 
Indeed, general managers go out of their way to reassure individuals that 
responsibility is a team, not an individual matter. 
The organisation views failure as a means to learn and bring closure; “one is 
to understand what we’ve learnt…..and two, I think, is to staunch the wound 
for people emotionally” (CEO). So attention centres on confirming the failure, 
learning, controlling individual exposure, reassuring and moving on to the next 
venture. “I get really annoyed with people when they hark back to people’s 
failures, even in a sort of joking sense. It just doesn’t do anyone any good” 
(CEO). At a lower level, intelligent failure is valued as a tool to guide training 
and development. In the main, the family and team values are strong and 
individual support through failure is significant. Important also is that there is a 







4.4.3.5 Summary of findings relating to the process of managing 
intelligent failure  
 








  Management Information System (MIS) 
 Customer feedback (e.g. Trip Advisor, in person, or via email) 
 Experiencing the event 
 Ongoing monitoring and informal discussions within teams.  
 One quarterly meeting specifically reviewing developments. 




  Predominantly informal and unstructured  
 On going 
 Ad hoc 
 A quarterly review of developments formerly (although) with 
an informal agenda) 
 Stand up meetings 
 As part of cyclical operations meetings 
 Board ‘Away Days’ 
 ‘Standard Project Methodology’ within Building Project 
Development 
 Largely single loop learning (except at ST level). 
 
Communicati
on of lessons 
learned  
  No organisational storage mechanism 
 Mainly dissemination is via individuals and teams on an 
ongoing and ad hoc basis 
 Informal by nature 
 ‘Building’ dept. has formal survey tool to communicate 
lessons 
 Little sharing between branches 
 Individuals from previous initiatives are used to utilise 




  A low fear of failure 
 Family values form the supportive framework for failure. 
 No clear formal approach 
 At all levels people ‘rally’ around to support the individual(s) - 








The regional wildlife organisation is a charity set up 53 years ago to protect 
and promote wildlife. Today it looks to create a reinvigorated natural world that 
helps deal with the environmental threats of climate change. It has a key role 
in creating wildlife havens, championing wildlife, and works to increase the 
value that people place on wildlife 
As a charity, it depends on individual support from the general public. 
Revenues come from membership and support for specific appeals. 
Consultancy is another income stream; however the largest revenue comes 
from grants, and also successful project bids. The previous CEO retired four 
years ago after twenty years of service. Whilst there was significant growth in 
that time, the new CEO has taken organisational growth to a new level. The 
organisation has 125 staff members. 
The corporate entrepreneurs within the organisation are given appropriate 
support to create and develop initiatives and opportunities. Findings from the 
interviews are rife with examples of entrepreneurial initiatives and endeavours. 
The organisation represents a good place for the entrepreneur to operate. As 
the Communications Team Leader puts it, “I think there are some bright people 
here and we have very bright guys managing it and my line manager is very 
clear sighted. So I think it’s that sort of intellectual energy within an 
organisation that will mean that there is a certain amount of entrepreneurship”.  
There is a significant flow of initiatives to encourage entrepreneurial behaviour. 
As the Fundraising Director puts articulates, “we’re a reasonable sized charity, 
but we’ve got big land holdings, we’ve got big projects that we’re delivering 
and we’ve got a whole load of new initiatives all sort of pushing forward at the 
same time.”  
“There’s a willingness to innovate, there’s a kind of leadership support for that 
in a sense that, you know, we are pushed to try to push boundaries, try new 
things, do things differently, do things better, so I’d say, you know, within the 
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context that we’re in, I think the (organisation) is a very entrepreneurial 
organisation” (Director of Fundraising). 
 
4.5.2 Entrepreneurial environment - summary 
 
To understand the nature of the organisation, findings are summarised within 
the headings of culture, leadership, strategy, and structure. Supporting data 
under these same headings can be found in appendix 10, and surveys 
appendix 4.  
4.5.2.1 Summary of the findings relating to the entrepreneurial 
environment  
 













 Moderate levels of  bureaucracy 
 Low hierarchy 
 Learning culture 
 Openness & trust 
 Risk taking 
 Tolerance of failure and low fear of failure 
Leadership   Leadership with an entrepreneurial mindset 
 Values driven 
 Through a strong vision 
 Encourages experimentation 
 Visible, open and approachable and non hierarchal 
 Charismatic 
 Leadership by example 
Strategy   The organisational vision provides strong and clear direction 
 Predominantly emergent as opportunities arise 
 Long and short term approachs 
Structure   Informal 
 Structures to monitor and manage risk 
 Shallow management structure 
 Open communication channels 
 Matrix structure engaged in project (field) work 
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4.5.3 Management of intelligent failure 
 
Within the organisation, there is little recognition of failure occurrence. Failures 
tend to be infrequent and often small. The lack of known failures maybe due 
the collaborative work completed at the front end of the initiative in the planning 
stage that is evident. Failures are described as “hurdles” (IT Officer) as part of 
a cycle of work whereby teams get together to redirect the initiative. 
Significantly, though, the word ‘failure’ is not largely used and instead people 
say such things as ‘it didn’t work’: “Fail is a very hard word, isn’t it? It’s a 
very…..I mean, I suppose we probably do use it occasionally, but we probably 
say ‘that didn’t work’” (NIA Project Manager). 
In terms of the management of the process of learning from failure, there are 
some informal processes but learning from failure episodes is not prolific: “I 
mean, this is the first time I’ve felt uneasy with any of the questions. No, we’re 
not really good at that, I think it’s kind of a ‘oh well, never mind’. I don’t mean 
that in an aggressive or arrogant way” (Commercial Director). Certainly there 
is a sense that because entrepreneurial areas of the organisation are so busy 
driving initiatives forward that when failure occurs they are “totally consumed 
by the next thing” (Communications Officer) and a review process does not 
take place. There was evidence however, that the attention to learning from 
failure can vary significantly depending on the manager responsible for 
managing the initiative. 
Inherently though, the processes for learning from failure are underdeveloped. 
“The delivery is great but we’re not always so good at the proper set up and 
authorisation processes and also the closing down of it – which is partly about 
how we capture and disseminate learning. So there’s a kind of ‘processy’ 
structural weakness that we’re looking to address at the moment there” 
(Funding Director). 
There is recognition of the importance of learning from failure at senior levels 
within the organisation, yet there is little evidence of senior management 
communicating the significance of failure to the organisation as a whole. 
Additionally there is recognition of the potential benefits of a process for 
managing intelligent failure; however, this has not translated into the creation 
of new structures and protocols.  
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Interviewees consistently responded that the most significant challenge to the 
learning from failure process is lack of time. The lack of time mainly reflects 
the level of entrepreneurial activity rather than core workload, although that 
also affects the amount of available time. The shortage of time means the 
process of managing intelligent failure is often weakened or just does not 
happen at all: “we’re rushing from one thing to another and you don’t always 
have that pause point to reflect in a constructive way about how something 
might or might not work” (Fundraising Director). The other significant challenge 
to the failure management process is the remoteness of multiple offices away 
from Head Office.  
 
4.5.3.1 Identifying failure 
 
Identification of failure sometimes comes via discussion in regular operational 
meetings. Ventures are discussed at cyclical weekly or fortnightly meetings on 
a ‘one to one’ basis or at team level. Through regular monitoring of projects 
the point of failure recognition comes early and presents the opportunity to 
address it and potentially find a way forward. 
Frequently failure is identified even before these meetings, as teams are highly 
collaborative and often work together in close proximity, chatting informally. 
The nature of open plan layouts in the office space allows for ongoing dialogue 
between individuals within their team: “We sit next to each other so pretty 
quickly you can tell if some things aren’t...well you’ve got the stats from 
previous years, the stats about media appearances and people responding to 
our materials. So we can see pretty quickly whether things are going in the 
right direction” (Communications Team Leader). Often projects have 
milestones and targets to achieve that act as a guide to progress. In everyday 
conversations, teams are constantly (informally) considering how the project 
is performing against relevant milestones. This means identification can be 
swift. 
Failure identification may also come from variation in financial targets that are 
sometimes highlighted first by the Commercial Manager “who will come and 
say ‘hang on, what’s going on here? We’ve got a massive overrun on this’, you 
197 
 
know, we think right, we’ll go straight in and look at that” (CEO). Within 
marketing initiatives, attendance numbers and visitor feedback determine 
results and, therefore, are an alternative measure to identify failure or success. 
In general terms, individuals are very close to their work and are quickly aware 
when issues arise and the initiative is failing. Management put forward a 
mantra that encourages individuals to let them know as early as is possible, 
as they “don’t like surprises” (Commercial Manager). What can make failure 
identification harder is the flexibility of most of the targets that causes 
significant ambiguity and makes failure occurrence less clear. 
 
4.5.3.2 Analysing failure 
 
At an individual level self-reflection is considered important by a number of 
interviewees; “the self-awareness and self-reflection time is something that, for 
me personally, is really hugely important” (Commercial Director). For the 
DRBC Manager, the failure “made me re-evaluate the original concept. Was it 
the right thing to do? Would I have done it differently? I think you’ve always got 
to look back and say, right. What would I have done differently? And if I did it 
again, you know, would it have or not?” Individual self-reflection is then often 
shared with colleagues. 
Generally, analysis and learning from failure is an informal process. Discussion 
is free flowing between individuals and the team on an ad hoc basis at their 
workstations. Discussion ends when team members feel that the topic is 
exhausted. The term ‘wash up’ was used several times to describe this activity: 
“As a team we would just go back and say, okay why hasn’t that worked and 
... I think then you just analyse what’s happened, is it to do with the location, is 
it do with what was on offer. Is it to do with how it was promoted and there are 
always opportunities to change some of those parameters to try again” 
(Communications Officer). Analysis can centre on trying to break down the 
venture into its component parts and examining these sections individually. 
Essentially, much of the analysing that takes place is informal and on a 




Analysis and learning can take place on a cyclical operational, team, or on a 
‘one to one’ basis’ with line managers: “I have one to ones, formal one to ones, 
well formal, like monthly planned one to ones with my two team leaders. So if 
we’ve got big projects going on, so the case in the north of the county, the 
nature reserve who is leading on quite a large chunk of it, I’ll catch up with him 
on the phone and pop out to see the work and stuff just so I’m on top of what’s 
happening.  I’ll catch up with the Team Leader and do it formally once a month 
and check he’s happy with how work’s going.  And then at that point if that’s 
not gone well then we would sit down, and sort of I guess, I suppose the phrase 
had a “wash up meeting” on it, in a way, and work out what’s gone wrong 
because nearly always if something’s gone wrong like that we will have to do 
it the next year” (Land Manager). Indeed, in the field project area there is a 
more enhanced structured process to learning from failure whereas the 
remainder of the organisation exhibits an unstructured approach. 
At a senior level much of the informal approach is replicated: “So we reviewed 
the business case, we reviewed the finances, we looked at the context in which 
we’d set it up, we thought well we’d assumed a certain context when we set 
up the business but the reality was a very different context and how should 
have we recognised that earlier?  So really it was just sitting down and talking 
in a constructive, honest way about it” (Director of fundraising). Also evident is 
the nature of enquiry and analysis at a senior level where analysis and learning 
is at a deeper level. Whilst there is some evidence of a deeper level of probing 
of failure episodes within the senior team, for the rest of the organisation there 
is limited evidence of a refined process to in-depth analysis. Indeed, single 
loop learning mainly occurs within the core of the organisation, while double 
loop learning is only evidenced within the senior team. 
Generally, across the organisation, learning from failure occurs and this is 
particularly the case in the more entrepreneurial areas. Interestingly, however, 
there is little conscious recognition of this process. Learning is almost intuitive 
as individuals who are highly engaged in their initiative are continuously 
thinking about them with intensity. When failure occurs, the entrepreneurs are 




4.5.3.3 Communication of lessons learned 
 
Evidence suggests that some learning from failure is disseminated, most if it 
via informal structures. Lessons are generally shared within teams rather than 
the whole organisation and mainly on an ad hoc basis. This principally occurs 
through day-to-day activities. There is a strong cyclical operational meeting 
structure at department, team and staff levels however; there was little 
evidence that the meeting structure was used to communicate lessons learnt. 
Lessons are shared more often within teams. Notes are not made and lessons 
are not generally shared outside of the team structure. Certainly there is no 
formal process of communication and limited documentation; “what we don’t 
do is have a sort of formal acknowledgement of ‘okay, this is a new idea, this 
is a record or where it’s gone right, this is a record of where it hasn’t gone so 
right and then we will put that on a part of the server that we can all share” 
(CEO). However, communication between individuals is good and individuals 
are “quite good at feeding or learning off one another” (IT Officer). It was also 
highlighted that sharing of information with other wildlife organisations from 
other regions was quite weak; “the conservation sector is competitive as well 
as collegiate” (Communications Team Leader). 
 
 4.5.3.4 Emotional management 
 
Support for entrepreneurs when failure occurs is evidenced throughout the 
organisation. This supportive approach starts at the top with the CEO: “You 
have that human emotion and I think certainly my take in terms of how I deal 
with it is I try and get the team together and say ‘don’t worry guys, we gave it 
our best shot, we can’t win them all.’” There is a consistent view within the core 
of the organisation that people are generally supportive when things do not 
work out. There is evidence of individuals being empathetic and caring towards 
each other. 
This support extends to when things go wrong. “I think at all levels there’s that 
feeling that, you know, it’s not down to one person to sort out if there’s 
something going wrong, it’s down to a number of people supporting each to 
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other. There is evidence of team members socialising out of work and this 
further enhances the open channels of communication” (Land Manager). 
Whilst there is no structure to managing negative emotions, the culture offers 


































  Mainly informal 
 Ongoing monitoring against milestones or targets (financial, 
operational dates of completion, attendance numbers, 
customer feedback) 
 Individuals generally very close to their project 
 Ongoing dialogue between individuals on an ad hoc basis 
within their open work spaces 
 Through cyclical operational, team, or ‘one to one’ meetings. 
Analysing 
failure 
  Mostly informal, little structure involved  
 Self-reflective analysis 
 One to one meetings 
 Collaborative 
 Ad hoc and ongoing within team workspace 
 Team meetings (‘wash up’) 
 Some discussion at cyclical ops meetings 
 Projects team are more structured in their analysis 
 Mainly single loop learning  
 Some SMT deep learning 
 
Communicati
on of lessons 
learned  
  No specific mechanism for storing lessons learned 
 Mainly through informal open dialogue 
 Ongoing 
 Ad hoc 
 Between individuals 
 Within teams 
 Limited dissemination outside of team 
 Limited sharing outside of the organisation to likeminded 
external parties  




  Low fear of failure 
 No recognised structures 
 Caring culture delivers a supportive environment 









The area development agency was set up in 2010 to bring about the 
regeneration of the local area and deliver economic benefits to the whole 
community. As an organisation, it has similarities to the Regional Development 
Agencies (RDA) set up by the government of the day in 1998 abolished in 
2010.  Nine RDA’s existed (covering the whole of England) and were financed 
from central government to, advance economic development, encourage 
business efficiency, competitiveness, and employment, to improve the 
development of employment skills, and contribute to sustainable development. 
This area development agency was set up by the local authority as an 
enterprising way to maintain support for business (post abolishment of the 
RDA) and the local economy. Significantly, the remit is considerably less, as 
is the financial support, with funds made available from the local government 
authority. The organisation has 140 staff members. 
 
The agency operates in five areas: 
1. Facilities Management: It manages council owned buildings through its 
Facilities Management team. 
2. Affordable Housing: It is responsible for delivering the region’s new affordable 
housing programme on behalf of the District Council. 
3. Asset Management: The Asset Management Service within the agency offers 
a comprehensive professional service relating to the management of council 
assets. 
4. A visitor attraction operator: A renovated aristocratic house is now operated by 
the agency as a visitor attraction. 
5. Regional Innovation Centres: The agency manages two regional Innovation 





From being fully funded by local government it is now part funded by local 
government with the remainder of funds coming from external activities. The 
organisation has 85 staff members. 
Working life for the corporate entrepreneur is regularly difficult. Whilst ideas 
are verbally encouraged by the organisation, there is no clear path to create 
and develop an initiative. Often ideas are not received well as line managers 
are short of time and resources. Sometimes ideas are ignored or they are 
bounced back by the manager with little offer of genuine support. Often ideas 
are received enthusiastically, but then any momentum is lost due to work 
overload on the ground. However, the more senior the position in the 
organisation the more time and resource is available. Entrepreneurs further 
down the hierarchy are likely to have significantly less time and resources.  
There is no specific innovation process, however, there is entrepreneurial 
activity which centres on ‘asset surpluses’ as they arise from project savings. 
The surpluses represent a reactive approach to entrepreneurship. When these 
funds become available ideas are sought and so for the entrepreneur timing of 
idea presentation is highly significant. Importantly, any ideas need to be closely 
relevant to the current strategy in order to gain traction with management.  
The organisation does not offer entrepreneurs free time to think and progress 
ideas; it is up to the individual to make time or do it out of working hours. The 
organisation is very much target driven and individuals are “working 100% just 
to deliver targets” (Planning and Housing Manager). When time can be found, 
there is often a lack of resources and this can be down to budget restrictions 
and reduced staffing. This can have implications as innovative ideas are stifled 
when individuals see colleagues struggling with current workload. The 
organisation suffers from inflexibility in budgeting and funding allocations. 







4.6.2 Entrepreneurial environment - summary 
 
To understand the nature of the organisation, findings are summarised within 
the headings of culture, leadership, strategy, and structure. Supporting data 
under these same headings can be found in appendix 10, and surveys 
appendix 5. 
4.6.2.1 Summary of the findings relating to the entrepreneurial 
environment  
 









  Bureaucratic nature and reduced autonomy for the individual 
 Focus is on the process over the client 
 Hierarchal 
 Quasi informality 
 Subdued atmosphere in open plan offices 
 Less open, less trust 
 Less collaboration 
 Less learning 
 Political 
 Low risk taking 
 Slow pace of change 
 Low failure tolerance and fear of failure 
 Blame culture 
Leadership   Hierarchal 
 Vision statement lead 
 Leads 'surface' innovation 
 Focus on compliance 
 Risk averse 
 Well-liked and respected 
 Lack visibility 
 Partial tolerance of failure 
Strategy   Structured and formal 
 Transparent to external stakeholders 
 Focused on core compliance operations 
 However aims towards a new entrepreneurial platform 
 Long and short approach 
Structure   Hierarchal  management structure 
 Clearly defined roles and responsibilities 
 Tight processes and heavily target driven 




4.6.3 The management of intelligent failure 
 
Significantly, failure as a word is not often used. Interviewees found it very 
difficult to articulate just why the word is not used. Instead of failure, the term 
‘it didn’t work’ is used. “It’s just learning isn’t it?  You’re not ... failure is a way 
of learning to move things forward and you might just not even consciously go, 
well that’s a failure, that’s a failure, you’ve just gone, oh that’s been done that 
way” (Registered Valuer). However, others view failure as a means to a 
successful end: “To me there’s no such thing as a failure, there’s just an 
alternative solution” (Business Manager). 
Evidence indicates that there is general recognition of the value for the process 
of managing intelligent failure. As the Contracts Engineer puts it: “I think going 
through the process enhances the learning because just asking the basic 
questions, what went well? What didn’t go so well? Did we achieve what we 
wanted to achieve? How can we do better next time? Just going through that 
review generates that sort of thought process”. He also suggests that, “doing 
the review is a much more positive closure to a project and it allows us to get 
some sort of measurement on performance”. However, it can also have other 
connotations; “I think for team wise and for individuals it can be seen as kind 
of a blame game I suppose of what didn’t work and even though not what didn’t 
work but whose fault was that that it didn’t work” (Marketing Assistant). 
There is general recognition of the importance of learning from failure. Failure 
learning processes assist in stopping repeated mistakes that are costly, waste 
time and can lead to losing customers and threaten the organisation. The 
process of learning from failure helps develop the organisation’s increased 
learning and offers early warning signs of future problems. Learning from 
failure can make tacit learning explicit which counters the problem of long-term 
staff leaving or retiring taking significant knowledge (learned through failure 
episodes) with them. As the building surveyor puts it, “There are people who 
are very close to retirement.  Now we need to get information from them to say 
don’t do that, that doesn’t work, these are things I’ve tried in the past – it doesn’t 




Whilst the significance of learning from failure is generally accepted, there is 
only limited evidence of a process to effectively learn from failure episodes 
within certain areas of the organisation. 
 
4.6.3.1 Identifying failure 
 
Identification of failure mainly occurs through informal discussion within teams 
in their workspaces. Where failure is identified, it is through an ongoing 
monitoring process by individuals and teams and ad hoc checking of data. 
Failure identification also occurs through the cyclical operational review 
meetings that can incorporate discussion on entrepreneurial activity as is 
deemed necessary. Additionally, identification may come through cost centre 
analysis activity or indeed simply the project running out of cash. The Business 
Manager asserts that “as the manager overseeing those cost centres, each 
month I’m reporting to all of the managers and the Chief Executive and the 
Financer Group regarding the performance of those units and there will come 
a point at which they will say, ‘well hang on this isn’t working, we need an 
alternative.’”  
There is little evidence to suggest that the organisation is effective at identifying 
failure. Indeed, findings suggest that the organisation experiences innovation 
drift. Projects can drag on much longer than anticipated: “I don’t think they are 
good at actually saying “Right, let’s leave that to bed now” and then it’s just 
carry on….I just don’t think they’re good at identifying which bits are going 
wrong” (Marketing Assistant).  
Essentially, there is little evidence of a structured approach to recognising 
failure and identification is primarily an informal process. 
 
4.6.3.2 Analysing failure 
 
Analysing of failure occurs in a number of ways. Analysis and learning can be 
generated through individuals and their own personal reflections: “I do look at 
things in my head quite, quite a lot and I go over them and over them” (Facilities 
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manager). Individual analysis is then informally shared with colleagues within 
teams and often within the open workspaces. Discussion, therefore, breaks 
out on an ad hoc basis. The analysis and learning centres on understanding 
the main issues relating to the failure, however, there is no structured 
mechanism to guide the process. Informal discussion occurs in the office 
space where colleagues may be talking to each other on a ‘one to one’ basis, 
or gathered around a desk conversing as a team. Additionally, analysis and 
learning occurs between the individual and their line manager: “So a mistake 
might have been made and then normally we would sit down and talk about 
why that was and what process we might be able to put in place to ensure that 
doesn’t happen again” (Planning and Housing Manager). Beyond the 
manager-team member, analysis occurs through the regular operational 
meetings that are scheduled on a monthly basis. Whilst the meetings are not 
purposefully aimed at failure episode evaluation, discussion takes place on an 
ad hoc basis. The informal and generally unstructured approach is the 
predominant form of analysis and learning from failure. Analysis and learning 
is of a mainly single loop nature with limited evidence that a deeper, wider level 
of learning occurs. 
However, in the building and projects management department there is 
evidence of a more structured process. After action review meetings centre 
analysis around a generalised agenda on what went well, what did not go well, 
what could be done better next time, what has not been delivered, and did the 
project achieve its aims. Further, analysis centres on contractor and sub-
contractor performance and review forms returned from participating bodies 
within a project. Minutes of meetings are taken and ‘action lists’ are created 
and reviewed within the existing meeting format. 
When projects are lengthy and the end finally arrives, individuals grow tired 
and interest wanes. People want to get back to their regular work: “they just 
want to get back to their day to day, so another meeting about the project is, 
you know, they’re starting to lose the appetite for it” (Contracts Engineer). The 
lack of engagement makes it hard to effectively review the project. The process 
of learning from failure can also be used for political gains as individuals use it 
as a means to highlight particular issues. In most instances, there is no formal 
programme management. Indeed, from idea creation or opportunity 
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recognition through to planning and implementation, there is no real 
entrepreneurial pathway for individuals to follow. 
 
4.6.3.3 Communications of lessons learned 
 
In the main, lessons learned from failure are not disseminated effectively 
among teams and across the business, as the Marketing Executive points out: 
“so ok we have had a look, we think we know what went wrong, but actually 
we will now completely forget to tell everybody else about it.”. Knowledge from 
similar previous projects is not automatically transferred forward. At best, 
learning is shared with the direct work group however; it is unlikely that sharing 
goes beyond team boundaries. Passing on knowledge gained is not a priority, 
“you know your nice to dos and your have to dos, and disseminating 
information is a nice to do and it’s not a have to do” (Planning & Housing 
Manager). Indeed, time is an issue: “if we do tell everybody else about it, they 
are so busy that they won’t get the chance to read the email I sent, or you 
know, time to make the meeting where I tell everybody about what lessons I 
have learned” (Marketing Executive). Indeed, the organisation is in “permanent 
delivery mode” (Planning and Housing Manager). Lack of time affects the 
ability to analyse and communicate in a suitable format. Even when the 
‘lessons learned’ reports are available on-line, they are rarely accessed.  
Lessons learned may be shared in regular operational meetings; however, 
communication in some areas of the organisation is not that frequent. The 
meeting format for general knowledge sharing is weak. Additionally, there is a 
reluctance to want to learn and hear the issues when the communication is 
from outside the individuals own work group. In addition, some people have 
an attitude whereby they keep information to themselves and are simply not 
prepared to share gained information. Separately, managers can act as 
barriers to the flow of entrepreneurial ideas as they themselves are not 
entrepreneurial and, therefore, are not instinctively motivated to recognise 
potential winning ideas. Finally, the lack of collaboration between departments 
reduces the flow of lessons learned. Essentially, there is a lack of open 
communication generally, and therefore there are reduced levels of shared 
learning from failure. 
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There is considerable learning and knowledge stored in long standing 
employees, much of it from lessons learned from previous projects. However, 
when these individuals leave the organisation there is no formal handover 
process so much of the knowledge is lost.  
 
4.6.3.4 Emotional management 
 
There is little evidence of a structured process to managing the negative 
emotions derived from venture failure. Management have not raised the 
subject specifically or given guidance to the organisation with a suitable 
approach. Support comes from friends and team members: “knowing the 
people within my team we are quite supportive of our colleagues as a group, 
as a unit” (Business Advisor). Collegial support is the main form of support for 
entrepreneurial failures. However, there is also evidence of individuals being 
isolated by peers: “you get like a distance feeling. If something goes wrong, 
people will distance themselves from it. This is the reality of it” (Contracts 
Engineer). In this instance, the fear of failure makes it harder for the 















4.6.3.5 Summary of findings relating to the process of managing 
intelligent failure 
 
Table 4.10 Area development agency: Findings summary - managing 
intelligent failure 
  Area development agency 
Identifying 
failure 
  Informal discussion  
 On an ad hoc basis 
 Within workspaces 
 Ongoing monitoring 
 Cost centre analysis 
 Running out of cash 
 Some discussion within cyclical operational meetings 
 Evidence of termination drift 
Analysing 
failure 
  Individual reflection 
 One to one with colleague or with manager 
 With team 
 Informal 
 Unstructured 
 Ad hoc 
 Within workspace 
 Within cyclical operations meetings 
 More structured approach within ‘Building’ dept. 
 Mainly singe loop learning 
Communicati
on of lessons 
learned  
  No specific mechanism for storing lessons learnt 
 Some communication within teams 
 Little communication outside of teams 
 Not an organisational priority 
 Some sharing of lessons learned with cyclical operational 
meetings 
 Informal 
 On an ad hoc and ongoing basis 
 Unstructured 
 Some fear of failure 
 Communication generally less open 
Emotional 
Management 
  Unstructured 
 No organisational guidance 
 Ad hoc and informal 
 Support from team members 
 Evidence of fear of failure 
 Individuals can feel isolated as people distance themselves 








Parliament created the government agency in the late twentieth century and 
divided it into 8 geographical regions, each controlling 2 area divisions within 
each region. In December 2014, the regional divisional level was removed 
meaning the 16 areas report directly to the centre in London. This study 
involves one of these areas. As with the national agency, the area division is 
responsible for a diverse, complex and dynamic mix of activities. The 
organisation acts as a regulator for the domains for which it has responsibility. 
The area division has 470 staff of which a higher than normal proportion are 
highly skilled or qualified (to level of PhD) in various scientific fields. Staff are 
situated in the former regional office and three other external locations. 
For the corporate entrepreneur, this is a difficult place to operate. The 
bureaucratic nature makes it difficult to progress initiatives, particularly if the 
initiative is of a significant size, as the area in this study is one of sixteen that 
make up the national organisation. In order not to be perceived as “going tribal” 
(Deputy Regional Director), the other areas need to show support for ideas 
generated within any individual regional area. The chances of gaining 
agreement at a national level are therefore limited. The process of developing 
an initiative is longwinded and exhausting, as numerous hurdles have to be 
jumped. Therefore, idea generation can be stifled, as individuals do not feel 
they have the appetite or energy to develop an initiative, or they simply give 
up along the way. 
The organisation at a national level has set up a ‘Continuous Improvement 
Programme’ with a central team who look at the larger programmes, 
procedures and processes to make them more efficient. The programme 
further reduces the chances of gaining national support for area initiatives as 
it forms an additional barrier to idea take up. A lack of incentive to innovate 
also impedes entrepreneurial behaviour as any innovations that results in 
efficiencies lead to savings, which are then taken by central government. 
There is additional pressure from government with regards reduced budgets. 
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The entrepreneur has to operate in an environment where there is resistance 
to change, where individuals demonstrate rigidity, preferring the status quo. 
However, there are areas and individuals although the minority, but do operate 
entrepreneurially. There is evidence of some individuals in middle 
management continuing to develop initiatives regardless of the culture and the 
institutional barriers that exist. The most significant space for driving 
entrepreneurial ideas (although of a smaller size) is at the lower end of the 
management hierarchy. Fieldwork teams experience more change and have 
to show creativity in dealing with challenges that are often novel by nature.  
Developments in these areas can occur if there is a lower level of resource 
requirement.  
However, when ideas do form, the lack of a clearly defined entrepreneurial 
process limits the development opportunity: “There’s a lot of red tape as an 
organisation, a lot of bureaucracy, a lot of hierarchy, so often you don’t know 
who to go to get the response that you want, so there’s often not a clear 
channel from idea to fruition” (ABPPBP). The lack of process clarity and the 
bureaucratic nature of the organisation create a barrier for idea generation, 
“you kind of think, ‘oh I’ve got another idea. Oh, I can’t be bothered now. ‘cause 
it’s too much like hard work’” (Ibid). The entrepreneurial process is delivered 
in a more cautious way: “what we do is try and produce a perfect product, but 
what we should produce is a prototype” (Area E Manager) thus product 
development is slow. In addition, there is a “one size fits all” (F S Team Leader 
(location B)), which does not reflect the nuances of regional locations. The 
entrepreneurial process also involves significant consultation that can be 
widespread and time consuming. This form of consultation leads to a design 
which can be over engineered, can cause frustration due to the lack of clear 
decision making, and eventually lead to subsequent failure: “I think one of the 
problems with the agency is it’s almost ‘too many cooks spoil the broth’ with 
committees. I think the committees grow too big, What you need is clear 
direction from maybe one person with two really strong advisors, or three at 
the most; and what you tend to get is a massive committee and you just get a 




Up to date technology is not readily available to the organisation. This reduces 
the opportunity for the entrepreneur to harness new technology to create 
innovation, and take advantage of opportunities that new technology may 
bring. ` 
Essentially, there is an intrinsic pressure on the organisation to manage its 
core responsibilities as the core priority. Then, and only then, is there time to 
consider entrepreneurial activity. The organisation does not see its role as a 
developer of new ideas, more an operator of compliance. Indeed, the agency’s 
role as a regulative body means that consistency is very important and that 
failure can affect its reputation. Therefore, the organisation does not 
encourage experimentation.  
4.7.2 Entrepreneurial environment - summary 
 
To understand the nature of the organisation, findings are summarised within 
the headings of culture, leadership, strategy, and structure. Supporting data 
under these same headings can be found in appendix 10, and surveys 
appendix 6.  
4.7.2.1 Summary of the findings relating to the entrepreneurial 
environment  
 
4.11 Area division of a government agency entrepreneurial environment 
summary 
   





  Bureaucratic and conformist 
 More formal than informal 
 Limited autonomy 
 Inflexibility 
 Hierarchal 
 Resistant to change 
 Highly political 
 Limited openness/trust/collaboration 
 Risk averse 
 Non-experimental 
 Slow pace of change 
 Blame culture 




Leadership   Hierarchal 
 Focuses on continuity and compliance 
 Entrepreneurship is a minor activity 
 Can be a block to idea generation 
 Professional, approachable, friendly, and inclusive 
 Inflexible 
 
Strategy   Mainly structured, but some emergent strategy 
 Encased in a strong organisational vision 
 Long term approach 
 Centred on compliance and operations, efficiencies and 
effectiveness 
 
Structure   Hierarchal management structure  
 Large volume of prescriptive policies and procedures 
 High levels of operational structure 
 Predominantly structured internal communication systems 
 Informal communications within 'specialist' departments 
 
 
4.7.3 The Management of intelligent failure 
 
Failure is not a word that is used often in the regular organisational vocabulary. 
Instead other phraseology is used; “so we didn’t say it had failed, what we said 
was well, we realise that that sort of thing doesn’t work for us in the future” 
Area E Manager. Evidence also suggests that failure recognition goes against 
internal policy. As the Analyst from the E Team puts it, “I think we have a very 
positive attitude and that failure is again a very negative thing and we do have 
this way of promoting well-being and that may be linked into it.” 
When considering the entrepreneurial process, the organisation does not show 
a significant level of organisational learning from failure. Evidence suggests 
this may be due to individuals not wishing to admit to the intelligent failure. 
Learning can be quite discreet, or as the Technical Specialist (location B) puts 
it, “I think most of us learn just by experience and then just keep it to ourselves.” 
The only evidence of lessons learned related to processes associated with 
Health & Safety. Within the findings, there is no suggestion that learning occurs 
at a deeper level. Learning from failure is predominantly a personal activity, 
excepting some of the field workers who may learn from the Communities of 
Practice when failure occurs. In essence, learning from failure is “local and ad 
hoc” (S T Specialist, location B). 
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There is very little evidence of a learning from failure process or as the Deputy 
Regional Director puts it, “I don’t think we do that (manage a process of 
learning from failure) brilliantly.” Referring to learning from failure at the F R 
Operations Manager suggests, “I don’t think there is a process – not that I’ve 
sensed anyway.” What the findings do suggest however is that the 
organisation has robust procedures and capabilities to manage ‘post incident’ 
activity to capture lessons learned. “It’s just because it has a bigger profile and 
you are dealing directly with the public and other professional partners……, 
you know, Councils, Policing, Emergency Services” (Team leader, location B). 
Findings do not suggest that these procedures and capabilities are used for 
managing failure. This may be due to the profile of the organisation and its 
priorities, as Team Leader T (location B) puts it; “(the management of 
‘incidents’) is a more critical activity to the business, so we feel as though we 
must put the time and effort in, whereas me building a new whatever gismo, 
well it’s not that critical to the business.” 
 
4.7.3.1 Identifying failure 
 
There are limited processes and systems in place for identifying intelligent 
failure. Indeed, there is no recognised way that failure is identified as part of a 
formal process and therefore it is often down to the line manager. Identification 
occurs predominantly by individuals within teams as part of ongoing work. 
Recognition of failure occurs through regular monitoring and reflection against 
milestones and targets. In the field, some of the project work involves technical 
aspects such as sampling that provides data as part of a monitoring process, 
which then illuminates failure. 
Essentially, identification of failure is hindered by people’s fear of failure and 
the low organisational tolerance of failure. It is also hindered by the 
inefficiencies within the bureaucracy. When initiatives are launched nationally 
effective feedback can be difficult: “You would send them (the feedback on 
failure identification) to one person, because someone had been told that’s the 
person who was dealing with it, and then someone else goes, “Oh, no, that’s 
the other…  No, you need to speak to this person, because they’re the one 
that’s picking it up.”  Therefore, there was about six people’s names who were 
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collecting feedback, but nothing official.  And you were like, “Well, how is this 
gonna be captured?” (ABPPBP). 
The organisation generally does not have the structures or culture to support 
entrepreneurial activities and this the same when it comes to identifying 
entrepreneurial failure. 
 
4.7.3.2 Analysing failure 
 
Generally, there is little evidence of failure analysis across the organisation: “I 
don’t know whether or not we do an in-depth sort of review or we have an in-
depth discussion of why stuff doesn’t happen in the way that we’d planned” 
(Deputy Regional Director). There is evidence of some analysis of failure 
where large formalised projects occur, but very little evidence to suggest there 
is a level of analysis for other entrepreneurial activity within the organisation: 
“One of the things in the organisation we don’t do is evaluation. We don’t 
evaluate how things are going…..I don’t think we ever look back” (Area 
Business Manager). 
Where analysis does take place, it is mainly an informal process and often 
between an individual and his or her manager: “The bottom line is by having 
an honest conversation about what went right and what went wrong. What 
could have gone right? What could have happened? What should have 
happened? What didn’t happen?” (Deputy Director). However, generally 
initiatives end without investigation, reflection or analysis; the initiative “just 
gets forgotten and we move onto something different, so we’re not doing any 
analysis” (Team Leader, T, location B). “We tend not to look back at those 
things that didn’t work and find out why they didn’t.  So, why did it fail?  And 
then, well, actually, if we go and start the process again and get to that point 
where it did fail, how can we do something different to make sure we can get 
to the point where it’s successful?  I think we always want to pick up an idea 
and start it from scratch” (ABPPBP). More analysis does occur within the field 
working teams where there is informal discussion as the team meets on an ad 




However, analysis and learning from failure is shallow, lacking depth of enquiry 
and engagement. Indeed, there is little analysis of failure within in this 
organisation. 
 
4.7.3.3 Communication of lessons learned 
 
When lessons are learned, there is evidence of some communication however; 
the flow is inconsistent, depending largely on the area of the business. 
Essentially, lessons are not openly shared, as there is little mention of failure 
by management and there is a natural disposition to only highlight successes. 
Indeed, even when there is a good analysis behind a failure episode, 
management shy away from communicating the nature of the failure and 
lessons learned. The failure is hidden. 
There is no formal communication path to transfer new failure knowledge 
across the business. Communication may occur via emailing contacts or via 
cascades where new knowledge is transferred down through the management 
hierarchy. Communication may occur at small workshops, meetings, or 
teleconferences. Communication also occurs between individuals in their 
teams. However, whilst there is a range of communication routes there is little 
evidence that controlled or targeted communication of lessons learned does 
take place. 
Communication across the regional areas occurs via the Communities of 
Practice. However, separate to the communities there is little evidence of 
communication of lessons learned between regions: “I think sometimes we 
could do a lot better sharing because some people have got a solution to a 
problem that they don’t think about sharing. And the same probably down here, 
that we have solutions to problems that we don’t share sometimes” (Field 
Services Team Leader, location L). Currently no mechanism exists for sharing 
knowledge widely. 
In essence, there is little communication of lessons learned within the region 
and with the regions. Communication, when it does occur, is principally 





4.7.3.4 Emotional management 
 
When intelligent failure occurs, there are limited emotional support 
mechanisms within the organisation. There is no formal process to deal with 
the negative emotions related to failure episodes. The support that does exists 
resides within the working teams or through peer to peer discussions. Line 





















4.7.3.5 Summary of findings relating to the process of managing 
intelligent failure 
 
Table 4.12 Area division of a government agency: Findings summary - 
managing intelligent failure 
   
Area division of a government agency 
Identifying 
failure 
  No formal process 
 Informal discussion  
 On an ad hoc basis 
 Within workspaces 
 Ongoing monitoring 
 Review of milestones and targets 
 Fear of failure restricts identification 
 The bureaucratic nature of the organisation restricts 
identification 
 Running out of cash 
 Some discussion within cyclical operational meetings 
 Evidence of termination drift 
Analysing 
failure 
  Generally little review of outcomes 
 Little evidence of failure analysis 
 Minor evidence of ‘one to one’ discussions with colleague or 
with manager 
 Within team 
 Informal 
 Unstructured 
 Ad hoc 
 Learning of a shallow nature 
Communicati
on of lessons 
learned  
  Little communication of lessons learned 
 Failures lessons hidden 
 No specific mechanism for storing lessons learnt 
 No formal structures 
 Some communication within teams 
 Little communication outside of teams 
 Informal 
 Unstructured 
 On an ad hoc and ongoing basis 
 Communication generally less open 
Emotional 
Management 
  No formal support mechanisms 
 No organisational guidance 
 Unstructured 
 Ad hoc and informal 





4.8 Cross case analysis 
 
Six different organisations provide evidence for the thesis to consider. Each 
organisation offers rich detail of the nature of its entrepreneurial environment, 
and most significantly, how each organisation manages the intelligent failure 
process. To enable some distillation of the findings, tabular representations 
are put forward. 
 
4.8.1 A summary of entrepreneurial environments evidenced within the 
six organisations 
 
Findings suggest that each organisation has different mix of environments. 
Table 4.13 offers a Case Ordered Matrix that illustrates a number of 
organisational factors to offer an indicative (only) perspective as to the nature 
of the organisations.  
The evidence from the six organisations indicatively suggests that the 
entrepreneurial environments of each organisation are different. Whereas the 
Area Division of Government and the Area Development Agency exhibit 
significant levels of hierarchy and bureaucracy, the Epos System Supplier and 
the Processed Juice Supplier exhibit very flat structures and less structured 
operating systems. The regional wildlife organisation and the public house 
operator are situated somewhere in between with more moderate levels of 
hierarchy and a mix of operating systems. Generally the organisations that are 
less hierarchal exhibit more openness and trust, collaboration, tolerance of 
failure, informality, individual autonomy, risk taking, and less internal politics, 
and are less resistance to change. Construct Table 4.13 selects some of the 
organisational factors to cross-reference against each organisation to 






Table 4.13 Case Ordered Matrix: Collated summary of selected 
organisational factors supportive of entrepreneurship evidenced within the 
six organisations.  
 
















Innovation        
Opportunity 
seeking 
       
Emergent 
strategy 
       
Learning 
climate 
       
Openness 
and trust 
       
Leadership supportive 
of entrepreneurship 
       
Tolerance of 
failure 
       
Risk  
taking 
       
Open, flat, or no  org 
structures 
       
 
Key:     Limited evidence        Partially evidenced        Significant evidence  
Whilst recognising that within these environments, the management of the 
failure process occurs differently, this thesis focuses on the findings that are 
evident across all environments. 
 
4.8.2 Common traits in the managing intelligent failure process 
 
From the analysis of data, important themes emerge within the process of 
managing intelligent failure. Table 4.13 summarises the findings as to how 
organisations manage failure by focusing on each part of the process. For each 
part of the process, the table identifies themes evident across all organisations 
and, of secondary interest, identified themes that are not evident in all the 














 Largely an informal and unstructured process 
 
 Customer feedback is an important means of failure identification 
 
 It may also occur through review within cyclical operational meetings 
 
 However, the process of identification is mainly by informal 
discussion of individuals within teams, within their own workspace, 
who continuously “pick up messages” via conversations and email 
chatter. 
 
 It is also through individuals and teams monitoring targets and 
milestones on an ongoing basis. 
 







 Quarterly meetings specifically reviewing developments  
 
 Site meetings to review project progress (mainly physical 
developments) 
 
 A Help Centre utilise an internal software system that logs failure 
details  
 
 In more bureaucratic environments, fear of failure restricts 
identification  
 
 Termination drift occurs in some cases 
 
 Otherwise identification can come from: 
 Supplier feedback  
 Management Information System (MIS)  
 Cost centre analysis 
















 Limited management focus on a process for learning from failure 
 
 Organisations are generally weak at analysing failure 
 
 Lack of structure towards analyses (through ‘after action reviews’) 
 
 Discussion of failure can take place within regular cyclical 
operational meetings 
 
 Also at one to one meetings with manager or with peer 
 
 Analysis is largely ad hoc process upon identification of a failure 
episode 
 
 Discussions are within team workspaces and often involve 
impromptu ‘stand up’ meetings 
 
 Analysis is informal without a specific agenda 
 







 Some lack of tolerance of ‘analysing’ activities by senior 
management team (SMT)  
 
 Analysis by SMT can be informal and in a very informal setting 
 
 Self-reflection as means to learn from failure  
 
 A quarterly review of developments formerly with an informal 
agenda 
 
 Or as part of Main Board ‘Away Days’ 
 
 Or as part of  a ‘Standard Project Methodology’ within Building 
Project Development  
 
 Project teams are more structured in their analysis 
 















 Little management focus or emphasis 
 
 Lessons are often not communicated 
 
 If they are, they are not communicated consistently or widely 
 
 Larger company failures are not overtly communicated by 
senior team 
 
 There is no clear communication process 
 
 Largely informal and on an ad hoc basis 
 
 Occurring between individuals and also within teams within 
workspace 
 
 Less communication outside of teams 
 
 Little documentation of lessons learned with limited or no 







 ‘Stand up’ meetings or informal meetings  
 
 Failure lessons hidden 
 
 Little sharing outside of the main operating branch with other 
branches or external parties 
 
 Building’ functions have a formal survey tool to communicate 
lessons learned 
 
 Individuals are used to utilising lessons learned from previous 
















 Management has no clear approach or designated process  
 
 No organisational guidance  
 
 There are no formal support mechanisms  
 
 Emotional support comes from team members (or friends) 
 







 Very low fear of failure therefore reduced failure emotions 
 
 Some individuals self-chastise 
 
 Support derives from: 
o The closeness of teams 
o Management  
o The closeness of a family culture 
 
 Development functions supported, however implementation 
functions less supported (fear of failure) 
 
 At all levels people ‘rally’ around to support the individual(s) - 
the organisation is highly caring 
 
 The approach starts at the top  
 
 Individuals can feel isolated as people distance themselves 










When examining the findings in the classification of “Generally evident across 
the case studies” within the identifying failure, analysing failure, 
communication of lessons learned, and managing emotions processes, it is 
recognised that whilst there is some evidence of a structured approach to the 
process of learning from failure; learning from failure is predominantly 
unstructured. The summarised findings predominately indicate that, across all 
cases, the processes of failure identification, analysis and learning, 
communication of lesson learned, and managing emotions are: 
1. Unstructured 
2. Informal 
3. Ad hoc. 
4. Ongoing within regular operational activity. 
 
Whilst this data offers evidence of the nature of the process across the cases, 
there is also evidence to confirm that the organisations have actually learned 
from failure in this manner. 
 
4.8.3 Evidence of unstructured, informal learning from failure within the 
organisations 
 
Where the informal learning from failure mechanisms exist within the 
organisations, there is evidence that learning takes place. Indeed, evidence 
suggests that learning from failure for most of the organisation is 
predominantly single loop and lacks some depth, however, double loop 
learning is evident at senior team level and this may reflect their strategic 
mindset. However, lessons are being learned. For some organisations, 
informal learning from failure means not making the same mistakes twice, for 
others it can mean gaining deeper learning experiences that impact on the 
organisational paradigm. The lessons from failure offer some fundamental 
learning episodes for the companies with the result that behaviours and 
protocols change. Table 4.15 offers some examples of informal learning 
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launch and 
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*Ad hoc spaces: open workspace, breakout meeting rooms or managers office 
 
4.8.4 Cross case consistencies within each stage of the learning from 
failure processes 
 
In reviewing the above summary tables of the stages of learning from failure, 
the following consistencies occur: 
 
 Failure Identification: 
The failure identification process occurs via customer feedback, open team 
discussion, email chatter, MIS, financial data, milestone or target referencing, 
within cyclical operational meetings, and discussions with line management. 
 
 Failure analysis: 
The analysis and learning process is generally underdeveloped and often 
weak, in a mix of locations, often within cyclical operational meetings, without 
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formal agenda or minutes, and within working team or ‘one to one’. Learning 
is mainly ‘single loop’ with some ‘double loop’ learning at a senior level. 
 
 Communication of lessons learned; 
The process of communicating lessons learnt is not overt and generally not a 
management priority, mainly occurring within teams and not between teams 
or across the organisation or, indeed, outside the organisation. The 
organisations share some lessons within cyclical operational meetings. 
 
 Across all stages: 
Some structure to the process of learning from failure, although disparate, is 
evident in software systems (organisational memory), specific development 
review meetings (quarterly, annually, or as determined by the failure 
occurrence), within functions engaged in project work (particularly building 
projects). 
 
4.8.5 Other consistencies across the cases 
 
 Management of negative emotions:  
Management of negative emotions from failure episodes is generally weak 
with little evidence of any strategic approach. Predominantly support comes 
from the fellow team members, friends, or line management, and is highly 
reflective of the supportive nature of the culture. 
 
 Management priorities: 







 The word ‘failure’: 
Interestingly also, is that the ‘failure’ word is not generally used either because 
failure is avoided or hidden (and therefore not recognised), or it is perceived 





This chapter communicates the journey of enquiry that moves towards theoretical 
discovery. It presents the outcome of a thematic data analysis process that 
engages in emergent coding techniques that deliver central themes of interest. 
Six organisations including an epos systems supplier, a processed juice supplier, 
a public house operator, a regional wildlife organisation, an area development 
agency, and area division of a government agency have been analysed on an 
individual basis and as part of a cross case analysis.  
Using template analysis two concepts emerge. In the ‘managing intelligent failure’ 
concept (identifying failure, analysing failure, communicating lessons learned 
from failure, and managing failure emotions) cross case analysis centres on the 
themes similar to each stage across all organisations, similar to all stages across 
all organisations as well as other themes that are identified as of interest. 
Secondly, in the concept of the ‘entrepreneurial environment’ a cross case 
analysis on selected organisational factors confirms the variance of environments 
of the organisations of study. 
From the approach to the thematic analysis, important findings that differ from 
existing literature emerge and are presented, and provide a basis for the 




























Chapter 5 Discussion 
5.1 Introduction 
 
Learning from failure is argued as being the hallmark of a truly innovative 
organisation (Cannon and Edmondson, 2005) delivering a significant number 
of benefits to the organisation (Sitkin, 1992) and is, therefore, an essential 
component of success (Lafley and Charan, 2008). Learning from failure is an 
important construct in the entrepreneurial domain. At the core of the lean start-
up model, where experimentation is at the heart of venture growth, learning 
from failure through the iterative process of build, measure, and learn, drives 
entrepreneurship (Ries, 2011). Learning from failure increases individual and 
organisational learning and therefore enhances the entrepreneurial capability 
of an organisation. 
Thematic analysis of data laid out in the ‘Findings’ chapter moves attention 
towards some prominent themes within the principle focus of the ‘managing 
intelligent failure’ and ‘entrepreneurial environment’ subject areas. In this 
chapter attention centres on comparing and contrasting these themes with 
literature to enable a discussion that delivers new ideas, concept development 
and theoretical discovery. 
Within the discussion on managing intelligent failure, the areas of identifying, 
failure, analysing failure, the communication of lessons learned, and managing 
emotions, which emerged from thematic analysis, are considered within Kolb’s 
theory of experiential learning (1981). Particular attention centres on learning 
that is unstructured, informal, ad hoc, and ongoing within regular operational 
activity. These are key themes identified in the data analysis and reside within 
each stage of the process. Using Kolb’s (1981) theory enables a fuller 
discussion incorporating additional theory and findings to help explain how 
organisations manage the process of learning from failure. Discussion centres 
firstly on the process of learning from failure by exploring the five stages that 






 Failure recognition 
 Reflection 
 Analysing and conceptualising 
 Sharing knowledges concepts 
 Trying a new approach 
Secondly, the discussion centres on the management of an organisational 
environment that may support the process of learning from failure. For both 
subject areas, discussion considers the key themes that emerges from the 
data analysis and important theoretical constructs to uncover some differing 
perspectives that are argued as adding to existing theory in the learning from 
failure domain. 
 
5.2 The Management of the process of learning from failure 
 
Introduction 
Literature in the entrepreneurial failure domain consistently argues for differing 
reasons, that learning from failure should predominantly be a structured 
process. Huber (1991) argues that experiential learning through 
experimentation is improved through the outcome analysis and the availability 
of this analysis to the organisation. Both analysis and the accuracy of the 
cause and effect feedback is important. Kuratko et al (2011) argue that each 
entrepreneurial initiative represents an experiment and that  a systematic 
process is required to extract the maximum learning from an entrepreneurial 
experience. Indeed, Kolb and Fry (1974) view the process of reflection, within 
the cycle of experiential learning, as being structured and challenging. Tidd 
and Bessant (2013) also argue that organisations should instigate a form of 
review of innovation projects in order to develop organisational technological 
and management capabilities. In a similar vein, when managing failure, 
McGrath and MacMillan (2000) assert that in order to promote deep 
commitment to continuous entrepreneurial development entrepreneurial 
leaders carry out constructive post-mortems. Being more specific, Senge 
(1990), a strong proponent of the value of learning from failure, argues that by 
234 
 
creating structures such as the ‘after action review’, it is possible to harness 
valuable individual and organisational learning.  
However, whilst literature propounds that a structured approach offers the best 
chance to learn from failure, most organisations do not take this approach. 
Manimala et al. (2006) suggest that generally organisations find it difficult to 
create and operate a systematic process to analyse failures yet “one has to 
scientifically analyse them and derive appropriate lessons” (p.56). Cannon and 
Edmondson (2005) suggest that “organisations that systematically learn from 
failure are rare” (P.299). Significant and consistent findings from across the 
case studies suggest that systematic analysis and learning from failure is 
indeed a problem. For example, the CEO of the epos supplier asserts that, “I 
don’t think we do enough lessons learnt in what we’re doing as an 
organisation…..so, I think probably just doing it better, a more thorough job of 
it, would probably help.” Or, as the agency Deputy Director puts it, “I don’t know 
whether or not we do an in depth sort of review or we have an in depth 
discussion of why stuff doesn’t happen in the way that we’d planned it to 
happen.” The lack of analysis is evidenced by organisations that have more 
entrepreneurial structures such as the epos supplier: “As a company, not even 
just at a department level, as a company, what went wrong isn’t…. wash-ups 
aren’t done” (Deputy Help Centre Manager). Additionally, the Operations 
Director of the juice supplier asserts that, “there isn’t a structure in place to 
actually try and drive out the issues and identify clearly what’s gone wrong and 
put an action plan in place.”  The stock controller describes the current 
approach of the organisation: “You know the phrase like “busy fools”, I think 
we’re a bit like that sometimes.  No one really stops and…..we don’t really 
properly stop and analyse.  I can’t think of anyone who would ever write a 
report like that or properly consider what’s just happened.” Organisations with 
an environment supportive of entrepreneurial activity are generally 
unsystematic and less structured by nature and therefore find formality and 
structure difficult to establish as it comes up against the natural culture. For 
organisations with an environment that is less supportive of entrepreneurship, 
the subsequent lower level of entrepreneurial activity is not creating the 
requirement for a specific differentiated process. Within all organisations in the 
study, structured failure processes are lacking. 
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Some of this may be explained by the perceived lack of importance of the 
management of failure process. As the COO of the public house operator puts 
it, “having it (the management of intelligent failure) in the mix is important but 
putting it in the front of the mix would tend to drive analytical behaviour and 
we’re a relatively small, relatively agile company.” This attitude is replicated by 
the processed juice supplier’s CEO: “I think it’s important that we don’t put a 
big emphasis on it (management of intelligent failure). I think it’s one of those, 
really - we just have a very honest approach to it that didn’t work. Why didn’t it 
work? Fine! And within literally minutes it’s put to one side, because we’re 
already spinning another plate anyway, or plates.” This response is at 
significant odds with literature that argues for a systematic approach to 
effectively leverage learning from trying new things out: from experimentation. 
Indeed Leonard Barton (1991) argues that organisations can take the form of 
a ‘learning laboratory’,  a term which describes “an organisation that is 
dedicated to knowledge creation, collection and control” (p.91). Within this 
argument, structure is significant. 
The attitude of some of the organisations reflects a predominantly explorative 
mind-set; a focus on the present and the future, over a focus on the past (Arora 
et al., 2013). Indeed, they perceive little value in managing failure particularly 
as they are averse to formal structures. Organisations within the study that 
have more bureaucratic internal environments and exploitative mindsets have 
differing reasons for not valuing the process. Principally they relate to their core 
reason for being (compliance) and the reduced value they place on creating 
entrepreneurial initiatives. 
For those organisations that focus on explorative activities, learning is taking 
place, however, there is often a preference just to move on from the failure. 
The founder and chairman of the processed juice supplier suggests that: “for 
every intelligent failure, we’ve got six positive things happening at that one 
moment so we give it very scant time and we rely on the fact that within our 
tighter group, we all know what we did and how we did it and that’s in that 
memory bank that we wouldn’t necessarily make those mistakes again. So we 
don’t spend too long analysing the failure, because we’re already too busy on 
the new thing.” This trait is replicated at different levels in the hierarchy. As the 
general manager of location P (Public House Operator) puts it; “in essence, 
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it’s (the initiative) failed and I’m comfortable, I don’t really need to know the 
exact reason it’s failed. It’s probably because, you know, our time is limited 
and I know if I use my time somewhere else it’ll get more benefit, if that makes 
sense. So, I think that’s why I’m happy to just let things drop.” In this way, 
entrepreneurs are perceiving a negative trade-off between learning from failure 
and pursuing the next initiative. 
This phenomenon is described by Peters and Waterman (1984)  as the 
“numbers game” (p.209) where innovation success is driven by the 
understanding that failure is inevitable. For example, understanding that the 
chances of success are 10% means that attention centres on driving the 
volume of initiatives to a higher number thereby increasing the overall number 
of successful ventures. By taking this approach, the organisation is effective in 
delivering innovation. However, a counter argument might suggest that if more 
learning from these failures occurred then perhaps the percentage rate might 
increase from 10%. In this way, the need for volume may reduce and the 
organisation may waste less resource and energy and achieve the same level 
of innovation success. Whilst this counter argument may have some validity, 
Peters and Waterman (1984) argue that the ‘numbers game’ approach is a 
‘championing system’ which they posit as being closely linked to the 
consistently successful organisations within their study. 
In essence, the case study research findings offer an aligned perspective with 
current literature putting forward that learning from failure in a systematic way 
is rare. It is fair to say that each organisation does not primarily learn from 
failure using a structured review process. To be clear, the challenge of creating 
and maintaining a systematic process of learning from failure is an experience 
shared by each organisation in the study. In this way, the research findings 
support existing theory. 
Informality and formality 
As has been highlighted, the theme of informality emerges from the data 
analysis as a construct relevant to learning from failure for all the organisations 
(as well as learning that is unstructured, ad hoc, and ongoing within regular 
activity).  Morand (1995) argues that informal or informality “refer to social 
situations or gatherings that are generally characterized by behavioural 
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spontaneity, casualness, and interpersonal familiarity. In contrast, formal and 
formality refer to situations and social relations that are more regimented, 
deliberate, and impersonal in nature” (p.831).  He suggests that informality 
imbues looser, casual behaviour, and formality imbues tighter and disciplined 
behaviour. This may be in the form of linguistics, conversational turn taking, 
emotional and proxemics gestures and physical codes, such as clothing or 
layout of furniture. The discussion engages informality and formality within the 
organisational context and is reflective of this perspective. 
Discussion approach 
In seeking to further understand how organisations learn from failure 
intelligently this thesis refers to Kolb’s (1981) theory of experiential learning. 
The theory puts forward that learning occurs across four stages that form a 
cycle. The stages are experience, observations and reflections, the formation 
of a concepts, and experimentation (Figure 5.2). 
                   
Figure 5.1 The experiential learning model - Kolb (1981) 
The conceptual model derived from the literature review offers an extension of 
Kolb’s theory reflecting the nature of learning from failure at an organisational 
level (Figure 5.3). Similarly, the extended model includes the sharing of new 
concepts, an important element in the organisational learning process. Using 
this conceptual model as a framework for discussing the process of learning 
from failure, this section considers the findings from the empirical research with 
















Figure 5.2. The Process of learning from failure - adapted from Kolb (1981) 
 




5.2.1.1 The significance of identifying failure 
 
Findings suggest that where there is reduced levels or no identification of 
failure there is less looking back, less deep analysis of the failure by the 
organisation and therefore, less learning from failure. In not detecting a failure, 
the organisation does not gain the individual and organisational learning that 



























argued that intelligent failures become just ‘failures’ and have the potential to 
be expensive in terms of resources, time, and organisational effort. In addition, 
when undertaking deeper analysis, the organisation may find it is at significant 
risk of making the same mistake twice, or indeed missing an early warning sign 
of a potentially large failure in the future, both which may be very costly to the 
organisation. Indeed, the organisation may miss capturing all the benefits of 
learning from failure offered by literature and highlighted in the literature 
review. It is argued, that failure identification is highly important to the process 
of learning from intelligent failure and, therefore, to the organisation.  
 
5.2.1.2. How do organisations identify failure? 
 
Cannon and Edmondson (2005) argue that timely identification is a 
prerequisite in the process of learning from failure. Actively seeking feedback 
from employees, customers and other stakeholders is effective when 
identifying failure. While there is evidence of feedback as a means to 
recognising failure, there is little evidence from the empirical findings to 
suggest that failure identification is part of a formal process generally. 
For most organisations in the study, there is very little evidence of a specific 
formal and/or structured approach to the way they attempt to identify failures. 
Indeed identifying failure is significantly absent. As the Property Director of the 
epos systems supplier puts it, “I think that’s probably our biggest failing; 
actually recognising to say, ‘that hasn’t worked out. What are we doing about 
it?’”. It is similar for the Area Division of Government. “I don’t think our 
organisation has a recognised way of recognising failure on 
entrepreneurialism” (Area E manager), or as the Team Leader puts it, “I don’t 
think … I don’t know if we have any sort of way of detecting them (failures) 
really.  It’s just something that failed.  Oh that’s a shame.  That looked quite 
good but it never really got here did it?  I don’t think there is any … I’m pretty 
sure we haven’t got any formal, or even informal way [laughs] of detecting that 
to be honest.” However, the identification process is not totally devoid of 
structure in all organisations. Led by the Retail Director, the public house 
operator holds a quarterly review meeting to discuss entrepreneurial activity 
and this acts as a means to assess outcomes. There is also evidence from the 
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findings that when larger building or externally financed projects arise there is 
a structured approach to measuring progress. Additionally, some 
organisations utilise the structure of existing cyclical operational meetings as 
a vehicle to discuss the outcomes of entrepreneurial initiatives, although this 
may be of an ad hoc approach as opposed to the initiative being a dedicated 
item on an agenda. 
In the main, recognition of failure (when it is recognised) occurs informally and 
on an ad hoc basis. Failure is identified by individuals and teams through the 
constant monitoring of initiatives against their milestones and targets through 
day-to-day and week-to-week work activities. There is often a general 
expectation of the likely performance for the initiative and discussion will form 
if these levels of performance do not materialise. Financial information and 
management information systems illuminate failure when sales or profit does 
not meet expectation. Sometimes it is simply the project running out of cash. 
In the case of a ‘special event’, simply being at the event, experiencing the 
atmosphere, is enough to detect failure; however, attendance numbers and 
visitor feedback are also significant. However, feedback direct from the 
customer can often prove to be important in identifying failure and is a principle 
mechanism. Identification of failure is often more prominent when it is 
customer related (indeed on occasion some customers go to the top of the 
organisation when failure occurs): “(Company name) has always been very 
focused on what the clients think so the fact that… if your clients are not happy 
you know that’s again defining your failure and you do learn from that” 
(Technical and Marketing Communication Manager, epos system supplier). 
Open, close and collaborative teams discuss initiatives and their performance 
as part of a constant open dialogue meaning indicators of performance levels 
are frequently communicated. Often working together in close proximity, 
people are aware of entrepreneurial ventures and pick up messages relating 
to progress of the initiative the throughout the span of the project, and 
discussing them informally. As the Stock Controller of the juice supplier puts 
it, “we’re all in an open plan office so you hear a lot of stuff even if it’s nothing 
to do with you.” Email exchange can also highlight the initiative’s progress. 
Essentially, failure identification occurs through fluid and open communication 
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by individuals and teams highly engaged in the initiative who are regularly 
monitoring activity and progress. 
 
5.2.1.3 The speed and flexibility of informal and ad hoc identification 
 
Therefore, whilst failure identification is largely an informal and ad hoc process, 
evidence suggests that there are significant informal routines within the 
organisations that successfully identify failures. Evidence suggests there is 
often an energy about the process whereby entrepreneurs are highly engaged 
with the initiative and the outcome. Where there is little or no fear of failure, 
identification of failures is more likely. Certainly, there is limited evidence from 
interviewees that they experience the constant reoccurrence of failures. It may 
be argued that the informal and ad hoc process of failure identification has the 
advantage over a more formal and/or structured approach of being more 
responsive. The ongoing monitoring of initiatives offers the potential for failure 
identification to be faster in that identification occurs as it happens, as opposed 
to during a scheduled meeting structure with a potential time delay. Through 
prompt identification the organisation is alerted to the failure and is able to 
react quickly in addressing the situation. This may save significant time, energy 
and cost and lead to a swifter positive outcome for the initiative in the future. 
In other words, this may lead to minimisation of the effects of failure for the 
organisation and to a more fluid and faster entrepreneurial process. 
Additionally, it may be argued that an informal identification process offers 
more flexibility. Within a more structured approach, creating a schedule of 
meetings to review progress may encourage group decision making at an 
untimely moment for the initiative. There may be natural stages for each 
initiative at which it is best to judge an outcome and this time may fall between 
scheduled meetings. Financial and political pressures may encourage the 
presumption of outcomes that may be incorrect leading to bad and wasteful 
decisions. The flexibility of informal identification processes can allow 
outcomes to be assessed as and when the natural stages of the initiative 
develop. In this way, better decisions can be made leading to positive 




5.2.1.4 Obscuring Failure 
 
Whilst findings indicate that failures are recognised via informal and ad hoc 
formats there may be instances where some failures are recognised but kept 
hidden. Evidence suggests that within some departments, within some 
organisations, there is a fear of failure and a fear of being blamed. The fear of 
being blamed for a failure encourages individuals to conceal the identification 
of a negative outcome. In certain situations individuals may prefer to 
disassociate themselves from failure through denial, distortion or avoiding 
failure (Cannon and Edmondson, 2005). At the epos systems supplier there is 
higher tolerance of failure in the early stages of initiative development, 
however, “as soon as an activity becomes visible to the wider organisation that 
tolerance tends to disappear” (COO). Within the functions which centre on 
compliance the organisation is described as having “a very low tolerance level 
for failure problems” (Operations Director). In these situations, failures are 
often not identified. Where there is fear of fear of failure, an individual may not 
wish to disclose the identification of a failure. It is argued that they may find it 
easier to hide the failure if identification measures are looser, informal and ad 
hoc. Alternatively, the lack of vigorous and focused attention may come with a 
more structured meeting format and, is more likely to uncover hidden or 
distorted information relating to a failure and its identification. In this way, a 
structured approach may be effective in failure recognition. 
 
5.2.1.5 Termination Drift 
 
Evidence from across the case studies indicates that initiatives can drift on 
without clear outcome identification and action from management. Initiatives 
can drag on, as the Marketing Assistant at the development agency puts it, “I 
don’t think they are good at actually saying “Right, let’s leave that to bed now” 
and then it’s just carry on.” Corbett et al (2007) argue that the timing of 
terminating an entrepreneurial initiative impacts on the organisations ability to 
learn from failure. They argue that allowing initiatives to drift can reduce 
learning due to the time lag, lack of ownership, and the non-commercialisation 
of the initiative. It is suggested that the optimum approach to learning from 
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failure is when the choice to terminate an initiative is strategic, that is when an 
outcome meeting is planned so that if termination is agreed, it avoids early or 
late decisions. Findings suggest that management within the case study 
organisations often believe that ultimately the initiative will work and the 
organisational optimism (as identified by McGrath and MacMillan (2000), and 
Royer (2003)) adds to the continued pursuit of it. There is little evidence from 
the findings of strategic termination. Essentially, many of the initiatives are 
pursued until fruition, or they continue in the background of activity until starved 
of resources and management time, they fade and die. It is therefore argued 
that the ad hoc approach to monitoring progress leads to a lack of proficiency 
at identifying failure that, in turn, leads to termination drift. A structured process 
to identification may be more effective. 
 
5.2.1.6 Recognising failure - Conclusion 
 
The identification of failure is highly important to the process of learning from 
failure and the organisation. Yet despite its significance, evidence suggests 
that organisations often struggle to identify failure or are inconsistent in their 
approach. 
Whilst literature accentuates the positives of a structured approach to the 
process of identifying failure this section highlights some of the strengths and 
weaknesses of both a structured process and an informal process. It is argued 
that the informal process is more favourable to failure identification as it may 
be more responsive, timely and flexible. Speed of identification allows 
identification to occur immediately, potentially reducing costs. Flexible 
identification allows identification within the natural stages of the outcome of 
an initiative. However, it is also argued that informal processes of identification 
of failure can lead it being hidden or distorted, and also delayed due to 
termination drift. With a structured approach more vigorous enquiry may 
uncover failure and the circumstances surrounding the event. Similarly, the 
structured approach that induces more focused, assertive enquiry and action 
may reduce the level of termination drift for entrepreneurial initiatives. In 
consideration of the natural advantages to both structured and informal 
processes, perhaps there may be an argument for a combined approach. That 
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is, within the framework of a structured approach that addresses the issues of 
termination drift and failure hiding, the informal process can run alongside to 
enable speed and flexibility of failure recognition. In this way, formal and 
informal systems may be considered as complimentary rather than polar 
opposites. By illuminating the potential value of informal identification 
processes to the identification of intelligent failure in this way, it is argued that 
this thesis adds to the literature on intelligent failure by extending the 
arguments of Cannon and Edmondson (2005). 
 





5.2.2.1 Personal reflection 
 
Daudelin (1996) argues that “reflection is a highly personal cognitive process. 
When a person engages in reflection, he or she takes an experience from the 
outside world, brings it inside the mind, turns it over, makes connections to 
other experiences” (p.39). The process allows the individual to step back and 
conceptualise, creating new meaning. In other words, reflection creates the 
opportunity for the entrepreneur to bring together disparate knowledge from 
previous experiences (Pittaway and Cope, 2007) to assimilate and reframe 
conceptual understanding (Bagheri and Pihie, 2011). Pretorius and Le Roux 
(2011) argue that the beliefs of an entrepreneur affect their mental structures, 















in the light of the entrepreneurial failure, that offers enhanced understanding, 
and this may lead to improved learning for the entrepreneur. The reflection 
process is argued as being a two-stage process: Bringing the failure 
experience into the conscious, followed by self-questioning and answering. It 
is a process that offers an interrogative experience, yielding new knowledge 
and then considering how best to use it. In this way, reflection enables 
entrepreneurs to learn from the failure and enhnace their ability to learn how 
to learn. Reflection is considered a highly significant means for entrepreneurs 
to learn from failure (Cope, 2003).  
Within the case studies, personal reflection is evidenced as an important 
mechanism for individuals in assimilating the failure experience to make sense 
of past events. As the Commercial Director of the regional wildlife organisation 
puts it, “the self-awareness and self-reflection time is something that, for me 
personally, is really hugely important”. The Marketing Executive from the area 
development agency uses reflection to effect sensemaking: “I will probably 
tend to go through the, you know, the discussion in my own head almost of, 
you know, “well what happened there, why didn’t it work?”……..So “well we 
tried this actually”….and “why is that not resonating with people?” “What is it, 
what’s stopping them?”  Is it that we have got the wrong product, or are we 
aiming it at the wrong market?” Personal reflection offers a means to learn and 
it can often be the first stage of reflection with group reflexion following 
thereafter. 
 
5.2.2.2 Personal and peer reflection 
 
The case studies demonstrate that when learning from failure occurs, it is often 
instinctive and driven by individuals who are close to and engaged with the 
initiative. Learning from failure often encompasses personal experiences and 
reflections that are shared with team members to aid sense making and 
cognitive understanding. This form of heuristic learning can be powerful as it 
combines personal and group experiences and reflections, with an intensity 
that can deliver meaning. In this way, the heuristic inquiry may be argued as 
reflecting the essence of ‘heuristic inquiry’ identified by Patton (1990). He 
argues that personal experience, reflection and insights are the prime source 
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of data, and shared reflection with team members experiencing and reflecting 
upon the failure, delivers understanding to the individual. Understanding 
comes from personal reflection and shared discussion with colleagues. 
Indeed, “the power of heuristic inquiry lies in its potential for disclosing truth. 
Through exhaustive self-search, dialogues with others, and creative depictions 
of experience, a comprehensive knowledge is generated, beginning as a 
series of subjective and developing into a systematic and definitive exposition” 
(Douglass and Moustakas, 1985 p.40). This personal and collective process 
often feels instinctive for the case study organisations. During the research 
interviewees, at times, found it hard to specify learning from failure episodes 
and this may be because entrepreneurial learning is often an unconscious and 
informal process (Cope and Watts, 2000). 
 
In the case studies, often individuals instinctively engage in analysis and 
concept building both individually and collectively, talking about projects and 
how they are developing. In effect, this means that lessons could be learnt 
without people really recognising that they are being learnt. Crossan et al 
(1999) argue that entrepreneurs learn informally and on an ad hoc basis 
through ‘intuiting’ which occurs when individuals subconsciously develop 
insights by the personal process of recognising similarities and differences, 
patterns and possibilities based on previous experiences. This sensemaking 
tool helps to create meaning from the new phenomena. In turn, the individual 
endeavours to ‘interpret’ or refine the intuitive perception individually and with 
others to develop shared understanding. Indeed, the organisations maybe 
experiencing ‘autopoietic’ learning (Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995) whereby 
ideas emanate from autonomous individuals, diffuse with the team, and then 
become organisational. Where autonomy exists within the case studies, it may 
be argued that the ‘autopoietic’ system is generating new knowledge (ibid). 
Findings suggest that whilst the organisations have some structure to create 
time for reflection predominantly it is an informal process for the individual 
(sometimes out of work time) and for the group within their natural workspaces. 
Liker (2005) identifies such reflection practices within the Toyota production 
system in the form of a ‘Hansai-kai’ (reflection meeting) when failure occurs. 
The reflection process is the antecedent to the process of analysis and concept 
building (Kolb, 1981). As a mechanism for reflection and subsequent learning 
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from failure evidence suggests that intuitive analysis, sensemaking, and the 
existence of an autopoietic system are important. Indeed the very intuitive and 
subconscious cognitive analysing and learning offer a meaningful explanation 
as to how organisations may learn from failure. 
 
However, whilst these unstructured mechanisms may add significant value, it 
may also be argued that even more might be gained from establishing some 
structured reflection. Utilising a considered list of headings, questions or 
frameworks could assist in enhanced reflection, increasing the learning from 
failure. For example Johns (2000) puts forward a structured model of reflection 
which centres on aesthetics (what was I trying to achieve? why did I respond 
as I did? what were the consequences for myself and others?), self-awareness 
(why did I feel the way I did within this situation?), ethics (did I act for the best? 
What factors were influencing me?), and reflexivity (how does this situation 
relate to previous experiences? How could I have handled this better? What 
would have been the consequences of alternative actions?) In this way, a 
deeper level of reflection may enable more insights. Taking time out to reflect 
is important, as it creates a framework that may sharpen the focus, making 
better use of reflection time and leveraging more lessons of varying sizes. 
 
In considering the reflection process, this thesis highlights the significance of 
reflection in learning from failure. Within the learning from failure domain, there 
is limited discussion of the role of reflection and the process of learning from 
failure. Drawing from the results of this research (within innovation, 
entrepreneurship, and learning literature), this thesis extends current theory on 
learning from failure. 
 
Having gained insights into the reflective stage of learning from failure, the next 
section centres on forms of organisational analysis and conceptualisation that 










5.2.3.1 Learning from failure as a structured process 
 
Literature argues that post performance learning can be effective when it 
occurs in a formally structured approach such as the ‘After Action Review’ 
(Senge, 1990, Cannon and Edmondson, 2005). Post-performance learning 
meetings centre on understanding the causes and processes of failure 
(Wilkinson and Mellahi, 2005), learning about skill and competency gaps, and 
learning about the project fit and alignment with organisational strategy 
(Corbett, 2005). Indeed, literature maintains that analysis should focus on 
diagnosing the problem, the design of the experiment, systematic analysis of 
data, statistical process controls, and the analysis of statistics (Cannon and 
Edmondson, 2005). Toyota, as the literature review uncovers, have developed 
a seven stage process of analysing and conceptualising centred on a ‘root 
cause’ analysis as a means to utilise structure to improve the process of 
learning from failure (Liker, 2005). Root cause analysis consists of: 
 The initial recognition of a problem  
 Clarifying the problem to create the ‘real problem’ 
 Locating the likely area of the point of the cause  
 Locating the direct cause (and then through five ‘why’ probing) 
 Identifying the root cause of the problem 
 Determining a countermeasure  
 Evaluating the performance of the counter measure  















In this way, a structured approach offers a more detailed, precise and robust 
approach with the potential to create a deeper level of learning. As a team 
leader at Roche pharmaceutical puts it: “It doesn’t come naturally to share 
failures, and you have to give people time, so you cannot really do this as part 
of regular rhythm meetings. You need to create space for it to happen, to put 
it on the calendar” (Birkinshaw and Haas, 2016). Current research consistently 
argues that effective learning from failure occurs when it resides within a 
structured process. 
From the findings, there is evidence of various forms of structure that the 
organisations use to analyse and conceptualise in order to extract learning 
from their failures. Evidence shows the use of software, daily meetings, and 
weekly reviews with project management, formal monthly SMT meetings, 
quarterly reviews, and ‘one to one’ reviews, all as a means to learn from 
initiatives that have failed. Whilst there is variety of forms across the case 
studies, the organisations use of them is limited or very limited. Often the form 
is used only in certain areas of the business. For example, the epos supplier 
has a structured software system that is used to rectify and review software 
launch issues. Once an issue is identified a ‘ticket number’ is offered by the 
system which then allows the logging of information and details, providing a 
link for people to access the data and see the issues and subsequent work 
required to resolve them. There is a ‘standard meeting’ which takes place on 
a daily basis in an adjacent office where the team get together and openly 
discuss progress, what has been discovered and lessons learnt, and possible 
solutions for testing. For the public house operator there is a quasi-formal 
quarterly business review process, where all new developments are 
discussed. The review centres on performance, a reflection on what action has 
occurred and lessons learned. Within the wildlife organisation, many of the 
projects involve formal ‘one to one’ meetings on a monthly basis between the 
manager and team leaders. At the government agency, if the initiative is part 
of a formalised project then a formal review takes place where milestones or 
‘gateways’ are monitored and respective discussion occurs although perhaps 
not rigorously. For the juice supplier structure comes in the form of a monthly 
senior management meeting that takes place over the course of the day. It is 
structured with an agenda and subsequent minutes. In these instances, 
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analysis takes place and lessons learned by focused and planned review of 
activities with a view to achieving a detailed and in-depth understanding of the 
failure and the context. 
 
5.2.3.2 Learning from failure as a semi-structured process 
 
Organisations within this study evidence a semi-structured approach towards 
the analysis and learning from failure with a form of informal ‘after action 
reviews’. The term ‘wash up’ is used in the regional wildlife organisation, and 
refers to an informal analysis where there is no fixed agenda and discussion 
centres on an ad hoc dialogue until members feel that the topic is exhausted. 
Another semi-structured approach is the ‘away day’ that is formally organised 
but the contents of the away days are designed to be informal and are 
approached informally. The ‘away day’ is also used by the epos supplier. A 
number of the organisations use regular or cyclical operational meetings as a 
means to assess initiative developments and performance, and open 
discussion about reasons for performance if the project falls short of 
expectations. There was also evidence of organised meetings but with a very 
fluid and open agenda. The COO of the epos supplier explains, “We’re not 
pointing fingers.  We just need to understand, so there’s usually a bit of calm 
down everyone.  No-one’s gonna lose their job [laughs].  Encourage … that’s 
the word I’m trying to say here, encourage people to be open and honest and 
to put the shit on the table so that we can look at it and go ah you know there 
is something we can learn from that, or occasionally, do you know what that 
was just back luck or whatever.  So that’s one type of meeting and typically 
that will resolve itself into a set of minutes of actions.” Whilst there is an 
element of structure to the process, informality is incorporated. In this way, it 
may be argued that the structure is shaping a more robust process and the 
informality may weaken the level of analysis, which can lead to reduced levels 





5.2.3.3 Learning from failure as an informal process 
 
Findings from across the case studies demonstrate that analysis, 
conceptualisation and learning from failure is predominantly an informal 
process. There is an absence of a consistently structured process or approach 
across divisions and up and down the hierarchy. Evidence from the findings 
suggest that learning occurs through ongoing and ad hoc analysis, often 
collaboratively, in informal locations and with a loose agenda. Fluidity and 
informality of tone represent the nature of the informal process. 
In a similar way to the ongoing monitoring of data that assists failure detection, 
so ongoing analysing, conceptualising and extraction of learning is evidenced 
within the organisations. The CEO of the public house operator explains, “I 
mean, I would speak to the director on a weekly basis anyway.  We’d all have 
anecdotal evidence, I’d see the numbers, I’d know what was expected, what 
wasn’t expected.  I would spend a fair amount of time, as would many other 
senior directors… we would talk about it as we went along.” Generally, across 
divisions and up and down the hierarchy of these organisations, individuals 
and teams are, informally discussing the aims of the initiative, using 
quantitative analysis that can show variances to expected outcome, before 
taking a qualitative approach by engaging and experiencing the initiative (by 
being present) and talking with those individuals closely involved. The ongoing 
approach can offer a more spontaneous analysis, conceptualisation and 
learning experience which may have some advantage particularly as the 
experience and contextual data is fresh in the mind and, therefore, potentially 
less likely to be forgotten or subject to bias. Analysing failure soon after 
identification gives the advantage of examining evidence which is 
uncontaminated by organisational discourse, distorted recollections and 
physical alterations. Informal analysis offers this particular advantage. 
Open discussion occurs in the organisations in the study but to varying 
degrees. Where organisations provide higher levels of psychological safety, 
the process of analysing and learning from failure occurs through very open 
discussion. As the Sales Manager of the juice supplier puts it, “people are very 
candid in our senior management team and they will happily talk about 
particular issues that they’ve had and things that have not worked.....and they’ll 
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come up and down the structure of the organisation and we just sit and talk 
about those things.  It’s done on a very informal basis.” 
These open discussions occur in different spaces. Sometimes stand-up 
meetings spontaneously occur in the middle of the open workspace, or 
meetings are convened in breakout meeting rooms or managers offices. The 
analysis may take place in different locations to gain a deeper understanding 
of the failure. There is a richness of discussing a failure where it occurs within 
the production or customer space giving added contextual data to consider.  
For two of the organisations that demonstrated an internal environment that is 
supportive of entrepreneurship, analysing and learning occur in very informal 
surroundings. For the CEO of the Epos system supplier it is, “probably me and 
P (the COO) in the pub to be honest”. A similar approach is taken by the CEO 
of the juice supplier. The location benefits from being away from the office, 
freeing the mind to focus on holistic discussion. Literature highlights the value 
of reflection and knowledge creation away from the business. Nonaka and 
Takeuchi (1995) highlight Honda’s approach to socialisation of tacit knowledge 
through meetings located in local resorts, where individuals drink ‘sake’, eat 
together and bath in the hot springs. Whilst a separate location away from the 
business offers freedom to the mind, the lack of structure to the discussion 
may yield a relatively underdeveloped learning experience compared with a 
meeting approach with a clear agenda and minutes. In not systematically 
extricating the lessons learnt from failure, it may be argued that these 
organisations are not maximising the full learning opportunity. 
In this informal process of learning from failure, learning happens over a period 
of time and not in one structured episode. Indeed, the timing of informal 
learning varies considerably. Analysis may begin as soon as the failure occurs 
or it can be at the next most convenient time, hence the fairly ad hoc nature of 
the analysis. More often though, a discussion meeting is organised within a 
relatively short period after failure recognition. There is very little evidence of 
the use of agendas, which means there is often a free flowing discussion 
among people connected to the initiative with a genuine engagement in 
factoring how the failure came about, where to move forward, and what 
lessons have been learned. As the Business Development Manager at the 
juice supplier puts it, “ normally it would be, you know, just a sit-round chat, it 
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would be quite informal, it wouldn't be very structured, it would just be you 
know so what have we learned.” It is not the case that purposeful, structured 
agendas and specific meetings are driving analysis, conceptualisation and 
learning. 
Often analysis and conceptualisation in the case studies is a collaborative 
process whereby individuals analyse and discuss failure, as Bagheri and Pihie 
(2011 p.455) put it, as a means “to share and challenge their different insights 
and reasoning processes, discover weak points on their reasoning and the 
ways to improve them, correct one another, adjust their understanding on the 
basis of others’ understanding and, more importantly, apply the acquired 
knowledge and skills to solve the problems”. In this way individual and 
collective learning occurs. For the organisations, learning is largely a fluid 
process of learning through practice or as Brown and Duguid (1991) put it, 
“learning-in-working” (p.41). Particularly evident in the specialist teams within 
the organisations are “communities of practice” (ibid). When complex failure 
occurs individuals work together collaboratively to make sense of failure 
through sharing hunches, insights, and mistaken beliefs creating new 
knowledge. Kolb (1981), in his theory of experiential learning, argues that the 
sharing of tacit knowledge between individuals, through such structures, is a 
clear means by which to convert tacit knowledge into codified knowledge, and 
create new knowledge.  Developing this line of theory, Nonaka and Kona 
(1998) argue that new individual, group, and organisational knowledge is 
created through the ongoing conversion of tacit and explicit knowledge via the 
processes of socialisation, externalisation, combination, and internalisation. 
They argue that, recognising the validity of this dynamic spiral process of 
knowledge conversion, management can support the mechanism by 
supporting ‘ba’, that is, “the shared space that serves as a foundation for 
knowledge creation” (p.40).  Further, they assert that managers can offer 
knowledge leadership by creating effective ba (whether the spaces are 
physical, virtual, or mental, or a combination thereof). They posit that 
‘originating ba’ (which supports socialisation) is a face-to-face space, that 
‘interacting ba’ (which supports externalisation) is a peer to peer space, that 
‘cyber ba’ (which supports combination) is a group to group space and that 
‘exercising ba (which supports internalisation) is an on-site space. 
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Understanding the nature of these four spaces enables managers to nurture 
the spaces individually and as a whole to maximise their potential. Indeed, the 
role of management is to manage the process of knowledge creation. It may 
be argued that this process potentially offers us further explanation as to how 
learning from failure may occur via an informal, unstructured process within 
the organisations. Indeed, informal learning from failure within the six 
organisations is often an ongoing heuristic activity that is collaborative by 
nature. However learning does occur, as is evidenced by the summarised by 
the table below (Table 5.1: repeated from the ‘Findings’ chapter) albeit that the 
learning may be single loop rather than double, that learning may be of a more 
shallow nature. Therefore, whilst straightforward and visible lessons relating to 
the project may be learned, deeper lessons that create advanced learning and 
value at an organisational level generally are not as forthcoming. In this way, 
it may be argued that this more informal, less rigorous, approach to learning 
from failure may not be generating the deeper, substantial double loop lessons 
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5.2.3.4 Analysis and conceptualisation: Structure or non-structure? 
 
The discussion on analysing, conceptualising and learning from failure 
highlights the differing perspectives provided by literature and the evidence 
from the empirical findings. Literature assertively argues that to effectively 
analyse, conceptualise and extract learning, significant organisational 
discipline and structure is required. The structure of a formal approach may be 
more inclusive, rigorous, in-depth, and therefore deliver more single and 
double loop learning, particularly the latter. Indeed, being part of the process 
may also broaden team member knowledge and competencies. The structured 
approach is argued as being the preferred approach to learning from failure, 
despite organisations fundamentally struggling to engage with such structures. 
Findings support existing literature and suggest that organisations do not 
engage in a highly structured approach to learning from failure. 
The organisations in this study use a mixture of mechanisms in which failure, 
when recognised, is analysed and conceptualised to extract learning. 
Additionally, each organisation has its own different mixture of mechanisms. 
There is evidence of some structures and quasi structures in which the process 
takes place; however, predominantly learning from failure is an informal affair. 
Learning occurs as a dynamic, collaborative, constant, and informal process 
often intuitive, subconscious and part of a diffusive ‘autopoietic’ system that 
creates new individual and organisational knowledge. Levitt and March (1988) 
highlight the phenomenon of ‘superstitious learning’ where “the subjective 
experience of learning is compelling, but the connections between actions and 
outcomes are miss-specified” (p.325). It may be argued that the informal 
process does not offer the structures and in depth approach required to avoid 
such disruptive learning episodes. 
Importantly though, evidence shows that the organisations are learning from 
failure in this informal way. Informal systems can be more spontaneous, offer 
fluid analysis and ongoing learning in a way that may replicate the informal 
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nature of the organisations (although this does vary amongst the case studies). 
Individuals that are part of informal cultures may find structures and disciplines 
at odds with the paradigmatic norm. Therefore, it is argued that there are 
positive values to both formal and informal learning. However, it is also posited 
that the argument for a structured approach is highly compelling due to the 
intrinsic detailed and thorough methodology yielding more robust analysis, 
conceptualising and deeper learning. 
Yet is it a simple case of one mechanism being better than another? Svensson 
et al (2004) argue that formal and informal learning cannot be considered as 
separate entities. They argue that learning in the work place occurs through 
the dynamic interaction of formal and informal learning. Indeed, Choi and 
Jacobs (2011) posit that it would be difficult to perceive either form of learning 
to be successful without the other as competence is achieved through the 
integration of knowledge gained from formal and informal learning. Neither 
entirely formal nor informal, they argue that both forms are complimentary and 
occur concurrently as all types of workplace learning is likely to be inclusive of 
formal and informal qualities. Additionally, Jensen et al (2007) argue that when 
organisations combine explicit and tacit learning mechanisms, they perform 
significantly better than when relying on just one form. Their research centres 
on two type modes of learning and organisation: Science, Technology, and 
Innovation (STI) and Doing, Using and Interacting (DUI). STI centres on 
codifying knowledge prioritising ‘know what’ and ‘know why’, and DUI centres 
on more pragmatic knowledge where learning comes from on-the-job learning 
with an emphasis of gaining ‘know how’ and ‘know what’, and is tacit and often 
localised by nature. STI is a formal process of R&D that produces explicit and 
codified knowledge, and DUI is an informal learning interaction within and 
between organisations which delivers tacit knowledge. Interestingly, they 
highlight an institutional bias towards STI mode learning in a similar way to the 
majority of current learning from failure theory does for a structured approach. 
However, the main findings “show that what really improves innovation 
performance is using mixed strategies that combine strong versions to the two 
modes” (p.690). They assert that the two modes of learning can co-exist and 
complement each other. Knowledge management therefore should centre on 
creating strong versions of STI and DUI and working them together. In 
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consideration of this work and in the context of learning from failure, discussion 
is encouraged as to the value of considering either structured or unstructured, 
informal learning mechanisms as a better learning vehicle. Indeed, it 
encourages an approach that centres on maximising the effectiveness of both 
learning mechanisms, with a view to effecting an appropriate knowledge 
management strategy that combines both learning mechanisms.  
In a similar vein, Argote and Miron-Spektor (2011) refer to the concept of 
“mindfulness”. They argue that learning processes can be mindful, which 
include analogical reasoning, and less mindful, which include stimulus 
response learning. They argue that both processes can complement each 
other, “with mindful processes enabling the organization to shift between more 
automatic routines and routines embedding past experience and conserving 
cognitive capacity for greater mindfulness” (p. 1128). These authors argue for 
the utilisation of a more dualist approach to learning processes, which centre 
on structured learning and unstructured learning. 
Indeed, Dörfler and Baumann (2014) in their case study research into the 
drastic failure of the A380 Airbus program, found that within the ‘problem 
solving’ context, an approach that engages ad hoc mechanisms (where senior 
management that take direct control by establishing rigid monitoring 
processes), followed by systematic process (which is more bottom up, with 
wider inclusion from across the organisation, leading to broader variety of 
explanations, and the development of trust) may be most effective in 
redesigning organisational behaviour. They highlight the deficiencies of the ad 
hoc approach to problem solving but also recognise some positives. For 
example, an initial quick fix and can avoid or reduce a situation deteriorating 
further, which can bring stability, and bring awareness. Whilst arguing the 
positives of a systematic process as being suitable for more rigorous and 
‘deep’ problem solving activities, they suggest that a sequential approach 
whereby ad hoc problem solving mechanisms preclude a systematic approach 
may be most effective, as it draws value from both approaches. 
Further, Senge (1990) recommends that organisations create a learning 
environment where individuals continuously learn both structured, formal 
processes  and unstructured, informal processes. Perhaps the ongoing and ad 
hoc analysis and conceptualisation can add value to a structured approach by 
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offering a pre-analysis that occurs close to failure identification, rich with 
unspoilt data. Perhaps the structured approach to analysis can help develop a 
paradigm of enquiry to help enhance the informal analysis more naturally. As 
Choi and Jacobs (2011) put it, “formal learning programs give employees 
experimental learning tools that make it possible to perform self-initiated 
learning through self-reflection” (p.242). In this way, discussion moves away 
from a singular perspective to one that engages with a dualist approach to 
learning from failure. One that principally recognises both the inherent strength 
of a structured approach and the strengths of the more natural organisational 
approach.  Indeed, the prevailing paradigm within the organisations is highly 
significant as it is difficult to change dominant paradigms (Kuhn, 2012). Where 
environments within the case studies have structures that are supportive of 
entrepreneurship, the paradigm is forward looking, with less patience for 
structure and looking backwards. Therefore, attempting to push against this 
paradigm may not be as effective as trying to work with it, combining different 
processes. It is argued therefore, that whilst a structured approach may offer 
a more effective means to learn from failure, there is a role for an informal 
process and that a mix of structure and non-structure may offer increased 
organisational performance when it comes to learning from intelligent failure. 
Therefore, it is argued that informal learning from the process of intelligent 
failure has significant value, more than is currently recognised in the 
entrepreneurship literature domain. 
 
5.2.3.5 Learning styles 
 
In the ‘structure, not structure’ discussion the four learning styles put forward 
by Kolb (1981) may be considered. He identified ‘convergers’ as individuals 
who use ‘hypothetical-deductive reasoning focusing on specific problems. 
‘Divergers’ have the ability to view situations from differing perspectives. 
‘Assimilators’ create theoretical models and use inductive reasoning. 
‘Accomodators’ learn by doing. This theory highlights the individuality of 
learning and that each person will have an individual mix of the four styles with 
a heavy preference for one or two of the styles. Educational literature promotes 
the consideration of learning styles to create effective classes, modules and 
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programmes (Morss and Murray, 2005). By extension, it is argued that this 
theory is also relevant to learning within organisations and, specially, from 
failure episodes. In considering that there is not just one learning style but four 
learning styles (and variations); it may be argued that organisations might 
reflect this phenomenon in the strategic consideration of the process of 
learning from failure. One learning process may well not suit all. A learning 
style that suits one individual may not suit another. Recognition of learning 
styles and planned methods to engage an individual, based on his or her 
learning style, may deliver more overall learning. Indeed a process looking to 
engage a mix of the learning styles could produce more learning at an 
individual level and therefore at an organisational level. For example, the 
informal learning approach may be supportive for ‘accommodators’ who “tend 
to solve problems in an intuitive trial-and-error manner” (Kolb, 1981 p.238), 
whereas ‘convergers’ may find a structured approach more supportive of a 
deductive mindset. Additionally the learning styles could be considered within 
a structured process so that activities within structured sessions (such as after 
action review meetings) are created to engage individuals from all four learning 
styles. 
Corbett (2005) widens the discussion on learning styles by arguing that 
“individuals with differing learning modes will perform better during different 
parts of the entrepreneurial process” (p.483). He perceives the front end 
stages as being the domain of  ‘convergers’, ‘assimilators’, and ‘divergers’. 
However, when it comes to the latter stages of the process where final 
decisions are made, where resources are organised, and forward actions 
pursued, he argues that the ‘accomodator’ is best suited. The strength of the 
‘accomodator’ rests in the natural orientation to carry out plans. The 
‘accomodator’ is adaptive, learning by doing, learning by experimentation, 
learning by failure. Therefore, it may be argued that in deciding on a suitable 
process for learning from failure, consideration should be given to learning 
styles theory as a means to engage individuals in a way that reflects their 
natural orientation. 
Mueller and Shepherd (2016) refer to two differing cognitive styles, ‘analytical’ 
and ‘intuitive’. Whereas analysts have an orientation towards detail, centring 
on hard data, and preferring a sequential step-by-step approach to learning, 
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intuitives are more holistic and use an open-ended and flexible approach to 
solving problems. They assert, “in terms of individual learning, analysts and 
intuitives have been found to observe, reflect, and process their experiences 
differently, leading to significant contrasts in learning preferences” (p.9). 
Positing that failure events represent a context of change, high complexity, and 
ambiguous information, they argue that an approach that is more open-ended 
is required. Specifically they argue that an intuitive cognitive style is more 
suited to this context.  An intuitive cognitive style enables analogical reasoning 
which connects knowledge from dissimilar situations. However, an analytical 
approach prefers to solve problems with structured methods where 
investigation is highly detailed, offering detailed information in a sequential 
analysis which is less suited to such an environment of complexity and 
ambiguity (ibid). It may be argued therefore, that the ‘intuitive’ cognitive style, 
which may best unravel failure episodes and create new lessons, is one that 
operates best in an unstructured environment, more informal by nature. 
Consideration of these cognitive styles in managing the failure process 
(structures and non-structures) may enhance overall learning. 
In essence, literature highlights the significance of learning styles to the way 
individuals learn. When considering this theory in the area of entrepreneurial 
failure, it is suggested that learning styles may influence how individuals learn 
from failure. Additionally it is suggested that the process of managing 
intelligent failure might strategically consider the various cognitive or learning 
styles in order to maximise individual and organisational learning as, “cognitive 
style can have important implications for task design” (Hayes and Allinson, 
1994 p.66). 
 
5.2.3.6 Analysing and conceptualising from failure occurrences 
 
In this section, discussion has highlighted the significance of structure, semi-
structure, and informal forms of analysis and conceptualisations from failure to 
extract learning. A structured approach inclusive of planned after action 
reviews, in designated meeting rooms, inclusive of key initiative stakeholders 
and detailed agendas offer a robust and deep analysis, thought generation, 
and learning. A personal and collective informal approach that is by nature 
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ongoing, spontaneously located, and collaborative can offer an intensive 
inquiry and one that uses uncontaminated data. Literature offers a persuasive 
argument for a structured approach being ultimately the more effective means 
to learn from failure. However, whilst the argument for a structured approach 
may be compelling, this section has perhaps identified the need for 
consideration of a dualist approach to learning from failure, one that 
recognises the value of informal learning and “that both forms of workplace 
learning can be viewed as complementary” (Choi and Jacobs, 2011 p.252). 
Whilst it is argued that a structured approach offers a robust process with the 
potential for deeper learning, the natural informal learning approach offers a 
continuous and fluid process, one that can occur closer to the point of failure 
identification, potentially offering a valuable pre-analysis. 
This section has highlighted, and supports existent literature in identifying, the 
lack of formal structures within organisation in failure enquiry. It is clear that 
the case study organisations do not learn from failure via a structured 
approach. In this way, the research adds to existing literature. 
This section also highlights the significance of informal learning from failure. 
Whilst lacking some vigour, there is evidence of individual and organisational 
informal learning from failure, some of which is at a deeper level. Literature on 
learning from failure offers limited recognition of the value of the informal 
process of learning from failure in the research domain. Through the heavy 
emphasis on the importance of a structured approach, there is perhaps an 
under representation of the values of the informal process, and inference that 
organisations are not learning from failure unless it is via a structured process. 
This thesis adds to theory by highlighting the significance of informal learning 
from failure, its potential advantages, and how a dualist approach might be 
considered, particularly as the general informality of organisations may be a 















5.2.4.1 The significance of new knowledge communication for 
organisational learning 
 
In the previous sections discussion has centred on how individuals and teams 
identify, analyse, conceptualise and extract learning from failure. 
Organisations struggle to effectively learn from failure for many reasons. It is 
therefore of high significance that the valuable lessons learned from a formal 
or informal process of enquiry should be efficiently shared within the 
organisation. Indeed, the way in which the distribution of knowledge occurs 
determines whether organisational learning actually occurs and how widely 
(Huber, 1991). The more widely the information is distributed the more likely 
the information will be utilised to create learning for the organisation (ibid). 
 
















Levitt and March (1988) suggest that in order to utilise new knowledge gained 
from experience, codification is required either in the form of documents, 
accounts, files, standard operating systems, rules and regulation literature, 
and standards of professional practice. In this way, the organisational memory 
is developed ready for utilisation. Indeed, whilst recognising that lessons 
knowledge learned from failure episodes may be significant, they are not 
necessarily long lasting. The findings from the research of Parker (2013) 
suggest that, for the individual, knowledge accumulates over the course of 
successive ventures, but that over time this knowledge dissipates, due to the 
gap in using the knowledge and the individual forgetting. He argues that this is 
also true of social capital when groups (including those groups engaged in 
learning from failure activities) are disbanded. In this situation, knowledge is 
dissipated due to the passing of time, spatial distance, and lack of use. In 
consideration of this theory, it may be argued therefore, that to prolong the 
value of lessons learned, codification in some form is in important to long-term 
knowledge capital of the organisation. 
Within the case studies, there is only limited evidence of structure when it 
comes to codifying lessons in the form of software applications, minutes, or 
notes and then sharing with the organisation. As the COO of the epos systems 
supplier puts it, “we’re having to be a lot more trusting that this knowledge 
transfer is actually taking place in the absence of a structured channel.” 
Trusting may not be the answer as his colleague asserts, “as for 
communicating intelligent failures, that’s a difficult one because it’s not 
something we would do normally and there’s not really a mechanism in place” 
(Communication Manager). The concern is shared by the Retail Director of the 
public house operator, “I think the after action review we’ve got to think much 
more about the process of how to track and disseminate the learnings….and 
how do we make sure that we don’t repeat the mistakes.” Some of the issues 
relating to effective communication of lessons learnt from failure relate to time 
and workload which is relevant to all the case studies but to varying degrees. 
As the Marketing Executive of the area development agency puts it, “So you 
know, so ok we have had a look, we think we know what went wrong, but 
actually we will now completely forget to tell everybody else about it, or if we 
do tell everybody else about it, they are so busy that they won’t get the chance 
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to read the email I sent, or you know, time to make the meeting where I tell 
everybody about, you know, what lessons I have learned from this.  So, I think 
it is an area that we probably could improve on.” Structures of process are 
limited. Organisations are struggling to communicate some significant lessons 
thus reducing the level of learning and risking error replication in the future. 
Indeed frequent error replication is identified at the epos supplier software 
development department for example, “we make…as a company, we make 
the same mistakes again and again and again.  That different releases of the 
software have the same issues in them again and again and again” (Deputy 
Help Centre Manager). Evidence from the findings firmly indicate that, in a 
similar nature to the early stage of the learning from intelligent failure process, 
the communication and dissemination is predominantly an informal event. 
Whilst there may be only limited structured channels of communication, 
findings show a significant level of collaborative communication within teams. 
This informal communication may disseminate more lessons learnt than is 
perhaps visible to organisational members. 
 
5.2.4.3 Collaboration and team discussion 
 
There is evidence of significant levels of collaborative communication within 
teams where lessons learned are shared as part of an ongoing dialogue. Case 
study organisations with an environment more supportive of entrepreneurship 
have informal channels of communication which are open and unstructured. “I 
think there’s a lot of communication that happens all the time” (Finance 
Apprentice of the processed juice supplier). Also, physical space impacts 
communication as is evidenced by the new office at the epos supplier: “since 
they’ve moved to the new office, people kind of walk about and actually go and 
see each other, and talk to each other, rather than emailing….you  learn more 
than you did” (Deputy Help Centre Manager). Organisations communicate 
lessons learned as part of the flow of ongoing collaborative work as close 
teamwork facilitates considerable communication. These informal channels 
disseminate some of the lessons learned from intelligent failure. The ad hoc 
nature of communication is prominent in the case studies, often this is within 
regular operational meetings. “I think the answer is quite a lot of it 
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(communication of lessons learnt) is ad hoc.  Quite a lot of it is discussed in 
team meetings and so we have entire trusts of staff meetings which happen 
four times a year” (MD, wildlife organisation). The most common form of 
learning is through informal conversations whereby individuals share lessons 
learned from colleagues. As the HR assistant (of the epos supplier) puts it, “the 
more you speak to people, and the more situations you deal with the more you 
learn about things.” Informal conversations move knowledge around the 
business. Communication is largely collaborative and informal in the form of 
ad hoc discussion and meetings, as well through regularly scheduled 
operational meetings. In this way, lessons from failure are ‘integrated’ as the 
development of collective meaning occurs within the organisation and new 
protocols are established, then replicated, eventually forming part of the 
operation as established routines as it is ‘institutionalised’ (Crossan et al., 
1999). Within these organisations, dissemination occurs almost 
subconsciously. At practitioner level, lessons from failure can be stored in the 
organisational memory as stories (Brown and Duguid, 1991) which are openly 
shared in an ad hoc manner and informal situations. These stories can be 
disseminated by the autonomous teams, which are interconnected across the 
organisation to become embedded in the social system (ibid). Where 
communication of intelligent failure occurs in the case studies it is a largely a 
collaborative process. 
 
5.2.4.4 Effective communication and disseminations of lesson learnt 
 
A systematic approach to memory management may offer a more complete 
memory of lessons learned from failure. A systematic memory that safely 
protects and makes this new knowledge accessible to the wider organisation 
on a permanent basis. The systematic process offers a robust process as it is 
not at risk to staff turnover, absence or memory loss; it is a fixed resource. 
However, it may also be argued that a structured organisational memory may 
be less accessible as searching is required and that depends on how user-
friendly the nature of the system is (something highlighted by the development 
agency), and the propensity of individuals to engage in such activity (if they 
are not engaged with research). Evidence from the case studies suggests 
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individuals prefer networking and team discussion as a means to source 
relevant information. This is reflected in the limited structural memory 
identified. In the organisations within the study, organisational memory is 
primarily made up of individual and team memory. Sometimes memory is 
encoded in work routines. As Crossan  et al (1999) put it, “Over time, 
spontaneous individual and group learning become less prevalent, as the prior 
learning becomes embedded in the organisation and begins to guide the 
actions and learning of organizational members” (p.529). 
Empirical evidence suggests that communication and dissemination of lessons 
learned (held within the organisational memory) is predominantly an informal 
process that occurs at individual and team levels during the course of day-to-
day and week-to-week activity on an ad hoc basis. It is argued that 
dissemination is a diffusive process where new knowledge permeates the 
organisation through socialisation (Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995) and 
storytelling (Brown and Duguid, 1991). Indeed Brown and Dugid (1991) assert 
that the narratives embedded in the social system are difficult to transfer into 
explicit structured organisational procedures. Particularly as “organizational 
assumptions that given the ‘right’ medium people will exchange information 
freely overlook the way in which certain socio-economic groups, organizations, 
and in particular, corporations, implicitly treat information as a commodity to 
be hoarded and exchanged” (p 54). Further supporting the argument of the 
presence of informal and unstructured learning, Takeuchi and Nonaka (1986) 
posit that the transfer of learning can take place through what they call 
“Osmosis”, where key individuals from one project are assigned to subsequent 
projects, thus spreading and utilising new knowledge. This is supported by 
Argote and Miron-Spektor (2011). Further, they argue that there are other 
transfer mechanisms as well as personal movement, such as social networks 
and alliances. 
In this way, it may be argued that the informal processes of knowledge 
distribution offer a more effective platform. Indeed the communication of 
lessons learnt may be better targeted and in a timelier fashion. When the public 
house operator engages in new initiatives it spends much time planning, 
discussing and reflecting on previous initiatives. As the Retail Director puts it, 
“So I think it’s almost the George Washington thing, if I had seven hours to cut 
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down a tree I’d spend six hours sharpening the axe and that’s … I think that’s 
a very good quote and it applies very much to what we are doing now.” In this 
way, individual’s specifically relevant lessons from previous intelligent failures 
making the dissemination very focused and effective, particularly as the 
narration may engage a fuller description of the previous failure and the context 
within which it occurred. The individual memory may be better explained and 
allows for probing and questions. Separately, informal communication can 
often be a fast process within collaborative communities (Brown and Duguid, 
1991). The risk however, for dissemination processes reliant on individual 
memory is loss, distortion and bias. In addition, the system is particularly reliant 
on individuals being available for team discussion, and indeed, remaining in 
the organisation. By the nature of the informal communication process, it is 
reliant on individual or team memory and this can make it less accessible to 
the organisation as a whole. Huber (1991) points out that the probability of an 
organisational member or unit will pass information to another member or unit 
depends on the relevance of the information, workload, and the gain from 
passing the information on, and how often information has been passed to the 
member/unit in the past. Indeed high workloads are identified as reducing 
communication of lessons learned in the case studies. Informal communication 
is open to various disturbances that can significantly affect its effectiveness: 
the ad hoc nature may mean that, as a system, it is less consistent. Yet despite 
these drawbacks, literature suggests that based on the open and collaborative 
engagement with failure, the informal channels are disseminating the lessons 
learnt from failure. Indeed Brown and Duguid (1991) argue that in complex 
failure situations the formal channels of memory (such as manuals and guides) 
can blinker the organisation. The explicit communication is unable to replicate 
the complexities that are better resolved through individuals finding ‘work 
arounds’ which are then shared via community communication. Therefore, it is 
asserted that the informal channels are important to the communication of 
failure lessons. 
However, whilst informal communication of lessons learned is occurring, it is 
argued that as a process it is, as a whole, less robust than a more structured 
approach. The rigidity of structure in memory systems and communication 
channels bring considerable consistency and reliability to the knowledge 
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transfer process. Perhaps differing approaches to communicating new 
knowledge from failure dependent on contextual matters should be 
considered. For example where high technical complexity exists (as in the 
epos suppliers case) informal channels may be preferred. Whereas in less 
complex projects (such as the roll out of new pub formats) by the public house 
operator, more explicit mechanisms are engaged to memorise and 
communicate learnings. Consideration of different approaches may be argued 
as a strategic process requiring a structured assessment of the organisational 
context. The organisations in this study may be learning informally but they are 
not fully aware of how their organisations learn, and it may be more by chance 
than by plan. However, the organisations are supporting free flowing 
communication (to varying degrees) by creating supporting environments, 
which is more by design. In essence, it is argued that a structured approach to 
communication through both formal and informal channels may deliver a more 
effective process. This argument, in its infancy, requires further research 
however; this thesis opens up a discussion into how both informal and formal 
mechanisms may be effective in failure knowledge dissemination, and how 
they may be used successfully in differing contexts. 
 
5.2.4.5 Sharing knowledge gained from intelligent failure - Conclusion 
 
The dissemination and communication of lessons learnt is important for 
organisational learning particularly as organisations find learning form failure 
difficult. How knowledge is distributed determines whether learning occurs and 
the breadth of learning (Huber, 1991). 
Whilst literature centres on a structured approach towards creating 
organisational memory and channels of knowledge distribution, organisations 
in the study offer only limited evidence of structure in the way lessons are 
codified. Indeed, communication is largely via informal collaboration and ad 
hoc discussion between individuals and teams. Lessons from failure are in 
intuitively diffused within teams and across the organisations permeating the 
organisation through socialisation and institutionalising new knowledge. 
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Systematic processes have the advantages of providing a more dependable 
process, one that is consistent, reliable, and long lasting. A systematic 
approach is a fixed resource potentially open to a wide audience. Alternatively, 
informal unsystematic processes can offer a fuller description of failure with an 
enhanced qualitative texture allowing probing and deeper understanding. 
Communication of lessons learnt may be targeted, timelier and often faster. 
However, dissemination may be less reliable due to memory loss, distortion 
and bias and may provide a memory that is less accessible to the organisation 
as a whole. There are also matters relating to the team member and their 
probability of passing on information. It is generally argued that to achieve an 
enhanced process of communication of failure, a systematic approach will 
facilitate an advanced organisational memory and breadth of dissemination. 
However, it is also argued that informal mechanisms may be as effective as 
formal mechanisms dependant on differing contextual situations. Therefore, a 
structured strategic process of considering and selecting appropriate formal or 
informal mechanisms for failure lesson communication may deliver optimum 
effectiveness. In highlighting the values of the informal process of 
communicating new knowledge from failure, this thesis adds to existent 
literature by broadening the discussion in the entrepreneurial domain beyond 
the focus on systematic processes. 
 
5.2.5 Trying a new approach 
 
 
Kolb’s experiential learning model (1981) suggests that newly formed abstract 















concrete experience. The empirical research indicates that, at an 
organisational level, the case studies largely reflect Kolb’s model. Indeed 
findings suggest that having communicated the new thoughts, ideas and 
generalisations derived from the analysis of the failure, organisations often 
adjust their position towards a new approach or future direction. The new 
approach reflects the lessons learned from the failure and may be adopted 
immediately in a new direction for the initiative, or may be stored in the 
organisational memory for future utilisation in developing an entrepreneurial 
initiative. It is interesting to note that Kolb’s experiential learning theory is 
embedded in current lean innovation theory (which centres more on learning 
by doing, experimentation; a systematic approach to fast continuous learning) 
is now being transferred to the field of entrepreneurship. 
 
5.2.5.1 Initiative redirection 
 
Organisations in the study exert significant effort to make initiatives work and 
therefore when they fail sometimes energy is aimed at redirecting the initiative 
and trying again. As the managing director of the processed juice supplier puts 
it, “we're not very accepting of intelligent failure. We will tend to try and make 
it work - I think it's a function of the nature of the business. So we might steer 
it into a different direction from the original intention”. Or, as the CEO of the 
epos system supplier put it, “we probably haven’t failed at all to be honest. 
We’ll just adjust what our plan is and carry on.” Or for the Business Manager 
for the area development agency, “to me there’s no such thing as a failure, 
there’s just an alternative solution.” Lessons learned from the failed initiative 
or from previous initiatives (stored in the organisational memory) are utilised 
to inform a new attempt at delivering a successful outcome. The redirection of 
initiatives may be considered in the light of lean startup theory that centres on 
experimentation. If the experiment delivers an unexpected result, the venture 
may ‘pivot’ in a new direction (Blank and Dorf, 2012). 
 




Literature asserts that entrepreneurs accumulate knowledge gained through 
experiential learning in a ‘cognitive store’ with which they reflect upon (Cope, 
2005), linking new experiences with those of the past to gain new meanings 
(Boud et al., 2013 p.9). In this way insights which are developed from past 
events are applied to future actions (Daudelin, 1996). In line with literature, 
evidence from the case study organisations suggest that lessons may be 
stored for future use in the organisational memory. From Table 5.1 we 
understand that the Epos supplier advocates, “new ventures will be scoped to 
ensure alignment exists with culture and core capabilities”. Based on the 
lessons learned from the failure, the Epos supplier is creating a platform for 
future initiatives to refer. Whilst not immediately applicable, the new approach 
is available for utilisation in the future. For the juice supplier the lesson of “no 
retail experts no product launches” also rests within the organisational memory 
for use in future initiative consideration. Therefore, lessons from failure may be 
preserved for use in the future to form new concepts. 
 
5.2.5.3 New approaches 
 
Whether the lessons learned from failure are utilised earlier or later, findings 
indicate that they are often tested with new entrepreneurial initiatives. This is 
significant as it leads to effective use of the new ideas, concepts, and 
generalisations to create a successful venture. However, what we understand 
from the findings is that often failure is not effectively analysed or 
conceptualised to enable new thinking, new ideas, and new generalisations. 
Without effective analysis and thought generation, the new approach may 
replicate some of the reasons for previous failures and are highly wasteful of 
organisational resource. What is also significant is that findings show that the 
organisations often follow that path of testing new ideas derived from failure 
analysis and conceptualisation in a way very similar to how Kolb (1981) 
articulates, as they create new directions (or ‘pivots) for current initiatives or 
attach previous lessons learned to new initiatives. Indeed this reflects current 
lean start-up theory that centres continuous learning through continuous 
experimentation to deliver innovation (Ries, 2011, Furr et al., 2014). Therefore, 




5.2.6 Managing the emotions in failure 
 
In the process of managing intelligent failure, literature suggests that managing 
the emotions of individuals and teams surrounding the intelligent failure is an 
important aspect. The principle author in this domain, Dean Shepherd (2003, 
2009a, 2009b, 2009, 2011) argues that intelligent failures can create a mix of 
negative emotions which can affect the entrepreneur and negatively  impact 
on their ability to learn from failure and their commitment to future projects. 
Grief, as a negative emotion linked to the loss of something special, can follow 
intelligent failure, especially as individuals and teams are often passionate and 
highly committed to project development. Individuals with high levels of grief 
learn less from failure and therefore managing emotions when failure occurs 
is important. Indeed, Shepherd (2009b) argues that to manage the  grief 
associated with failure individuals might oscillate between the two orientations 
of grief recovery, those being loss orientation and restoration orientation. Loss 
orientation confronts grief, working a way through the negative feelings in order 
to reduce the level of emotions. Restoration orientation takes an alternative 
approach focusing on suppressing emotion and encouraging a return to 
normal life activity.  It is argued that rather than a singular approach to grief 
recovery, the way to effectively speed the process is through oscillation 
between both orientations. As a faster recovery is enabled, so this allows 
individuals to learn more from feedback. Grief management forms an important 
part of the managing of intelligent failure process (Shepherd, 2003). 
Generally, across the case studies, there is little evidence of managing 
emotions in a structured fashion and support is often informal and instinctive 
to the culture. However, a strategic approach to its consideration is evidenced. 
The CEO of the public house operator views intelligent failure as a means to 
bring some closure, “to staunch the wound for people emotionally.” Indeed, he 
has a forceful perspective: “I get really annoyed with people when they hark 
back to people’s failures, even in a sort of joking sense. It just doesn’t do 
anyone any good.” The CEO of the wildlife organisation takes a similar view 
and creates a structured response through a team briefing, as he puts it, “you 
have that human emotion and I think certainly my take in terms of how I deal 
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with it is I try and get the team together and say ‘don’t worry guys, we gave it 
our best shot, we can’t win them all.’” In organisations with open environments, 
there is a strong sense of family that provide a supportive environment for 
when failures occur. The friendly and supportive nature of the culture positively 
affects individuals facing intelligent failure. As the Business Development 
Manager within the processed juice supplier puts it, “There isn’t really an 
aftercare support – there isn’t, really.  You just kind of get on with it, forget 
about it and move on.  It didn’t work – move on.” Further she adds, “So, 
everybody’s quite encouraging.  There’s no set place in structure or system 
but, you know, it’s a quite a strong team and you kind of go, “I heard about that 
thing that happened.  Just… you know, you gave it a really good shot.  Just 
bad timing or you know it just didn’t work.  Don’t worry about it – well done,” 
sort of thing.  It’s that kind of culture.” These natural support mechanisms are 
important. As the Bar Supervisor in the public house operator in location P puts 
it, ““we just like to look after each other.” Indeed loss and restorative 
approaches to grief management are more likely to derive from instinctive 
support resulting from the team’s culture. Whilst organisations within the study 
often engage in an intuitive approach to supporting individuals, there is a 
generally a lack of structure and strategic consideration to the subject which 
can lead to inadequate support at times. As the Operations Director of the epos 
supplier puts it, “I would say the business is not great at supporting that (failure 
emotions) always, you know, and I think it’s because…..there’s nothing 
personal there; it’s just the business has very high expectations.” In 
organisations with less open environments, sometimes there is no support at 
all. As the Contracts Manager at the area development agency puts it “you get 
like a distance feeling. If something goes wrong people will distance 
themselves from it. This is the reality of it.” 
Also evident from the findings is that when failures occur, there is a lack of a 
real sense of grief from the entrepreneur as might be expected (based upon 
literature). This may be due to the future-focused orientation of the 
entrepreneur who quickly moves their focus onto the next initiative (Arora et 
al., 2013), or the limited recognition of failure as a concept. Where there is less 
fear of failure within the organisation there is also less evidence of pain from 
failure. Perhaps the corporate entrepreneur enclosed in a collaborative team 
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feels less personal grief compared to the start-up entrepreneur (often the 
centre of focus in literature) who intelligently fails. However, there is evidence 
from the case studies of some higher levels of emotion and individuals self-
chastising and, therefore, there are emotions that need support. 
The organisations in the study highlight that, in essence, there is little 
‘management’ of emotions as a process. Intuitive and unmanaged grief 
support mechanisms that derive from the supportive culture may be argued as 
being more immediate and authentic, however it does depend on the individual 
and their relationship with team members. Certain individuals may feel 
exposed. A more strategic process may create a more consistent and 
therefore effective approach. Indeed, a more strategic approach to managing 
the negative emotions of failure may enhance the process of grief recovery by 
creating awareness of the issue and offering a comprehensive and high quality 
(trained) organisational response. Team support may always be important but 
a considered approach to managing the process is argued as being the most 
effective means of tacking this area of failure. On this basis, it may be argued 
that both structured and unstructured forms add value and a strategic process 
to determine appropriate usage may enhance the management of failure 
emotions. Certainly, without managing failure emotions organisations risk 
experiencing reduced learning from failure and experiencing error 
reoccurrence (Shepherd et al., 2011, Cannon and Edmondson, 2005). 
 
5.3 Managing an environment that supports the process of learning 
from failure 
 
Having explored the process of learning from failure, discussion now centres 
on the management of an organisational environment that may support the 
process of learning from failure. 
Entrepreneurial literature suggests that an environment can be created to 
normalise the failure process, principally through the formation of a 
psychologically safe environment, and through transformation of the 
management mind-set (Carmeli, 2007, Edmondson, 2011, Gu et al., 2013). 
Creating a psychologically safe environment for learning from failure includes: 
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 Clearly articulating the difference between failures and intelligent failures 
(Edmondson, 2011). 
 Management consistency and predictability (Edmondson, 2011) 
 Creating a strong social structure and high levels of trust (Gu et al., 2013). 
 Encouraging high quality relationships (Carmeli and Gittell, 2009). 
 Not ‘shooting the messenger’ (Edmondson, 2011). 
 Changing the management mind-set includes: 
o Articulating a vision that heightens the importance of learning from 
failure (McKenzie and Sud, 2008) 
o Management modelling behaviours to communicate the desired 
behaviour (Cannon and Edmondson, 2005). 
o Taking a tangible interest in initiatives that fail and openly sharing 
own failure experience (Farson and Keyes, 2002). 
In our case studies however, there is limited evidence of activities purposely 
focused on nurturing an intelligent failure mind-set, but there is evidence of 
some organisations (and to varying degrees) creating a psychological safe 
environment. Specifically, some organisations have or are creating a strong 
social structure and high levels of trust, and encourage high quality 
relationships. However, the creation of psychological safety relates to 
encouragement of a positive and entrepreneurial working environment rather 
than one that supports the management of failure. Within the case studies, 
there is no evidence of management articulating a vision that heightens the 
importance of learning from failure or that clearly explains the difference 
between failure and intelligent failure. Essentially the organisations offer little 
purposeful management towards an environment that supports intelligent 
failure specifically. 
 
5.3.1 Entrepreneurial climates and supporting intelligent failure. 
 
The review of corporate entrepreneurship literature illuminates the 
organisational climates that are supportive of corporate entrepreneurship. This 
thesis argues that some of these are supportive of the latter stages of the 
entrepreneurial process, specifically, managing intelligent failure. Supportive 
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climates may include, top management support, openness and trust, 
autonomy, tolerance of failure, rewards, collaboration and teamwork, learning, 
time for entrepreneurial activity and positive emotions. 
 
5.3.1.1 Commitment from top management 
 
Kuratko et al (2014) argue that when entrepreneurial values are manifested in 
top management commitment there is a direct relationship with positive 
entrepreneurial outcomes. This commitment may come in the form of 
championing ideas, providing resources (Hisrich and Kearney, 2011), 
promoting norms of helpfulness, cooperation (Schneider et al., 1994), and 
change (Ireland et al., 2003). Indeed commitment and personal responsibility 
can be supported by increasing the level of team involvement and challenge 
(Ahmed, 1998). By involving team members in daily operations and strategic 
work, management can increase levels of motivation which may help build a 
stimulating and dynamic environment (Isaksen and Lauer, 2002). Therefore, 
commitment from top management centres on development and maintenance 
of the intelligent failure paradigm and may facilitate an environment that can 
positively respond to the challenges of failure. 
 
5.3.1.2 Openness and trust 
 
Of the climates that support creativity, openness and trust are identified by 
Isaksen and Lauers (2002) as the most supportive. Openness relates to the 
free flow of unrestricted communication where open debate is encouraged 
(Kuratko et al., 2011). A high level of trust encourages new idea creation 
(Ahmed, 1998) and sharing of knowledge irrespective of roles and 
responsibilities (Burns, 2013). The climate of trust begins with the way 
management behave. As management develop a sense of fairness through 
their actions, so the fairness generates trust (Schneider et al., 1994). As 
highlighted by Gu et al, (2013), openness and trust is crucial for the formation 
of psychological safety, and psychological safety is highly significant to the 
process of learning from failure. Where there is fear of failure (and low levels 
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of psychological safety), learning from failure is reduced and failure is distorted 
or hidden. Openness and trust may support a more effective process of enquiry 
and analysis without fear of blame, where radical and differing points of view 
are welcome. It may also be argued that as openness and trust also promote 
free flowing communication, that also assists in the dissemination of lesson 
learnt. 
 
5.3.1.3 Autonomy and freedom to act 
 
Literature argues that a climate of autonomy is supportive of entrepreneurship. 
Burns (2013) argues that as individuals are given more scope to influence their 
work so they are more likely to try new  ways of doing things, which in itself is 
a considerable asset in the learning from failure process. The climate also 
increases the intensity with which an individual works and the amount of time 
they dedicate (Frese et al., 1999). The intensity of the individual’s engagement 
within an initiative may intuitively encourage curiosity when they fail. In an 
environment where there are low levels of fear of failure and autonomy, it is 
argued that entrepreneurs are more likely to actively engage in learning from 
failure. 
 
5.3.1.4 Tolerance of failure 
 
Aversion to failure represents one of the most significant obstacles to learning 
from failure (Edmondson, 2011, Carmeli and Gittell, 2009). In some situations 
individuals may prefer to disassociate themselves from failure through denial, 
distortion or avoiding failure (Cannon and Edmondson, 2005). The fear of 
failure may be the fear of shame or embarrassment, devalued self-esteem, 
losing the interest of important colleagues, or of upsetting important colleagues 
(Mitchell and Shepherd, 2010) Indeed the fear of failure is the fear of being a 
failure. The fear of failure can affect each stage of the learning from failure 
process. From the identification of intelligent failure, the analysis, and the 
communication of lessons learnt, fundamental and wide aversion to failure can 
reduce the effectiveness of the process and reduce lessons learnt (Cannon 
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and Edmondson, 2005). It is argued therefore, that where organisations have 
an environment with a high tolerance of failure, increased learning from failure 
occurs. Indeed fear of failure within an organisation can be eased when a 





Ahmed (1998) argues that the way in which management recognises success 
and failure influences the organisational culture and climate. Hornsby et al 
(2002) assert that the appropriate use of rewards promote corporate 
entrepreneurship. Indeed, Hisrich and Kearney (2011) suggest that the reward 
system is a significant feature of an entrepreneurial climate; rewarding 
entrepreneurial behaviour reinforces entrepreneurial behaviour. Whilst much 
literature centres on rewarding creative activities, there is also discussion on 
rewarding failure. Kriegesmann et al (2005) discuss the approach taken by 
BMW, who initiated a ‘flop of the month’ award as an important tool to 
encourage innovation but at the same time encourage learning from failure. 
Nokia, recognising the knowledge gained from failure, promoted individuals 
involved with failures so that the new knowledge might be transferred to other 
ventures (McGrath et al., 2006). A climate of rewarding entrepreneurial failure 
may help create an environment that supports the management process. 
 
5.3.1.6 Collaboration and teamwork 
 
Collaboration and teamwork are a prerequisite for creativity and therefore a 
climate which supports collaboration and teamwork is one which supports 
entrepreneurship (Isaksen and Lauer, 2002). Indeed co-worker cohesion is a 
predictor of organisational innovation (Treuer and McMurray, 2012). Whilst 
emphasis on collaboration and teamwork may centre on the earlier stages of 
the entrepreneurial process, it is also important at the failure stage as teams 
try to make sense of failure. Where higher levels of teamwork and collaboration 
exist there may be increased effectiveness in identifying, analysing, learning 
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and communicating lessons derived from failure. For example, collaboration in 






Ireland et al (2003) argues that an entrepreneurial environment fosters a 
climate of learning. A learning climate may offer a social system where 
“members learn conscious communal processes for continually generating, 
retaining and leveraging individual and collective learning to improve 
performance of the organisational system in ways important to all 
stakeholders” (Drew and Smith, 1995 p.5). Indeed organisational support for 
learning reflects the value the organisation places on learning and 
development (Choi and Jacobs, 2011). A climate of learning will exist where 
leaders are approachable, empower their team members and believe they can 
make change happen, focus on people over tasks, encourage open 
communication, where there is an environment of psychological safety, and 
where there is an holistic approach is used to solve problems (Schein, 1994). 
Indeed the after action review adds to the overall climate of learning (Keith and 
Frese, 2011), indeed a learning climate may improve an organisations 
readiness to learn (formally or informally), and is inclusive of a willingness to 
learn by members (Wang and Ahmed, 2003). It may be argued that such a 
climate, by its very nature, would support the management of intelligent failure. 
A learning environment is supportive of the process of learning from failure. 
 
5.3.1.8 Time for entrepreneurial activity 
 
Kuratko et al (2014) assert that an organisation’s entrepreneurial capacity will 
be enhanced by a climate that makes time available for innovation. Advancing 
the discussion, Isaksen and Lauer (2002) argue that time for idea creation 
enhances team creativity as it establishes the opportunity to test initial 
suggestions, explore and develop new ideas. Tidd and Bessant (2013) 
281 
 
highlight the climate which supports innovation at Google, whereby technical 
employees spend 20% of their time away from their core responsibilities, 
working on new initiatives and their development. 3M in a similar way allows 
15% (Katz, 2004). The allocation of time is a reliable indicator of the 
organisations desire to innovative by allowing individuals the freedom to 
explore new ideas, try things out, and fail. 
In considering the management of intelligent failure process, and reflecting on 
literature, it may be argued that time for entrepreneurial activity could enhance 
learning from failure. Isaksen and Lauer (2002) argue that making time 
available allows teams to discover new avenues and alternatives, to think and 
enter deep levels of reflection. Such additional time centred on failure analysis, 
therefore, may facilitate learning from failure and, by extension, the 
management of failure process. 
 
5.3.1.9 Positive emotions 
 
Vacharkulksemsuk et al (2011) argues that a climate that supports positive 
emotions can: 
 Increase trust 
 Lead to more favourable reactions to others 
 Lead to actively helping others 
 Enhance interest in others 
 Increase the strength of interpersonal relationships 
 Produce varying and unusual patterns of thought 
 Increase an individual’s receptiveness to new information 
 Increase persistence 
 Increase motivation 
 Increase individuals propensity to tackle challenges 
In essence, a positive climate may broaden mind-sets by extending the ability 
of individuals to see themselves, others and the social world (ibid), thus 
potentially enhancing the power of enquiry and analysis. It is argued therefore, 





5.3.1.10 Managing an environment that supports the process of learning 
from intelligent failure: Conclusion 
 
Intelligent failure literature argues for a targeted approach to managing an 
environment that normalises learning from failure. However, there is only 
limited evidence of its occurrence within the organisations of the study. 
However, there is evidence that some organisations have an environment 
more supportive of entrepreneurship, offering some psychological safety, 
which may also support the process of learning from failure. This section 
highlights existing literature that illuminates important climates supportive of 
entrepreneurship, and which it may be argued, individually and as group, as 
being specifically supportive of the back end of the entrepreneurial process, 
that being the process of learning from failure. It is further argued that these 
climates offer support for both structured and informal mechanisms of learning 
from failure. In consideration of these arguments, it may be posited that a 
strategic approach to managing the environment centred on enhancing certain 
climates may deliver an effective management approach. This thesis extends 
existing theory relating to environments that can normalise failure to make a 
case for a number of climates supportive of entrepreneurship, which create a 
platform for effecting deep analysis and deeper understanding. In this way, it 
is argued that a strategic approach to managing the environment centred on 
enhancing the identified climates may add to the delivery of an enhanced 




In this chapter, discussion has focused on examining key themes that emerged 
during the data analysis and important theoretical constructs taken form 
literature. Attention centres on the management of the process of learning from 
failure (recognising, reflection, analysing and conceptualising from failure to 
extract learning, sharing new knowledge and concepts, and trying a new 
283 
 
approach), management of emotions related to intelligent failure, and 
management of an environment supportive of learning from failure. 
Literature argues that the management of intelligent failure process is more 
effective in creating new knowledge from failure if the process is structured. As 
Carmeli and Sheaffer (2008) assert, “The theory of organizational learning 
suggests that well-orchestrated and structured mechanisms of learning from 
failure are key processes in robust and reliable organizations” (p.468). Indeed 
Kotnour and Kurstedt  (2000) conclude from their quantitative data that not 
only do formal lessons learned produce a higher quality of lesson learned, they 
have greater effect on subsequent ‘decision quality’ than informal lessons. 
Formal lessons learned make higher quality information available than informal 
lessons and are therefore more effective at supporting decision makers. 
Further, literature also suggests that most organisations find it difficult to 
effectively adopt these structures and learn from failure. Empirical evidence 
indicatively supports these theories. Taking the six organisations together, 
there is limited evidence of a finely tuned approach towards managing failure, 
indeed it is often lacking. For the case studies, learning from failure is 
predominantly an informal process. Table 5.4 summarises the perspectives of 


















put forward by literature 
Informal structures 
largely evidenced by 
findings 
Recognition Timely meetings to 
enable identification is 
a prerequisite in the 
process of learning 
from failure (Cannon 
and Edmondson, 2005) 
Ongoing and ad hoc by 
individuals and teams 
constantly monitoring 
initiative performance 
Reflection Reflection meetings for 
example Toyota 
production systems 
offers a ‘Hansai-kai’ or 
reflection meeting when 
failure occurs (Liker, 
2005). 
Individual and peer to 




‘After action reviews’ 
(Senge, 1990, Cannon 
and Edmondson, 2005) 
Post performance 
meetings (Wilkinson 
and Mellahi, 2005) 
Ongoing; ad hoc; 
individual, peer-to-peer, 
or group meetings in 
open workspace, 
breakout meeting rooms 
or managers office. 
Agenda – loose 




rules etc. (Levitt and 
March, 1988) 
Individual, peer to peer, 
and groups collaboration 
via informal 
communication channels 
Trying a new 
approach 
Experiential learning 
theory (Kolb, 1981) 
Structured approaches 
to venture development 
(Ireland et al., 2009) 




Table 5.2. A Summary of the predominant arguments from literature and 
predominant research findings relating to forms of learning from failure. 
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As learning from failure is a largely informal process, the organisations within 
the study are failing to maximise the opportunity to extract new knowledge from 
the failures as they occur, restricting individual and organisational learning. 
Further, there is a significant risk of failure reoccurrence that may be highly 
costly to the organisation. Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995) highlight the success 
of Japanese car manufacturers’ approach to learning from failure within a 
clearly defined structure. Liker (2005) is even more specific with his focus on 
the Toyota production system, articulating the success from continuous 
improvement or ‘kaisen’, a structured process. The Toyota Way internal 
document 2001 is clear: “We view errors as opportunities for learning. Rather 
than blaming individuals, the organisation takes corrective actions and 
distributes knowledge about each experience broadly. Learning is continuous 
companywide process” (Liker, 2005 p.250). However, this chapter opens up a 
discussion that suggests that there is a role for a more informal approach and 
that perhaps a more dualist approach may be considered. 
When it comes to recognising failure, the discussion recognises the values of 
a structured approach. It is suggested that a structured approach offers a 
vigorous, focused and assertive enquiry as a means to uncover failure. 
However, in considering the empirical evidence, the discussion also highlights 
some potential advantages of an informal process that may be more timely 
and flexible. Therefore, it is argued that informal mechanisms of failure 
recognition may be supportive of a structured approach. 
In a similar way, it is argued that analysing and conceptualising failure may 
benefit from both formal and informal mechanisms as they could be viewed as 
complementary forms. Whilst a structured approach offers a robust, deep 
analysis and learning experience, the informal structures may be seen as 
natural to the prevailing organisational climates, offering a continuous and fluid 
process approach, one that can occurs closer to the point of failure 
identification, and which potentially may lead to valuable pre-analysis. 
This discussion also recognises learning styles theory and how it may affect 
learning from failure and how strategical consideration of this may enhance 
the process of learning from failure. Recognising the natural orientation of 
individuals as to how they learn may enable organisations to better plan and 
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effect structures, methods and systems to maximise learning from failure 
episodes. 
Organisations in the study communicate lessons learnt from failure through 
informal collaboration and ad hoc discussion between individuals and teams. 
Lessons are intuitively diffused within teams and across the organisations, 
permeating them through socialisation and institutionalising new knowledge. 
Yet dissemination may be less reliable due to memory loss, distortion and bias, 
and it may provide an organisational memory that is less accessible to the 
organisation as a whole. A systematic approach, however, is a fixed resource 
argued as being more dependable and potentially open to a wider audience. 
The discussion suggests that both mechanisms may offer value and that the 
organisational context may inform a strategic approach to mechanism 
selection. 
Discussion moves from managing the process of learning from failure to 
managing the emotions involved with project failure. Case studies offer little 
evidence of significant consideration of managing the negative emotions 
resulting from failure. In this way organisations risk experiencing reduced 
learning from failure and error reoccurrence. Literature suggests a strategic 
approach may enhance the process of grief recovery by creating awareness 
of the issue and offering a comprehensive and high quality organisational 
response (Shepherd et al., 2011). However, intuitive support for individuals is 
evidenced within teams as an organisational climate and often is sufficient as 
a support mechanism. This informal mechanism may still be relevant to 
supporting a strategic approach to managing emotions. 
When it comes to managing an environment that is supportive of learning from 
failure, case studies offer limited evidence of planned activities. However, 
some organisations have an environment which is more supportive of 
entrepreneurship generally, offering some psychological safety and therefore 
support the latter stage of the process, managing intelligent failure. This thesis 
extends the arguments from existing literature and puts forward a number of 
climates that may be supportive of both structured and informal processes of 
learning from failure. In this way, it is argued that a strategic approach to 
managing the environment centred on enhancing supportive climates may 
deliver an effective management approach. 
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In examining the management of learning from failure, this thesis highlights 
the potential value of managing the process effectively, and how organisations 
continuously fail to manage the process, negating the opportunity to gain new 
knowledge. It argues that a structured process is important in effectively 
coordinating a process of learning from failure, more so than an informal 
process. However, informal processes may have an important role, indeed at 
each stage of the management of failure process an argument is presented for 
the consideration of the values within an informal process. Therefore, this 
thesis argues that the two mechanisms may be seen as coexisting, indeed 
complementary, and may be considered in a dualist light. This thesis also 
argues that irrespective of the nature of the process, there are a number of 
climates that may enhance the learning from failure process, thus making an 






















The thesis has explored the domain of entrepreneurship, the sub domain, 
corporate entrepreneurship, and specifically the area of entrepreneurial failure. 
The aim of the research was to answer the overriding question: 
 
How do organisations manage the process of intelligent failure? 
 
Enquiry centred on: 
 The processes that organisations use to learn from failure 
 The importance of a process for managing intelligent failure to the 
organisation 
 How failures are recognised and how are they analysed. 
 How individuals and organisations learn from failure. 
 How lessons learned are disseminated across the organisation. 
 The nature of the outcomes of the process of learning from failure 
 How environments can support learning from failure 
 Why organisations do not learn from failure 
In exploring these areas and answering the research question this thesis adds 
to existing literature in the entrepreneurial research area and, by specifically 
focusing on the process of intelligent failure and the learning process of failure 
episodes, addresses a gap in current literature (Cope, 2011). It also adds to 
literature on the practical management of the learning from failure process. 
 
6.2 Research project approach 
 
In the first instance, a literature review was carried out with the aim of exploring 
existing theory on entrepreneurial failure to gain an understanding of how 
organisations learn from failure. An exploratory approach was taken to review 
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literature that started encompassed a broader domain enquiry before a 
snowballing process narrowed attention. Articles were identified until it was 
considered that the necessary depth and breadth of literature had been 
sourced and no more relevant articles could be found. In the first instance 
overarching entrepreneurial theory was addressed in order to provide a 
theoretical base on which to rest the thesis, followed by a review of literature 
that centred on the characteristics of the organisational entrepreneur and the 
characteristics of an entrepreneurial environment. By so doing, the thesis 
illuminates the setting for the entrepreneurial process and the outcome of 
entrepreneurial failure. The review also explored the cognitive and 
organisational processes that influence or are influenced by the learning from 
failure process, and how they may be managed. Having reviewed current 
literature, the thesis offered a conceptual framework (figure 6.1) which draws 
together the important constructs to provide a holistic perspective as to how 
organisations manage intelligent failure and thereby effect their 
entrepreneurial capability. The conceptual framework was used as a means to 
empirically explore six organisations.  
 
 




Arguing that the ontology of the process of intelligent failure is socially 
constructed, the thesis has taken an interpretive methodological approach to 
illuminate the deep complexities that reside within this process. An inductive 
approach was taken which centres on the predominant use of a qualitative 
method, as part of multiple case study research strategy. 
 
6.3 How do organisations manage intelligent failure? 
 
Literature predominantly argues that the management of intelligent failure 
process is more effective in creating new knowledge from failure episodes if 
the process is structured. As Carmelli and Sheaffer (2008) proffer: “Well-
orchestrated and structured mechanisms of learning from failure are key 
processes in robust and reliable organizations” (p.468). However, the findings 
from the six organisations within the empirical study indicate that there is some 
evidence of a structured approach to the process of learning from failure, but  
predominantly it is unstructured, informal, ad hoc, and ongoing as part of 
regular operational activity. The process is not a significant priority for 
management and is therefore generally underdeveloped which means that 
lessons from failure may be lost. Additionally, within the different stages of the 
process of managing intelligent failure findings suggest that: 
 Failure identification, when it occurs, is from customer feedback, open team 
discussion, email chatter, MIS, financial data, milestone or target 
referencing, within cyclical operational meetings, and discussions with line 
management. 
 
 The analysis and learning process is often weak occurring in in team 
workspaces (often impromptu ‘stand up’ meetings) or ‘one to one’ 
conversations, cyclical operational meetings, and management ‘away 
days’. Learning is predominantly ‘single loop’ with some ‘double loop’ 





 The process of communicating lessoned learnt is not overt and generally 
not a management priority, mainly occurring within teams and not between 
teams or across the organisation or, indeed, outside the organisation. 
There is little documentation of lessons learned and few or no 
organisational storage systems. 
 
 The management of negative emotions is generally weak with little 
evidence of any strategic approach. Support mainly comes from fellow 
team members, friends, or line management, and is highly reflective of the 
supportive nature of the culture and leadership. 
 
Whilst organisations within this study generally fail to engage in a structured 
approach towards learning from failure, which literature proffers as the most 
effective manner, it does occur and is evidenced. Often learning from failure 
episodes are intuitive to both individuals and teams highly engaged in the 
initiatives. Indeed, it is often the case that failures are not perceived as failures; 
just points of pivot on a journey towards eventual success. 
 
6.4 The roles of structured and unstructured processes in managing 
intelligent failure 
 
This thesis argues that, given the significant volume of literature articulating 
the importance of structure to the process of learning from failure, the 
organisations within the study are failing to maximise the opportunity to extract 
new knowledge from failure episodes. Indeed, they experience the significant 
risk failure reoccurrence and must absorb the cost. 
However, this thesis also argues that whilst a more vigorous, focused and 
assertive enquiry into failure identification may be achieved by the use of a 
structured approach, the informal process engaged by the organisations may 
be timely and flexible. Indeed, it also argues that, rather than being polar 
opposites, formal and informal mechanisms may be viewed as complementary 
forms. Recognising that the structured approach may lead to an enhanced, 
robust, deep analysis and learning experience, an informal structure could be 
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perceived as natural to the prevailing organisational climate, thereby offering 
a more instinctive, fluid and continuous process that can occur closer to the 
point of failure identification. The informal process may also lead to valuable 
pre-analysis available for utilisation as part of a more structured approach. In 
a similar way, the systematic forms of sharing lessons learnt are argued as 
being open to a wider audience and as more dependable yet informal forms 
allow intuitive diffusion within in teams and across organisations permeating 
new knowledge, as it is available. Both forms can offer value and the 
organisational context may inform a more strategic approach to the 
appropriateness of which mechanisms to utilise. Further formal and informal 
mechanisms may also be both supportive of managing the emotions involved 
in project failure. In this way, the thesis argues for a dualist approach to the 
consideration of processes centred on learning from failure rather than a pure 
focus on structure, which may allow both systems to coexist and indeed 
complement each other. 
 
6.5 Contribution to theory 
 
6.5.1 Principal contribution to theory 
 
In the first instance, this thesis supports current theory that argues for the use of  
a formal and structured approach as a means to effectively learn from 
entrepreneurial failure episodes, Senge 1990, Wilkinson and Mellahi (2005), 
(Liker 2005), Ellis et al (2006), and Platzek et al (2014).  However, most 
significantly, this thesis argues that unstructured and informal processes are also 
of value to the process of learning from failure. In looking at each stage of the 
process of learning from failure (recognising failure, reflection, analysing, 
conceptualising, and communication of lessons learned), the thesis argues for 
the consideration of a dualist approach, allowing formal and informal mechanisms 





a. Recognising failure: This thesis argues that an unstructured, informal 
process of identifying failure has the advantages of being more 
responsive, timely and flexible. By illuminating the potential value of 
informal identification processes, this thesis adds to existing literature, 
Cannon and Edmondson (2005), Reason (1990), Liker (2005), Barkai and 
Harrison (2012), Syed (2015) Limoncelli et al (2016).  
 
b. Reflecting on failure: This thesis argues that the ‘reflective’ stage of  
learning from failure is an important part of the process, particularly the 
unstructured, informal mechanisms, and adds to existing entrepreneurial 
learning literature, (Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995), Crossan et al (1999), 
Cope (2003, 2005), Pittaway and Cope, (2007), Bagheri and Pihie (2011).  
 
c. Analysing and conceptualising failure: This thesis argues that 
unstructured, informal analysis and conceptualisation of failure has 
significant value in the learning process and adds to current theory, 
McGrath and MacMillan (2000), Lafley and Charan (2008), Kuratko et al 
(2011), Gino and Pisano (2011), and Birkinshaw and Haas (2016). As a 
mechanism of learning, this thesis argues that it can be more natural, more 
spontaneous, and offer a continuous, fluid process, one that can occur 
closer to the point of failure identification, and potentially offering a 
valuable pre-analysis.  
 
d. Sharing lessons learned: In highlighting the values of the unstructured, 
informal process of communicating new knowledge from failure (that is a 
fuller, richer more qualitative description, timelier and often faster), this 
thesis adds to literature by broadening the discussion in the 
entrepreneurial domain beyond the focus on systematic processes, 
McGrath and MacMillan (2000), Lafley and Charan (2008), Kuratko et al 





Summary: Principal contribution to theory 
This thesis argues that for organisations to optimise learning from failure, both 
formal and informal mechanisms should be considered together within a 
singular approach. This adds to important literature in the intelligent failure 
domain, Sitkin (1992) Cannon and Edmondson (2001, 2005), Baumard and 
Starbuck (2005), Ellis et al (2006), Madsen and Desai (2010), and Muehlfeld 
et al (2012). 
This contribution to the theory of informality is illustrated in Figure 6.2 and 
Figure 6.3 below. Figure 6.2 illustrates the positive facets inherent to formality 
within the process of learning from failure put forward by existing literature. 
Figure 6.3 illustrates the positive facets inherent to both formality and 
informality (evidenced in the empirical findings) within the process of learning 
from failure. The illustration shows how formality and informality may be 
considered at each stage of learning from failure, suggesting a method that 
optimises the strengths of each approach leading to the optimising of 
organisational learning from failure. 
Figure 6.2: The positives inherent in formality within the process of learning 






Figure 6.3: The positives inherent in formality and informality within the 
process of learning from failure, and the optimisation of learning from a dualist 
approach. 
 
6.5.2 Additional contributions to theory 
 
This thesis also contributes to existing literature in a number of different ways: 
 
1. The empirical research of six organisations delivers new case findings to 
the learning from failure domain adding to existing case studies, such as 
Tucker and Edmondson (2003), Baumard and Starbuck (2005), Carmeli 
and Gittell (2009), and Cope (2011). 
 
2. This thesis supports existing theory that asserts that organisations find it 
difficult to create structures to manage the learning from failure process. 
For example, Cannon and Edmondson 2001, Manimala et al 2006, and 




3. This research supports existing theory by finding that organisations use 
knowledge gained from failure learning to create new directions for 
initiatives that test cognitive suppositions, Ries, 2011, Blank and Dorf, 
2012, Furr et al., 2014 
  
4. Finally, this thesis extends existent literature that centres on environments 
that may support learning from failure, Hoecht and Trott (1999) Isaksen 
and Lauer, (2002),Van Dyck et al (2005), Hisrich and Kearney (2011), 
Edmondson, (2011), Keith and Frese (2011), Vacharkulksemsuk et al 
(2011), and  Burns (2013).This thesis argues that a number of 
organisational climates that support an entrepreneurial environment, 
specifically support the process of learning from failure. The climates are 
top management support, openness and trust, autonomy, tolerance of 
failure, rewards, collaboration and teamwork, learning, time for 
entrepreneurial activity, and positive emotions.  
 
 
6.6 Contribution to practice  
 
This thesis contributes to practice in a number of ways:  
 
 The significance of learning from failure: 
 
This thesis affirms the importance to organisations of learning from failure 
episodes and the significant potential benefits available to the organisation, as 
well as the potential threats of not effectively learning from failure. By drawing 
attention to the importance of learning from failure, this thesis raises 
awareness of the opportunity for practice to grasp the positive value that 








 The importance of formality in enhancing intelligent failure: 
 
This thesis affirms the importance to organisations of having a formal, 
structured approach to the process of managing intelligent failure, highlighting 
the benefit of robust systems and tools on individual and organisational 
learning. The formal approach engages in a process with clear timelines and 
after action reviews that are well lead, with a focused agenda that allows for a 
robust process that increases the likelihood of double loop rather than single 
loop learning. Structures that facilitate quick failure recognition, deep analysis 
and learning and that allow effective dissemination of lessons learned either 
directly or through the organisations memory, create the opportunity to 
enhance the potential value from failure episodes. Literature highlights the 
difficulty that organisations experience in creating structures for learning from 
failure. Practice may reflect on formality and learning from failure in their 
organisations, and draw potential process solutions from existing literature to 
enhance the effectiveness of intelligent failure mechanisms.  
 
 The importance of informality in enhancing intelligent failure: 
 
This thesis puts forward a new perspective that centres on the value of informal 
learning from failure. In failure identification, informal mechanisms may be 
more responsive, timely and flexible. In analysing failure, they may be more 
natural, more spontaneous, a continuous and fluid process, close to the point 
of failure identification. In communication of lessons, informality may offer a 
fuller, richer, qualitative description, which is timelier and faster. Practice 
therefore, may consider informal processes and learning from failure as a 








 To optimise the management of intelligent failure, a dualist approach 
towards formality and informality should be considered. 
In highlighting the potential positives that may arise from an informal 
approach, this thesis argues that both formal and informal processes may be 
considered together. In this way, practice may strategically develop a process 
(taking into consideration contextual organisational factors) that reflects on 
the advantages of both formal and informal failure learning mechanisms, 
thereby optimising the potential to learn from failure. 
 
 Learning styles that enhance learning from failure processes: 
 
Further, this thesis highlights the significance of learning styles put forward in 
literature and the potential implications for the learning from failure process. In 
recognising that individuals have different cognitive styles and learning modes, 
the organisation is enabled to effect a process to engage a mix of the learning 
styles that might meet the learning needs of more people, producing more 
learning at an individual level and therefore at an organisational level. In 
drawing attention to existing theory, practitioners may reflect on their process 
so that learning styles of individuals are considered strategically when 
considering intelligent failure processes. In this way, individuals and the 
organisation may increase their ability to learn more from failure episodes. 
 
 An environment that supports intelligent failure: 
 
This thesis highlights the significance of the environment of the organisation, 
and how it may affect the process of managing intelligent failure. By extending 
arguments within current literature, this thesis puts forward a number of 
climates that may be supportive to both formal and informal failure learning 
mechanisms. Those climates are, commitment from management, openness 
and trust, autonomy and freedom to act, tolerance of failure, reward, 
collaboration and teamwork, learning, time for entrepreneurship activity, and 
positive emotions. Practitioners, therefore, can consider a strategical approach 
that is inclusive of tactics that may enhance these climates to augment the 
learning from failure process. 
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6.7 Further research 
 
1) Unstructured learning from failure. 
This thesis puts forward some tentative theory on the significance of 
unstructured learning from failure as a means to enhance or complement more 
structured mechanisms. However, additional research is required to identify 
the unstructured processes that are inherent in the learning from failure 
process. Developing the findings of this thesis, a closer definition and 
categorisation of the types of unstructured learning from failure and their 
nature would enable a deeper understanding of the construct. Are the 
unstructured processes ad hoc and ongoing? Alternatively, are there some 
underlying, subtle structures that influence the process? In the unstructured 
process, are some organisations better at gaining valuable learning? Does the 
physical location of the process affect the learning from failure outcome? 
Answering these questions will enable a more advanced understanding of the 
management of intelligent failure construct. Indeed, a specific focus on just the 
one informal mechanism may add support or otherwise to the existing findings 
of this thesis, and identify additional ways informal structures may support the 
management of intelligent failure process in: recognising failure, reflection, 
analysing, conceptualising, and communicating lessons learnt. In this way, 
further understanding of this young theory within the entrepreneurial failure 
domain may be developed to offer insights into how it may be utilised within a 
strategy that is centred in structured processes. 
2) Learning Styles 
Additionally, further research is required to focus specifically on ‘learning 
styles’ theory and the process of learning from failure. Additional research 
should centre on how a learning style affects an individual and how they learn 
from failure. This may be of significance as the learning style of the founder or 
top management may influence the entire management of the lessons learned 
process. There may also be value in trying to understand how learning styles 




 Recruitment of individuals for the review meeting. Is a balance of learning 
styles required, or just more of one learning style? 
 Considering an appropriate agenda for the review meeting. Should the 
agenda engage with each learning style to ensure all perspectives are 
included? 
 Taking the review meeting. Should discussion utilise differing cognitive 
learning styles to maximise individual learning and subsequent 
organisational learning? 
Engaging with learning style theory in the learning from failure domain would 
open a fresh stream of novel research that would add to existing literature. 
3) Entrepreneurial environments and managing intelligent failure 
The empirical study researches six differing organisations that have different 
environments. Each of those organisations exhibit differing approaches 
towards failure management processes. Further research in this area should 
focus on the impact of entrepreneurial environments on the management of 
failure. How are certain environments supportive of the process and which 
climates are important to that environment? Having suggested a number of 
climates that may be relevant in this exploratory study, further research is 
required to understand the relationship between the organisational 
environment and the failure learning process. Current literature offers insights 
about relationships between organisational climates and the entrepreneurial 
process in a more general way. By focusing purely on the latter stage of the 
entrepreneurial process, further research would help to illuminate the nature 
of the relationship, adding to current literature and an increased understanding 
in this area.  
4) Failure and Pivots 
Also identified in the empirical research is the lack of use of the ‘failure’ word. 
In some of the environments that are less open, there is evidence of fear of 
failure, which may part explain this phenomenon. However, in environments 
that are more open the ‘failure’ word is not used because at that moment the 
initiative is deemed as ‘not working’ and a ‘pivot’ or new direction is 
determined. Further research is required to explore this phenomenon to 
understand the nature of a pivot in the entrepreneurial environments. What 
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makes them different, should a pivot moment spur engagement in a different 
form of after action review, and is there any other reason why the ‘failure’ word 
is not used explicitly? 
 
5) Industry and country 
Whilst this thesis offers some insights into the process of managing intelligent 
failure in a mix of organisations in a variety of sectors, all within the UK, further 
research into specific industries (indeed sectors) and countries outside the UK 
would enhance knowledge in this domain. Research into the manufacturing 
and service industries, for example, may highlight significant variations, which 
may reflect their respective cultures and structures.  
Additional research of a similar nature, but in other countries may also inform 
the managing intelligent failure discussion. Research, for example, could 
explore how the various international cultures affect the engagement with the 
process, or, what differing outcomes from the process are and how are they 
valued. Exploring other countries would illuminate the domain and add to 
existing theory. 
 
6) The outputs of the intelligent failure process and the entrepreneurial process 
This thesis suggests that managing a process of intelligent failure can 
positively affect organisational learning, which can positively affect the 
entrepreneurial process. Further research into the outcomes of the intelligent 
failure process may enhance the discussion about the value that it may, or 
may not bring. How does an effective process affect creativity, innovation, 
initiative development, team collaboration, and organisational growth? How 
does the process of managing failure affect the effectiveness of the process 
as a whole? The quality of initiatives? The quantity? Does managing failure 
effectively ensure a better front end to the entrepreneurial process? A specific 
area of focus may be the effect on the entrepreneurial mindset of corporate 
entrepreneurs. How do the differing levels of engagement and effectiveness of 
managing intelligent failure affect the entrepreneurial mindset? Deeper 
insights into the outputs of intelligent failure would allow a richer understanding 
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of the process. By exploring the outcomes of learning from failure specifically, 
an understanding of a full range of positive and negative attributes may be 
gained, which could offer a clear understanding of the value that it brings to 
the entrepreneurial process. This research would also add to existing theory. 
 
6.8 Reflective thoughts on the writing of this thesis 
 
Learning by doing has been a core construct within this thesis centred on 
intelligent failure. In writing it, learning by doing has also been the central pillar 
of the researcher’s learning experience. The process has led to learning at 
every part of every stage of the journey, pulling together a significant volume 
of learning in numerous areas. The rich experience of developing new skills, 
finding new answers, and stretching the researcher’s conceptual thinking has 
come from doing: learning from writing this thesis. 
Amongst a myriad of learning points, one stands out: The focus on depth rather 
than breadth. Whilst the researcher has learned that there is a constant tension 
between breadth and depth of enquiry within research generally, less focus on 
breadth might enhance his practice. An assertive approach to research design 
in tightening the scope of analysis and the approach to sampling may have 
improved this research. Indeed it could be argued that the researcher was 
slow/and or reluctant to scope activities and attention at many stages of this 
research. Narrowing the focus and pursuing a deeper level of enquiry will add 
to the quality of future research by teasing out important insights. It will also 
allow the author’s research practise to develop, as a tighter research design 
will lead to less wastage of time and a more efficient process; if not closely 
relevant to the research, managing volumes of data and a wide discussion can 
be time consuming and inefficient. Reducing the breadth of the research 
perhaps could have centred on using a tighter definition of the corporate 
entrepreneurship construct, ‘purposeful’ sampling, and the inclusion of fewer 
organisations within the study (but the same number of total interviews). 
Additionally, a triangulation of research method would improve the credibility 
of the in-depth findings and subsequent interpretations. 
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However, reflecting on this research project, the researcher recognises that he 
has also learned that there are some positives from a broader approach. The 
wider search for new knowledge in this thesis has enabled the discovery of 
new fertile areas of academic interest. It has added new findings and theories 
to existing theory and, at the same time, it has opened up new opportunities 
for further research in a domain, which literature suggests is underexplored.  
Separately, the researcher has also learned the positive value of: 
 A sound conceptual model as a key instrument in the research process. In 
this thesis, the conceptual model shapes the exploration of the intelligent 
failure process and, in this way, has strengthened the work. 
 
 A robust methodological approach as the backbone to quality research. 
Immersing himself in philosophical and methodological literature has 
created personal learning for the researcher, and a sound approach to 
carrying out this research.  
In reflecting upon and recognising some of the stronger and weaker elements 
of this thesis, the researcher further develops his ability to critically self-analyse 
and learn. Learning by doing has been important in writing this thesis and will 













Appendix 1: Epos Supplier Corporate Entrepreneurship Audit Results 
 
            Architecture Results (Percentage) 
 
----------------------- = Average of the combined architecture results = 72.5% 
 
 








Descriptive Statistics (Architecture) 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Leadership 11 3.4 5.5 4.665 .5694 
Culture 11 3.4 5.0 4.396 .5521 
Structure 11 2.8 4.6 3.931 .6212 
Strategy 11 3.4 5.2 4.411 .5995 























 Leadership Culture Structure Strategy 
N Valid 11 11 11 11 




 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 3 1 9.1 9.1 9.1 
4 1 9.1 9.1 18.2 
5 8 72.7 72.7 90.9 
6 1 9.1 9.1 100.0 
Total 11 100.0 100.0  
 
Culture 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 3 2 18.2 18.2 18.2 
4 2 18.2 18.2 36.4 
5 7 63.6 63.6 100.0 
Total 11 100.0 100.0  
 
Structure 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 3 3 27.3 27.3 27.3 
4 4 36.4 36.4 63.6 
5 4 36.4 36.4 100.0 
Total 11 100.0 100.0  
 
Strategy 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 3 1 9.1 9.1 9.1 
4 4 36.4 36.4 45.5 
5 6 54.5 54.5 100.0 




Leadership: Average results for each question 
        






Culture: Average results for each question 
 
 




Structure: Average results for each question 
 
                                  Mean 
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Strategy: Average results for each question 
 
 




Appendix 2: Processed Juice Supplier Corporate Entrepreneurship Audit 
Results 
 
            Architecture Results (Percentage) 
 
 
------------------------- = Average Combined Architecture Results = 60.3% 
 
 








 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Leadership 18 1.6 5.2 3.760 .7856 
Culture 18 1.8 5.0 3.909 .7292 
Structure 18 1.8 4.3 3.413 .5174 
Strategy 18 1.5 4.8 3.382 .8141 
Valid N (listwise) 18     












 Leadership Culture Structure Strategy 
N Valid 18 18 18 18 











 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 2.0 1 5.6 5.6 5.6 
3.0 5 27.8 27.8 33.3 
4.0 8 44.4 44.4 77.8 
5.0 4 22.2 22.2 100.0 
Total 18 100.0 100.0  
 
Culture 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 2.0 1 5.6 5.6 5.6 
3.0 3 16.7 16.7 22.2 
4.0 11 61.1 61.1 83.3 
5.0 3 16.7 16.7 100.0 
Total 18 100.0 100.0  
 
Structure 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 2.0 1 5.6 5.6 5.6 
3.0 5 27.8 27.8 33.3 
4.0 11 61.1 61.1 94.4 
5.0 1 5.6 5.6 100.0 
Total 18 100.0 100.0  
 
Strategy 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 1.0 1 5.6 5.6 5.6 
2.0 2 11.1 11.1 16.7 
3.0 9 50.0 50.0 66.7 
4.0 5 27.8 27.8 94.4 
5.0 1 5.6 5.6 100.0 





Leadership: Average results for each question 
 





Culture: Average results for each question 
 




Structure: Average results for each question 
 




Strategy: Average results for each question 
 




Appendix 3: Public House Operator Corporate Entrepreneurship Audit 
Results 
 
            Architecture Results (Percentage) 
 
 
----------- = Average of the combined architecture results = 69.9% 
 
 
Cluster Analysis (Scores 0-6) 
 
 
Descriptive Statistics (Architecture) 
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 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Leadership 19 2.8 5.9 4.655 .8154 
Culture 19 2.9 5.5 4.200 .7863 
Structure 19 2.6 4.6 3.604 .5835 
Strategy 19 3.4 5.4 4.312 .6225 
Valid N (listwise) 19     
 
 









 Leadership Culture Structure Strategy 
N Valid 19 19 19 19 













 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 3 2 10.5 10.5 10.5 
4 6 31.6 31.6 42.1 
5 9 47.4 47.4 89.5 
6 2 10.5 10.5 100.0 
Total 19 100.0 100.0  
 
Culture 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 3 4 21.1 21.1 21.1 
4 9 47.4 47.4 68.4 
5 5 26.3 26.3 94.7 
6 1 5.3 5.3 100.0 




 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 3 8 42.1 42.1 42.1 
4 10 52.6 52.6 94.7 
5 1 5.3 5.3 100.0 




 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 3 3 15.8 15.8 15.8 
4 9 47.4 47.4 63.2 
5 7 36.8 36.8 100.0 









Leadership: Average results for each question 
 





Culture: Average results for each question  
 
 





Structure: Average results for each question 
 





Strategy: Average results for each question 
 




Appendix 4: Regional Wildlife Organisation Corporate Entrepreneurship 
Audit Results 
 
            Architecture Results (Percentage) 
 
 
--------------------------- = Average Combined Architecture Results = 66.0% 
 
 






 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Leadership 20 2.9 5.4 4.310 .6726 
Culture 20 2.4 5.2 4.104 .6496 
Structure 20 2.5 4.5 3.612 .5051 
Strategy 20 2.7 5.2 3.816 .5884 














 Leadership Culture Structure Strategy 
N Valid 20 20 20 20 









 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 3.0 2 10.0 10.0 10.0 
4.0 9 45.0 45.0 55.0 
5.0 9 45.0 45.0 100.0 




 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 3.0 2 10.0 10.0 10.0 
4.0 10 50.0 50.0 60.0 
5.0 8 40.0 40.0 100.0 




 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 3.0 6 30.0 30.0 30.0 
4.0 12 60.0 60.0 90.0 
5.0 2 10.0 10.0 100.0 




 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 3.0 4 20.0 20.0 20.0 
4.0 14 70.0 70.0 90.0 
5.0 2 10.0 10.0 100.0 








Leadership: Average results for each question 
 
 





Culture: Average results for each question 
 





Structure: Average results for each question 
 





Strategy: Average results for each question 
 




Appendix 5: Area Development Agency Corporate Entrepreneurship Audit 
Results 
 
    Architecture Results (Percentage) 
 
 
--------------- = Average of the combined architecture results = 56.8% 
 






Descriptive Statistics (Architecture) 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Leadership 13 2.1 5.7 3.452 1.1252 
Culture 13 1.8 5.6 3.551 1.0035 
Structure 13 2.0 4.3 3.151 .7960 
Strategy 13 1.8 5.6 3.489 1.1411 













 Leadership Culture Structure Strategy 
N Valid 13 13 13 13 













 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 1.0 1 7.7 7.7 7.7 
2.0 3 23.1 23.1 30.8 
3.0 3 23.1 23.1 53.8 
4.0 3 23.1 23.1 76.9 
5.0 2 15.4 15.4 92.3 
6.0 1 7.7 7.7 100.0 
Total 13 100.0 100.0  
 
Culture 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 1.0 1 7.7 7.7 7.7 
3.0 4 30.8 30.8 38.5 
4.0 6 46.2 46.2 84.6 
5.0 1 7.7 7.7 92.3 
6.0 1 7.7 7.7 100.0 
Total 13 100.0 100.0  
 
Structure 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 1.0 1 7.7 7.7 7.7 
2.0 2 15.4 15.4 23.1 
3.0 4 30.8 30.8 53.8 
4.0 4 30.8 30.8 84.6 
5.0 1 7.7 7.7 92.3 
6.0 1 7.7 7.7 100.0 
Total 13 100.0 100.0  
 
Strategy 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 1.0 2 15.4 15.4 15.4 
2.0 1 7.7 7.7 23.1 
3.0 3 23.1 23.1 46.2 
4.0 3 23.1 23.1 69.2 
5.0 3 23.1 23.1 92.3 
6.0 1 7.7 7.7 100.0 






Leadership: Average results for each question 
 




Culture: Average results for each question 
 
 





Structure: Average results for each question 
 





Strategy: Average results for each question 
 
                                   Mean 
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Appendix 6: An Area Division of a Government Department Corporate 
Entrepreneurship Audit Results 
 
    Architecture Results (Percentage) 
 
 
---------------------- = Average of the combined architecture results = 54.4% 
 
 









Descriptive Statistics (Architecture) 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Leadership 13 2.1 5.3 3.791 .8660 
Culture 13 2.3 4.8 3.489 .7243 
Structure 13 2.0 3.9 2.698 .6850 
Strategy 13 1.9 4.7 3.089 .7982 















 Leadership Culture Structure Strategy 
N Valid 13 13 13 13 







 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 2.0 2 15.4 15.4 15.4 
3.0 2 15.4 15.4 30.8 
4.0 7 53.8 53.8 84.6 
5.0 2 15.4 15.4 100.0 
Total 13 100.0 100.0  
 
Culture 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 2.0 2 15.4 15.4 15.4 
3.0 5 38.5 38.5 53.8 
4.0 4 30.8 30.8 84.6 
5.0 2 15.4 15.4 100.0 




 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 1.0 2 15.4 15.4 15.4 
2.0 5 38.5 38.5 53.8 
3.0 4 30.8 30.8 84.6 
4.0 2 15.4 15.4 100.0 




 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 2.0 2 15.4 15.4 15.4 
3.0 7 53.8 53.8 69.2 
4.0 3 23.1 23.1 92.3 
5.0 1 7.7 7.7 100.0 





Leadership: Average results for each question 
 






Culture: Average results for each question 
 





Structure: Average results for each question 
 





Strategy: Average results for each question 
 
                                  Mean 
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Appendix 7: The Corporate Entrepreneurship Audit (CEA) 
 
Welcome to the Corporate Entrepreneurship Audit and thank you for taking part 
in this questionnaire. 
It is anticipated that the questionnaire will take around 30 minutes to complete; 
there are 100 questions. When starting the questionnaire, the first few questions 
may take a while however, as you become accustomed to the format, response 
times may significantly shorten. Please complete the questionnaire in one 
sitting. 
Your survey responses are anonymous. 
Indicate a score:         0 = not true at all                6 = very true 
1. There are clear values underpinning everything the organization does 
2. The organization encourages team working 
3. There is a clear vision for the organization 
4. There is loose organisational control but tight accountability 
5. Senior managers are reflective and self-aware 
6. Strategy development is both top-down and bottom up, involving everyone 
7. The risks associated with strategic (planned) options are identified 
8. The organization encourages strategizing (forward planning) 
9. Operating divisions or subsidiaries are relatively autonomous (independent of each 
other) 
10. The organization encourages open communication, top-down, bottom-up and 
across the organization 
11. The voice of the customer is important 
12. There is an understanding of the basis for competitive advantage in the 
organization’s different markets within which it operates 
13. There have been spin-offs (unrelated subsidiary businesses) from new venture 
activities 
14. Senior managers model the vision and values of the organization – they ‘walk-the-
talk’ 
15. Strategies are aimed at achieving year-on-year growth 
16. Strategy can be implemented quickly 
17. Entrepreneurs and/or new cross-functional venture (project) teams are used to take 
new business ideas forward  
18. There are facilities (resources, rooms, etc.) that encourage creative thinking 
19. The organization encourages building networks of relationships with external 
people and organizations 
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20. Encouraging entrepreneurship is central to the organisation’s strategy 
21. The vision for the organization is clearly communicated 
22. There are distinct principles which form the foundation of everything the 
organisation does 
23. There are structures to encourage and facilitate training and development 
24. The organisation is informal 
25. Bench-marking against competitors is regular and continuous 
26. There is a clear strategy for achieving the vision 
27. Structures encourage delegated decision-making 
28. The organisation is achievement orientated 
29. The vision is realistic and achievable but stretching 
30. There is an understanding of the opportunities and threats that the organisation 
faces 
31. There are structures to provide resources for new venture (project) activities 
32. There is time for learning and innovation (idea creation and development) 
33. The organisation encourages continual learning from both inside and outside 
34. There are strategies and structures to get customer feedback 
35. The organisation has strategic (planned) options for the future 
36. Structures encourage and facilitate Entrepreneurship 
37. The organisation encourages experimentation 
38. Senior managers work as a team 
39. There is a ‘Research & Development’ (R&D) department and budget 
40. Staff feel responsible for the future of the organisation 
41. People are valued in the organisation 
42. The organisation identifies and implements risk-mitigation (alleviating) strategies  
43. Crowdsourcing (external finance from the general public) and open innovation 
(collaborating with outside organisations) are encouraged and facilitated 
44. Senior managers are accessible and approachable 
45. Senior managers listen 
46. The organisation is an empowering one (passing power to individuals and teams) 
47. The voice of the supplier is important 
48. The organisation is broken down into small sub-structures 
49. The product/market portfolio (range) is managed strategically 
50. There is an understanding of the organisation’s core competencies (what the 
organisation does best) 
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51. Senior managers influence rather than direct; they manage with a ‘light touch’ 
52. Senior managers are good at reconciling conflict 
53. Entrepreneurship and innovation is recognised and rewarded 
54. There is an understanding of the opportunities and threats that the organisation 
faces 
55. The organisation is tolerant of mistakes 
56. The organisation celebrates success 
57. There is continuous innovation to improve the product/service offering and/or 
reduce costs 
58. Senior managers are good at clarifying uncertainties going forward, focusing effort 
on important things 
59. There is a clear vision for the organisation that is realistic and achievable but 
stretching 
60. The organisation has developed and participates in a number of professional 
(external) networks 
61. There are strategic options for the future 
62. The organisation encourages continuous innovation 
63. Senior managers have good relationships with staff 
64. Senior managers show care and respect for staff 
65. There is a clear strategy for achieving the vision 
66. The organisation encourages entrepreneurial risk-taking 
67. There is a new venture division/department 
68. Span of control is broad 
69. There are strategies to encourage and facilitate innovation 
70. The organisation encourages and facilitates delegated decision-making 
71. Senior managers are trustworthy 
72. The organisation participates in strategic alliances/partnerships and/or joint-
ventures with other organisations 
73. The organisation is not hierarchical  
74. There are strategies to encourage and facilitate commercially orientated creativity 
75. Senior managers are consistent in their behaviour with staff 
76. The organisation encourages creativity and innovation 
77. There are structures to monitor and manage risk 
78. Senior managers think and act strategically (planning at a wider level, for the longer 
term) 
79. Resources and capabilities are shared across the organisation 
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80. There are facilities that encourage and facilitate internal and external corporate 
venturing (new business development) 
81. The organisation encourages internal information and knowledge sharing 
82. Team working is encouraged and facilitated 
83. Team working is encouraged in the organisation 
84. Cross-functional team working is commonplace in the organisation 
85. The organisation encourages staff to build relationships at all levels 
86. Information and knowledge is shared in the organisation 
87. There are structures to facilitate continuous innovation 
88. The organisation structure is flexible 
90. Decision-making is decentralised, incremental and adaptive 
91. Staff are encouraged to strategize 
92. Senior managers empower people to deal with problems and opportunities 
93. The senior management team are organised organically  
94. Environmental developments in the future are reviewed regularly 
95. Staff are encourage to spot commercial opportunities for the organisation 
96. The organisation is egalitarian (democratic) 
97. The organisation sees change as normal 
98. The organisation is not bureaucratic (overly administrative) 
99. There are clear strategic objectives 














Appendix 8: Semi- Structured Interview Questions  
 
 




 Tell me about your role and what you enjoy 
 
 When it comes to developing your own ideas, do you have the time, 
resources and support to do so? Can you give me an example? 
 
 In what ways is your organisation entrepreneurial?  
 
 How frequent are entrepreneurial initiatives? 
 
 How big are the ideas? 
 
 How does entrepreneurship work in the organisation, how do 
entrepreneurial ideas end up as a reality?  
 
 Has there been a situation where someone (who is not part of the senior 
team) has taken an initiative that impacts at an organisational level and 
made it a reality? Was this a one off or does this happen regularly? 
 
 How is experimentation encouraged? 
 
 Can you think of an entrepreneurial initiative (or the last entrepreneurial 
initiative) that became a reality and resulted in success? How did the 
organisation react to that success? What happened?  
 
 Can you think of an idea that ended in failure (or the last failure)? What 




 What about general failures? When is it ok to fail - Random failure or 
constrained failure? 
 
The process of managing intelligent failure 
 
 How do you/the organisation identify or detect failures? What is the 
process? Who is involved? And what are the positives in this process? 
What would you like to change in this process? How come? (Is there a lot 
of covering up?)  
 
 How do you/people analyse events precluding failure? – What is the 
process? Who is involved? What are the positives in this process? What 
would you like to change in this process? How come? 
 
 How do you/people learn from failure? Can you think of the last 
entrepreneurial failure? What lessons were learnt?(Academy, 2013) 
 
 How is new knowledge distributed within the organisation? What is helpful 
about it? What would you change about it? What would you like the 
organisation to do differently? 
 
 What are the barriers to knowledge being distributed? 
 
 What does the organisation do to create an environment that supports 
learning? 
 
 How important is learning from failure to the organisation? 
 
If there is no form of after action review… 
 
 Why is there no after action review?  
 
 Why is it so difficult to manage the process of review and learning? 
 




 What happens to the learning that has occurred? 
 
 
Intelligent failure and the individual 
 
 What is it like to fail in this organisation? 
 
 Do you/people have a fear of failure? Does it stop people from coming up 
with initiatives and making them happen? Do you feel encouraged to take 
risks? 
 
 What might put you off or even scare you about pursuing an 
entrepreneurial initiative? 
 
 How are you/people supported when entrepreneurial initiatives fail? 
 
 How does the organisation make it more ok to fail? Consider different 
micro-environments within the organisation 
 
 How does the organisational environment reduce the fear of failure for 
individuals (entrepreneurs) who might wish to pursue an initiative? And 
how does the organisation make it more ok to take risks? 
 
How does the management of intelligent failure affect an organisations 
entrepreneurial capability? 
 
 In regard to the particular example you talked about before, when an 
initiative went well, what were your thoughts, feelings and specific 
behaviours afterwards? (Self-efficacy, risk propensity, need for 
achievement, internal locus of control, autonomy).  
 
 In regard to the particular example you talked about before, when an 
initiative went wrong, what were your thoughts, feelings and specific 
behaviours afterwards? (Self-efficacy, risk propensity, need for 




 In the way the failure is managed how does it affect the organisation? (In 
what way?) And micro-environments within the organisation. 
 
 In the way the failure is managed how does it affect the organisations 
overall ability to be entrepreneurial? (In what way?) 
 
 In the way the failure is managed how does it affect your ability to learn? 
(In what way?) What are the positives? What would you change? 
 
 In the way the failure is managed how does it affect the organisations 
overall ability to learn? (In what way?) 
 
 In the way the failure is managed how does it affect the size of future 
initiatives? 
 
 And the frequency? 
 


















Appendix 9: Case study protocol 
 
CASE STUDY PROTOCOL: “INTELLIGENT FAILURE” 
 
Yin (2013) argues that having a case study protocol is essential in conducting a 
multiple case study, positing that as a mechanism to guide the investigator, it 
offers a major way of increasing the reliability of the research project.  
 
1) Background 
a) An overview of the case study 
Corporate entrepreneurial failure rates are high and the lessons from such failure 
episodes, as an organisational resource, are far too expensive to waste (Corbett 
et al., 2007). Therefore learning from failure is important. Yet despite this 
recognition by organisations, it would appear to be more common in management 
exhortation than in practice (Cannon and Edmondson, 2001). Indeed, 
“Organisations that systematically learn from failure are rare” (Cannon and 
Edmondson, 2005 p.299). 
 
b) Previous research 
The domain of learning from failure is identified as being significantly under 
explored: 
 Baumard and Starbuck (2005) assert that “there has been so few studies 
of learning from failure” (p.282).  
 “Despite the recent upsurge in interest, organisational learning from 
failures has received only scant attention by management investigators 
despite its avowedly pivotal role in prevention of escalation into ineffective 
systems” (Carmeli and Sheaffer, 2008, p.468) 
However, Cannon and Edmondson (“Failing to learn and learning to fail 




Cannon and Edmondson (2005)  
What is failure 
 The benefits of small failures 
 Why do organisations fail to learn from failure 
 Learning processes and barriers: Identifying, analysing, experimentation 
 Reframing the traditional framework 
 Psychological safety.  
 
Additionally Jason Cope authors a number of papers on entrepreneurial learning  
Jason Cope 2000, 2003, 2005, 2011:  
 Single loop, double loop learning – superficial or deeper. 
 Learning by doing. Gradual change in a person’s orientation as a result of 
continuous information gained from experience. 
 The importance of reflective learning. Entrepreneurs standing back from 
the ‘thick of it’. 
 Both forms of learning can happen at the same time (reflective and 
experiential learning). 
 Learning through crises. ‘Critical incidents’ accelerate learning, particularly 
by those that you attribute failure to themselves. 
 Dynamic learning perspective; Reflection, learning, and action 
 Generative learning: Adaptive = cumulative store, or stock of knowledge. 
Proactive = cognitive early warning 
 
c) Main research question 
 






d) Supporting aims of the research 
 
To explore and develop understanding as to: 
 The processes that organisations use to learn from failure. 
 The importance of a process for managing intelligent failure to the 
organisation. 
 How failures are recognised and how they are analysed 
 How individuals and organisations learn from failure. 
 How lessons learned are disseminated across the organisation. 
 The nature of the outcomes of the process of learning from failure. 
 How environments can support learning from failure. 




Intelligent failure lies within a highly emotional and complex phenomenon 
immersed in psychological and sociological influences. Perception of Intelligent 
Failure may be highly contextual. Obscure, and indistinct components. 
 
Social construction 
Managing Intelligent failure is a socially constructed phenomenon (humans make 
meaning through engagement with the world they live, making sense of it based 




The research takes an interpretivist view of what may establish acceptable 
knowledge in this domain and focuses on reality as a human construct which can 




Research will take an inductive approach with the predominant use of a 
qualitative methodology and, as part of a multiple case study strategy with 
embedded design, research is carried out in six organisations operating in 
differing sectors within the UK.  
The multiple case study strategy allows the case researcher to increase the 
robustness of a finding by replicating it across cases. Multiple case studies with 
a variety of data collection can improve the validity of the study. As the subject of 
the research is underexplored, it is argued that a broader, rather than a narrower 
approach, be used. A case study strategy is an appropriate research strategy to 
support the enquiry of such a highly complex domain (Piekkari et al., 2008). 
 
Qualitative research 
The qualitative research design is able to provide rich descriptions and has the 
ability to tackle complexity, providing “thick descriptions”. Intelligent failure 
domain is in its infancy and therefore appropriate for qualitative research as there 
is less theory to test. 
Convenience sampling using the researcher’s network of high quality research 
vehicles. Whilst convenience sampling is applied, six organisations from a variety 
of industries, and with a mix of entrepreneurial environments (polar opposites of 
the entrepreneurial spectrum) are researched. 
 
Semi-structured interviews.  
Within the semi-structured interviews, a balance between constraining openness 
and enhancing ability of case comparison should be applied. Not all the questions 
have to be used to enable flexibility of questioning to reflect responses from the 
interviewee (including follow up questions in order to probe and build upon 
responses).  
Preparation time to be given before each interview to compose and focus on the 
intricacies of interviewing taking consideration of the organisational context, and 
reflecting on how to be structuring, clear, gentle, sensitive, open, steering, critical, 
358 
 
remembering, interpreting, balanced, and ethically sensitive. The researcher 
should centre attention on these facets as a means to face the inherent 
challenges within the interview process.  
Questions to be drafted, peer reviewed, and test answered by the researcher, 
before being accepted. More questions were prepared than could be answered 
with the aim of offering some flexibility to theme enquiry. Questions are available 
as appendix 8. A ‘spine’ of reference to the principle themes of the research to 
be maintained. 12 interviews per organisation to take place, for around 1 hour. 
Liaising with the organisational coordinator, pre-arrange individual interview and 
interviewees to include 2 Senior Managers, 4 Middle Managers, 6 Staff from a 
mix of departments from R&D and Sales through to HR and Accounts, to ensure 
a wide mix of data. Questions to centre on the core themes from the conceptual 
framework. 
Interviews to be recorded, transcribed, and imported to NVIVO software for 
coding. Codes that match the themes (used for questioning and in alignment with 
literature review) to be created and sub codes that emerge from responses. On 
completion of coding, findings to be analysed in detail by code and sub code at 
individual organisational level across the cases. Each case to be written up 
independently before cross case analysis pursue combined themes. In order to 
manage the detail, a summary spreadsheet was prepared to offer a structured 
holistic overview of the data for each organisation. 
 
Quantitative research 
Corporate entrepreneurship audit by Burns (2013) to be utilised: self-assessment 
survey of 100 questions relating to facets that may support entrepreneurial 
activity under four headings: Leadership, culture, strategy, structure. 
Respondents score 0-6,   0 = not true, 6 = very true.  
Up to 20 respondents per company (Ratio of 2 Senior Managers, 3 Middle 
Managers, 5 Staff) assisted by organisational coordinator (agreed with 
organisation MD/CEO). 
Survey uploaded to ‘Lime survey’, where respondents completed the audit in one 
sitting, on line, at their place of work. All responses were anonymous, voluntary 
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and given over a 3 week period. Data was transferred from LimeSurvey to SPSS 
(Statistical Package for the Social Sciences) software for analysis. Analysis 
should centre on each architecture response focusing on the minimum, 
maximum, mean, and percentage scores, as well as producing a cluster analysis 
and a frequency table. Additionally, the mean score should be established for 
each statement within each architecture, and then averaged to provide an overall 
score.  
Results to be used only as indicative data as they represent low level statistical 
significance. 
Research to be used to gain initial understanding of the nature of the 
organisation, and support qualitative data on the entrepreneurial environment. 
 
Ethics 
In consideration of the ethics related to this research, reference to the principles 
and expectations for ethical research demanded by the Economic and Social 
Research Council (ESRC) to be adhered. Specifically the “ESRC Framework for 
research ethics - Updated January 2015” is to be used as a form of reference, 
reflection and compliance (ESRC, 2015). 
Research to be carefully designed to ensure recognised standards of integrity, 
objectivity, and quality. Potential risk of harm to participants and researchers is 
to be mitigated by reflection, planning and action throughout the process.  
An overview of the research project highlights the potential psychological risk 
related to the research subject of organisational failure. Fear of failure, 
association with failure, and the revisiting of negative emotions due to failure were 
identified as a potential reason why individuals may not wish to participate or 
withdraw from the research. The issue is to be made clear and assurances to be 
given before each interview that participants can withdraw at any stage.  
At each stage of the research process thought and action is to be given to 
research participants. At the earliest stages of contact with participating 
organisations, assurances are to made in writing as to the ethical framework to 
be used, that being the “ESRC Framework for research ethics”. Within the written 
communication to organisational leads (in the main CEOs) included should be 
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the “six key principles of ethical research”. During discussions with organisational 
coordinators with regard to respondent selection, reference is to be further made 
to ensure voluntary participation, free from undue influence. At the beginning of 
each interview, confirmation is to be taken of their voluntary participation and 
informed consent. 
Throughout the interview the rights, dignity and autonomy were respected and 
appropriately protected. As a follow up to the pre-interview written communication 
and to ensure understanding, at the beginning of each interview, interviewees are 
to be given information about the research including the purpose, methods and 
its intended use. Discussion should also centre on what was required from 
themselves, the confidentiality through the qualitative research process and their 
anonymity through the quantitative research process. Permission is to be 
requested for the recording of the interview. Interviewees to be informed that the 
recordings will be anonymously labelled and transcribed. The recordings will only 
be accessible to the researcher and be stored safely for up to 5 years when they 
will be deleted. It should be emphasised that no one in their organisation would 
ever know of the details of their personal contribution. The researcher should 
offer complete transparency to research work protocols at all times throughout 















Appendix 10: Entrepreneurial environment – enhanced review of findings  
 
The Epos Systems Supplier 
 
Findings suggest a number of organisational climates that may be supportive 
to entrepreneurship and give an understanding to the nature of the 
organisation. To enhance the understanding of the environment findings in the 
areas of leadership, strategy, and structure are also represented. 
Culture: 
 
 Innovation  
The organisation is innovative by nature, as the CEO puts it, “I think it 
(innovation) is in our DNA”. The innovative culture shows itself through the 
organisation’s propensity to be constantly prepared to try new things and 
accept failure when it occurs. One of the top scoring statements in the survey 
was ‘the organisation encourages continuous innovation.’ A quasi-formal 
creative process to capture ideas that is known as the “Muppet Show” provides 
a space for corporate entrepreneurs to present their ideas to colleagues and 
the senior team. With this kind of organisational approach, the entrepreneur is 
encouraged to be creative and has the opportunity to develop an initiative. 
 
 Experimentation 
There is significant and wide breadth of evidence that experimentation is 
encouraged and indeed, it is recognised as being part of the culture of the 
business. Experimentation is particularly important to research and 
development where teams are given new technology and asked to play with it 
in order to suggest how the organisation “could blend and adapt that 
technology with our product sets to offer, you know, a rich solution and a richer 





 Client centricity 
The organisation recognises the importance of the customer and has high 
‘client centric’ values, obsessing over client relationships. This focus is driven 
from the top and is recognised and generally shared throughout the business. 
Another top scoring statement in the survey is ‘the voice of the customer is 
important’, 
 Vibrancy / fast pace of change 
There is a vibrant working atmosphere where the pace of change is fast which 
generates positivity and employee engagement across most departments. The 
organisation sees change as normal. 
 Informality and collaboration 
The new premises have made a significant impact on the working environment 
of the organisation. The new space is wide, open, light, and on one level, which 
encourages people from differing sections to engage in casual conversation. 
This supports informality and a collaborative culture. 
 Autonomy 
The culture generally supports work autonomy at most levels of the 
organisation. The COO comments, “I love the fact that Stuart (CEO) created 
that space for me to make that commitment”.  Senior managers allow 
managers significant levels of autonomy and encourage innovative work, 
indeed, individuals are given space to work and are encouraged to use it. 
Autonomy also exists within core functions such as Human Resources.  
 Learning 
The organisation has a well-developed learning culture that supports a number 
of different mechanisms for individuals to learn. A coaching culture centres on 
‘one to one’, on the job development. Encouragement, practical support and 
advice is used to develop individual thinking when problems or opportunities 
arise; significant tolerance is applied in the coaching process. Additionally 
learning comes about through informal conversations with colleagues that 
occur as part of an individual’s daily work. Coaching is the most common 
method from which individuals can learn. The commitment to learning is 
reinforced by the provision of a dedicated internal training manager. Learning 
is important to the organisation. 
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 Openness and trust 
The family values promote an openness within the organisation. Senior 
managers are approachable and people are able to project their personality. 
Individuals openly offer candid discussion without fear of retribution. There is 
significant evidence of openness and trust within the workforce. With a mind-
set of challenging the norm, individuals in open and informal surroundings 
constantly discuss opportunities with each other on an ad hoc basis. 
 Managed risk-taking 
Risk-taking is prevalent within the senior management team and the core of 
the organisation, which engages in innovative activities. Indeed the 
organisation behaves impulsively at times. However, generally the risks 
inherent within new initiative development are well considered and significant 
effort is applied to manage the risk in order to minimise exposure. 
 Tolerance of failure and low fear of failure 
The organisation generally demonstrates a culture where individuals have a 
low fear of failure. Members of the senior management team are understand 
the personal implications of failure that are minimised by the organisations 
tolerance of failure in development spaces. In the R&D departments constant 





 Informal, non-hierarchal, friendly and approachable 
Senior management have an informal demeanour and are approachable, 
friendly and supportive in the main, reflecting the family values of the 
organisational culture. One of the most supported survey statements was 
‘Senior managers are accessible and approachable’ 
 Leadership based on trust and clear principles 
There are distinct principles which form the foundation of everything the 




 CEO and COO driving force 
There is a significant driving force within organisation which comes from the 
founder (and CEO) and the COO.  
 Innovation focused 
The COO is visionary in approach and highly focused on driving innovation as 
he talks of “looking into the future with a view to redefining the product in its 
totality with a view to finding the ‘perfect solution’”. The CEO suggests that the 
COO, “has a vision, boom, and he’ll go ahead and he’ll want to do it.” In this 
respect, the senior team lead by example.  
 Strongly based on a clear and guiding ‘vision’ 
They have put forward a challenging and evocative vision that has caught the 
imagination and engagement of the employees. The survey statements that 
was most supported was ‘there is a clear vision for the organisation’. The 
senior management team leads from the front with a strong entrepreneurial 
vision. 
 Dynamic and passionate 
The COO offers a charismatic persona that draws much support. The vision 
and the senior leaders combined provides strong direction for the organisation. 
 Highly supportive of entrepreneurial activity and opportunity focused 
The CEO and COO lead the innovation and entrepreneurship processes from 
the front. They are constantly looking for opportunities, whether that is through 
innovation or market exploitation. 
Essentially leadership is proactive, dynamic, passionate, and leaders are 
prepared to take risks when driving the front end of the entrepreneurial 
process. Significant also, is that within many of the departments in the 
company there is a more distributive approach to leadership, where individuals 
lead with ideas and create teams to support and actualise these initiatives. 








 Encased in a strong ‘vision’ 
The organisational vision is an important tool and at the core of strategy. A 
strong mental protocol ensures that there is alignment between the initiative 
and the organisations vision. “Well, we have our vision. So we’ve got our vision 
and we want things to fit into that vision, and if they fit into that vision then 
they’re a goer, and if they’re not, then we’ll stand back.” (CEO). 
 Partly formal and structured 
Organisational strategy is partly generated through a formal mechanism. The 
formal strategy process engages the senior team for two days of discussion 
away from the business where the existing strategy and vision is reviewed to 
ensure it is relevant and accurate. 
 Largely emergent and centred on opportunity seeking actions, 
sometimes impulsive and often instigated by external sources 
(suppliers/customers) 
Reflecting the opportunity seeking nature of the senior team, strategy is often 
emergent and the preferred method of strategising. Opportunities create an 
emerging strategy and come from differing locations. External stimulation, 
such as supplier meetings, can deliver instinctive responses and new 
directions for the organisation. Similarly, meetings with clients can lead to ad 
hoc strategy development. Additionally, the CEO spends considerable time 
researching the world market on line, through networking, and by traveling to 
tradeshows in the U.S.A. He prides himself on knowing the market, which the 
organisation operates in, and constantly seeks out opportunities that may be 
suitable for the company, and which reflect world market realities 
 Considered with a long term approach 
Strategy is significantly influenced by the fact that the organisation is family 
owned and prefers taking a long-term approach to decision making. 




In essence, the organisation has a strong strategic approach, all be it mainly 
driven from the senior team. As the survey and the interview findings suggest 




 Non hierarchal  
The organisation operates a management structure with three layers that 
allows quick decision-making: “if we’re making a decision, we’ll make it quickly, 
so we’re not stuck in 47 layers, you have to get sign-off from 19 people – we 
don’t have any of that” (CEO). Generally, structures encourage delegated 
decision making. 
 Open 
Physical open space and open communication streams across the 
departments, and up and down the organisation, supported by significant 
psychological safety, enable open communication. 
 Collaborative 
The organisation is divided into functional departments however, there is 
significant collaboration outside of departments.  
 Unstructured and informal 
Meetings are generally ad hoc and informal rather than following a pattern of 
structure and regularity. The fluid structures support agility, flexibility and the 
ability to move fast on an entrepreneurial opportunity. 
 Flexible to the needs of the individual initiative 
Project teams are created based on the needs of the initiative and individuals 
move from project to project, as the Production Assistant puts it, “there’s a lot 
of inter-departmental moving….progressing into different teams because of 






Summary of the findings relating to the entrepreneurial environment:  
 
Epos supplier entrepreneurial environment summary  




  Innovation 
 Experimentation 
 Client centricity 
 Vibrancy / fast pace of change 
 Informality and collaboration 
 Autonomy 
 Learning 
 Openness and trust 
 Managed risk-taking 
 Tolerance of failure and low fear of failure 
 
Leadership   Informal, non-hierarchal, friendly and approachable 
 Leadership based on trust and clear principles 
 CEO and COO driving force 
 Innovation focused 
 Strongly based on a clear and guiding ‘vision’ 
 Dynamic and passionate 
 Highly supportive of entrepreneurial activity and 
opportunity focused 
 
Strategy   Encased in a strong ‘vision’ 
 Partly formal and structured 
 Largely emergent and centred on opportunity seeking 
actions, sometimes impulsive and often instigated by 
external sources (suppliers/customers) 
 Considered with a long term approach 
 
Structure   Non hierarchal  
 Open 
 Collaborative 
 Unstructured and informal 




The Processed juice supplier 
 
Findings suggest a number of organisational climates that may be supportive 
to entrepreneurship and give an understanding to the nature of the 
organisation. To enhance the understanding of the environment findings in the 







 Opportunity seeking and impulsive 
The organisation has a culture that is heavily influenced by the founder and 
current chairman. As a start-up entrepreneur, his mindset is constantly 
centred on opportunity seeking activity. This passionate and direct influence 
is recognised across the organisation.  
 Innovation 
The organisation perceives that there are many opportunities in its sector and 
encourages entrepreneurial activity. Entrepreneurs are encouraged to put 
forward ideas at every level and these ideas are positively received. The 
organisation, therefore, has constant and continuous flow of entrepreneurial 
initiatives. Ideas also emerge from scheduled meetings across the calendar 
year. Differing fruits are, by their very nature, available at different times of the 
year and findings suggest that the seasonality of the business acts as a foil 
for innovation. 
 Client centric 
Distinct in the culture of the organisation is the customer centricity of its 
approach. There is a high level of importance placed on the customer 
relationship. Customers engage in co-creation of product which also develops 
the long term nature of the relationship. The customer centric nature of the 
organisation is highly prominent. 
 Family values 
The culture reflects close warm family values where management look after 
the employees in a more considerate way as if they were part of the family. 
Looking after staff is important. There is significant loyalty to the founder and 
his family and those senior team members who joined in the early years of the 
organisation. As the company has expanded, it has largely maintained a 




 Informality and collaboration 
By nature the organisation is informal with a low level of structure. Staff are 
generally at ease and open discussion is constant. Idea generation occurs at 
an individual level but more often within the group setting as ideas are often 
generated informally by team discussion in their pods (team desks are 
arranged together) on a day-by-day basis. Collaboration is instinctive. 
 Autonomy 
The nature of the organisation is earthed in entrepreneurship and fluidity 
where bureaucracy is minimal. Individuals largely experience autonomy within 
their job roles offering significant freedom to explore and develop initiatives. 
 Learning  
The organisation positively supports personal and team learning. Learning 
occurs in a mix of structured and unstructured, formal and informal channels. 
The strong learning paradigm promotes learning through experimentation and 
there is open encouragement of learning by doing and learning from others.. 
 Openness & trust 
The organisation offers open channels of communication that are supported 
by an open office layout and by the approach of management. Open 
communication transcends departments and management levels and a high 
level of transparency exists. Generally, mistakes are not hidden and this in 
part reflects the trust in the response from the senior team. The openness of 
the organisation to ideas makes it a natural and comfortable environment in 
which to develop products.  
 Risk taking 
The culture is inclusive of norms relating to risk-taking. Within boundaries risk-
taking is encouraged by the organisation, however, management of any risk is 
a priority and a norm. Within the sub cultures of the organisation, some are 
more, or less, risk averse depending on the nature of work. 
 Tolerance of failure and low fear of failure 
Generally, there is little evidence of fear of failure by people and teams. 
Individuals are not fearful of negative repercussions from the organisation as 
management view intelligent failure as part of the entrepreneurial process. 
There is no blame: “I think people can take a little bit of time to actually get 
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used to the fact that there isn’t going to be a blame placed on you” (Financial 
Controller). Tolerance of failure is based on the premise that individuals are 
learning from the experience. The nature of the organisation is such that 




 Entrepreneurial mindset 
The entrepreneurial nature of the organisation is due in a large part to the 
leadership of the founder and chairman who has a significant influence on the 
organisation. He leads an entrepreneurial culture and, with the newly formed 
senior team, they lead with an entrepreneurial paradigm. 
 Leadership by example 
The founder’s influence on the culture is important as value sets are closely 
aligned to his entrepreneurial paradigm. As the leader of a much larger 
organisation today, many of these values continue to be promoted 
passionately. With these strong natural beliefs, he leads the organisation 
forward challenging the status quo and constantly looking to develop the 
business. 
 Supports individual entrepreneurial activity 
Individual idea generation is supported by an advanced openness to senior 
managers and resources who are highly approachable. Leadership champion 
and support initiatives with practical advice, allocation of specific resources, 
and encouragement. 
 Close working relationships with staff 
The leaders communicate openly with the organisation and are open to 
individual communication at all levels that creates significant engagement with 
team members. Staff are free to knock on managers doors and discuss what 
is on their mind. Leaders generally have a close connection to employees 
offering few barriers to communication. The statements in the survey that were 
supported the most were ‘senior managers are accessible and approachable’, 
‘senior managers listen’, ‘senior managers have good relationship with staff’, 
and ‘senior managers work as a team’. 
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 Strong team ethos 
The Managing Director offers strong overall leadership operating a teamwork 
ethos: “I don’t like it the fact that people say they work for me.  As far as I’m 
concerned they work with me to give an end result.” 
 On occasion can overpower organisation 
The passion and entrepreneurial mind-set of the Founder and Chairman 
affects the organisation both positively and negatively. With a high need for 
achievement, he personally drives the business forward with a constant flow 
of differing ideas; however, this can also cause significant operational 




 Highly emergent 
Evidence suggests that entrepreneurship is at the centre of the organisation’s 
long and short-term strategy; however, this is not something that is 
communicated. Entrepreneurship and strategy are entwined and the two exist 
together and are accepted as such. Whilst the company recognises the need 
to adjust to its growth and increase in size, entrepreneurship remains the core 
approach to the future and an emerging strategy. 
 Predominantly unstructured 
Essentially, the strategy process is unstructured and mainly emergent based 
on the development of initiatives as they arise. However, ideas are managed 
to ensure they sit within the overall framework of the concentrate juice sector. 
 Mainly short term focus and dependant on the next venture, 
however, long term goals drive a vision 
The organisation mainly visualises strategy in the short term over the long 
term, but has a long-term ambition to be doubling turnover and has recruited 
a senior team accordingly. 
Structure 
 Low levels of structure - non hierarchal management structure 
The organisation has low levels of structure in terms of management hierarchy 
and the way in which it organises itself. Communication channels are largely 
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unstructured. Meetings are few and ongoing discussion in a collaborative 
fashion is the norm.  
 Predominantly informal structures 
Whilst the company has a management structure, the structure is shallow and 
relatively informal by nature, which means that generally, communication flows 
are unimpeded through the soft hierarchy. 
 Open communication channels 
Communication structures are open and largely informal across the 
organisation. 
 Increasing level of structure as the organisation grows 
Whilst the organisation is largely unstructured, it is going through a period of 
change as it recognises the need for structure to be brought about by the 
increasing size of the company. These changes are deemed as necessary for 
the future success of the company. 
 Flexible and adaptable 
 
Generally, however, structures within the organisation are flexible, adaptable 















Summary of the findings relating to the entrepreneurial environment  
 








  Opportunity seeking and impulsive 
 Innovation 
 Client centric 
 Family values 
 Informality and collaboration 
 Autonomy 
 Learning 
 Openness & trust 
 Risk taking 
 Tolerance of failure and low fear of failure 
 
Leadership   Entrepreneurial mindset 
 Leadership by example 
 Supports individual entrepreneurial activity 
 Close working relationships with staff 
 Strong team ethos 
 On occasion can overpower organisation 
 
Strategy   Highly emergent 
 Predominantly unstructured 
 Mainly short term focus and dependant on the next 
venture, however, long term goals drive a vision 
 
Structure   Low levels of structure - non hierarchal management 
structure 
 Predominantly informal structures 
 Open communication channels 
 Increasing level of structure as the organisation 
grows 








Public House Operator 
 
Findings suggest a number of organisational climates that may be supportive 
to entrepreneurship and give an understanding to the nature of the 
organisation. To enhance the understanding of the environment findings in the 
areas of leadership, strategy, and structure are also represented. 
Culture 
 
 Family values 
The overarching culture relates to the family ownership of the organisation. 
Whilst the business has been established for over 238 years and has grown 
into a sizeable operation, the family values remain strong and draws significant 
loyalty from across most areas of the business. Whilst the family values may 
overarch the organisation, there are differing sub cultures in the two divisions 
within the study: Head Office and the branches (public houses). 
 Entrepreneurship (with some innovation) 
Experimentation is encouraged and engaged with in the central functions of 
Head Office. There is significant trialling of new ideas at the company level, 
whether it be a new approach to the way business partnerships are managed, 
or a new ‘cluster’ management approach to replace a departing Regional 
Manager. New public house concepts are constantly being tested as 
experimentation is deemed important 
 Mostly informal 
Whilst the organisation has a more traditional feel about it (based on its family 
history), informality is evident in most areas of the business. Whilst it would be 
inaccurate to suggest that the organisation is a relaxed, highly innovative, and 







 Client centric 
There is a heavy focus on the customer and the customer experience. This 
was emphasised across the organisation. The top scoring statement in the 
survey was, ‘the voice of the customer is important’. 
 Autonomy 
An important part of the culture is the freedom for individuals to carry out their 
work. There is evidence of higher levels of autonomy in Head Office and lower 
levels within the branches. The levels of autonomy allow the time and space 
for entrepreneurial thought and action. 
 Often collaborative 
The openness encourages collaboration and working parties are common. The 
collaborative approach means change to products are made early, quickly and 
there is a level of team ownership. Separate to any individual role, ideas flow 
from across the functions and many of the entrepreneurial initiatives arise from 
collaboration. The organisation encourages team working. 
 Moderate levels of  bureaucracy 
The branches are driven by targets, especially sales targets, where they are 
focused on beating last year’s numbers and budget. With energy and 
emphasis on the processes that lead to sales there is less time and resource 
available for entrepreneurship. Managers are given specific operational 
guidelines or as the GM of location T puts it, “it’s almost like an ABC guide as 
to how to run your day”. In this entrepreneurially restricted space, there was 
evidence of individuals using their own time to progress an entrepreneurial 
initiative. 
 Moderate hierarchal approach 
There is evidence of some hierarchy based on culture that is affected by its 
substantial history. Therefore, whilst a modern approach to organisational 
management exists, it resides within a backdrop of traditional influences, which 






There is a strong learning culture throughout the organisation and this is very 
much an aim of the CEO, “We’re trying to create a real culture of learning and 
development.” Training and development comes in the form of a wide montage 
of formal and informal learning activities.  
 Openness & trust 
The culture encompasses a significant amount of trust and openness that 
comes from the very top of the organisation. As a priority for the CEO, the 
current leadership training programme centres on developing the values of 
trust and openness to further enhance the aims of the business. 
 Managed risk taking 
The culture is supportive of risk taking albeit in a controlled manner. Again, this 
emanates from the top of the organisation; “I think one of my particular skills is 
risk management……so I feel very comfortable with analysing risk and 
mitigating it…..I just think there are ways that you can get 90% of the 
opportunity whilst mitigating some of those risks”(CEO). Significantly, risk in 
the centre is minimised by placing significant emphasis on the early stages of 
the entrepreneurial process. 
 Tolerance of failure and low fear of failure 
Across the organisation, there is little evidence of a fear of failure in the context 
of entrepreneurial activity. In the centre and in the branches consistent 
interview response detailed that there was no fear of failure. The lack of fear 
of failure is preeminent. This culture is promoted from the top where the CEO 
talks of team responsibility over individual responsibility. There is no evidence 
of a blame culture in the centre or in the branches where the environment is 
supportive of the individual. 
Leadership 
 
 Non hierarchal approach 
Whilst there is a strong reporting line within the management structure, there is 
little evidence of a hierarchal approach to leadership of the organisation. 
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 "Custodian” leadership style (CEO) 
The CEO perceives himself as the custodian of the family business and he leads 
with the organisation with this emphasis. 
 Through a strong vision 
The most supported survey statements were ‘the vision  for the organisation is 
clearly communicated’, ‘there is a clear vision for the organisation’, ‘there are 
distinct principles which form the foundation of everything the organisation does’, 
‘There is a clear strategy for achieving the vision’. 
 Visible, open and approachable 
He leads the organisation by being in and amongst it, always visible and 
approachable. He puts emphasis on people first: “There’s a bit that I suppose I 
love most, which is in terms of leading people, leading individuals, and working 
with individuals, for them to really work to their full potential” (CEO).  
 Centred on supporting staff to fulfil their own potential 
The CEO enjoys “creating an environment for exceptional people to excel – as 
simple as that”. With the aim of achieving this goal, the CEO leads the drive 
towards personal fulfilment through the placing emphasis on individual 
development and training within the culture of the organisation. 
 Centred on creating entrepreneurial environment 
Whilst there is a significantly entrepreneurial culture, there is little evidence to 
suggest that he is an entrepreneur himself. Through his leadership he 
demonstrates a clear understanding of the potential of entrepreneurship, and has 
shaped the business to be entrepreneurial. At a senior level the Retail Director 
fronts up innovation and entrepreneurship activity. 
 
Strategy 
 Strong direct approach 
There is evidence of a clear strategic approach towards supporting and 
sustaining entrepreneurship. Strategy focuses on entrepreneurship within the 
central functions and high quality execution of a rigid set of procedures in the 
branches, all-be-it within a set of values that encompass the whole organisation. 
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 Mainly top down 
The strong, direct approach offers a “directive helping people and making sure 
that we have a properly constructed and thought out strategy that everyone can 
work towards and focus towards” (CEO). There is particular emphasis in creating 
an environment supportive of entrepreneurship. 
 Long term approach 
Organisational strategy is considered on a long-term basis, as the short term is 
of less interest. The custodian approach promotes a longer term perspective. 
 Structured and emergent strategy 
Whilst the business is comfortable with encompassing an ‘emerging strategy’ 
approach when strategizing, it also has a formal and traditional approach to 
creating strategy. Significantly, there is a large emphasis put on the ‘vision and 
values’ of the organisation which also creates a longer term focus.  
 Vison and values align both emergent and structured strategy 
The vision and values are communicated extensively throughout the organisation 
and were referred to regularly at all levels by the interviewees. The prominent 




 Traditional management structure (softened by management 
approach) 
 
There is evidence of a traditional reporting management structure within the 
organisation; however, the structure is reduced by the open nature of the 
organisation.  
 Cross functional collaboration mainly at HO 
Within the Head Office, an open environment promotes teamwork and cross 
function collaboration where emphasis rests on teamwork, individual support 
and flexibility of approach. In the branches there is also teamwork, however, 
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there is less flexibility as there is more structure required to implement tight 
operating procedures. These protocols define the customer experience.  
 Open communication structures generally 
Communication structures vary. Whilst both Head Office and the branches 
experience open communication within their own operational space, external 
communication is significantly less open. There is little collaboration between 
Head Office and the branches, as is also the case between one branch and 
another. 
 Branches have significant procedural structure 
Whilst the centre experience less bureaucratic systems, the branches have 
clear and specific procedures to follow, allowing limited interpretations. Tight 
operational processes and standards are important to the organisation’s aim 
to achieve success. 
Essentially, the organisation is shaped to accommodate entrepreneurial 
activity, and to accommodate tight operational procedures as is deemed 



















Summary of the findings relating to the entrepreneurial environment  
 








  Family values 
 Entrepreneurship (with some innovation) 
 Mostly informal 
 Client centric 
 Autonomy 
 Often collaborative 
 Moderate levels of  bureaucracy 
 Moderate hierarchal approach 
 Learning 
 Openness & trust 
 Managed risk taking 
 Tolerance of failure and low fear of failure 
 
Leadership   Non hierarchal approach 
 "Custodian” leadership style (CEO) 
 Through a strong vision 
 Visible, open and approachable 
 Centred on supporting staff to fulfil their own potential 
 Centred on creating entrepreneurial environment 
 
Strategy   Strong direct approach 
 Mainly top down 
 Long term approach 
 Structured and emergent strategy 
 Vison and values align both emergent and structured 
strategy 
 
Structure   Traditional management structure (softened by 
management approach) 
 Cross functional collaboration mainly at HO 
 Open communication structures generally 







The Regional wildlife organisation 
 
 
Findings suggest a number of organisational climates that may be supportive 
to entrepreneurship and give an understanding to the nature of the 
organisation. To enhance the understanding of the environment findings in the 





There is evidence of a culture that is supportive of innovation and 
entrepreneurship generally. A new CEO has been challenging working 
practices and championing a number of areas with the aim of enhancing the 
level of entrepreneurship in the organisation. He has initiated a significant 
change in the working culture towards innovation and entrepreneurship that 
has been well received in the main. 
 Experimental 
There is a positive attitude within the organisation towards experimentation, 
“there is a culture of saying let’s try this” (Communications Officer). Ideas and 
experimentation are encouraged in the search for new income streams. 
 Informal 
Informality and collegiality is evidenced throughout the organisation. 
 Autonomy 
The culture supports significant levels of autonomy and a varying workload 
for the individual, yet it also supports a strong sense of togetherness. 
 Collaboration 
There is significant evidence of collaboration across most levels of the 
organisation that also extends beyond the organisation. High levels of 
teamwork are demonstrated within a positive atmosphere where people work 
together in an environment of trust. 
 Moderate levels of  bureaucracy 
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There is evidence also that the organisation is target driven and whilst some 
people see this as restrictive, for others they are guides to achievement which 
when not achieved, will not bring heavy sanctions. The centre has a process 
lead approach to managing operations. 
 Low hierarchy 
The emphasis on hierarchy is low. The organisation operate within a high 
values paradigm and there is shared approach to working and managing. The 
organisations status as a charity affects the culture and the approach taken by 
individuals. “A lot of people that work here, work here because they believe in 
what the charity does, so for that reason you can feel confident that people are 
going to give their best, very few people are just here to take home a salary at 
the end of the day” (Communications Officer). 
 Learning culture 
There is evidence of a learning culture that goes beyond formalised training 
where experiential learning is significant. Respondents referred to the ‘learning 
curve’ of taking on some of the sizeable projects. Internally individuals learn 
from each other and, externally, collaboration with other agencies provides a 
format for learning. There is also a supportive approach to formal training.  
 
 Openness & trust 
The organisation operates within an open environment where trust is very 
evident. Management and staff freely interact on most matters leading to a 
safe environment for individuals’ to engage. 
 
 Risk taking 
With this increased propensity to be innovative, there is evidence of a culture 
that is bolder and less risk averse: more ambitious. The CEO has instigated a 
number of projects with significant risk (of which two are large in scale). The 
approach to risk taking is replicated across the entrepreneurial departments of 
the organisation.  
 Tolerance of failure and low fear of failure 
In the main, there was very little evidence of fear of failure. There is no 
evidence of blaming or dressing down: it is a safe place to fail. Generally, there 
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is a tolerance of intelligent failure. The Trustees of the organisation also share 




 Leadership with an entrepreneurial mindset 
 
The current CEO is pivotal in the transformation of the charity to becoming a 
entrepreneurial organisation: “I think we have an entrepreneurial spirit at the 
head. I think the Chief Executive is very entrepreneurial and that’s very 
inspiring. You know, he is very clearly and very openly willing to do new 
exciting stuff; he is a safe pair of hands in that he runs the place very well – I 
think H is great – but I think also he is prepared to do things like S (project), 
which is huge, and, you know, has clearly got a risk of skewing the organisation 
and everyone’s aware of it and so we work with it” (NIA Project Manager.) 
 Values driven 
His disposition is more centred on new projects and shaping the values, and 
the vision of the organisation.  
 Through a strong vision 
Leadership puts forward a strong and defining vision for the organisation. 
 Encourages experimentation 
Corporate entrepreneurs are supported by a management approach that 
actively and openly encourages experimentation. “We would absolutely 
encourage you to have a go at it. And there is a tolerance and a supportive 
nature – I can’t emphasise how supportive it is, in terms of the individual. 
There’s no ‘big stick’. Nothing like that. We would offer, ‘is there anything we 
can do?’” (Commercial Director). The energy towards experimenting is also 
shared by some of the external clients creating an opportunity for significant 
collaborative innovation. 
 Visible, open and approachable and non hierarchal 
In the main leadership is open and engaging, and ignores organisational 
hierarchy. However, there was evidence that communication can be ‘top down’ 
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in some instances. There is significant support from leadership who are 
comfortable sharing success and taking personal responsibility for team 
failure. 
 Leadership by example 
Entrepreneurial behaviour is fully encouraged, verbally and in action with 




 The organisational vision and values provide strong and clear direction 
Within the organisation, there is less focus on structured corporate strategy 
and more on the vision and the values. The strength of the vision draws 
significant support and allows space for individuals and teams to move the 
organisation forward. 
 Predominantly emergent strategy as opportunities arise 
Whilst there is some structured strategy formulated at Board level, most 
forward direction emerges as opportunities arise. The emergent strategy 
always has to be in line with the vision. However, separate to that caveat, the 
organisation is flexible to change and keen to take advantage of new 
directions.  
 Long and short term approach  
Whilst reactive to emerging propositions as they occur, a long-term approach 




In the main, the organisation has informal structures that reflect its 
entrepreneurial nature. Project teams vary and collaboration across 
departments is constant. 
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 Structures to monitor and manage risk 
However, there is a significant amount of processes within the centre to 
enhance operational efficiency and manage risk. Projects are more likely to 
have defined parameters and goals. 
 Shallow management structure 
The management structure has three layers, which creates a shallow non-
hierarchal platform for the organisation to operate. 
 Open communication channels 
Communication channels are designed to be open to encourage flow of 
information up and down and across functions within the organisation. 
 Matrix structure engaged in project (field) work 
In the project delivery end of the organisation there is a matrix structure 
allowing individuals to take core responsibilities but also be pulled into a 
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 Moderate levels of  bureaucracy 
 Low hierarchy 
 Learning culture 
 Openness & trust 
 Risk taking 
 Tolerance of failure and low fear of failure 
 
Leadership   Leadership with an entrepreneurial mindset 
 Values driven 
 Through a strong vision 
 Encourages experimentation 
 Visible, open and approachable and non-hierarchal 
 Charismatic 
 Leadership by example 
 
Strategy   The organisational vision provides strong and clear direction 
 Predominantly emergent as opportunities arise 
 Long and short term approaches 
 
Structure   Informal 
 Structures to monitor and manage risk 
 Shallow management structure 
 Open communication channels 











The Area development agency 
 
 
Findings suggest a number of organisational climates that may be supportive 
to entrepreneurship and give an understanding to the nature of the 
organisation. To enhance the understanding of the environment findings in the 
areas of leadership, strategy, and structure are also represented. 
Culture 
 
 Bureaucratic nature and reduced autonomy for the individual 
The overall culture is predominantly influenced by values that might be 
associated with being a local government organisation (a focus on process, 
procedure, transparency and politics). There is also evidence to suggest that 
the organisation is looking to develop a culture more in line with that of the 
private sector. Autonomy is constrained by the existing protocols, structures 
and volume of workload. 
 Focus is on the process over the client 
The organisation is centred on continuity of existing operations over 
entrepreneurship. “Rather than focusing on the end product and the 
relationship with the client, there is a lot of time spent in the process and 
ultimately it’s not the end product that’s examined or tested or measured” 
(Contracts Manager). Engagement with innovation and entrepreneurship 
largely rests with senior management. The public sector ways, ethics, and 
attitudes are proving hard to change. Whilst there is a wish for a more 
innovative position, the culture is adapting slowly.  
 Hierarchal 
The organisation has a hierarchical culture despite current change activities 
from Senior Management. 
 Quasi informality 
The informal environment promotes some informality, as does management, 
however, the formal verbal protocols of bureaucracy are evident. Informality is 




 Subdued atmosphere in open plan offices 
The working environment is quite transactional with many staff only prepared 
to put in appropriate effort and hours to reflect the amount they are paid. 
 Less open, less trust 
There is a level of openness within the organisation however, openness 
closely relates to organisational transparency rather than at a deeper personal 
level that might promote psychological safety and trust.  
 Less collaboration 
Some collaboration occurs in the open plan offices, which actively facilitates 
the informal sharing of information, mainly by colleagues talking with each 
other. There is freedom to share thoughts and ideas. However, in most areas 
of the organisation there is little evidence of collaboration in idea generation or 
execution. Whilst there are open plan offices, there is little communication 
outside of immediate teams. The atmosphere in the open spaces is subdued. 
With the aim of developing a collaborative approach, management organise a 
compulsory ‘Away Day’ each year.  
 Less learning 
There is evidence of a mix of ways in which learning occurs however, in the 
main, it is more structured than unstructured. Learning and development is 
encouraged and offered, however, it is up to the individual to proactively sign 
up on relevant training courses. Some learning occurs via experience within 
work and from colleagues. However, with less experimenting there is less 
learning. Learning is a function of HR and not a significant part of the overall 
culture. 
 Political 
As the main supply of funds derives from the council, there is evidence of a 
significant level of internal and external politics that influences the way the 
organisation behaves. 
 Low risk taking 
The culture is generally risk averse however; where risk is taken, it is informed 
and considered against the market. The main financial resource being ‘tax 
payer’s money’, there is heightened awareness of managing risk as the 
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organisation is publically accountable and has to offer information openly and 
freely. 
 Slow pace of change 
 The organisation demonstrates signs of being change averse, and when 
change is instigated, the organisation is slow to effect the change. 
 Low failure tolerance and fear of failure 
Fear of failure does exist for some and this is dependent on the department 
and/or the manager. The impact of this fear of failure leads to stemming of the 
flow of ideas for some but not for all. Whilst there is general warmth towards 
the senior team there is significant fear of being on the ‘wrong side’ of important 
individuals 
 Blame culture 
There is evidence of a blame culture where successes are recognised as a 




There is evidence of a hierarchal approach to leadership within the 
organisation. This being the most predominant paradigm, there is also a mix 
of other styles of leadership reflecting a more democratic approach. 
 Vision statement lead 
Management have put forward a clear vision for the organisation that seeks to 
change the way leadership and decision-making happens. The vision includes 
a significant element of  being entrepreneurial. Paradoxically, the vision is ‘top 
– down’ in its creation and communication. 
 Leads 'surface' innovation 
Whilst senior management aspire for the organisation to be innovative, the 
approach is quite shallow. More words are spoken than actions taken 
conducive to innovate workplace. Whilst at times senior management 
generally encourages entrepreneurship, there is no close engagement with the 
development of ideas.  
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 Focus on compliance 
Experimenting is encouraged to a degree however, the workload is prohibitive, 
there is lack of freedom, and more evidently, time is in short supply. Essentially 
leadership is focused on the regularity nature of the organisation and this is 
the dominant focus. 
 Risk averse 
Leadership is generally risk averse and this is reflected in the organisation.  
 Well-liked and respected 
Leadership engage in an open and transparent communication and are 
generally liked and respected. 
 Lack visibility 
However, communication is mainly top down and, generally; the senior team 
are less visible to business. 
 Partial tolerance of failure 
There is a moderate tolerance of failure and failing on a small scale is 
perceived to be acceptable. However, leadership does create a level of fear 




 Structured and formal 
Strategy is essentially ‘top - down’ and driven by a structured process. There 
is a formal process for creating strategy delivered by the senior management 
team. There is little evidence of emergent strategy. 
 Transparent to external stakeholders 
Due to the transparency of the strategical approach to stakeholders and 
external parties, it is rigid by nature. 
 Focused on core compliance operations 
The predominant focus of the strategy relates to the core of its operations, 
which rest within its function of compliance. 
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 However aims towards a new entrepreneurial platform 
 
The strategy of the organisation centres on a gradual movement from local 
government finance to private finance. Within this strategy, there is a focus on 
driving innovation and, whilst this is recognised in the organisation’s vision 
statement, it remains largely separate from most employees working lives. 
Senior management, however, have a more entrepreneurial focus and are 
moving towards the organisational aim.  
 Long and short approach 




 Hierarchal  management structure 
There is a hierarchal management structure within the organisation and 
responsibilities are clearly defined. There is evidence of layers of processes 
and procedures. The level of bureaucracy is quite evident: “The problem with 
this organisation is it is hamstrung by process – procedure.” (Building 
Surveyor). Essentially, the structures are bureaucratic; however, management 
are trying to reduce some of these bureaucratic structures.  
 Clearly defined roles and responsibilities 
There are formal communication structures and there are significant channels 
for informal communication driven by the open plan workspace. However, 
there is no evidence of a structure to support entrepreneurship: “I’m not 
convinced our structure is conducive to creativity, innovation, uniqueness. I 
don’t think it is” (Contracts Manager). 
 Tight processes and heavily target driven 
It takes a long time and significant effort to promote ideas and the bureaucracy 
stifles entrepreneurship. The organisation is heavily reliant on targets to drive 
performance and focus, and therefore, centres on very tight controls of 
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resource. This is demonstrated by the new ‘staff time’ system that means every 
hour of every individual is documented and charged to an activity.  
 Mainly informal communication channels 
Whilst there is evidence of structure in many facets of the organisation, when 
it comes to communication channels, there is little structure and open office 
offers a foil for continuous communication within teams and across functions. 
Summary of the findings relating to the entrepreneurial environment  








  Bureaucratic nature and reduced autonomy for the individual 
 Focus is on the process over the client 
 Hierarchal 
 Quasi informality 
 Subdued atmosphere in open plan offices 
 Less open, less trust 
 Less collaboration 
 Less learning 
 Political 
 Low risk taking 
 Slow pace of change 
 Low failure tolerance and fear of failure 
 Blame culture 
 
Leadership   Hierarchal 
 Vision statement lead 
 Leads 'surface' innovation 
 Focus on compliance 
 Risk averse 
 Well-liked and respected 
 Lack visibility 
 Partial tolerance of failure 
 
Strategy   Structured and formal 
 Transparent to external stakeholders 
 Focused on core compliance operations 
 However aims towards a new entrepreneurial platform 
 Long and short approach 
 
Structure   Hierarchal  management structure 
 Clearly defined roles and responsibilities 
 Tight processes and heavily target driven 





Area division of government agency 
 
 
Findings suggest a number of organisational climates that may be supportive 
to entrepreneurship and give an understanding to the nature of the 
organisation. To enhance the understanding of the environment findings in the 




 Bureaucratic and conformist 
The culture within the agency centres on bureaucratic values as opposed to 
entrepreneurial values: “One of the things they do get hung up on is process 
and methodology. So the agency gets caught up in the process rather than 
looking at the result and the outcome...…all the jargon says we’re outcome 
driven, but really we’re not” (Scientific Technical Specialist). ‘Consistency’ is 
an important word for management and “therefore the business has quite 
rightly set some procedures and processes within which we need to work” 
(Deputy Regional Director).  
 
 
 More formal than informal 
The organisation is more formal than informal by nature. Whilst there is friendly 
and positive working environment, with the bureaucratic structures bring a 
level of formality. This is reinforced by the hierarchal management structure.    
 Limited autonomy 
For most people there is limited autonomy in their job roles; however, this was 
not the case in all areas. Some roles allow for some discretion and autonomy, 





With the advanced levels of structure comes a rigidity within the organisation, 
which leads to reduced flexibility. 
 Hierarchal 
The organisational culture is hierarchal: “National talk to Region; Region talk 
to Area; very rarely did area talk to National. You always had to go up and 
down the chain” (PA to the Area Manager). The hierarchy and 
institutionalisation is evidenced by the heavy use of jargon by individuals, 
reaching such a high level that the organisation launched a scheme to 
specifically reduce jargon and promote plain English. 
 Resistant to change 
There is a significant level of evidence indicating a general resistance to 
change. This is a prominent part of the overall culture. Many organisational 
members are comfortable just carrying out their prescribed work, which is core 
to the operation. 
 Highly political 
Individuals articulated the political nature of the organisation and the problems 
for idea development that arise. The organisational environment is affected by 
internal and external politics. 
 Limited openness/trust/collaboration 
Findings suggest that there is a level of openness within some teams but, in 
line with the hierarchal nature of the organisation, this is somewhat restricted 
in the main. Generally, there is little collaboration within the organisation. 
Indeed, some of the functions are “very insulated” (Analyst, Evidence Team).  
 Risk averse 
The agency is predominantly risk averse. The organisation is part of a 
government department that has to ensure the delivery of their core activities 
efficiently and effectively. There is little room to manoeuvre and therefore 





Learning is a not a prominent part of the culture of the organisation. The 
emphasis of learning is centred on training individuals to be able to effectively 
carry out their role. Whilst there is learning that occurs during the organisation’s 
normal activities, it is at a less in-depth level as the lack of experimentation 
restricts new learning. 
 Slow pace of change 
As the organisation prefers to plan activities extensively leaving little to chance, 
the pace of change is slow. Indeed, a constant theme from the interviews 
related to the very aged technology used within the organisation. 
 Blame culture 
Whilst senior management do not believe there is a blame culture, evidence 
further down the management structure suggests otherwise. If initiatives go 
wrong then the blame is attached to an individual as opposed to the team 
taking ownership of the outcome. However, there is another perspective that 
suggests blaming is avoided because the organisation is very conscious of 
bullying, harassment, and dignity of work. In this way, there is a “no blame 
culture” (PA to the Area Manager). 
 Low tolerance of failure and fear of failure 
Evidence suggests that there is a fear of failure that is widespread across the 
organisation. Whilst there is evidence that failure is acceptable in some 
circumstances it is not built into the culture: “….intelligent failure, whether 
they’re intelligent or not, the word failure is still in there, and some people will 
only see that bit of… those two words” (ABPPBP). Fear of failure can affect an 
individual’s: 
 Personal reputation 
 Personal capability 
 Job security 
 Draw ridicule from colleagues  
Essentially, the tolerance of failure is limited within the organisation and the 
concept of intelligent failure is not promoted. However, depending on the job 
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role and/or position in the management hierarchy, there are some areas of the 
business where there is less, or no fear of failure, but this is not the norm.  
The least supported survey statements are ‘the organisation encourages 
entrepreneurial risk taking’, ‘there is time for learning and innovation’, ‘the 
organisation encourages experimentation’, and ‘the organisation encourages 





Leadership is centred within a management system that is hierarchal by 
nature. The Deputy Regional Director articulates that the organisation is in a 
situation where they are “working within the envelope of what we’re required 
to deliver by the government and by our sponsoring department, as well as 
then constraining that further through the policies and procedures and 
processes that we put in place.” 
 Focuses on continuity and compliance 
Leadership centres on continuity over discontinuity and thus leadership 
focuses on the disciplines and practices supporting operations, processes and 
procedures. 
 Entrepreneurship is a minor activity 
Corporate entrepreneurship is not a priority for leadership, even though their 
senior management would like to explore new ideas and can see value in doing 
so. Essentially, many initiatives never gain the relevant exposure and 
entrepreneurs give up putting ideas forward. Leadership does not actively 
strive for an entrepreneurial culture.  
 Can be a block to idea generation 
Indeed, there is frustration that leaders may on occasion encourage 
entrepreneurial activities but actually form the administrative block to idea 
progression. As the Team Leader, T (at location B) puts it “people used to say 
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‘I wish I could do that’ and he (the line manager) always said ‘well what’s 
stopping you?’ And of course everybody used to want to say ‘well you, 
actually’”. 
 Professional, approachable, friendly, and inclusive 
Leaders are generally approachable, friendly and inclusive in discussion on 
topics within their activity domain. 
 Inflexible 
However, the rigidity of the bureaucracy means they can offer less flexibility 
and support than perhaps they might like. 
In essence. leadership centres on highly efficient compliance of existing 




 Mainly structured, but some emergent strategy 
Strategy is a structured process and is driven by the government and, at a 
local level, by the senior team. Essentially, it is a ‘top down’ exercise. 
However, the strategy can be affected by significant external factors that 
cannot be planned. This can create some emerging strategy. Nevertheless, 
strategy generally is not a free flowing and emergent practice.  
 Encased in a strong organisational vision 
Significantly, strategy is heavily influenced by the vision of the agency, which 
forms the values and bedrock of future planning. 
 Long term approach 
The organisational strategy centres on delivering its core responsibilities set 
out by the government and takes a long-term approach. 
 Centred on compliance and operations, efficiencies and effectiveness 
In order to deliver a closely defined target on a consistent basis, organisational 
strategy principally focuses on operational efficiencies and effectiveness. 
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Focused on delivery of a strict criterion, there is little evidence of innovation 
or entrepreneurship being part of that strategy. However, at a local level 
leadership does discretely encourage new idea creation and acknowledge it 
as important in the future plans and development of the business.  
Structure 
 
 Hierarchal management structure  
The organisation has a hierarchal management structure with extensive and 
specific job roles and responsibilities.  
 Large volume of prescriptive policies and procedures 
The organisation has a detailed operational structure including a large volume 
of policies and procedures that are prescriptive.  
 High levels of operational structure 
The organisation is bureaucratic by nature and the structure is supportive of 
detail, consistency, and compliance. It is much less supportive of 
entrepreneurial activities. 
 Predominantly structured internal communication systems 
Communication structures are both formal and informal. There is a significant 
number of formal communication structures which are regular, inclusive and 
thorough: “The area manager has a monthly meeting with all of his manager 
level and business partners, the managers would have a meeting which 
includes all the team leaders, the team leaders would meet with their team and 
sometimes the area manager would join it, sometimes the local manager 
would join in. So there are regular meetings” (PA to the Area Manager). 
Informal communication occurs within their teams in their natural workspaces 
on an ad hoc basis and on an ongoing basis. 
 Informal communications within 'specialist' departments 
Additionally, an informal communication network forms around the 
specialisms, or ‘business units’ in the organisation. These ‘communities of 




Summary of the findings relating to the entrepreneurial environment  
 
Area division of a government agency entrepreneurial environment 
summary 
   





  Bureaucratic and conformist 
 More formal than informal 
 Limited autonomy 
 Inflexibility 
 Hierarchal 
 Resistant to change 
 Highly political 
 Limited openness/trust/collaboration 
 Risk averse 
 Non-experimental 
 Slow pace of change 
 Blame culture 
 Low tolerance of failure and fear of failure 
 
Leadership   Hierarchal 
 Focuses on continuity and compliance 
 Entrepreneurship is a minor activity 
 Can be a block to idea generation 
 Professional, approachable, friendly, and inclusive 
 Inflexible 
 
Strategy   Mainly structured, but some emergent strategy 
 Encased in a strong organisational vision 
 Long term approach 
 Centred on compliance and operations, efficiencies and 
effectiveness 
 
Structure   Hierarchal management structure  
 Large volume of prescriptive policies and procedures 
 High levels of operational structure 
 Predominantly structured internal communication systems 






















Appendix 11: Managing Intelligent Failure Summary: Cross Case Matrix
Organisation Epos Systems Supplier Processed Juice Supplier Public House Operator
Managing  Intelligent 
Failure
Significance of managing intelligent failure (MIF)Not prevalent (in formal sense) or a priority Not prevalent (in formal sense) or a priority Not prevalent (in formal sense) or a priority
Recognition of intelligent failure By support functions By production dept. By the branches
Non recognition of intelligent failure Project drift and focus is on moving on to the Focus on making it work in the future "didn't work but possibly could", not working is
next initiative just stage in an entrepreneurial process that leads
to success
Identifying failure Low level; customers principally but also Customer feedback, supplier feedback, continuous MIS system, customer feedback, experience and
software, sales & profit numbers. "picking up messages", email chatter, informal feel, ongoing general discussion
discussion, ongoing monitoring .
Use of 'failure' word No. Instead: "It didn't work let's move on" No. No. 
Analysing Failure Little analysis, very informal, can include the Informal meetings and discussion and mainly Little analysis, generally informal accept 
customer, little documentation   on an ad hoc basis. Or very informal 'down quarterly review where qual and quant findings
the pub' . One formal SMT monthly meeting explored
Unstructured after action reviews with very little
documentation.
Structure Unstructured and informal Unstructured and informal Unstructured and informal
Learning from failure Yes Yes Yes (the branches would say 'no'!)
Deep learning from failure Senior Team No ST only
Cross dept. learning from failure No Some No
Personal reflection/learning Yes Yes Yes
Managing the after action review "Shouty" and "non shouty" versions Casual and ad hoc unstructured and unfocused
Communications of lessons learnt No structure - ad hoc and informal Informal, ad hoc,  with team and other depts. No structure - ad hoc and informal
Emotional management Little structure, informal friendly 'family' support No (not required -no recognition of failure!) Yes
Localised MIF (at dept level) Yes, differing levels in differing depts. Yes Yes
Challenges to MIF process Time and lack of emphasis Lack of emphasis and structure Lack of emphasis
Entrepreneurial 
Environment
Culture Client Centric Yes (Very) Yes (very) Yes
Innovative nature More 'yes' but some 'no' depending on function Yes Yes (in HO but not branches)
Experimenting More 'yes' but some 'no' depending on function Yes Yes (but 'no' in the branches)
Vibrant working atmosphere Yes Yes  Yes
Family values  Yes Yes Yes
Informality  Yes Yes Yes (but traditional)
Autonomy  Yes  - significant Yes Yes (in HO but not branches)
Collaboration  Yes Yes Yes (in HO but not branches)
Bureaucratic No No (but some in Production) No (but some in the branches)
Hierarchy No No (very un hierarchal) No
Learning Culture  Yes  - very well developed Yes (Strong) Yes (very strong)
Openness  Yes Yes (very) Yes (very)
Trust  Yes Yes (very) Yes (very)
Politics No No No (except between HO and branches)
Risk taking  Yes  - particularly the ST Yes Yes (in HO but not branches)
Pace of change Fast Fast Steady
Impulsive Yes Yes No
Fear of Failure Generally 'No' (also 'Yes' depending on function) No (Strong) No (Strong)
Blame Generally 'No' (also 'Yes' depending on function) No (Strong) No (Strong)
Tolerance of failure Generally 'Yes' (also 'No' depending on function) High High
Leadership Non hierarchal, CEO + COO driving force, Strong entrepreneurial leadership Non hierarchal, "Custodian" approach centring on
leading innovation from the front. creating an environment for self actualisation
Strategy Long term approach encased in clear vision, Short and long term focus on entrepreneurship Long term approach focused on developing 
some formal but principally emergent strategy to deliver emerging strategy environment to support people development  and
centred around opportunity seeking actions, entrepreneurship. Mix of 'emerging' and formal
strategical awareness of culture approaches towards strategising all which sits
within strong emphasis on vision and values.
Structure Moderately flat management structure, Very flat management structure, open informal Moderately flat management structure, open and
wariness of bureaucracy, open unstructured channels of communication. Flexible and less structured in the centre, cross dept.
communication flows, project teams created, adaptable. collaboration. Branches have significant
not target driven, structure in Support depts.  procedural structure and are target driven
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11 Continued…. 
Appendix 11: Managing Intelligent Failure Summary: Cross Case Matrix continued
Organisation Regional Wildlife Organisation Area Development Agency Area Division of Government 
Managing  Intelligent 
Failure
Significance of managing intelligent failure (MIF) Not prevalent (in formal sense) or a priority Low Low
Recognition of intelligent failure By core support functions By building functions By 'Field' teams only
Non recognition of intelligent failure "that didn't work" and then "totally consumed "just move on" + "no such thing as Failure forgotten and org moves on
by the next thing" a failure, there’s just an alternative solution"
Identifying failure Project milestones, continuous monitoring, Informal discussion, regulate ops reviews Very limited or no formal/informal  process,
informal discussion in teams, or 1 to 1 meetings milestones and targets.
Use of 'failure' word No No. Instead: "it didn't work" No. Instead: "it doesn't work"
Analysing Failure Little evidence. Individual and team analysis Very limited - Informal, ad hoc. Limited Very limited and little documentation
informal (no agendas) ad hoc, no fixed process. documentation
Projects - more structured approach
Structure Unstructured and informal Structured and less informal (ex building projects) Structured and  less informal
Learning from failure Yes Limited Limited
Deep learning from failure ST only No No
Cross dept. learning from failure No No No
Personal reflection/learning Yes Yes (main learning) Yes
Managing the after action review Informal + manly ad hoc (projects more structured) No evidence No evidence
Communications of lessons learnt limited, local, informal, ltd documentation Limited + close to individual/team No targeted communication - ad hoc and informal
Emotional management General authentic support No Peer group mainly - informal
Localised MIF (at dept level) Yes Yes Yes
Challenges to MIF process Lack of emphasis Lack of emphasis and processes Time (reduced staffing), lack of emphasis, lack
Entrepreneurial 
Environment
Culture Client Centric Moderately No No
Innovative nature Yes No (but innovation encouraged No (but some ' yes' in the field)
Experimenting Yes No No
Vibrant working atmosphere Yes (calm vibrance!) No No
Family values No No No
Informality Yes No No (but some ' yes' in the field)
Autonomy Yes No No 
Collaboration Yes Mainly No Mainly 'no' but also 'yes'  (dependent on dept.)
Bureaucratic No (some in Support depts.) Yes Yes
Hierarchy Very little Yes Yes
Learning Culture Yes No No
Openness Yes Some No
Trust Yes Some Not mentioned
Politics No Yes Yes
Risk taking Yes No No
Pace of change Quick Very Slow (Org is resistant to change) Very Slow (Org is resistant to change)
Impulsive Yes No No
Fear of Failure No (Strong) Yes Yes (high)
Blame No (Strong) Yes Yes (high) 
Tolerance of failure High Generally No No
Leadership Strong entrepreneurial leadership, creating Hierarchal, enacts 'surface' innovation, risk Very hierarchal, centres on detail, consistency,
environment to promote initiatives. Non hierarchal adverse, focus on compliance, well liked and and compliance. Speak but don't act innovation.
charismatic and very open leadership style. Leads respected Friendly and inclusive.
by example
Strategy More focus on short term and reactive to emerging Short and long term approaches focused on Long term approach focused on effective
opportunities. However strategy for long and short developing private culture and being more compliance; operational effectiveness
term entwined with strong vision and values. entrepreneurial.
Structure Shallow management structure and informal Hierarchal  management structure, heavily target Hierarchal  management structure, detailed 
structures. Open communication channels and driven, lack of structured communication operational structure made up of large volume 
individual autonomy. Matrix structure engaged channels of prescriptive policies and procedures. Very 
engaged in project (field) work. structured internal communication systems,
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